Dixon v. NYCHDC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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TERRANCE DIXON,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

23-CV-6114 (RPK) (LB)

NEW YORK CITY HOUSING

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; ERIC

ENDERLIN; THADDEUS PIEKARSKI;

JOSPEHINE LOGOZZO; K&R REALTY

MANAGEMENT; MICHELLE CAVAZZA;

CHRIS ALLRED; ROBERT EZRAPOUR;

J2 OWNER LLC; ARTEMIS

CONSTRUCTION; JAMES

SPITHOGIANNIS; L’ABATTE, BALKAN,

COLAVITA & CONTINI, LLP,

Defendants.

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RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Terrance Dixon brings this suit against twelve defendants—the New York

City Housing Development Corporation (“HDC”); Eric Enderlin; Thaddeus Piekarski; Josephine

Logozzo; K&R Realty Management; Michelle Cavazza; Chris Allred; Robert Ezrapour; J2 Owner

LLC; Artemis Construction; James Spithogiannis; and L’Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, LLP

(“LBCC”)—alleging violations of federal and state law arising from the denial of his application

for affordable housing. For the reasons stated below, defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are granted.*

BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from plaintiff’s complaint and state court

submissions and orders, to the extent they are subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., Dixon v. von

* Because the complaint is dismissed, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is denied as moot.

Blanckensee, 994 F.3d 95, 103 n.6 (2d Cir. 2021) (taking judicial notice of the “fact that the state

court dismissed [a litigant’s] claims on specified grounds” but not “any historical facts referenced

in the state court order”); see also Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)

(“[C]ourts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts, . . . not for the truth of

the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and

related filings.”).

I. Factual Background

HDC is a New York state “public benefit corporation” that runs an affordable housing

lottery. Am. Compl. 2 (Dkt. #24); see N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 653. In March 2022, plaintiff

applied to rent an affordable housing unit through HDC’s lottery. Am. Compl. 5. J2 Owner LLC

owned the unit to which plaintiff applied, while K&R Realty managed it. See id. at 2–3. As part

of its management duties, K&R Realty was responsible for selecting a tenant. See id. at 2.

During the application process, plaintiff communicated with Michelle Cavazza, a

marketing agent for K&R Realty. Am. Compl. 3, 5. Cavazza informed plaintiff that, because the

documentation he had submitted “indicate[d] [he] would be under income for the unit,” K&R

Realty could not “proceed with [his] application.” Id. at 6. Cavazza then stopped communicating

with plaintiff. See id. at 6, 8.

Plaintiff appealed K&R Realty’s denial of his application to HDC. See id. at 8. HDC

denied plaintiff’s appeal on the ground that “[t]he documents [he] provided” to K&R Realty

showed that his “historical earnings” were “below the minimum income limit for any unit in the

project.” Ibid.

In June 2022, plaintiff filed a petition challenging HDC’s decision in state court pursuant

to Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, which authorizes New York courts to

review state administrative actions. Id. at 9; see N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801–06. The petition asserted

that HDC failed to follow Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) guidelines

when calculating plaintiff’s income. Decl. of Isabella J. Kendrick (Dkt. #43) (“Kendrick Decl.”),

Ex. A 11 (Dkt. #43-1) (“Art. 78 Pet.”).

At the Article 78 hearing, HDC—through its employees Thaddeus Piekarski and Josephine

Logozzo—“misrepresented” plaintiff’s income as well as its authority over K&R Realty. Am.

Compl. 10.

The state court initially dismissed plaintiff’s petition, see Kendrick Decl., Ex. B (Dkt. #43-

2) (“Aug. 4, 2022, State Ct. Order”), but then granted plaintiff’s renewal motion on the ground

that “facts pertaining to [plaintiff’s] income sources were previously overlooked,” Kendrick Decl.,

Ex. C 3 (Dkt. #43-3) (“Oct. 13, 2022, State Ct. Order”). The court also ordered HDC “to conduct

an additional review” of plaintiff’s application, “while taking all income documents submitted by

[plaintiff] into consideration.” Id. at 4.

