LE. L. v. BURLINGTON COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

Le. L.,

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 20-6027 (RMB-MSJ)

v.

OPINION (PUBLIC)

DETECTIVE JENNIFER

MARCHESE,

Defendant.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff Le. L. is a sergeant in the United States Air Force. In 2018, he was

under investigation by the Air Force and Burlington County Prosecutor’s Office

(“BCPO”) for sexual abuse of his eight-year-old daughter, L.L. Detective Jennifer

Marchese of the BCPO interviewed L.L. about those allegations in the presence of

Special Agents from the United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The

interview was inconclusive. Accordingly, Detective Marchese informed the Air Force

that there was insufficient evidence to charge Plaintiff with the commission of a crime.

Nevertheless, the Air Force special agents took Plaintiff into custody and criminally

charged him with sexually abusing his daughter.

The Air Force eventually dismissed the charges against Le. L. He filed this suit

for malicious prosecution and false arrest. But rather than sue the Air Force—the only

entity to take Le. L. into custody and charge him with a crime—he sued Detective

Marchese. He alleges that her interview of L.L. was improperly suggestive, and it was

based on her improper questioning that the Air Force brought criminal charges against

him.

Detective Marchese has moved for summary judgment.1 Because Plaintiff has

not shown that Detective Marchese initiated a criminal proceeding against him by

improperly influencing the Air Force’s decision to bring charges or that she took any

intentional acts to set the arresting Air Force agents into motion, the Court will

GRANT summary judgment and DISMISS the Complaint.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the afternoon of May 23, 2018, Jennifer Marchese, a detective at the BCPO,

received a call from a guidance counselor at Atlantis Elementary School expressing

concern that a second-grade student, L.L., had been sexually abused by her father,

Plaintiff Le. L., a United States Air Force staff sergeant. [SOMF ¶¶ 2, 6; RSOMF

¶¶ 2–3, 6; Docket No. 77, Ex. 14, Deposition Transcript of Le. L. (“Le. L. Depo.”) at

30:24–31:5.] L.L. disclosed to the guidance counselor earlier in the day that she was

experiencing a burning pain around her genitals and that sometimes, her father

touched her in that area. [SOMF ¶ 7 (citing Docket No. 73, Certification of Phoenix

1 The Parties’ submissions are referred to herein as follows: (i) Defendant’s Brief in

Support of Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 72-2], her Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts, [Docket No. 72-1 (“SOMF”)], and her Reply Brief in Further Support

of Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 78 (“Def.’s Reply”)]; and (ii) Plaintiff’s Brief in

Opposition to Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 77 (“Pl.’s Br.”)], his Responses to

Defendants’ SOMF, [Docket No. 77 at 29–31 (“RSOMF”)], and his Counterstatement

of Undisputed Material Facts, [Docket No. 77 at 31–34 (“CSOMF”)].

Meyers in Support of Summary Judgment (“Meyers Certif.”), Ex. E); RSOMF ¶ 7.]

She also apparently told the guidance counselor that the touching was supposed to be

a secret and that she did not want her father to get in trouble. [Id.]

Detective Marchese interviewed L.L. at the Burlington County Child Advocacy

Center. [SOMF ¶ 8; RSOMF ¶ 8.] Special agents from the United States Air Force

Office of Special Investigations (“OSI”), who were also notified of L.L.’s statement to

the guidance counselor, were present for the interview, watching from behind a two-

way screen. [SOMF ¶¶ 9–10; RSOMF ¶¶ 9–10.] OSI’s investigation was separate from

Detective Marchese’s investigation on behalf of the BCPO. [SOMF ¶ 11; RSOMF

¶ 11.] The interview—which ran for nearly an hour and a half, [CSOMF ¶ 33]—was

far from conclusive. Detective Marchese asked L.L. what she talked to the school

guidance counselor about. [Meyers Certif., Ex. F (Video Interview of L.L.).] L.L.

again explained to Detective Marchese that, sometimes, her father touched her

genitals when helping her get ready to go swimming at the pool or at bathtime. [Meyers

Certif., Ex. F at 20:15–21:00; 29:00–29:15; [SOMF ¶ 7; RSOMF ¶ 7.] But L.L. could

not provide sufficient detail regarding whether the touching occurred in any

purposeful, sexualized manner or was simply for bathing, health, or hygiene

purposes.2

2

Plaintiff voluntarily appeared for questioning by Detective Marchese at the

BCPO later that evening. [Le. L. Depo. at 68:19–70:25.] OSI special agents remained

present to observe Plaintiff’s interview. [Meyers Certif., Ex. B, Deposition Transcript

of Detective Jennifer Marchese (“Marchese Depo.”) at 54:15–22.] Also present

observing were an assistant prosecutor and Detective Marchese’s supervisor. [Id.]

