Bramble v. Hynes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

------------------------------------x

REUBEN BRAMBLE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-5141 (EK)(LB)

-against-

CHARLES H. HYNES, JONATHAN FINK,

JULIE SCHWARTZ, MICHAEL JUVILER, and

LEWIS DOUGLASS1

Defendants.

------------------------------------x

ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Reuben Bramble brought this action against former

King’s County District Attorney Charles Hynes, two former

Assistant District Attorneys in his office, and former Kings

County Supreme Court Justices Michael Juviler and Lewis

Douglass. Bramble is proceeding pro se.2 Retired Justice

Douglass has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); the two former ADAs — Jonathan Fink and

Julie Schwartz — have moved to dismiss for failure to state a

claim.3

1 The complaint misidentifies the defendants as “Mr. Fink, Julie Swartz,

M. Juviler, and L. Douglass.” The Court respectfully directs the Clerk of

Court to amend the official caption of this case to conform to the caption

above.

2 Bramble paid the filing fee and was therefore not subject to Section

1915 review. See ECF No. 2.

3 Justice Juviler passed away in 2017 and his estate has not yet been

served. See ECF No. 14 at 11. Justice Douglass is represented in this

action by the New York State Attorney General’s office, which — although it

For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’

motions are granted.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from Bramble’s complaint

and materials attached thereto, and are assumed to be true,

unless otherwise indicated. Thirty years ago, Bramble was

arrested and charged in connection with a gunpoint home-invasion

robbery. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13, ECF No. 1. An alleged accomplice,

Vincent Lubin, was charged alongside him. Id. ADAs Schwartz

and Fink prosecuted the case under Hynes’s direction; Justices

Juviler and Douglass presided over the relevant judicial

proceedings.4 Id. at ¶ 1. In October 1994, Bramble pleaded

guilty to Robbery in the First Degree. People v. Bramble, No.

303/1994, 2008 WL 3333884 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 5, 2008).

Justice Juviler sentenced him to five to fifteen years’

imprisonment. Id.

His co-defendant, however, apparently did not wait

around for trial: Lubin absconded while on pretrial release and

was not rearrested until 2001.5 Id. The following year, Lubin

is not representing Justice Juviler — maintains that “all defenses described

herein apply equally” to both former justices. Id. Similarly, all of Fink

and Schwartz’s arguments apply equally to their former boss, District

Attorney Hynes.

4 Justice Juviler presided over Bramble’s sentencing in 1994, while

Justice Douglass granted the State’s motion to dismiss Lubin’s indictment in

2002.

5 These facts appear in a state court judgment, of which the Court may

take judicial notice. See Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 16 F.4th 357, 360

filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment because of the

prosecution’s ostensibly “improper receipt of the hearsay

ballistics report” and the “consequent infirmity of the Grand

Jury evidence.” Id. at *1 n.3. That motion was denied by

Justice Douglass. Still, the district attorney eventually

declined to pursue the case against Lubin, apparently (as

discussed below) because of the passage of time. Id. On the

prosecutor’s oral application, Justice Douglass dismissed the

indictment against Lubin in 2002. Id.; Compl. ¶ 16.

Attached to Bramble’s complaint in this case is a copy

of Lubin’s motion to dismiss the indictment — the motion that

was denied. Bramble argues that Lubin’s motion establishes that

the ADAs “intentionally presented legally insufficient evidence

before a Grand Jury to secure an invalid indictment” against the

two of them. Id. at ¶ 12; see Ex. A., Id. at 10-11. Bramble

also claims — inaccurately — that Justice Douglass granted

Lubin’s motion. According to Bramble, this decision to dismiss

the indictment as to Lubin, but not Bramble himself, denied

Bramble the “equal protection of the law.” Id.

Bramble made this same claim to the state courts

before coming here. Bramble, 2008 WL 3333884 at *1. In 2008,

the New York Supreme Court denied Bramble’s C.P.L. Section

(2d Cir. 2021) (courts may take judicial notice of state-court judgments and

filings).

