Stone v. The Board of County Commissioners for the County of Quay

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

STATE of NEW MEXICO ex rel. BUCKY

STONE; STATE of NEW MEXICO ex

rel. DUSTY STONE; BUCKY STONE,

INDIVIDUALLY; AND DUSTY STONE,

INDIVIDUALLY AND d/b/a STONE RANCH,

Plaintiffs,

v. 1:22-cv-00805-MV-JMR

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

FOR the COUNTY OF QUAY; LARRY

MOORE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS QUAY

COUNTY ROAD SUPERINTENDENT;

EVELYN WALLIN; AND LARRY WALLIN,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY

AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO ALLOW DISCOVERY

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on defendants Board of County Commissioners

for the County of Quay and Larry Moore’s (“County Defendants”) Motion to Stay Proceedings

Pending Outcome of County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 12, 2024. Doc. 51.

Plaintiffs filed a response (Doc. 56), and the County Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 62). Having

read the parties’ submissions and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that the

County Defendants’ motion to stay discovery is well taken and will GRANT it. Because the

Court grants the motion to stay discovery, the Court will DENY plaintiffs’ Motion to Allow

Discovery Against County Defendants (Doc. 49).

“Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of

litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[.]”

Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (quotation marks omitted); Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th

Cir. 1992) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991)). The doctrine of qualified immunity

protects government officials not only from the costs associated with trial, but also from “the

other burdens of litigation,” including “the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” Mitchell, 472

U.S. at 526. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving

immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 232 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he driving force behind [the] creation of

the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims against

government officials will be resolved prior to discovery.” Id. at 231 (quotation marks, brackets,

and citation omitted). Thus, in general, when a defendant asserts the defense of qualified

immunity on a motion to dismiss, the district court must stay discovery until the immunity issue

is resolved. Workman, 958 F.2d at 336.

There is no dispute that Mr. Moore has raised the defense of qualified immunity in his

motion to dismiss. Doc. 50 at 9–10. Nevertheless, relying on the case of Maxey by Maxey v.

Fulton, 890 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1989), plaintiffs oppose the motion requesting a stay of

discovery. Doc. 56 at 1. Maxey, however, does not support allowing discovery before the Court

rules on the pending motion to dismiss. Maxey, as plaintiffs assert, did hold that “discovery is

permissible where the plaintiff adequately alleges a violation.” Maxey, 890 F.2d at 282.

However, whether plaintiffs adequately allege a violation in this case is exactly what the subject

motion to dismiss seeks to test. See id. (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (“Unless the plaintiff’s

allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified

immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”)) The motion to

dismiss must be denied in this case before discovery can begin. Maxey, 890 F.2d at 283 (noting

that only “the denial of the motion to dismiss foreclosed [defendant’s] claim of immunity from

all discovery.”) Nothing in Maxey supports allowing discovery prior to the Court’s ruling on the

pending motion to dismiss.

Finally, the Court notes that “limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the

district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 n.14 (1998) (citation omitted). But, unlike a motion

for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint and

requires no additional discovery. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 674–75 (2009).

The Court will stay discovery as to all defendants. Standard practice in this District is to

stay discovery—as to all defendants—when the defense of qualified immunity has been raised.

See Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Schs., No. 11cv422 JB-KBM, 2012 WL 6846393, at *10 (D.N.M.

Dec. 20, 2012) (unpublished); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 685–86 (noting that a defendant

raising the defense of qualified immunity “would not be free from the burdens of discovery” if

“pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants” because he would still need to “participate

in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes

prejudice to [his] position”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Board of County Commissioners for the

County of Quay and Larry Moore’s Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Outcome of County

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 51) is GRANTED. Discovery in this case shall be stayed,

as to all defendants, pending resolution of the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’

Complaint and Memorandum in Support Thereof (Doc. 50), or until further order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ Motion to Allow Discovery Against County

Defendants (Doc. 49) is DENIED. The Court will set a scheduling order once the pending

dispositive motions (Docs. 6, 50) have been decided, if appropriate.

NNIFER M. ROZZON

nited States Magistrate Judge