HDC began conducting an additional review in October 2022. See id. at 10. During that

process, plaintiff communicated with K&R Realty employee Christopher Allred. See id. at 10–

11. Allred “stop[ped] responding” to plaintiff on November 7, 2022. Id. at 11. On November 17,

2022, however, HDC notified plaintiff that he qualified for a studio apartment and advised him

that if he was “interested in being processed for a studio,” he should “contact the marketing agent

directly.” Ibid. Plaintiff followed up with Allred but did not receive a response. Ibid.

Plaintiff filed a motion in the Article 78 court to “hold [HDC] in contempt of Court, order

sanctions, and compel [HDC] to award [him] a one-bedroom unit” rather than a studio. Kendrick

Decl., Ex. D 2 (Dkt. #43-4) (“Dec. 19, 2022, State Ct. Order”). In December 2022, the court

denied plaintiff’s motion on the ground that HDC “ha[d] not violated” its previous order directing

HDC “to conduct an additional review” of its denial of plaintiff’s application, “while taking all

income documents submitted by [plaintiff] into consideration.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff filed a series of

motions challenging the court’s December 2022 order including two motions to renew his motion

to hold HDC in contempt, see Kenrick Decl., Ex. E (Dkt. #43-5) (“Jan. 30, 2023, State Ct. Order”);

Kendrick Decl., Ex. F (Dkt. #43-6) (“Feb. 15, 2023, State Ct. Order”), and another motion to hold

HDC in contempt, see Kendrick Decl., Ex. G (Dkt. #43-7) (“Aug. 9, 2023, State Ct. Order”). The

Article 78 court denied each of those motions. See Jan. 30, 2023, State Ct. Order 4; Feb. 15, 2023,

State Ct. Order 4; Aug. 9, 2023, State Ct. Order 3. Plaintiff also moved for default judgment

against HDC, and the Article 78 Court denied that motion. See Kendrick Decl., Ex. H 1 (Dkt. #43-

8) (“Sept. 25, 2023, State Ct. Order”).

In January 2023, plaintiff filed a new action in state court against HDC, Piekarski,

Logozzo, K&R Realty, and Allred. See Kendrick Decl., Ex. K (Dkt. #43-11) (“State Ct. Compl.”);

Kendrick Decl., Ex. M (Dkt. #43-13) (“July 24, 2023, First State Ct. Order”); Decl. of James

Spithogiannis (Dkt. #34-1) (“Spithogiannis Decl.”), Ex. K (Dkt. #34-12) (“July 24, 2023, Second

State Ct. Order”). He alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1985(3), the Fair Housing

Act (“FHA”), see id. § 3601 et seq., and state law. See State Ct. Compl. The court dismissed the

action in July 2023, holding that it was “barred as against HDC, Thaddeus Piekarski, and Josephine

Logozzo, by the doctrine of res judicata,” July 24, 2023, First State Ct. Order 3, and that plaintiff

had failed to establish that he had properly served any of the defendants, ibid.; July 24, 2023,

Second State Ct. Order 2.

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in August 2023. He brings claims under federal and state law

against HDC, Eric Enderlin (HDC’s president), Piekarski, Logozzo, J2 Owner LLC, K&R Realty,

Robert Ezrapour (K&R Realty’s chief executive), Cavazza, Allred, Artemis Construction (a

development company under Ezrapour’s “control”), LBCC (a law firm that represented K&R

Realty in state court), and James Spithogiannis (a lawyer at LBCC). Am. Compl. 2–3.