440.10 motion to vacate his conviction. Id. The court pointed

out Bramble’s misimpression, noting that the charges against

Lubin were not dismissed because of any defect in the

proceedings before the grand jury:

[T]he defendant continues to raise this argument

because he is laboring under the misapprehension that

his co-defendant’s case was dismissed on this same

ground. That is not true. While the co-defendant had

brought the identical claim seeking dismissal of his

case on the basis of the alleged improper receipt of

the hearsay ballistics report and consequent infirmity

of the Grand Jury evidence (by way of a pro se motion

dated March 19, 2002), such was not the ground upon

which the indictment was ultimately dismissed against

him.

On the contrary, it is evident that the co-defendant's

case was dismissed upon an application by the District

Attorney’s Office because the People were no longer in

a position to prosecute the case against the co-

defendant given the passage of time and loss of

witnesses due to Mr. Lubin's having absconded and

being at large for seven years.

While the co-defendant benefitted from his flight,

this provides no ground to reverse Mr. Bramble's

conviction and vacate his plea, entered years earlier.

In any event, none of this affects the defendant's

subsequent conviction, after trial, upon the charge of

Manslaughter in the Second Degree and his sentence of

seven to 14 years thereon.

Id. at *1 n.3.

II. Legal Standard

When a party moves for dismissal under both Rule

12(b)(1) and other grounds, “the court should consider the Rule

12(b)(1) challenge first” because, following a dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, “the accompanying defenses

and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.”

Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Ala. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 674, 678

(2d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v. United States, 201

F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).

To overcome a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must plead facts sufficient “to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The Court must accept all

factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Lundy v.

Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d

Cir. 2013).

Moreover, when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se,

courts “construe [the] complaint liberally and interpret it to

raise the strongest arguments that it suggests.” Chavis v.

Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). That said, a pro se

plaintiff must still comply “with relevant rules of procedural

and substance law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.

1983).

III. Discussion

Bramble brings claims for “wrongful conviction,

unlawful imprisonment, and denial of equal protection of the

law,” Compl. ¶ 1, which the Court construes as Fourteenth

Amendment due process and equal protection claims brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relief, Bramble requests that the Court

“[d]ismiss the entire indictment and anything that proceeds

[sic] it” and award $100 million in compensatory damages, $100

million for pain and suffering, and $100 million in punitive

damages. Compl. at 9.

The defendants move for dismissal. They argue that

Bramble’s request that the Court dismiss his state court

indictment and conviction is barred by Rooker-Feldman, and that

his request for money damages is barred by the doctrines of

sovereign and absolute immunity.

A. Rooker-Feldman

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of

Bramble’s request that this Court dismiss his indictment and

vacate his state court conviction. And Rooker-Feldman is

jurisdictional: it “pertains not to the validity of the suit but

to the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.”

Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427

(2d Cir. 2014).

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district

courts “are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction

over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S.

459, 463 (2006). The doctrine bars suit where:

(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court;

(2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a

state court judgment;

(3) the plaintiff invites review and rejection of that

judgment; and

(4) the state judgment was rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced.

Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2023).

District courts have been instructed to employ a

“claim-by-claim” approach to Rooker-Feldman preclusion. See

Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 2021). And when

a plaintiff seeks multiple remedies on a single claim — say,

both vacatur of a conviction and money damages, in response to a

single due-process violation — it becomes necessary to break

that approach down even further. In such cases, courts will

bifurcate the analysis of a single claim, asking whether Rooker-

Feldman bars consideration thereof “to the extent that” the

plaintiff seeks one remedy or the other. See, e.g., Teichmann

v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To the extent

that Teichmann only seeks a declaration that his state

conviction is invalid, he seeks nothing more than review of a

state court judgment.”). Here, Rooker-Feldman clearly precludes

consideration of Bramble’s due-process and equal protection

claims to the extent that he seeks to vacate his conviction.

