Doall v. New York State Unified Court System

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------X

DENISE DOALL,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

23-CV-0364(JS)(SIL)

-against-

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT

SYSTEM; OFFICE OF COURT

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Denise Doall, Pro Se

71 Vinton Street

Long Beach, New York 11561

For Defendants: Beth M. Kaufman, Esq.

New York State Office of the Attorney General

200 Old Country Road, Suite 240

Mineola, New York 11501

SEYBERT, District Judge:

The New York State Unified Court System (“NYSUCS”) and

the Office of Court Administration (“OCA”) (together,

“Defendants”) move, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the Complaint of pro se Plaintiff

Denise Doall (“Plaintiff”) (hereafter, the “Dismissal Motion”).

(See Dismissal Motion, in toto, ECF No. 18.) After careful

consideration, for the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Dismissal

Motion is GRANTED, which disposes of all federal claims in this

case. Consequently, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against the

Defendants and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed in its entirety

as set forth below.

BACKGROUND1

The facts set forth below are taken from Plaintiff’s

Complaint, matters of which the Court may take judicial notice,

and Plaintiff’s pro se Opposition to the instant motion. See

Felton v. Loc. Union 804, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 22-CV-2779,

2024 WL 2813896, at *3 (2d Cir. June 3, 2024) (“A court may consider

. . . on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . materials

appropriate for judicial notice.”); Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d

119, 122, n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A district court deciding a motion

to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se party

in his papers opposing the motion.”).

Plaintiff challenges the denials of her requests for an

exemption from the NYSUCS’s vaccine mandate requiring all judges

and court employees to obtain a COVID-19 vaccination (the “Vaccine

Mandate”).2 Those employees with approved exemptions for religious

1 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and

are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion; moreover, all

reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the Plaintiff.

2 “SARS-COV-2 (‘COVID-19’ or ‘COVID’) is a deadly virus that has

killed over 950,000 Americans and over 54,000 New Yorkers since

March of 2020.” Ferrelli v. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-0068,

2022 WL 673863, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (citing COVID-19

Fatalities, New York State Department of Health, found at

https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/fatalities-0, and COVID-19

Dashboard, Johns Hopkins University of Medicine, found at

or medical reasons were shielded from the consequences of

non-compliance, which included denial of access to NYSUCS premises

and disciplinary action including lost wages, lost benefits,

suspension, and termination. Ferrelli, 2022 WL 673863, at *5.

The denials of Plaintiff’s exemption requests resulted in the

termination of her employment on April 7, 2022. (Compl., ECF No.

1, at 6, ¶ III.E.)3

Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on January 19, 2023

against the Defendants on the Court’s complaint form for employment

discrimination claims. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) In her Complaint,

Plaintiff has checked the boxes on the form to allege that her

discrimination and retaliation claims are brought pursuant to

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to

2000e-17 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967, 28 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (“ADEA”), and the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 to 12117 (“ADA”).

(Id. at ¶ II.) Plaintiff also alleges that her claims are brought

pursuant to:

The Constitution of the United States of

America, including but not limited to the 1st

& 14th Amendments; GINA Title II of the

https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (each last viewed by that

Court on March 7, 2022)).

3 Citations to the record in this Memorandum and Order will use

the pagination assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System (“ECF”), which may differ from the page numbers included by

the parties.

Genetic Information Non Discrimination Act of

2008; the Rehabilitation Act; Black Letter

Federal Law; HIPPA Law 1996; Taylor Law.

(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges she is “Catholic/Christian”, and

her birth year is 1967. (Id. at ¶ III.D.) Plaintiff wrote only

“Hip” in the space that calls for the specific disability or

perceived disability claimed. (Id.)

In addition, Plaintiff has checked the boxes on the form

to allege that the Defendants unlawfully terminated her

employment, failed to accommodate her disability and to promote

her, retaliated against her, and caused her to suffer unequal terms

and conditions of employment. (Id. ¶ III.A.) In the space that

asks for any other acts of which Plaintiff complains, Plaintiff

wrote: “Forced to Covid-Test weekly (on own time) & to disclose

personal confidential medical information to supervisor & to

upload into Employers portal/Database.” (Id.) Plaintiff lists

the approximates dates for the challenged actions as follows:

(1) Forced to disclose personal/confidential medical:

on or about 9/21 through 4/22;

(2) Employer refused reasonable accommodations: on or

about 9/21 through 4/22;

(3) Religious exemption denied: 12/29/21;

(4) 1st Medical Exemption denied: 1/10/22;

(5) 2nd Medical Exemption denied: 2/9/22;

(6) 3rd Medical Exemption (Refused to Process):

2/24/22;

(7) FMLA Papers (Refused to Process): 3/28/22;

(8) Terminated: 4/7/22;

(9) Altered completed/signed off on Time & Leave Card:

on or about 4/22;

(10) Time & Leave stolen/deleted after termination: on

or about 4/22;

(11) Payroll discrepancy filed – Employer refused to

restore/compensate on or about 5/22;

(12) Failure to Promote (Interview); 12/22/22.