Plaintiff alleges that, during the Article 78 proceedings, defendants made

misrepresentations in court, raised frivolous defenses, and improperly sought adjournments or

dismissals. See Am. Compl. 17, 24–26, 31–34, 43–46. He also alleges that defendants violated

several laws in their review of his application for a one-bedroom unit and in their acceptance of

federal funds. See id. at 14–18, 21–24, 29–31, 33–37, 39–42, 42–43. Based on those allegations,

he brings claims under (i) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983, see Am. Compl. 14–15; (ii) the FHA, see

Am. Compl. 16–18, 39–42; (iii) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(“RICO”), see 18 U.S.C. § 1961; see also Am. Compl. 18–21; and (iv) state law, see Am. Compl.

at 21–31, 33–39, 42–43.

Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See K&R Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. #35); HDC Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. # 42-1).

While defendants’ motions to dismiss were pending, plaintiff filed a motion for partial

summary judgment against HDC, Enderlin, Piekarski, and Logozzo. See Pl.’s Mot. for Partial

Summ. J. (Dkt. #65). Those defendants moved to strike the motion. See May 8, 2024, Letter Mot.

(Dkt. #66).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff

must show that the Court has “the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the action.

Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.A.R.L., 790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015).

“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must grant a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). A complaint fails to plausibly state a claim and is properly dismissed when “the allegations

in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief” as a matter of law,

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or when “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct” as a matter of law. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

The complaint of a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed, and . . . however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Pro se status,

however, does not “exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and

substantive law.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting

Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only (i) the complaint itself, (ii)

documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference, (iii) documents the plaintiff

both relied on and knew of when bringing suit, and (iv) matters in the public record which are

properly subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d

87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007); Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004); Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc.

Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint are granted. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

does not bar this Court from reviewing plaintiff’s federal-law claims, but those claims are

dismissed for failure to state a claim. And I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state-law claims.

I. Federal Claims

The Court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal causes of action, but they are dismissed

for failure to state a claim.

A. Rooker-Feldman Does Not Preclude Review of the Plaintiff’s Federal Claims.

Defendants err in contending that the Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s federal

claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See K&R Mot. to Dismiss 10–13; HDC Mot. to

Dismiss 11–13.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462 (1983). “Together, those cases ‘established the clear principle that federal district courts lack

jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.’” Sung Cho v.

City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of

Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005)). For a claim to be barred, “four requirements must be

met: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of

injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and

rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced.” Id. at 644–45 (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85).

Though plaintiff alleges that defendants made misrepresentations and otherwise committed

misconduct in state court, those allegations “speak not to the propriety of the state court judgments,

but to the fraudulent course of conduct that defendants pursued in obtaining such judgments.”

Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2015). They therefore do not

invite review of those judgments. See ibid. Nor do his claims alleging that defendants violated

state and federal law in reviewing his application and accepting federal funds. Though plaintiff

raised similar claims in state court, “Rooker-Feldman . . . does not deprive a district court of

subject-matter jurisdiction ‘simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter

previously litigated in state court.’” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)).

B. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims Are Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim.

Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim under any of the federal causes of action alleged

in his complaint, his federal claims are dismissed.

Section 1982 Claim. Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1982 claim because he does not

“allege facts supporting [defendants’] intent to discriminate against him because of his race,”

Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Plaintiff

alleges that defendants use “community preferences” that “inadvertently” favor “applicants

currently residing in a zip code,” thereby “creat[ing] racial barriers and disparities.” Am. Compl.

14–15. And though plaintiff’s opposition brief asserts, in a conclusory manner, that defendants

“intentionally off[ered] a community preference” that “steer[s] races of . . . certain communities

to stay within that community,” Pl.’s Opp’n to HDC Mot. 15 (Dkt. #53), he does not allege any

facts supporting the inference that defendants used “community preferences” for the purpose of

discriminating against plaintiff on the basis of race. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.”).

