Pflug v. The County Of Suffolk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KRISTY PFLUG,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

-against- 20-cv-00018 (SIL)

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK,

Defendant.

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STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:

Presently before the Court in this disability discrimination action is Defendant

County of Suffolk’s (the “County” or “Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). See

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion” or “Def. Mot.”),

Docket Entry (“DE”) [30]. Plaintiff Kristy Pflug (“Plaintiff” or “Pflug”) opposes. See

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp.”),

DE [30-32]. By way of Complaint dated January 2, 2020, later modified by an

Amended Complaint dated March 10, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this litigation

against the County, asserting claims for failure to accommodate, intentional

discrimination, retaliation and disparate impact pursuant to the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq. (“ADA”) and the New York State Human

Rights Law, N.Y. Executive Law § 290, et seq. (“NYSHRL”).1 See Complaint, DE [1];

Amended Complaint, DE [26].

1 At the time the Complaint was filed, there were two additional plaintiffs, Anne Di Iorio and Joseph

Montaldo. See Complaint, DE [1]. After some discovery, the parties agreed to sever Di Iorio’s and

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Pflug’s claims are

barred by a prior release of all claims against the County. Accordingly, Defendant’s

Motion is granted, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, and the

parties’ Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) statements. See Defendant’s State of Undisputed

Material Facts (“Def. 56.1”), DE [30-2]; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Rule 56.1

Statement with Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts (“Pl. 56.1”), DE [30-33];

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Counterstatement of Facts (“Reply 56.1”), DE [30-

54]. Unless otherwise noted, these facts are not in dispute.

1. The Public Safety Dispatcher Position

Plaintiff Pflug was hired by the County as a Suffolk County Police Department

(“SCPD”) Public Safety Dispatcher I (“PSD I”) in December of 2002. Def. 56.1 ¶ 1.

The SCPD Communications Section – which includes PSD Is – operates 365 days a

year, 24 hours a day. Id. ¶ 69. The unit must be operational and fully staffed at all

times. Id. A PSD I receives information from a 911 emergency complaint operator,

dispatches the calls to police sector cars and coordinates efforts to respond to the

emergency with a particular SCPD precinct. Id. ¶ 3.

According to Defendant, overtime was always mandatory for all PSD Is and

each employee was informed of this requirement upon hiring. See id. ¶ 73. Pflug

Montaldo’s claims from this action on February 2, 2021, and Pflug filed the Amended Complaint

thereafter. See DEs [25] – [26].

asserts that when she was hired, overtime was voluntary. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 8.2 If a PSD

I called in sick and no one volunteered, another PSD I would be required – based on

seniority – to work overtime. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 9. Overtime was assigned in four-hour

increments either at the beginning or end of a PSD I’s assigned shift. Id. ¶ 72. The

requirement to perform overtime was referred to as a “mandate,” or “working a

mandate.” See id. ¶ 18. PSD Is were also required to work six extra days per year in

addition to their scheduled shifts, referred to as “X-Days.” See id. ¶ 24.

On August 3, 2012, Lt. William Rohrer of the Communications Section (“Lt.

Rohrer”), sent a memo to the SCPD Communications Section supervisors. See

Declaration of Hope Senzer Gabor (“Gabor Decl.”), Ex. H. The memo states that as

of August 25, 2012, “no employee will be exempted from working mandated

[overtime],” regardless of whether they were previously exempted by their supervisor

for medical reasons. Id. Further, an employee could “submit medical documentation

requesting special consideration in this matter.” Id. On January 11, 2013, Maureen

Looby of the SCPD Human Resources Bureau emailed Lt. Rohrer and others

regarding overtime mandates, stating that “no employee will be excused from

overtime” and that “overtime is part of the position.” Gabor Decl., Ex. I. Looby

further indicated that if an employee “can’t work overtime, they are unfit for duty

and therefore cannot work their normal shift.” Id.

2 One of Plaintiff’s supervisors, Jennifer Worthington, has worked for the County since 1991 and

testified that overtime mandates existed throughout her entire employment. See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 52, 60.

2. Plaintiff’s Employment as a PSD I

As noted above, Plaintiff began working as a PSD I in December 2002.

Between 2002 and 2011, Pflug worked mandatory overtime. Def. 56.1 ¶ 8. By 2011,

Plaintiff was working the midnight shift from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. Def. 56.1 ¶ 14.