(-Id-.- ¶ III.B.) Plaintiff sets forth the facts underlying her

claims in a single page, reproduced here, in its entirety:

My employer arbitrarily and capriciously

changed the terms of my employment by

mandating an intrusive bodily procedure to

inject foreign substances into my body.

It is not legal to require an unlicensed

vaccine. All Covid-19 vaccines have not been

approved or licensed by the FDA. They have

been authorized for emergency use only.

As a child of God created in his divine image;

I must honor my body as a temple of God. The

life of the flesh is in the blood (Leviticus

17:11) and I can not alter my genetic code;

DNA.

Covid-19 vaccines are only available under

Emergency Use Authorizations (EUA) with a

MessengerRNA/MRNA delivery system. MRNA

alters Human Genome coded in DNA. It is

discriminatory to deny someone a job because

they choose to function with their God-given

genetic makeup from birth.

My employer forced me to disclose my

personal/confidential medical from on or about

September 2021 through April 2022.

My employer refused me a reasonable

accommodation including, but not limited to

working from home from: on or about September

2021 through April 2022. After my employer

required me to work from home during the

height of the pandemic from: on or about March

2020 through June 2021 with positive and

successful results.

My employer denied and refused to accommodate

my sincere Religious beliefs and denied my

exemption on 12/29/21;

My employer denied my 1st medical exemption on

1/10/22. At that time I had Covid.

My employer denied my 2nd medical exemption on

2/9/2022. At that time I had just recovered

from Covid.

My employer refused to process my 3rd medical

exemption on 2/24/22. At that time I

possessed natural immunity.

My employer refused to process my FMLA

documentation for the period of March 28, 2022

through May 6, 2022.

My employer terminated me on April 7, 2022

after 24 years of service and within 6 months

of my retirement.

My employer altered my completed/signed off on

time and cards: on or about 4/22.

My employer stole/deleted my accrued time and

leave credits after my termination: on or

about 5/22.

My employer refused to interview and promote

me for a position that I worked and tested

for: on or about 12/22.

(-Id-.- at 6 (designated as “5(A)” by Plaintiff).)

For relief, Plaintiff seeks to be reinstated4 with back

pay to the current pay scale including incremental increases,

raises, benefits, and bonuses. (Id. ¶ V.) Further, Plaintiff

seeks restoration of time, leave, and retirement credits, as well

as reimbursement for union and medical benefits, COBRA payments,

contract bonuses, and any further “relief as deemed equitable by

the Court.” (Id.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was issued a right-to-sue letter on October

15, 2022 from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and has

annexed a copy of said letter to her Complaint. (Id. at 9.) On

January 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court

together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF

Nos. 1-2.) By Order dated June 8, 2023, the undersigned granted

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered

service of the summonses and Complaint upon the Defendants. (ECF

No. 6.)5

4 Defendants assert, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff

was reinstated to her former position as a Senior Court Clerk on

June 22, 2023, and that she accepted a promotion to the position

of Associate Court Clerk beginning on November 9, 2023. (Support

Memo, ECF No. 18-1 at 1 n. 3-4.)

5 The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Justin

Barry, Nancy Barry, and the “Secret ‘Unqualified’ Committee Panel”

without prejudice because her Complaint did not include any factual

allegations against any of these parties and, thus, did not comply

with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff

With leave of the Court (see Elec. Orders dated Oct. 4,

2023, Oct. 18, 2023, Dec. 8, 2023, and Dec. 13, 2023), Defendants

filed the instant, fully-briefed Dismissal Motion on January 2,

2024 including Plaintiff’s Opposition (hereafter, the

“Opposition”), and the Defendants’ Reply. (See Dismissal Motion,

ECF No. 18; see also Support Memo, ECF No. 18-1; Opp’n, ECF No.

18-3; Reply, ECF No. 18-4.) Defendants contend Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim under each of the laws cited by Plaintiff

in her Complaint. (See Support Memo; Reply.) Further, Defendants

assert Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the ADA and the ADEA

are also barred by sovereign immunity. (Id.)

Plaintiff appears to have abandoned her claims brought

under “Black Letter Federal Law, . . . [and the] Taylor Law” as

she had alleged in the Complaint because she now asserts in her

Opposition that her rights were violated under:

1. (Religion) The Constitution of the United States of

America including but not limited to the 1st and

14th Amendments;

2. (Religion) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act;

3. (Religion) 42 US Code section 2000a;

4. (Religion) 42 US Code section 2000e-2;

5. (Age) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967;

6. (GINA) Title II of the Genetic Information;

7. Nondiscrimination Act of 2008;

8. (Disability) The American’s with Disabilities Act;

9. (Disability) The Rehabilitation Act.

was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint in order to cure

this defect. (Id.) However, Plaintiff has not done so.

(Compare Compl., ¶ II, with Opp’n at 1.) Plaintiff also asserts:

“My HIPPA rights were violated by being forced to test weekly;

share results with my courthouse and upload results into a portal.

In addition to being forced to provide my medical status weekly;

I was forced to provide my personal medical documentation in order

to request a medical exemption.” (Opp’n at 3-4.)