Section 1983 Claim. Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim because he does not

sufficiently “allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1998)). Instead, his complaint contains only the conclusory allegations that “[d]efendants

individually and collectively conspired to deprive [p]laintiff of constitutionally and federally

guaranteed rights and privileges” and that “[d]efendants have policies in place that are

unconstitutional.” Am. Compl. 15. His opposition briefs add (i) that K&R Realty and its

employees engaged in “income discrimination,” “family status” discrimination, and “occupancy

discrimination,” Pl.’s Opp’n to K&R Mot. 5 (Dkt. #38), and (ii) that HDC violated his due process

rights by denying his appeal without a hearing, Pl.’s Opp’n to HDC Mot. 15. But even if plaintiff’s

complaint were liberally construed to allege unlawful discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment, that claim fails because he does not allege any facts establishing that he “suffered

purposeful or intentional discrimination.” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365

F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)). And plaintiff’s due process claim fails because plaintiff has not alleged

the deprivation of a “liberty or property interest protected by the United States Constitution or

federal statutes.” Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff fails to identify any

source of law protecting a property interest in an affordable housing unit of a particular size. Cf.

Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that the Constitution contains no “guarantee

of access to dwellings of a particular quality”).

FHA Claims. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Sections 3631, 3604, and 3617 of the

FHA.

First, Section 3631 is “the criminal provision of the FHA,” Mee Wah Chan v. Nashty,

No. 08-CV-1089 (CBA), 2009 WL 10700936, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 3631), and “federal criminal statutes do not provide private causes of action,” Sheehy

v. Brown, 335 F. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009).

Second, plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination under Section 3604. To state such

a claim, a plaintiff must “plausibly allege . . . at least minimal support for the proposition that” the

defendant’s actions were “motivated by discriminatory intent.” Francis, 992 F.3d at 73. Plaintiff

alleges that defendants’ “refusal to make a proper unit size available to him” constituted “family

size discrimination” because defendants were “aware” that plaintiff has a son. Am. Compl. 16.

But defendants’ “mere awareness” of plaintiff’s family size “does not provide sufficient support

for [his] allegation of discriminatory intent.” Palmer v. Fannie Mae, 755 F. App’x 43, 46

(2d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants “hav[e] more stringent policies for self

employed individuals,” Am. Compl. 42, yet he fails to allege any facts supporting the inference

that those policies are motivated by an intent to discriminate based on race, color, religion, sex,

familial status, or national origin, Francis, 992 F.3d at 71, 73. Finally, plaintiff cites Section

3604(c)’s prohibition against discriminatory notices, statements, and advertisements, but he fails

to identify any particular notice, statement, or advertisement that violates the prohibition. See Am.

Compl. 40. He has therefore failed to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that [defendants] are liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 at 678.

Third, plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 3617, which makes it “unlawful to

coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on

account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by section 3603,

3604, 3605, or 3606” of the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. To state a claim for retaliation under Section

3617, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that he was “engaged in protected activity,” that the

defendant “was aware of this activity,” that the defendant “took adverse action against the

plaintiff,” and that “a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse

action.” Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 54 (2d Cir.

2002) (quoting Sands v. Runyon, 28 F.3d 1323, 1331 (2d Cir. 1994)), superseded by statute on

other grounds, ADA Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a retaliation claim under those principles. Plaintiff

asserts that K&R Realty, Cavazza, and Allred retaliated against him “for exercising rights under

[the] FHA to file complaints and litigation” because they “ceas[ed] communication[s]” and

“offer[ed him] a unit smaller than” the one to which he was “entitled.” Am. Compl. 17. And he

alleges that Logozzo and Piekarski retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the FHA

by making misrepresentations during the Article 78 hearing. Ibid. But he does not plausibly allege

that he engaged in any protected activity with a causal connection to those actions. To start, he

alleges that Cavazza stopped communicating with him before he filed his Article 78 petition or

initiated any other litigation. See Am. Compl. 6. He therefore has not alleged that the Article 78

petition or any ensuing litigation are causally connected to Cavazza’s alleged failure to

communicate. See, e.g., Thomas-Tupper v. Cath. Charities, No. 22-689, 2023 WL 4044101, at *2

(2d Cir. June 16, 2023) (holding that a plaintiff “failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of

retaliation” under Section 3617 where adverse actions occurred “before” the protected activity).