Detective Marchese questioned Plaintiff about any inappropriate touching of his

daughter. [Le. L. Depo at 163:10–164:5] After about ten minutes, Detective Marchese

suggested that Plaintiff had sexually abused L.L. which prompted Plaintiff to invoke

his right to counsel and end the interview. [Id. at 76:20–22, 163:10–164:5.]

The OSI Special Agents escorted Plaintiff out of the BCPO and back to Joint

Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst where he was formally arrested and charged with

sexually assaulting L.L. [SOMF ¶ 13; RSOMF ¶ 13.] Prior to escorting him back to

base, OSI informed Detective Marchese that they would be charging Plaintiff with

sexually assaulting L.L. Detective Marchese did not agree with that decision. [SOMF

¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14.] At her deposition, she testified that she told OSI that she did not

agree with its decision to take Plaintiff into custody and charge him with a crime given

the inconclusiveness of L.L.’s interview. [SOMF ¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14; Marchese Depo.

at 51:2–12, 103:9–104:13.]

The BCPO never arrested or filed criminal charges against Plaintiff. [SOMF

¶ 16; RSOMF ¶ 16.]3 The Air Force eventually dropped all criminal charges against

Plaintiff and restored his rank and promotions. [SOMF ¶ 17; RSOMF ¶ 17.] But

because the Air Force’s Central Registry Board found that the incident met the criteria

for sexual maltreatment of L.L., it placed Plaintiff on the Department of Defense’s sex

offender registry. [SOMF ¶¶ 15, 17; RSOMF ¶¶ 15, 17.] Plaintiff alleges that he

remains on the registry to this day even though the Air Force dropped the criminal

charges. [Docket No. 24, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 25.]

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Although the Air Force was the only entity to pursue criminal charges against

Plaintiff, he sued Burlington County, the BCPO, CP&P, and Detective Marchese.

[Docket No. 1 at 1.] His First Amended Complaint dropped all defendants other than

Detective Marchese and brought claims against her for malicious prosecution, false

arrest and imprisonment and loss of consortium, each under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Docket

No. 12.] Relying mostly on an expert report prepared by Dr. Gerald Cooke, a licensed

clinical and forensic psychologist, Plaintiff alleges that Detective Marchese’s interview

of L.L. was unduly suggestive and produced unreliable responses from L.L. and it was

based on those unreliable responses that the Air Force wrongly charged Plaintiff. He

alleges that he suffered various injuries as a result of the later-dropped charges

3 The only state entity to bring proceedings against Plaintiff was The New Jersey

Division for Child Protection and Permanency (“CP&P”). But a family court judge

found CP&P’s proofs insufficient to sustain a finding of abuse against Plaintiff.

[Meyers Certif., Ex. C at 13.]

including remaining on the Department of Defense’s sex offender registry, pain and

suffering, loss of reputation, and separation from L.L.4

Detective Marchese moved to dismiss each claim. [Docket No. 19.] This Court

dismissed the malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment claims without

prejudice for failure to state a claim as conclusory and formulaic recitations of the

elements of the causes of action. Le. L. v. Burlington Cnty., 2021 WL 6125777, at *3–4

(D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2021). The Court dismissed the loss of consortium claim with

prejudice because Section 1983 does not support a derivative claim for loss of

consortium. Id. at *4 (citing Armstrong v. Sherman, 2010 WL 2483911 at *5, (D.N.J.

June 4, 2010)).

Plaintiff filed his operative Second Amended Complaint alleging claims against

Detective Marchese only for malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment.

[SAC ¶¶ 36–52.] Detective Marchese filed an answer and moved for summary

judgment.