While Plaintiff largely repeats the facts alleged in her

Complaint, her Opposition also includes citation to, and a summary

of, a 2023 New York State Public Employment Relations Board opinion

relating to the obligation of NYSUCS to bargain with employee

unions concerning the implementation of procedures relating to the

adoption of vaccine and testing mandates. Further, Plaintiff

includes the following additional facts in her Opposition: (1)

after being terminated, Plaintiff “was deactivated off of and

passed over on all of the promotional lists I was on. Thereby

loosing access to choice Courts and Locations”; and (2) Defendants

“further compromised my rights by allowing unvaccinated attorneys,

agencies, departments, visitors, family members, friends, support

personnel, jurors, general public and press in to the courthouses

while simultaneously barring and terminating me.” (Id. at 4

(emphasis in original).) Finally, Plaintiff asserts for the first

time:

After careful exemption comparisons with

multiple similarly situated co-workers in

several different counties and courthouses;

one conclusion can be drawn. There was a

disproportionate number of exemptions

approved for my co-workers who currently or

previously held the tile of Court Officer and

who currently carry a firearm. I believe that

“The Committee” did have prior knowledge of

everyone’s status and that my exemption was

denied, in part, because I do not carry a

weapon. Additionally, after careful exemption

comparisons with multiple similarly situated

co-workers in several different counties and

courthouses; a second conclusion can be drawn.

There was a disproportionate number of

exemptions disapproved for my co-workers

nearing a retirement benchmark; 5, 10, 15, 20,

25, 30 years. I believe that “The Committee”

did have prior knowledge of everyone’s status

and that my exemption was denied, in part,

because I was eligible to retire within 6

months.

(Id.) Thus, Plaintiff concludes that the vaccination mandate has

been rescinded because “it was illegal and a violation of the U.S.

Constitution and the Civil Rights Act.” (Id.) Further, she

asserts that, as of December 2, 2023, she has “not been made whole”

because, for the time she “was illegally terminated”, her

retirement credits have not been restored, nor has she been

reinstated “to the current pay including increments, raises,

benefits, and bonuses[.]” (Id.)6 Plaintiff further contends she

has not received the time and leave credits that she would have

accrued in addition to the back pay and other payments to which

Plaintiff claims entitlement for the period during which her

employment was terminated. (Id.)

6 (See supra note 4.)

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that dismissal is appropriate if

the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept as true all

factual statements alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” McCarthy v. Dun &

Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). To survive a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must state

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Clark

v. Hanley, 89 F.4th 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2023) (“On a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court’s task is to assess

the pleadings to determine whether they contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face.”).

A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Consequently, a complaint is

properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, “the allegations in

a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement

to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. Similarly, a complaint is

also properly dismissed “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Although all allegations contained in

the complaint are presumed true” at the motion to dismiss stage,

“this principle is ‘inapplicable to legal conclusions’ or

‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Szewczyk v. City of

N.Y., No. 15-CV-0918, 2016 WL 3920216, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 14,

2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (alteration in original).

Where “[a] plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is

obliged to construe his [or her] pleadings liberally.” McEachin

v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). Because

Plaintiff’s submissions were filed pro se, the Court will liberally

construe them “‘to raise the strongest arguments that they

suggest.’” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d

Cir. 2014) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.

1994)). Notwithstanding, the Court is not “bound to accept

conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as

factual conclusions.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98,

104 (2d Cir. 2011).

II. Analysis

A. Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law

or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one

of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.

U.S. CONST. amend. XI. “‘The reach of the Eleventh Amendment has

. . . been interpreted to extend beyond the terms of its text to

bar suits in federal courts against states, by their own citizens

or by foreign sovereigns . . . .’” State Emps. Bargaining Agent

Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting

W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation v. Orange County, 395 F.3d 18, 20 (2d

Cir. 2004)) (ellipses in original). Thus, “[t]he Eleventh

Amendment to the Constitution bars suits against a state in federal

court unless that state has consented to the litigation or Congress

has permissibly enacted legislation specifically overriding the

state’s immunity.” Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 667 (2d Cir.

1990) (citations omitted); see also Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of

Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). This bar also applies

to claims against State agencies and gives a state government

immunity from suit, not just from liability. Puerto Rico Aqueduct

& Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (citation

omitted); Quirk v. DiFiore, 582 F. Supp. 3d 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y.

2022) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity, if applicable here, would

preclude all of [plaintiff’s] claims regardless of whether the

sought-after relief is monetary or injunctive.” (citing Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101–02 (1984);

further citation omitted)).

“It is well-established that, as an agency or arm of the

State of New York, the New York Unified Court System, [and] the

Office of Court Administration, . . . are immune from suit under

the Eleventh Amendment.” Tomczyk v. N.Y. Unified Ct. Sys., No.

19-CV-2753(JS)(AYS), 2019 WL 2437849, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 10,

2019) (citing Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009)

(“[T]he New York State Unified Court System is an arm of the State

. . ., and is therefore protected by Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity”)); Quirk, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 113 (“The Second Circuit

has recognized the New York State Unified Court System, of which

OCA is the administrative arm, is a state instrumentality protected

by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.” (citing Pietri v.