Pflug took parental leave from April 10, 2011 to April 9, 2012. Id. ¶ 11. In or

around April of 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with transverse myelitis – or swelling

of the spinal cord – which causes numbness and tingling throughout the body, as well

as headaches. See Declaration of Kristy Pflug (“Pflug Decl.”), DE [30-34], ¶¶ 22-26.

In March 2012, Pflug submitted a letter from Dr. Scott McWilliams recommending

that she not work overnight hours because sleep deprivation could exacerbate her

transverse myelitis symptoms. See Gabor Decl., Ex. F.3

Plaintiff returned from parental leave on April 10, 2012. Def. 56.1 ¶ 12. Upon

her return – in light of the letter from Dr. McWilliams – Pflug was reassigned to

Rotating Squad 3, rather than the midnight shift. See id. ¶¶ 13-14. As a result,

Plaintiff worked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. for five days followed by two days off and

then worked from 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. for five days followed by three days off. Id.

At this time, Pflug’s supervisors were Sandy Flammer (“Flammer”) and Jennifer

Worthington (“Worthington”), both Public Safety Dispatcher IIs (“PSD II”). Id. ¶ 19.

Plaintiff was also breastfeeding at this time and was provided with a room in which

3 The Court notes that Dr. McWilliams’s letter is dated both “March 9, 2011” and “3/09/2012.” Gabor

Decl., Ex. F. Pflug asserts that she was diagnosed with transverse myelitis sometime after she gave

birth to her first child on April 10, 2011. See Pflug Decl. ¶¶ 21-22. Moreover, in her sworn declaration,

Plaintiff refers to the letter as being dated March 9, 2012. Pflug Decl. ¶ 29. Based on the statements

in Pflug’s declaration, the Court will assume the letter was written on March 9, 2012 and the reference

to March 9, 2011 is a clerical error.

she could breast pump at her request. See id. ¶ 21.4 In that first month following

her return from leave, Pflug worked mandatory overtime. Id. ¶ 16.

Thereafter, overtime mandates occurred “pretty much every day,” and each

PSD I was mandated to work overtime one to two times a week. Id. ¶ 17; Gabor Decl.,

Ex. B, Transcript of Deposition of Kristy Pflug (“Pflug Tr.”), 35:21-23. Around this

time, Plaintiff was “physically and mentally” stressed about working mandates and

felt that she “was already pushing [herself] for [her] eight-hour shift.” Pflug Tr.

43:13-19. Pflug provided three additional letters from physicians dated August 2,

August 30 and November 17, 2012 from Drs. McWilliams, Katherine Wightman and

Erica Jurasits, respectively, recommending that Plaintiff not work in excess of eight

hours in a single shift. See Pflug Decl., Exs. 9 & 11; Gabor Decl., Ex. AA.

3. Plaintiff’s Lateness and Refusal to Work Mandates

On April 12, 2012, Plaintiff was late to work and was informally counseled by

a superior. Gabor Decl., Ex. Y. Pflug was also late in returning from her meal breaks

on May 4 and 21, 2012. Id. On May 25, 2012, Plaintiff was issued a verbal reprimand

regarding this lateness and was advised that any further infraction of this nature

would result in additional disciplinary action. Id.

On November 11, 2012, Pflug was issued a written reprimand concerning her

failure to report for work on November 3, 2012, an X-Day. See id. ¶ 25; Gabor Decl.,

Ex. J. Plaintiff wrote to her superiors on November 15, 2012 and explained that she

4 Plaintiff asserts that this accommodation was only provided “[w]hen [she] pushed [the issue],” but

also testified that the room was provided within a week after she brought it to her supervisors’

attention. Pflug Tr., 41:9-19.

forgot she was scheduled to work an X-Day on November 3, 2012 and that once she

was reminded it was too late to get a family member to watch her child. See Def. 56.1

¶ 26. PSD II Dennis Lawlor wrote a memo on November 19, 2012 regarding Pflug’s

failure to report to work on November 3, contradicting Plaintiff, noting that when

confronted regarding her absence, Pflug stated “I don’t work x-days.” Gabor Decl.,

Ex. L; see Def. 56.1 ¶ 27.

On December 1, 2012, Plaintiff was late in returning from her meal break.

Gabor Decl., Ex. M. In a memo to Lt. Rohrer, Pflug explained that she was late due

to needing to go home to breastfeed her child and attend to her daughter’s injury. Id.

On December 23, 2012, Plaintiff did not report for mandatory overtime

scheduled for 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., prior to her regular shift. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 29.

