HOBBS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR OF LABOR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TAMECA HOBBS,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 22-00956 (GC) (JTQ)

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al.,

Defendants.

CASTNER, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on two motions: first, the State of New Jersey’s motion

to dismiss Plaintiff Tameca Hobbs’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

(Rules) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and second, Hobbs’s motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.

(ECF Nos. 34, 39, 40.) Following briefing by the parties (ECF Nos. 40, 41, 43), the Court carefully

considered the parties’ submissions and decides the motions without oral argument pursuant to

Rule 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause

shown, the State’s motion is GRANTED, and Hobbs’s motion is DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The premise of this action is that the State unlawfully “blacklisted” Hobbs from

employment with the State between 2015 and 2018. (ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 36, 62, 65.)1 Hobbs, a former

employee with the United States Department of Labor, alleges that Donna Scheel, her former

1 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual

allegations in the complaint as true. See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2022)

(quoting Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008)).

supervisor at the USDOL, disparaged her to prospective State employers, leading the State to

decide that Hobbs was bipolar, mentally unfit to work, and violent. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 64.) Hobbs also

alleges that the State unlawfully removed her “Veterans Preference” status without notifying her,

in violation of New Jersey Administrative Code § 4A:5-2. (Id. ¶¶ 93, 96, 102.)

Hobbs initially sued the USDOL, the United States Department of Justice, Donna Scheel,

and the State in this Court, claiming violations of various federal civil rights, anti-discrimination,

and administrative procedure laws, as well as state-law torts. (ECF No. 1.)2 The Federal

Defendants (USDOL, USDOJ, and Donna Scheel) moved to dismiss, arguing that Hobbs did not

plead sufficient or plausible facts to support each element of her claims. (ECF No. 21.) The State

also moved to dismiss on similar grounds. (ECF No. 10.)

The Court granted both motions. (ECF No. 29.) As a threshold matter, the Court found

that Hobbs’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State, as then pled, were barred by the

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hobbs, 2023 WL 2264266, at *3. And

Hobbs did not name an individual state actor who may be subject to § 1983 liability—a facial

deficiency. Id. As a result, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the § 1983 claims

against the State. The Court gave Hobbs an opportunity to amend her complaint, instructing that

any amendment should account for the two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in

New Jersey. Id. As to the Federal Defendants, the Court agreed that Hobbs’s claims were

deficiently pled. And so, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

Hobbs timely amended. In her new complaint, Hobbs dropped the Federal Defendants,

kept the State as a defendant, and added the following defendants: the New Jersey Civil Service

2 For a detailed recitation of the procedural and factual background, see the Court’s previous

opinion at Hobbs v. United States Dep’t of Lab. Off. of Solic. of Lab., Civ. No. 22-956, 2023 WL

2264266 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2023).

Commission (NJCSC); Mamta Patel, director of NJCSC’s division of Equal Employment

Opportunity and Affirmative Action; Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County prosecutor; and Steven

Scheel, employee with the New Jersey Department of Labor and Work Force Development and

husband of Donna Scheel. (ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 7-11, 57-58.) The record does not include proof that

Hobbs served the new defendants with copies of the summons and amended complaint. (See

Docket Sheet; ECF No. 6; ECF No. 41 at 6 n.1.)

Though the amended complaint’s precise causes of action are difficult to decipher, the

Court liberally construes the complaint as asserting three categories of claims3: first, constitutional

claims for violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

as to all Defendants (Count 1); second, anti-discrimination law claims for violations of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),

and New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) as to all Defendants (Count 2); and third,

veterans’ preference claims for violations of veterans’ employment rights and benefits under the

Uniformed Services Employment & Reemployment Act of 1994 (USERRA) as to NJCSC and

Patel only (Count 3).

Hobbs seeks to recover money damages, including back pay, front pay, “[t]ime in

employment grade and rank for retirement purposes,” and fees and costs. (ECF No. 34 ¶ 104.)

She also seeks an order enjoining Defendants from (1) “engaging in the policies, practices, and

conduct complained of,” and (2) “promoting to employers that Constitutional Rights should not

apply to Plaintiff.” (Id.) Finally, she seeks a judgment declaring that “Defendants’ actions,

3 “[A] pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers;’” courts “review the pleading to ensure that it

has ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520-21 (1972); then Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

practices and conduct as alleged herein violate Plaintiff’s rights under the United States

Constitution as well as Federal and State laws.” (Id.)

The State’s motion to dismiss followed. In opposing the motion, Hobbs also moved for

summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1)—Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Rule 12(b)(1) permits a defendant to move at any time to dismiss the complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction on either facial or factual grounds. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United

States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).