N.Y.S. Off. of Ct. Admin., 936 F. Supp. 2d 120, 127 (E.D.N.Y.

2013); further citation omitted)).

1. The Constitutional Claims

Plaintiff’s claims alleging a denial of her First and

Fourteenth Amendments rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”) are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.7 See Trivedi v.

7 That sovereign immunity bars Section 1983 claims against the

Defendants should come as no surprise to Plaintiff given that such

claims were dismissed for this reason in a prior case brought by

Plaintiff. See Doall v. Suffolk County Fam. Ct., No. 05-CV-5891,

2008 WL 11412188, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2008).

N.Y.S. Unified Ct. Sys. Off. of Ct. Admin., 818 F. Supp. 2d 712,

734 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against OCA as

barred by sovereign immunity), aff’d sub nom., Seck v. Off. of Ct.

Admin., 582 F. App’x 47 (2d Cir. 2014)); Mora v. N.Y.S. Unified

Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-10322, 2023 WL 6126486, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

19, 2023) (dismissing Section 1983 claim alleged against NYSUCS

and OCA as barred by Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity)

(quoting Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366)). Moreover, Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claims are not plausible because the Defendants are not

“persons” within the meaning of the statute. Will v. Mich. Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding “neither a State

nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’

under § 1983”); Coughlin v. N.Y.S. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-

4002, 2023 WL 7091904, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2023) (finding

“the claims against [NYS]UCS and OCA are barred because they are

not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Since Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, they are not

plausible and are thus dismissed without leave to amend.

2. The ADA and ADEA Claims

Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the

ADA and the ADEA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.8 With

8 Again, like her Section 1983 claims, it should come as no

surprise to Plaintiff that her ADA claims are barred by the

regard to the ADA, “[t]he Supreme Court has unequivocally held

that Title I of the ADA does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment

immunity, Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374, 121 S.

Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001), and New York State has not

waived immunity for ADA claims, Nicolae v. Office of Vocational &

Educ. Servs. for Individuals with Disabilities, 257 F. App’x 455,

457 (2d Cir. 2007).” Pietri, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 128-29 (citing

Kilcullen v. N.Y. Dep’t of Transp., 55 F. App’x 583, 584 (2d Cir.

2003)); Mone v. N.Y.S. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 21-CV-6914, 2023 WL

4424093, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 21-CV-6914, 2023 WL 4073770 (E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2023)

(dismissing ADA discrimination and retaliation claims against

employer NYSUCS as barred by state sovereign immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment), aff’d, No. 23-CV-964, 2024 WL 1109258 (2d

Cir. Mar. 14, 2024); Canales–Jacobs v. N.Y. Office of Court Admin.,

640 F. Supp. 2d 482, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Title I [of the ADA]

does not abrogate the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the State of

New York or its agencies and officials.”)).

Likewise, as to the ADEA, the Supreme Court has long

held that a claim brought under the ADEA against a state is barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528

Eleventh Amendment given that such claims raised in a prior action

brought by Plaintiff were dismissed for this same reason. See

Doall, 2008 WL 11412188, at *4.

U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (“[W]e hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise

of Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

ADEA’s purported abrogation of the States’ sovereign immunity is

accordingly invalid.”); see also McGinty v. State of N.Y., 251

F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing the “Supreme Court

unequivocally stated that ‘the ADEA does not validly abrogate the

States’ sovereign immunity’” (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91)). Nor

has New York State consented to being sued under the ADEA. See

Darcy v. Lippman, 356 F. App’x 434, 436 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary

order).

Thus, Plaintiff’s ADA and ADEA claims against the

Defendants are dismissed without leave to amend because they are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Darcy, 356 F. App’x at 436

(holding ADA and ADEA claims against the New York Unified Court

System were barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Canales–Jacobs v.

N.Y.S. Off. of Ct. Admin., 640 F. Supp. 2d 482, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

(“[P]laintiff’s ADA claims seeking retroactive and prospective

relief against the Office of Court Administration must be and are

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. . . . The

Eleventh Amendment also bars all claims asserted under the ADEA,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, which prohibits discrimination based on age,

from being asserted in federal court against a state, its agencies

and any state officers acting in their official capacities.”); see

also Trivedi, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (finding ADA claim barred by

sovereign immunity because “[t]he OCA is a government entity that,

pursuant to sovereign immunity, is not amenable to suit”).9

B. Rehabilitation Act Claims

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits

disability-based discrimination by government agencies and other

recipients of federal funds, and provides, in relevant part:

No otherwise qualified individual with a

disability . . . shall, solely by reason of

her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of,

or be subjected to discrimination under any

program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Gentleman v. State Univ. of N.Y. Stony Brook,

No. 21-CV-1102, 2022 WL 1447381, at *3 (2d Cir. May 9, 2022)

(summary order). The legal standards and analysis for claims under

the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the New York State Human

Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) are the same. Gentleman, 2022 WL 1447381,

at *3; see also Bahl v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med. of N.Y.