In support of summary judgment Detective Marchese argues that (i) she is not

a “person” amenable to suit in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) the

malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment claims fail because Detective

Marchese did not initiate a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff and her actions did

not set the arresting OSI agents in motion; and (iii) even if those claims do not fail as

4 Plaintiff is no longer separated from L.L. who spends the school year months with

Plaintiff and the summer months with her mother. [Le. L. Depo. at 15:9–16.]

a matter of law, she is entitled to qualified immunity. [Def.’s Br. at 1–2.]5 Plaintiff

opposed, and Detective Marchese filed a reply brief in further support of summary

judgment. The Motion is now ripe for adjudication.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment should be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it will “affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue is

“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id. at 250.

When deciding the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, a court's role is

not to weigh the evidence: all reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility

should be resolved against the moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d

303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir.1983). However, “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence,”

without more, will not give rise to a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

In the face of such evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “[w]here the record

... could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party....” Matsushita

Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). “Summary

judgment motions thus require judges to ‘assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a

5 Because the Court will grant summary judgment on all claims, it does not consider

Detective Marchese’s argument that Dr. Cooke is unqualified to render an expert

opinion. [Def.’s Br. at 8; Def.’s Reply at 2.]

“fair-minded” jury could “reasonably” decide.’” Williams v. Borough of West Chester,

Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265).

The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(c)). Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary judgment [has been]

made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). The non-

movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to concrete evidence in the record”; mere

allegations, conclusions, conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary

judgment. Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Detective Marchese is Not a “Person” Subject to Section 1983

Liability in Her Official Capacity

Section 1983 authorizes relief against any “person” who acted under color of

state law to deprive a plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Even

though state law enforcement officials, like prosecutors and detectives, are literally

“person[s],” they are not persons subject to suit in their official capacities for damages

under Section 1983. Est. of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 769 F.3d 850, 856 (3d

Cir. 2014) (state detectives and prosecutors not “persons” amenable to suit under

Section 1983 for damages in their official capacities); Martinez v. Choe, 2019 WL

6487315, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2019) (same); Greene v. Perez, 2016 WL 781690, at *2

(D.N.J. Feb. 29, 2016) (same). That is because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that

a Section 1983 suit against a state official acting in her official capacity is the same as

suing the State itself, an entity subject to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989) (citing Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985)); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,

54 (1996). So, as long as state law enforcement engages in “classic law enforcement

and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State” and are therefore not

amenable to suit in their official capacity for damages under Section 1983. Est. of

Lagano, 769 F.3d at 856. If, however, a state law enforcement officer performs

administrative functions “unrelated to the duties involved in criminal prosecution,”

they act as county officials who are amendable to suit for damages under Section 1983.

Id. at 855–56 (citing Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505–06 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Detective Marchese is not a person amendable to suit in her official capacity

under Section 1983. Her investigation on behalf of the BCPO to determine whether

Plaintiff engaged in criminal misconduct involved classic law enforcement functions

including interviewing L.L., a potential victim, and Plaintiff, the investigation’s target.

Plaintiff admits as much. [Pl.’s Br. at 14 (“[T]he averred misconduct against Defendant

Marchese is directly related to her law enforcement and/or investigative

functions[.]”).]6 Accordingly, the claims against Detective Marchese in her official

capacity fail as a matter of law. The remainder of the analysis considers each claim

asserted against Detective Marchese in her personal capacity. Hafner v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21 (1991) (state officials sued for damages in personal capacity are “person[s]” subject

to Section 1983 liability).

B. Malicious Prosecution

To establish a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under Section

1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)

the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding

without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than

bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty

consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Johnson

v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d

497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).7

6 Plaintiff, relying on Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 443 (N.J. 2001) argues that the State

may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of prosecutors and their

investigative subordinates. [Pl.’s Br. at 13.] But Wright was not a Section 1983 case. It

was brought under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act which abrogates sovereign

immunity against the State for acts of negligence. And, unlike the New Jersey Tort

Claims Act, Section 1983 does not abrogate sovereign immunity such that state

officials can be held liable for damages in their official capacity. Will, 491 U.S. at 66

(explaining that Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’

Eleventh Amendment immunity).