As to the first Rooker-Feldman requirement above,

Bramble lost in state court when he was convicted pursuant to

his plea in 1994. “[T]hat the state court violated [a

plaintiff]’s constitutional rights in accepting a guilty plea

. . . is precisely the kind of claim the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

bars.” Gokadze v. Hynes, No. 11-cv-6099, 2012 WL 6737505, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2012); see also Molina v. James, No. 21-CV-

3144, 2022 WL 813815, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2022).

The second element is also clearly met. Bramble’s

injuries — that he was “unlawfully imprisoned for more than two

decades” — are the direct result of his state court conviction.

Compl. ¶ 17.

As to the third requirement, Bramble “invite[s] review

and rejection” of the state court’s judgment when he asks that

this Court “[d]ismiss the entire indictment and anything that

proceeds [sic] it.” Compl. at 9; see Teichmann, 769 F.3d at 826

(dismissing Section 1983 claims under Rooker-Feldman); see also

Mitchell v. New York State, No. 22-CV-1747 (LDH), 2023 WL

2734823, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023) (“Because Plaintiff

challenges the validity of his state court criminal conviction,

he necessarily invites the Court to review the judgment of

conviction.”).

Rooker-Feldman does not bar Bramble’s request for

money damages. “[A]lthough plaintiffs may not seek to have a

state court judgment voided, our court has concluded that

Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiffs from seeking compensatory

damages for misconduct that defendants pursued in obtaining

state court judgments.” Dorce v. City of N.Y., 2 F.4th 82, 104

(2d Cir. 2021); see also Cowan v. Hunter, 762 F. App’x 521, 523

(10th Cir. 2019) (while Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiff’s

request to vacate state conviction, his “claim for money damages

doesn’t trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); Molina, 2022 WL

813815 at *4 (Rooker-Feldman barred request for a declaration

that the plaintiff was not guilty, but not request for money

damages).

B. Immunity

Bramble’s requests for monetary damages are subject to

dismissal based on certain immunities. Bramble has named all

defendants in “their official and individual capacities.”

Compl. ¶ 1. As set forth below, New York judges and prosecutors

are afforded Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages claims

asserted against them in their official capacities. And they

are accorded absolute immunity on the damages claims asserted

against them here in their individual capacities.

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Bramble professes to assert claims against all

defendants in their official capacities. In that posture, the

Second Circuit has instructed that we “treat the suit as one

against the entity of which an officer is an agent.”

D’Alessandro v. City of New York, 713 F. App’x. 1, 8 (2d Cir.

2017) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)).

When “a district attorney or an assistant district attorney acts

as a prosecutor, she is an agent of the State, and therefore

immune from suit in her official capacity.” Id. (citing Ying

Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 536 (2d Cir. 1993)).

When the Eleventh Amendment applies, a damages action

cannot proceed “unless the state has waived its sovereign

immunity or Congress has abrogated it.” Dean v. Univ. at

Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 193 (2d

Cir. 2015). New York has not waived its sovereign immunity in

Section 1983 suits. Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park

Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1977). And Congress has not

abrogated it. Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594

(2d Cir. 1990).

Still, Bramble’s allegation that the defendants acted

in their official capacities does not make it so; official-

capacity action is defined more narrowly than the nomenclature

might suggest. The Eleventh Amendment bars actions against

state officials only when “the state is the real party in

interest,” see Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 921 (1988) — or,

put differently, when “the action is in reality a suit against

the state itself.” Id. (citing Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984)).

These criteria are not inherently satisfied when state

officials’ actions violate the Constitution, even if they are

acting pursuant to a state-law requirement. Farid, 850 F.2d at

921-22. More is required: for example, some indication that the

plaintiff is demanding “a judgment payable from state funds.”

Id. at 923 (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982)); see

also Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Jorling, 3 F.3d 602, 606 (2d

Cir. 1993) (“The complaint specifically seeks damages from the

defendants in their individual capacities and the mere fact that

the state may reimburse them does not make the state the real

party in interest.”). There is no such indication here.