Inst. of Tech., 683 F. Supp. 3d 224, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (“Courts

interpret the NYSHRL ‘coextensively’ with the Rehabilitation Act,

Williams v. MTA Bus Co., 44 F.4th 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2022), and

treat claims under both statutes through the same legal standards

as claims under the [ADA].” (citing Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machines

9 However, New York has waived sovereign immunity for damages

suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act. See Marino v. City

Univ. of N.Y., 18 F. Supp. 3d 320, 331-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

(collecting cases). The Court proceeds to address said claims.

Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 94, 95 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted));

see also Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir.

2002); Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir.

1999)”.10

1. The Discrimination Claim

To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under

the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff is

a “qualified individual” with a disability; (2) the defendant

“receive[s] federal funding;” and (3) the plaintiff was “denied

the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated

against by defendants, by reason of [] [her] disability.”

Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted). Here, Defendants assert Plaintiff “fails to

allege that she is disabled within the meaning of the

Rehabilitation Act.” (Support Memo at 17.) The Court agrees.

“A person has a ‘disability’ under the ADA (or

Rehabilitation Act) if he has: (a) ‘a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more [of his] major life

activities,’(b) ‘a record of such an impairment,’ or (c) is

“regarded as having such an impairment.’” Veldran v. Dejoy, 839 F.

10 Thus, even if Plaintiff’s ADA claims were not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment, the following analysis shows that such claims

still would have failed.

App’x 577, 579 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29

U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (emphasis added)). “Major life activities

include ‘caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking,

seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.’” Id.

(citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)). “‘An impairment need not

prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual

from performing a major life activity in order to be considered

substantially limiting’; however, ‘not every impairment will

constitute a disability.’” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2

(j)(ii)). Importantly:

Only where an employer knew, or reasonably

should have known, that the employee has a

disability within the meaning of the ADA [or

Rehabilitation Act] does the employer have a

duty to “engage in an interactive process with

the[ ] employee[ ] and in that way work

together to assess whether an employee’s

disability can be reasonably accommodated.”

Id. (quoting Costabile v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 951 F.3d

77, 81 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up)).

Here, the Complaint alleges only that Plaintiff’s

disability is “hip” without any further explanation. (See Compl.

¶ III.D.) Wholly absent are any allegations from which the Court

could reasonably construe that any impairment of Plaintiff’s hip

limits one or more of her major life activities, much less

“substantially”. (Id., in toto.) Nor are there any facts

suggesting Plaintiff’s “employer knew, or reasonably should have

known” about her alleged hip impairment. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff’s

disability discrimination claim based upon a hip impairment fails

as a matter of law; hence, this claim is dismissed.

Moreover, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s

Complaint to include a claim that her status as a non-vaccinated

individual caused her to be perceived or regarded as disabled,

such claim similarly misses the mark. In a recent, similar case

dismissing ADA and Rehabilitation Act causes of action brought

against the NYSUCS by former employees claiming their termination

for noncompliance with the NYSUCS’s COVID-19 vaccination policy

constituted disability discrimination and retaliation, the Court

explained: “That an employer requires an employee to follow

generally applicable COVID-19 safety rules and enforces those

policies when an employee fails to comply does not, without more,

support the inference that the employer regards the employee as

disabled.” Mone, 2023 WL 4424093, at *9. In reaching this

determination, the Mone court further observed: “Courts across

the country confronted with substantively identical challenges to

employer vaccine mandates under the ADA have reached the same

conclusion.” Id. (citing Speaks v. Health Sys. Mgmt., Inc., No.

22-CV-0077, 2022 WL 3448649, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2022)

(“Refusing to get a vaccine required by an employer is not itself

an ‘impairment’ of any sort. Rather, it reflects a personal choice

by [plaintiff] that, while [plaintiff’s] to make in this context,

cannot be considered an impairment under the ADA.”) (emphasis in

original); Shklyar v. Carboline Co., 616 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926 (E.D.

Mo. 2022) (finding plaintiff failed to plausibly allege defendant

regarded her as disabled when defendant implemented COVID-19

policies because to find otherwise “would require inferring that

[defendant] regarded all of its . . . employees as having a

disability”), aff’d, 2023 WL 1487782 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 2023)); see

also Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 3d 264,

278-79 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (“The allegation that Defendant perceived

Plaintiff as potentially infectious fails to plausibly allege a

claim that the Defendant regarded Plaintiff as having an

impairment.”); D’Cunha v. Northwell Health Sys., No. 22-CV-0988,

2023 WL 2266520, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023) (rejecting ADA

claim where plaintiff maintained she was “regarded as” having an

impairment based on risk of developing COVID-19 in the future);

Cagle v. Weill Cornell Medic., 680 F. Supp. 3d 428, 438 (S.D.N.Y.

2023) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim since “[r]eligious faith

is not a disability” and plaintiff “d[id] not allege that Defendant

was aware of her disability or discriminated against her on the

basis of her disability”); Newell v. State Univ. of N.Y.