According to her supervisor, Flammer, Pflug explained that she did not like coming

in at 4:00 a.m. for mandates because she did not want to inconvenience her in-laws

to watch her daughter at that hour. See id. On December 25, 2012, Plaintiff again

refused to report for her mandated overtime at 4:00 a.m., but indicated she could

report for her normal shift at 8:00 a.m. See Gabor Decl., Ex. P.

Plaintiff again did not work her mandatory overtime on January 8, 2013 due

to a doctor’s appointment that could not be rescheduled. See Gabor Decl., Ex. Q. The

following day, Pflug’s supervisor filed a “Supervisor’s Complaint Report” regarding

Plaintiff’s failure to report for this mandate, indicating that this was not her first

failure in this regard. See Gabor Decl., Ex. R. Pflug testified that following this

incident she believed she was “on borrowed time” and “knew something was going to

happen,” which is why she “tried to quit.” Pflug Tr. 71:21-72:8.

4. Internal Affairs Proceedings and Plaintiff’s Resignation

According to Plaintiff, in late May 2013, she told Worthington and Flammer

that she was resigning her position, effective June 5, 2013. Pflug Tr. 94:14-95:17.

Pflug testified that she did not fill out any paperwork regarding her resignation until

June 5, 2013 “because you do it the day you resign.” Id. 95:18-25. According to

Plaintiff, she started this paperwork on June 5, 2013, but never completed it. Id.

95:20-96:2. Pflug asserts that a resignation party for her was organized on June 5,

2013, which Defendant denies. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 41; Reply 56.1 ¶ 41.

On June 5, 2013, Plaintiff attended a meeting with Internal Affairs, at which

she was provided with union representation. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 42. Pflug was presented

with 14 charges of misconduct and was suspended from duty without pay, effective

June 4, 2013. See id. ¶¶ 43-44; Gabor Decl., Ex. T. The charges included ten

instances of unexcused absences, three failures to work mandated overtime and a

failure to renew her departmental identification card to reflect a name change. See

Gabor Decl., Ex. T. According to Plaintiff, Defendant would not allow her to resign

without addressing the charges, which the County denies. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 43; Reply

56.1 ¶ 43. Pflug testified that she accepted the suspension in lieu of resigning in

order to receive health insurance benefits during her suspension. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 45.

Plaintiff contacted her union regarding the charges and was assigned union counsel.

Id. ¶ 46. Although Pflug felt the suspension was unfair, she was advised to “take

whatever the County offers you and go on your way.” Id.

Plaintiff was reinstated on July 3, 2013. See id. ¶ 47. Pflug reported for work

on July 4, 2013 for the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift. Id. At the end of her shift, Plaintiff

was told she was required to work mandatory overtime from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Id. In response, Pflug resigned. See id.

5. The Agreement and Release

On September 3, 2013, Plaintiff and the County entered into a Stipulation and

Agreement (the “Agreement”) concerning the June 5, 2013 disciplinary charges. Def.

56.1 ¶ 48; Gabor Decl., Ex. V (Agreement). The Agreement was reviewed by counsel

on Pflug’s behalf. See Agreement, 1. Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff pled no

contest to the disciplinary charges, and Defendant agreed to reimburse Pflug for 11

out of 30 days of her suspension, amounting to $2,466.20 in wages, provide Plaintiff

with a neutral reference and not interfere with Pflug’s attempt to apply for

unemployment benefits. Id. ¶¶ 1-3. Plaintiff also agreed to execute a General Release

(the “Release”), “releasing the County from any liability whatsoever in connection

with [Pflug’s] disciplinary charges.” Id. ¶ 4. The Release, annexed to the Agreement,

provides that Pflug:

releases, discharges and holds harmless the [County] . . . from all

actions, causes of action, [and] suits . . . whatsoever in law, admiralty or

equity, which against the [County], [Pflug] . . . ever had, now have or

hereafter can, shall or may have for, upon, or by reason of any matter,

cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day

and date of this General Release, including but not limited to all claims

of any kind or any nature whatsoever which were raised, or could have

been raised, in connection with [Pflug’s] employment or service with [the

County] arising from the disciplinary charges brought against her.

Id., 4. According to Plaintiff, she signed the Agreement and Release under duress

and was promised one month’s compensation in exchange. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 47; Pflug

Decl. ¶ 51. Pflug asserts that she was told by her attorney that she must sign “to

move on from the charges so [she could] leave on good graces with the County.” Pflug

Decl. ¶ 53; Pflug Tr. 108:17-24. Plaintiff further claims that she was told that she

was only giving up her right to fight the suspension, not releasing all claims against

Defendant. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 46; Pflug Decl. ¶ 58.