To the extent Bramble seeks to proceed against the

defendants in their official capacities, his claims for damages

are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). See Nat’l Ass’n for

Advancement of Colored People v. Merrill, 939 F.3d 470, 479 (2d

Cir. 2019) (sovereign immunity deprives court of subject matter

jurisdiction); Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &

Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 150 (1993) (Stevens, dissenting)

(Eleventh Amendment “goes to the jurisdiction of the federal

court”). Given that he also — and more plausibly — asserts

claims against them in their individual (or “personal”)

capacities, we proceed to consider the immunities that apply in

that context.

2. Absolute Immunity for Judges and Prosecutors

As noted above, Bramble sued all defendants “in their

official and individual capacities.” Compl. ¶ 1. The

individual-capacity claims, too, must be dismissed, as the

defendants are immune from suit for damages in their individual

capacities. See Ying Jing, 996 F.2d at 530.

To plead a viable individual-capacity claim, Bramble

must demonstrate that the defendants acted entirely outside

their respective mandates. “Judges are absolutely immune from

damages suits for judicial acts, even when a complaint raises

allegations of bad faith or malice, as long as that conduct was

not taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Idlibi

v. Burgdorff, No. 23-7384, 2024 WL 3199522, at *3 (2d Cir. June

27, 2024) (affirming dismissal of religious-discrimination claim

against judge in her individual capacity).

Likewise, “unless a prosecutor proceeds in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction, absolute immunity exists for those

prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process.” Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358,

361 (2d Cir. 1987); see also D’Allessandro, 713 F. App’x. at *5

(prosecutor is not protected “when she acts without any

colorable claim of authority”). And in the Second Circuit, “a

prosecutor unquestionably acts as an advocate — and therefore

receives absolute immunity — when she initiates and pursues a

criminal prosecution.” Id. (citing Shmueli v. City of New York,

424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005)).

Here, all of Bramble’s allegations stem from actions

that fall squarely within the defendants’ core duties as judges

and prosecutors in the criminal proceedings: they prosecuted,

convicted, and / or sentenced him for committing robbery. The

defendants are thus absolutely immune from suit with respect to

their alleged actions. Bramble’s claims against them are

dismissed.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims are Time-Barred

The prosecutors’ immunity, at least, is not

jurisdictional; instead, it is “a common law immunity available

upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Tigano v. United States, 527 F.

Supp. 3d 232, 243 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419-22 (1976); Bouchard v. Olmstead, 775

F. App’x 701, 702-03 (2d Cir. 2019)). Accordingly, we go on to

hold that Bramble’s claims are barred by the applicable statute

of limitations.

A complaint that is time-barred fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted, see Griffin v. Carnes, 72 F.4th

16, 21 (2d Cir. 2023), and a district court may sua sponte

dismiss a complaint as time-barred “where the facts supporting

the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers

plaintiff himself submitted.” Walters v. Indus. & Commer. Bank

of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011). “Under

well-settled law, claims under Section 1983 . . . are governed

by New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury

actions under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.”

Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 104 (2d

Cir. 2023). This clock “begins to run once the plaintiff knows

of the injury on which the claim is based.” Jaghory v. N.Y.

State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 331 (2d Cir. 1997).

Bramble’s Section 1983 claims are clearly time-barred.

Bramble alleges that he was convicted in 1994 and that the

indictment against his accomplice was dismissed in 2002. He has

had over two decades to contemplate the injuries he now asserts.

Indeed, he has used that time to bring similar claims in state

court, see Bramble, 2008 WL 3333884 at *1, before finally

initiating this action.

Because Bramble’s complaint was filed long after the

expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the Court

sua sponte dismisses his claims as time-barred.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motions to

dismiss are granted. The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff, to enter

judgment, and to mark this action as closed.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United States District Judge

Dated: September 26, 2024

Brooklyn, New York