7 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint bases his claim for malicious prosecution

solely under the Fourth Amendment. [SAC ¶ 41.]

“Prosecutors, not police, are generally responsible for initiating criminal

proceedings.” Dress v. Falls Twp., 2017 WL 2215270, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2017).

So, in order to hold Detective Marchese responsible for initiating a criminal

proceeding against Plaintiff, she must have done something to affirmatively

“influence[] or participate[] in the decision to institute [the] criminal proceeding[] such

as “conceal [or] misrepresent material facts” to the prosecutor. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750

F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2014); Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998)

(“Decisions have recognized that a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim might be

maintained against one who furnished false information to, or concealed material

information from, prosecuting authorities.”); Dress, 2017 WL 2215270, at *3 (“To hold

a police officer responsible for initiating a criminal proceeding, a plaintiff needs to

demonstrate that the officer knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or

otherwise interfered with the prosecutor’s informed discretion.”). Put differently, the

defendant-officer’s affirmative misconduct, misrepresentations, encouragement, or

pressure must have been the but-for and the proximate cause of the criminal

prosecution. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308, 308 n.5 (6th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff

“must show that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the

defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute” when

considered against traditional tort causation principles) (cleaned up); Cruz ex rel. Alvarez

v. City of Phila., 2008 WL 4347529, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2008) (“[Detectives] may,

however, be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff can establish that the

[] officers exerted pressure or influence on the prosecutor to initiate proceedings or

made knowing misstatements to the prosecutor.”); see also WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW

OF TORTS § 119 (4th ed. 1971) (common law malicious prosecution claim requires

defendant to “take[] some active part in instigating or encouraging the prosecution”

and that her “persuasion was the determining factor in inducing the [prosecution]”);

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 144 S. Ct. 1745, 1750 (2024) (elements of Fourth

Amendment malicious prosecution claim shaped by common law tort principles).

Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter of law because there

is no evidence to support that Detective Marchese did anything to affirmatively cause

the Air Force to bring the criminal charges against him. She did not misrepresent or

furnish false information to OSI regarding L.L.’s interview or otherwise advise,

encourage, or pressure OSI to bring charges. Indeed, OSI was present for the interview

and came to its own independent conclusion related to its own separate investigation

that Plaintiff should be court martialed. Cf. Stief v. Robeson Twp., 2021 WL 2137588, at

*6 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2021) (no allegations to permit reasonable inference that officer

interfered in any way with the prosecutor’s independent decision to bring charges).

And Detective Marchese disagreed with OSI’s decision to charge Plaintiff. She testified

that she told the OSI agents that she disagreed with its decision to take Plaintiff into

custody and charge him with a child sex abuse crime given the inconclusiveness of

L.L.’s interview. [SOMF ¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14; Marchese Depo. at 51:2–12.]

Plaintiff claims that Detective Marchese “technically” initiated a criminal

proceeding against him and characterizes Detective Marchese’s testimony as “self-

serving.” [Pl.’s Br. at 15.] But Plaintiff fails to point to any concrete evidence in the

record establishing a genuine issue of material fact that Detective Marchese

encouraged or influenced OSI to bring criminal charges. Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484

(nonmovant must point to concrete evidence in the record to defeat summary

judgment). The record, in fact, reflects the opposite—Detective Marchese disagreed

with OSI’s decision to charge. Additionally, if Detective Marchese encouraged or

influenced OSI to bring criminal charges because she believed that there was probable

cause that Plaintiff committed a crime, it would have made sense for the BCPO to

likewise bring criminal charges against Plaintiff. But it did not. [SOMF ¶ 16; RSOMF

¶ 16.]