Westchester Comm. Coll., No. 22-CV-8524, 2023 WL 4082030, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2023); Librandi v. Alexion Pharm., Inc., No.

22-CV-1126, 2023 WL 3993741, at *5-6 (D. Conn. June 14, 2023).

Thus, Plaintiff’s perceived disability discrimination claim

arising from her vaccination status fails to plausibly allege she

was disabled or regarded as disabled.

Furthermore, the factual allegations set forth by

Plaintiff in her Opposition make clear that decisions concerning

her employment were not the result of her vaccination status.

Rather, according to Plaintiff, the denials of her vaccination

exemption requests were either because of her retirement

eligibility status or her firearm status. (See Opp’n at 4.)

However, neither of these proffered reasons suggests that the

conduct of which Plaintiff complains was because of any disability

-- actual or perceived. See Lorenz v. Erie Cmty. Coll., No.

14-CV-0210, 2018 WL 2939492, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018)

(dismissing discrimination claims where, “[e]ven assuming that

[plaintiff] was targeted by [d]efendants, he ‘has not shown that

such treatment occurred because of [his] age [or disability], which

is a sine qua non for [a] discrimination claim’” (quoting Weichman

v. Chubb & Son, 552 F. Supp. 2d 271, 286 (D. Conn. 2008))). Indeed,

“a plaintiff’s mere subjective belief that he was discriminated

against because of his [protected characteristics] does not

sustain a . . . discrimination claim.” Bethea v. JP Morgan Chase

& Co., No. 15-CV-3544, 2019 WL 4805141, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,

2019) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s

Rehabilitation Act claims alleging discrimination fail to state a

claim for relief and are thus DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

2. The Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff also claims to have suffered retaliation for

refusing the COVID-19 vaccination. (Compl. ¶ III.A.) In this

regard, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that her employer refused

to process her Family and Medical Leave Act papers, altered her

time and leave cards, failed to promote her, forced her to disclose

personal and confidential medical information, and terminated her

employment. (Id.) Dismissal of Plaintiff discrimination claim

does not preclude her retaliation claim. See, e.g., Kelly v.

N.Y.S. Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 403 (E.D.N.Y.

2016) (stating a claim of retaliation for protected conduct is a

separate claim from a discrimination claim and does not depend on

the success of the employee’s disability claim) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

A prima facie case of retaliation under the

Rehabilitation Act requires: “(i) a plaintiff was engaged in

protected activity; (ii) the alleged retaliator knew that

plaintiff was involved in protected activity; (iii) an adverse

decision or course of action was taken against plaintiff; and (iv)

a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the

adverse action.” Natofsky v. City of N.Y., 921 F.3d 337, 353 (2d

Cir. 2019) (quoting Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 287

F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted)). For

a retaliation claim, an adverse employment action is one that “well

might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination” and “is broader than the adverse action

element of a discrimination claim.” Anderson v. City of N.Y.,

No. 22-CV-3990, 2024 WL 183103, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2024)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To plausibly

allege a causal connection between protected activity and an

adverse employment action, the plaintiff must allege that the

retaliation was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action,

i.e., that ‘the adverse action would not have occurred in the

absence of the retaliatory motive.” Mone, 2023 WL 4424093, at *11

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Evans v.

N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-CV-7901, 2023 WL 8034449, at *9

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2023) (dismissing retaliation claim where

“COVID policy applied to all employees and [plaintiff’s] own

pleadings show he was disciplined as a consequence of the refusal

to comply with the policy, rather than as retaliation for

opposition to it”).

Here, even assuming Plaintiff’s opposition to the

Vaccine Mandate was protected activity, she has wholly failed to

allege a causal connection between that activity and the alleged

adverse actions. Rather, Plaintiff acknowledges that the

challenged employment decisions were made because she “do[es] not

carry a weapon” and/or “was eligible to retire within 6 months.”

(Opp’n at 4.) Neither of these reasons are related to Plaintiff’s

alleged protected activity; hence, by her own admission,

Plaintiff’s opposition to the Vaccine Mandate is not the “but for”

cause for any of the challenged actions. Thus, Plaintiff fails to

plausibly allege a retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act

and such claim, too, is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

C. Title VII Claims

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2. Plaintiff alleges she is a “Catholic/Christian” and

suffered discrimination and retaliation on account of her religion

in violation of Title VII. (See Compl. ¶ III.D.)

1. The Religious Discrimination Claim

Plaintiff claims, on December 29, 2021, Defendants

failed to accommodate her religious beliefs by denying her request

for a religious exemption to the Vaccine Mandate in violation of

Title VII. (See Compl. ¶ III.E.) A prima facie case for religious

discrimination based on a failure to accommodate one’s religion

requires allegations that plaintiff: “(1) held a bona fide

religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2)

informed [her] employer[] of this belief; and (3) [was] disciplined

for failure to comply with the conflicting employment

requirement.” Adams v. N.Y.S. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-9739,

2023 WL 5003593, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2023) (citing Baker v.

The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up)).

