Maltese v. Delta Airlines Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARYANN MALTESE,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, 24-CV-7356 (HG) (LB)

v.

DELTA AIRLINES CORPORATION, TD

BANK REGIONAL NYS, and RACHEL

KOVNER, Judiciary,

Defendants.

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Maryann Maltese filed this fee-paid pro se complaint on September 24, 2024, in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. ECF No. 1 (Complaint).

That court transferred the action to this district, where it was received on October 21, 2024. ECF

No. 12 (Transfer Order); ECF No. 14 (Transfer Receipt Order). Although Plaintiff has paid the

filing fee to commence this case, the Court has nevertheless reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint sua

sponte to assess the merits of her claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kovner as frivolous, and dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the

remaining Defendants as duplicative of claims she is already asserting in another action in this

district.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims against Judge Kovner, Delta Airlines Corporation

(“Delta”), and TD Bank Regional NYS (“TD Bank”). Aside from the claims asserted against

Judge Kovner, the claims in the Complaint mirror almost identically claims Plaintiff previously

raised against Delta Airlines and TD Bank in Maltese v. Delta Airlines Corp., et al., No. 24-cv-

4311. On October 3, 2024, Judge Kovner dismissed that complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. See Maltese v. Delta Airlines

Corp., No. 24-cv-4311, 2024 WL 4389282 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2024). Plaintiff’s time to do so has

not yet expired, but to date, Plaintiff has not availed herself of that opportunity.

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kovner are based on her alleged “failure to grant a

hearing” in “6 dockets” related to Plaintiff’s other claims. ECF No. 1 at 2, 5, 8–10. Plaintiff

attaches to her Complaint documents from prior cases she filed in federal and state courts. Id. at

11–29.

In addition to the previously referenced case against Delta Airlines and TD Bank,

Plaintiff has filed five prior actions in this district. See Maltese v. NYS Legislature, No. 23-cv-

4359 (dismissed Nov. 6, 2023; appeal dismissed Sept. 3, 2024); Maltese v. Brown, No. 23-cv-

4566, Maltese v. Adams, No. 23-cv-4940, and Maltese v. Governor, No. 23-cv-6204 (dismissed

in one order in Maltese v. Governor, No. 23-cv-6204, 2024 WL 3875940 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19,

2024)) (appeals pending); Maltese v. Trader Joes Company, 23-cv-4736 (pending).

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).1 “A claim is plausible ‘when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d

Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations

contained in a complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal

1 Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration

marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted.

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court’s

obligation “to construe a pro se complaint liberally” continues to apply “[e]ven after Twombly”

established the plausibility standard for assessing pleadings. Newsome v. Bogan, 795 F. App’x

72, 72 (2d Cir. 2020).

However, regardless of whether a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court has the

inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous or the

court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp.,

221 F.3d 362, 363–364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts are especially likely to be exposed to

frivolous action, and thus have an even greater need for inherent authority to dismiss such

actions quickly in order to preserve scarce judicial resources.”); see also Jean-Baptiste v.

Westside Donut Huntington Ventures LLC, No 23-826, 2023 WL 8015698, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov.

20, 2023) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of pro se complaint without prior notice to plaintiff

and reiterating that “[a] district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a complaint sua

sponte, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, when it is clear that the claims are

frivolous”). “A complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when it is clear that the defendants are

immune from suit.” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kovner must be dismissed because Judge Kovner is

entitled to judicial immunity. Judges and their supporting personnel have absolute immunity

from suits alleging injuries arising out of judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. See

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (“Like other forms of official immunity, judicial

immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”). “Under the

doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, judges are subject to suit only for (1) non-judicial actions,

i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, or (2) actions, though judicial in nature,

taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Kapsis v. Brandveen, No. 09-cv-1352, 2009

WL 2182609, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009). Indeed, judicial immunity “is not overcome by

allegations of bad faith or malice,” nor can a judge “be deprived of immunity because the action

he took was in error or was in excess of his authority.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13. Here,

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kovner concern only her involvement in presiding over

Plaintiff’s previously-filed cases. See ECF No. 1 at 2, 5, 8–10. Because Judge Kovner was

acting within her judicial capacity, she is immune from suit. Accordingly, the claims against

Judge Kovner are dismissed as frivolous. See, e.g., Tapp v. Champagne, 164 F. App’x 106, 108

(2d Cir. 2006) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of claims against judges protected by judicial

immunity); Kroger v. Richardson, No. 19-cv-9053, 2019 WL 5080008, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,

2019) (sua sponte dismissing as frivolous pro se plaintiffs’ claims against two judges because

“the law is so clear with respect to judicial immunity”).

II. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are almost identical to those asserted in Plaintiff’s

previously-filed case against Delta and TD Bank. See Docket No. 24-cv-4311. That case

remains pending in this district, awaiting Plaintiff’s amended complaint, consistent with Judge

Kovner’s Order on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Maltese v. Delta Airlines Corp., No. 24-

cv-4311, 2024 WL 4389282 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2024).

With the claims against Judge Kovner dismissed, all the remaining claims raised in this

action are currently proceeding in Case No. 24-cv-4311. Accordingly, no useful purpose would

be served by the litigation of this duplicate action, and Plaintiff’s claims in this action against

Delta and TD Bank are dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing those claims in the

litigation pending in Case No. 24-cv-4311. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d

Cir. 2000) (“As part of its general power to administer its docket, a district court may stay or

dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Kovner are dismissed as frivolous, and

Plaintiff’s claims against Delta and TD Bank are dismissed as duplicative, without prejudice to

Plaintiff pursuing her claims in the litigation pending in Case No. 24-cv-4311.

Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this action, the Court certifies pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma

pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 269 U.S. 438,

444–45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with this Order,

close this case, and mail a copy of this Order to the pro se Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Hector Gonzalez

HECTOR GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

October 25, 2024