Similarly, Plaintiff argues that Detective Marchese was “one of the only persons

who had the knowledge and ability to conceal or misrepresent the veracity and

reliability [of] her interview[] with L.L” based on her “extensive experience and

training in handling child sexual abuse victim interviews.” [Pl.’s Br. at 15.] Even if that

were true,8 Plaintiff fails to point to anywhere in the record to create a genuine dispute

of material fact that Detective Marchese in fact concealed or misrepresented the

veracity and reliability of L.L.’s interview to OSI. Plaintiff could have called the OSI

agents to testify at a deposition regarding their interactions with Detective Marchese

to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. He did not do so. Accordingly, the Court

8 Detective Marchese did not have extensive experience in handling child sexual abuse

victim interviews. She testified that she was new to the child sex abuse unit at the time

of L.L.’s interview and that, accordingly, her supervisor was present monitoring the

interview. [See Def.’s Reply at 8 (citing Marchese Depo. at 12:3–18).]

will GRANT summary judgment for Defendant Marchese on the malicious

prosecution claim.9

C. False Arrest/Imprisonment

A claim for false arrest or false imprisonment requires a plaintiff to show that

he was unlawfully detained without probable cause. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700

F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 2012). Without allegations that Detective Marchese personally

arrested or imprisoned Plaintiff (which she did not), Plaintiff must show that Detective

Marchese’s “intentional actions set the arresting [OSI agents] in motion.” Berg v.

County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff has not done so. Without any evidentiary support, Plaintiff baldly

concludes that Defendant Marchese’s “joint investigation” with OSI “greatly

influenced” the Air Force’s decision to take Plaintiff into custody. As an initial matter,

Plaintiff has admitted that OSI’s investigation was concurrent, not joint, with

Burlington County’s investigation. [SOMF ¶ 11; RSOMF ¶ 11.] Moreover, the record

evidence (again) establishes precisely the opposite—Detective Marchese attempted to

influence OSI not to press charges because she believed that there was no probable

cause to arrest Plaintiff. [SOMF ¶ 14; RSOMF ¶ 14; Marchese Depo. at 51:2–7.] OSI

9 And even if Plaintiff could establish that Detective Marchese instituted a criminal

proceeding against him, there is no evidence in the record that she did so maliciously.

Nor does Plaintiff attempt to argue otherwise in his summary judgment brief. [Pl.’s Br.

at 15–16 (arguing only Detective Marchese instituted a criminal proceeding against

him).] A summary judgment opponent cannot “merely rely upon conclusory

allegations in [its] pleadings or in memoranda and briefs.” Harter v. GAF Corp., 967

F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). He must establish the essential elements of his claim to

survive summary judgment.

proceeded to bring charges against Plaintiff anyway. Because Detective Marchese “did

not initiate or even actively participate in the arrest or criminal prosecution of

[P]laintiff,” the Court will GRANT summary judgment for Defendant Marchese on

the false arrest/imprisonment claim. Morales v. Busbee, 972 F. Supp. 254, 265 (D.N.J.

1997); Berg, 219 F.3d at 274 (to avoid summary judgment on false arrest claim, plaintiff

“must point to some evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

[defendant] intentionally caused his arrest”); Garcia v. City of Paterson, 2015 WL

857801, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2015) (granting summary judgment where there was no

evidence suggesting that defendant officer instigated the arrest, or requested that

plaintiffs be arrested).10

10 Even if Plaintiff could somehow establish each element of his malicious prosecution

and false arrest/imprisonment claims, the Court finds that Detective Marchese would

be entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields state officials sued in

their personal capacity for damages so long as their conduct did not “violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “A right is clearly established

where existing precedent has ‘placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.’” Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., --- F.4th ----, 2024 WL 4262139,

at *7 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Plaintiff

generically points to the clearly established right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures and to due process. [Pl.’s Br. at 20.] But the constitutional right for

purposes of qualified immunity must be defined at a much more specific level of

generality “to determine ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established.’” Williams, 2024 WL 4262139, at *8 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)). Plaintiff fails to cite to any clearly

established precedent establishing a Fourth Amendment violation against a state law

enforcement for conducting a suggestive interview of a potential child sex abuse victim

during the course of a criminal investigation. Cf. Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 816

(9th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity on fabrication of evidence claim

where officer used “overbearing tactics” in interviewing child abuse victim); Devereaux

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of qualified immunity

on fabrication of evidence claim and holding that there is “no constitutional due

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be

GRANTED. An accompanying Order shall issue.

October 22, 2024 s/Renée Marie Bumb

Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge

process right to have child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation interviewed

in a particular manner, or to have the investigation carried out in a particular way”).