Defendants do not contest Plaintiff held a bona fide

religious belief. (Support Memo at 13.) Rather, they contend

“Plaintiff fails to plead that she informed Defendants about an

alleged bona fide religious belief, and fails to allege any job

requirement with which her purported beliefs conflicted.” (Id.)

Defendants further argue Plaintiff “fails to allege any facts that

could support an inference that she suffered any adverse employment

action based on her failure to comply with any existing employment

requirement.” (Id.)

Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff did not inform her

employer about her bona fide religious belief is a nonstarter.

Plaintiff alleged she applied for a religious exemption to the

Vaccine Mandate, which was denied on December 29, 2021 (see Compl.

¶¶ III.B(3), III.E), thereby satisfying the first two elements of

a prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII.

See Adams, 2023 WL 5003593, at *2 (citing Corrales v. Montefiore

Med. Ctr., No. 22-CV-3219, 2023 WL 2711415, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.

30, 2023) (“[Plaintiff] alleged that she notified [defendant]

about her particular religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccine

by notifying [a supervisor] of her desire to request a religious

exemption to the vaccination policy.”)); Riley v. N.Y.C. Health &

Hosps. Corp., No. 22-CV-2736, 2023 WL 2118073, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Feb. 17, 2023) (finding plaintiff made out a prima facie case of

religious discrimination under Title VII by alleging, inter alia,

she had requested a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate).

The Court next considers whether Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged she suffered an adverse employment action for failure to

comply with the conflicting employment requirement on account of

her religion. The Court finds she has not. Plaintiff alleges her

request for a religious exemption to the Vaccine Mandate was denied

on December 29, 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ III.B(3), III.E.) After that

denial, however, Plaintiff abandoned her religious reasons for

refusing to comply with the Vaccine Mandate and, instead, sought

an exemption for medical reasons. The denial of Plaintiff’s first

medical-based request occurred on January 10, 2022. Yet, during

the 12-day period between her December 29, 2021 religious exemption

denial and her January 10, 2022 medical exemption denial, Plaintiff

does not allege that any employment actions -- adverse or otherwise

–- were taken against her, which is fatal to her religious

discrimination claim. Rather, the date of the first alleged

adverse employment action was February 24, 2022, when Plaintiff

claims her “employer refused to process my 3rd medical exemption.”

(Compl. ¶ III.E.) Thus, in the absence of an adverse employment

action based upon her religion, Plaintiff has failed to allege a

prima facie case of religious discrimination. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim alleging religious discrimination is

DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

2. The Retaliation Claim

The Second Circuit recently reiterated:

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under Title VII, “a plaintiff must demonstrate

that (1) she engaged in protected activity,

(2) the defendant was aware of that activity,

(3) she was subjected to a retaliatory action

. . . that w[as] materially adverse, and (4)

there was a causal connection between the

protected activity and the materially adverse

action.”

Russo v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 23-716-CV, 2024 WL

2350314, at *2 (2d Cir. May 23, 2024) (quoting Carr v. N.Y.C.

Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023)).

As with her Title VII discrimination claim, Plaintiff

has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of

retaliation. For the reasons set forth above (see supra at 27-

28), Plaintiff has not alleged any retaliatory action as a result

of her request for a religious exemption to the Vaccine Mandate;

therefore, her Title VII retaliation claim fails. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim is likewise DISMISSED

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).11

D. The GINA Claim

Plaintiff’s claim under GINA similarly lacks merit.

“GINA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise

discriminate against an employee based on genetic information or

testing.” Powell v. Lab Corp., 789 F. App’x 237, 240 (2d Cir.

2019) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s GINA claims for

failure to state a claim (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1))).

“The Act defines ‘genetic information’ to include: (1) an

employee’s genetic tests; (2) the genetic tests of the employee’s

family members; or (3) the manifestation of a disease or disorder

in the employee’s family members.” Perry v. John A. Guerrieri,

DDS PLLC, 518 F. Supp. 3d 665, 676 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (granting

summary judgment dismissing GINA claims for failure to state a

claim); see also Guan v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Env’t Conserv., No.

16-CV-2180, 2019 WL 1284260, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019)

(providing same definition of “genetic information” and granting

11 Further, Plaintiff’s own allegations confirm that her religious

belief and/or her request for a religious exemption were not the

“but for” cause for any claimed adverse actions. To be sure, as

noted above (see supra at 24-25); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union

Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding a

“plaintiff must plausibly allege that the retaliation was a

‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action”), Plaintiff

asserts she was mistreated as a result of her retirement status

and/or her firearm status, neither of which have any relation to

her religion.

motion to dismiss pro se plaintiff’s GINA claim). A prima facie

claim for genetic discrimination under GINA requires a plaintiff

allege: “(1) that she was an employee; (2) who was discharged or

deprived of employment opportunities; (3) because of information

from her genetic tests.” Perry, 518 F. Supp. 3d at 676–77; Guan,

2019 WL 1284260, at *6 (describing same elements of GINA claim).

Although Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the first two

requirements of a GINA prima facie case, she has not -- and cannot

-- satisfy the third requirement because “[a]sking whether a person

or their family members have received a vaccine—as opposed to

asking whether they have had a particular disease—is not a request

for genetic information.” Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist.,

No. 22-CV-01569, 2024 WL 149131, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024)

(citing Rides v. City of Chicago, No. 22-CV-2740, 2023 WL 6126726,

at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2023) (holding city’s request that

employee disclose whether he had received a COVID-19 vaccine did

not violate GINA); Harden v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 23-CV-0176,

2023 WL 3310172, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2023) (dismissing GINA

claim based on COVID-19 vaccination requirement because plaintiff

failed to show his “vaccination status meets th[e] statutory

definition of ‘genetic information’”)).