Though the other alleged adverse actions plaintiff cites occurred after he filed the Article 78

petition, see Am. Compl. 10–11, he does not sufficiently allege that the petition was protected

activity. While the petition asserts that HDC failed to follow HUD’s guidelines for calculating

income, it does not assert that HDC violated the FHA or any fair housing guidelines. See generally

Art. 78 Pet. It therefore does not “constitute opposition to an act or practice made unlawful by”

the FHA. Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc., 294 F.3d at 54 (citation and brackets omitted)

(defining “protected activity”). Nor does plaintiff allege any other FHA-protected activity

predating defendants’ alleged adverse actions. See generally Am. Compl. He has accordingly

failed to state a claim for retaliation under Section 3617.

RICO Claim. Plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim because he does not plausibly allege

that defendants committed “a substantive RICO violation under [18 U.S.C.] § 1962.” Skyes, 780

F.3d at 83 (quoting In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 2013)).

To plead a substantive violation of the RICO statute under Section 1962, a plaintiff must allege

“(1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a ‘pattern’

(4) of ‘racketeering activity’ (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an interest in, or

participates in (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.”

Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Moss v. Morgan

Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c).

Plaintiff alleges a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of wire fraud, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1343, and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, see Am. Compl. 19–21, “which

are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b).” Knoll v.

Schectman, 275 F. App’x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing First Cap. Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood,

Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2004)). Under those requirements, a plaintiff “alleging fraud . . .

must state with particularly the circumstances constituting fraud,” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b),

including “the contents of the [allegedly fraudulent] communications, who was involved, where

and when they took place, and . . . why they were fraudulent.” Knoll, 275 F. App’x at 51 (alteration

added) (quoting Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff,

however, alleges only that “[d]efendants commit[ted] . . . wire fraud through the receiving and

transmitting of federal funds . . . under the false pretenses of being compliant” with “non[-]

discriminatory practices” and that they “committed . . . mail fraud on December 23, 2019[,] and

every year thereafter through compliance renewal.” Am. Compl. 19–21. Those allegations do not

satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirements. See, e.g., Knoll, 275 F. App’x at 51 (holding that a plaintiff

bringing a RICO claim failed to allege mail and wire fraud even though his complaint “set[] forth

the dates, locations, senders and recipient of the allegedly fraudulent communications” because

his “assertions as to their contents and the reason each communication was fraudulent [were]

conclusory”).

Plaintiff also suggests that defendants engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity

consisting of witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, and witness retaliation, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513, by “retaliat[ing] against plaintiff . . . for commencing this case.”

Am. Compl. 21. But because plaintiff does not allege how defendants retaliated against him, see

ibid., he has failed to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that [defendants are] liable for the misconduct alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff’s federal-law claims are accordingly dismissed.

C. I Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s State-Law

Claims.

Because I have dismissed all the federal claims, I decline to retain jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state-law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “a district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

Four factors bear on whether it is appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction: “judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d

77, 81 (2d Cir. 2018). As a general matter, where “a plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed before

trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113–

14 (2d Cir. 2010); see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Cath. Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan

v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 727 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiff does not provide a

persuasive reason to depart from the usual practice of declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction once federal claims are dismissed. See Pl.’s Opp’n to HDC Mot. 18 (arguing that the

Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction since “this matter . . . addresses constitutional

issues”); accord Pl.’s Opp’n to K&R Mot. 9 (Dkt. #38). Accordingly, I decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are granted and the motion for summary

judgment is denied as moot. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal

from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied

for the purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The Clerk

of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Rachel Kovner

RACHEL P. KOVNER

United States District Judge

Dated: August 13, 2024

Brooklyn, New York