According to Plaintiff she “never received the consideration promised in the

agreement in order for [the Agreement] to be effective.” Pl. 56.1 ¶ 48. Pflug testified,

however, that she received “a payment” in exchange for signing the Agreement and

Release, although she did not specify the amount. Pflug Tr. 108:25-109:14. Plaintiff

also asserts that Defendant challenged Pflug’s application for unemployment

benefits, despite agreeing not to do so, which the County denies. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 50

(Pflug Decl. ¶ 61). The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ultimately concluded

that Plaintiff was entitled to unemployment benefits based on its determination that

Pflug quit her job with good cause. See Pflug Decl., Ex. 15, 3.

B. Procedural History

Following her employment with the County, Plaintiff filed a charge of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See

Pl. 56.1 ¶ 53. On February 19, 2016, the EEOC determined that there was probable

cause that the County discriminated against Pflug on the basis of disability in

violation of the ADA. Pflug Decl., Ex. 14. Specifically, the EEOC rejected Defendant’s

argument that Plaintiff waived her right to file a charge by signing the Agreement

and Release and found that the County failed to engage in an interactive process to

arrange a reasonable accommodation. See id.

On January 2, 2020 Plaintiff, along with Anne Di Iorio and Joseph Montaldo –

two other County employees – commenced this action against Defendant, asserting

causes of action for: (1) failure to accommodate under the ADA, (2) failure to

accommodate pursuant to NYSHRL, (3) intentional discrimination under the ADA,

(4) intentional discrimination pursuant to NYSHRL, (5) retaliation under the ADA,

(6) retaliation pursuant to NYSHRL, and (7) disparate impact under the ADA. See

Complaint, DE [1]. Following some discovery, the parties agreed to sever Di Iorio’s

and Montaldo’s claims from this action on February 2, 2021. See DE [25]. Plaintiff

thereafter filed the Amended Complaint on her own behalf and asserting the same

claims on March 20, 2021. See Amended Complaint, DE [26]. On May 26, 2021 the

parties consented to this Court’s jurisdiction for all purposes. See Consent to

Jurisdiction by US Magistrate Judge, dated May 26, 2021.5

Following the completion of discovery, Defendant’s Motion was filed on

November 3, 2023. See Def. Mot. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes

that Pflug’s claims are barred the Release. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is

granted, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

5 This action was originally assigned to the Honorable Dora Lizette Irizarry, then later reassigned to

the Honorable Arthur D. Spatt on April 27, 2020, and later reassigned again to the Honorable Sandra

J. Feuerstein on June 30, 2020. See Order Reassigning Case dated Apr. 27, 2020; Order Reassigning

Case dated June 30, 2020.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears

the burden of establishing that there are no issues of material fact such

that summary judgment is appropriate. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69

(2d Cir. 2004). In deciding the motion, the Court “is not to weigh the evidence but is

instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party

opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party,

and to eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361

F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986) (holding that a motion for summary judgment should be

denied if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party”).

Once the movant has met its initial burden, the party opposing summary

judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts . . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (internal

quotation omitted); see Maxton v. Underwriter Labs., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542

(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“An issue of fact is considered ‘genuine’ when a reasonable finder of

fact could render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party”). In determining

whether summary judgment is warranted, “the court’s responsibility is not to resolve

disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried,

while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving

party.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986); see Artis v. Valls,

No. 9:10-cv-427, 2012 WL 4380921, at *6, n. 10 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2012) (“It is well

established that issues of credibility are almost never to be resolved by a court on a

motion for summary judgment.”).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks summary judgment dismissing the Amended Complaint in its

entirety, arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and each of

Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. See Memorandum of Law in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment, DE [30-1], 1. As a threshold matter, the County

asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Pflug’s causes of action because

Plaintiff waived all claims against the County by signing the Release. Id., 15-16. The

Court agrees. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion

is granted, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

A. Effect of a General Release Under New York Law6

Under New York law, the enforceability of releases of employment

discrimination claims is generally analyzed under the same principles of contract law

as any other release of claims. Johnson v. Lebanese Am. Univ., 84 A.D.3d 427, 429,

6 Although the Agreement does not contain a choice-of-law provision, both parties assume New York

law governs its interpretation. Accordingly, the Court applies New York law. See Henneberry v.

Sumitomo Corp. of Am., No. 04-civ-2128, 2005 WL 991772, at *5, n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005) (“Where

the parties so assume, the Court need not address choice of law sua sponte.”).