Nor does Defendants’ requirement that Plaintiff test

periodically for COVID-19 and report the test results violate GINA.

“Multiple courts have held that tests for COVID-19 do not analyze

genetic information and, therefore, do not “‘qualify as genetic

tests under GINA.’” Russo, 2024 WL 149131, at *6 (quoting McKinley

v. Princeton Univ., No. 22-CV-5069, 2023 WL 3168026, at *3 (D.N.J.

Apr. 28, 2023) (granting motion to dismiss plaintiff’s GINA claim

against employer)); see also, e.g., Taylor v. Vanderbilt Univ.,

No. 22-CV-465, 2023 WL 2398761, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2023),

report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2390678 (M.D. Tenn.

Mar. 7, 2023) (granting motion to dismiss plaintiff’s GINA claim

because plaintiff did not allege facts suggesting employer used

COVID-19 tests to obtain genetic information).

Here, since Plaintiff has not alleged Defendants used

COVID-19 tests to collect her genetic information, her allegations

do not plausibly allege a GINA violation. Indeed, “requesting

that Plaintiff, as required by state law, show proof of having

received a COVID-19 vaccine” does not violate GINA. Russo, 2024

WL 149131, at *6. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s GINA claim fails to

state a claim for relief thereby warranting its DISMISSAL pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6).

E. HIPAA Claims

Insofar as Plaintiff seeks relief under HIPAA,12 these

claims, too, fail. It is well-established there is no private

12 The Court understands Plaintiff’s reference to “HIPPA Law 1996”

to be the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act of 1996

(“HIPAA”). (See Compl. ¶ II.)

right of action under HIPAA. See, e.g., Meadows v. United Servs.,

Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2020) (“HIPAA prohibits the

disclosure of medical records without a patient’s consent. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to 1320d-7. But the statute does not expressly

create a private cause of action for individuals to enforce this

prohibition.”); Iosilevich v. City of N.Y., No. 21-CV-4717, 2022

WL 19272855, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022) (dismissing HIPAA claim

because “there is no private right of action under HIPAA” (citing

Moussa v. Sullivan, No. 22-CV-3709, 2022 WL 2906177, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2022); further citation omitted)). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims under HIPAA are DISMISSED pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6).

III. State Law Claims

Having dismissed all of Plaintiff’s federal claims,13 in

its discretion, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over her remaining state law claims against the

Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction . . . .”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which

13 To the extent not explicitly stated herein, the Court has

considered the balance of Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to

the Dismissal Motion and find them to be without merit.

all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine

-- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -- will

point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining

state-law claims.”); One Commc’ns Corp. v. J.P. Morgan SBIC LLC,

381 F. App’x 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“If all of a plaintiff’s

federal claims are dismissed, a district court is well within its

discretion to decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over any

state law claims.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims

against the Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IV. Leave to Amend the Complaint

“It is the usual practice upon granting a motion to

dismiss to allow leave to replead.” Cruz v. TD Bank, N.A., 742

F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 2013); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)

(“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so

requires.”). However, “[l]eave may be denied for good reason,

including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to

the opposing party.” TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d

493, 505 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Bischoff v.

Albertsons Cos., Inc., No. 22-CV-4961, 2023 WL 4187494, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2023) (denying plaintiff’s request to amend

“because ‘[t]he problem[s] with [plaintiff's] causes of action

[are] substantive,’ and ‘better pleading will not cure [them]’”

(quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)

(alterations in original))).

The Court has carefully considered whether leave to

amend the Complaint is warranted here. For the reasons set forth

above, it is clear from the face of the Complaint that the defects

in Plaintiff’s claims are substantive and cannot be cured with

better pleading. Thus, further amendment of the Complaint would

be futile. Moreover, Plaintiff was previously granted leave to

file an Amended Complaint by Order dated June 8, 2023 and elected

not to do so. (See Order, ECF No. 6.) Consequently, further leave

to file an Amended Complaint is denied. Such denial is without

prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing any valid claims she may have

against the Defendants in state court.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

Defendants’ Dismissal Motion (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED as set forth

above; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED in

its entirety as set forth above; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith; therefore, in forma pauperis

status is DENIED for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall:

(1) enter Judgment accordingly in favor of Defendants; (2) mail a

copy of this Memorandum and Order and the Judgment to the pro se

Plaintiff at her address of record; (3) note such mailing on the

docket; and (4) mark this case CLOSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT_____

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: July 2, 2024

Central Islip, New York