922 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1st Dep’t 2011). To that end, “a release that is clear and

unambiguous on its face and which is knowingly and voluntarily entered into will be

enforced.” Hui-Wen Chang v. New York City Dep’t of Ed., 412 F. Supp. 3d 229, 243

(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (applying New York law). “Where the language of a release is clear,

effect must be given to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language

employed.” Tromp v. City of New York, 465 F. App’x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he mere recitation of the specific claims underlying a

settlement will not undermine the broad prophylactic effect of general release

language.” Vornado Realty Tr. v. Marubeni Sustainable Energy, Inc., 987 F. Supp.

2d 267, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying New York law).

Moreover, “the enforceability of a release does not depend on whether the

releasor was subjectively aware of the precise claims to which the release pertains

upon executing the release.” Clark v. Buffalo Wire Works Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 366, 373

(W.D.N.Y. 1998) (construing New York law). A release of claims, however, is not valid

unless the releasor receives something of value in exchange. See id. “The proper

interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court, and a

dispute on such an issue may properly be resolved by summary judgment.” Omni

Quartz, Ltd. v. CVS Corp., 287 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2002).

B. The Release Bars Plaintiff’s Claims

Here, the language of the Release is broad and unambiguous on its face,

referring to “all actions, causes of action, [and] suits . . . whatsoever in law, admiralty

or equity” Pflug has or had against the County, without temporal limitation.

Agreement, 4. Although the Release specifically refers to claims arising out of the

disciplinary charges against Plaintiff, such language does not limit an otherwise

general release of claims. See Vornado, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 278. Further, while Pflug

asserts that she believed she was only waiving her right to fight her suspension, see

Pl. 56.1 ¶ 46, Plaintiff’s subjective belief does not impact the legal effect of the

Release. See Clark, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 373 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that general

release was unenforceable based on their subjective knowledge).

In addition, it is undisputed that Pflug was represented by counsel in

connection with her disciplinary proceedings and at the time she signed the

Agreement. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 46; Pflug Decl. ¶ 53; Pflug Tr. 108:7-24. Plaintiff claims

that she signed the Agreement under duress, see Pf. 56.1 ¶ 47, although this

conclusory assertion is made without further explanation or evidentiary support and

so cannot be credited. See Arnow v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines, 980 F. Supp. 2d 477,

482 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[C]onclusory affidavits, standing alone, are insufficient to

create a triable issue of fact and to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).

Pflug further argues that the Release is invalid because she did not receive the

promised consideration in exchange. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp.”), DE [30-32], 11-13.

According to the Agreement, the County agreed to pay Plaintiff $2,466.20 in wages

for 11 out of the 30 days of her suspension, to provide Pflug with a neutral reference

and not to interfere with her application for unemployment benefits. See Agreement,

¶¶ 1-3. Plaintiff asserts that, contrary to these terms, and with no explanation or

corroborating evidence, that she was promised a full month’s compensation, see Pl.

56.1 ¶ 47, but concedes that she in fact received payment following the execution of

the Release. See Pflug Tr. 108:25-109:14. And while Plaintiff claims that Defendant

challenged her application for unemployment benefits, see Pl. 56.1 ¶ 50, the

Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s decision makes no reference to any

challenge or opposition by the County, and she was awarded the benefits she sought.

See Pflug Decl., Ex. 15. As a result, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that

Plaintiff received consideration in exchange for signing the Agreement and Release.

Given that the Release’s unambiguous language precludes any claim by

Plaintiff against the County and that Pflug knowingly agreed and received

consideration in exchange, the Court concludes that the Release bars all of Plaintiff’s

causes of action. See Hui-Wen Chang, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 244 (granting summary

judgment in defendant’s favor where plaintiff signed general release of all claims).

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all claims, and the

Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.7

7 In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff’s causes of action fail on their

merits. The Court notes, however, that in a sister case involving Pflug’s former co-plaintiff, the

Honorable Judge James M. Wicks reached the merits of Di Iorio’s claims and granted summary

judgment in favor of the County on all causes of action. See Di Iorio v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. 21-1273,

2024 WL 1908602, at *10-21 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2024) (dismissing ADA intentional discrimination,

disparate impact, failure to accommodate and retaliation clams and declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Pflug’s claims are

barred the Release. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is granted, and the Amended

Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

August 5, 2024 SO ORDERED:

/s/ Steven I. Locke

STEVEN I. LOCKE

United States Magistrate Judge