A facial challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds

to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438

(D.N.J. 1999). In analyzing a facial challenge, a court “must only consider the allegations of the

complaint and documents attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould

Electronics Inc., 220 F.3d at 176. “A court considering a facial challenge construes the allegations

in the complaint as true and determines whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Arosa Solar

Energy Sys., Inc. v. Solar, Civ. No. 18-1340, 2021 WL 1196405, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021).

A factual challenge, on the other hand, “attacks allegations underlying the assertion of

jurisdiction in the complaint, and it allows the defendant to present competing facts.” Hartig Drug

Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016). The “trial court is free to weigh

the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case” and “the plaintiff

will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462

F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). “Therefore, a 12(b)(1) factual challenge strips the plaintiff of the

protections and factual deference provided under 12(b)(6) review.” Hartig Drug Co., 836 F.3d at

268. Regardless of the type of challenge, the plaintiff bears the “burden of proving that the court

has subject matter jurisdiction.” Cottrell v. Heritages Dairy Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 09-1743, 2010

WL 3908567, at *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2010) (citing Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

Rule 12(b)(1) also encompasses dismissals for “lack of jurisdiction due to Eleventh

Amendment immunity.” Nemeth v. Office of the Clerk of the N.J. Superior Court, Civ. No. 19-

16809, 2020 WL 2537754, at *2 (D.N.J. May 19, 2020). State sovereign immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter

jurisdiction.” Wright v. New Jersey/Dep’t of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 3d 490, 494 (D.N.J. 2015). Once

a challenge to jurisdiction is raised under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden to

demonstrate the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable

Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)—Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts “accept the factual allegations in

the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and assess whether

the complaint and the exhibits attached to it ‘contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting

Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of City of Scranton, 975 F.3d 406, 412 (3d Cir. 2020)). “A claim

is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Clark v. Coupe, 55

F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372

(3d Cir. 2019)). When assessing the factual allegations in a complaint, courts “disregard legal

conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported only by mere

conclusory statements.” Wilson, 57 F.4th at 140 (citing Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d

892, 903 (3d Cir. 2021)). The defendant bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion bears the burden of

“showing that a complaint fails to state a claim.” In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab.

Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 349

(3d Cir. 2016)).

Rule 8(a) does not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. Still, “a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original); see Phillips v. Cnty.

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Rule 8 requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” (citation and some quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the

complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a

speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see, e.g.,

W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013).

That facial-plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Though “[t]he

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

In the amended complaint, the only causes of action against the State are (1) § 1983 claims

for violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) anti-discrimination law claims for

violations of Title VII, the ADA, and NJLAD. Hobbs asserts her final, USERRA claim against

the NJCSC and Patel only. Because the State is the only movant here—indeed, Hobbs has not

shown that she served the new defendants with copies of the summons and amended complaint—

the Court need not address the USERRA claim.

A. Section 1983 Claims

As to Count 1,4 the State argues that it has Eleventh Amendment immunity against Hobbs’s

§ 1983 claims for violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) “the conduct complained of

was committed by a person acting under color of state law;” and (2) “the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011). But “a State is not a ‘person’

within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989).

So unless the State waived its immunity or Congress abrogated the State’s immunity, “[t]he

Eleventh Amendment bars such suits.” Id. at 66; see Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 227 (3d Cir.

2023) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] imposes a jurisdictional bar against individuals bringing suit

against a state or its agencies in federal court, or against a state official in his or her official

capacity.” (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Will, 491 U.S. at 71).

Hobbs does not point to any congressional abrogation or waiver by the State as for her §

1983 claims. Instead, she invokes a third exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity: “suits

against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end an ongoing

violation of federal law.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d

4 Though Hobbs placed “Sec 1983” alongside her Title VII and ADA claims under Count 2,

a liberal review of the complaint lets the Court infer that she intends to use § 1983 as the vehicle

for remedying the violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments alleged under Count 1. See

n.3 above.

Cir. 2002); see Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2015)

(“[L]iability under § 1983 may be imposed on an official with final policymaking authority if that

official establishes an unconstitutional policy that, when implemented, injures a plaintiff.” (citation

omitted)). (ECF No. 40 at 2-3, 5.) For that exception, Hobbs names Mamta Patel, director of

NJCSC’s EEO/AA division; Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County prosecutor; and Steven Scheel,

employee with the NJDOL and husband of Donna Scheel. (ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 9-11.) But as the State

correctly notes, these defendants have not been served and are thus not presently active in this

matter. (ECF No. 41 at 6 n.1.) So the Court need not address the sufficiency of Hobbs’s claims

against them.

As to the State, nothing in fact or law has changed since the Court last ruled that Hobbs’s

§ 1983 claims must be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment-immunity grounds. See Hobbs, 2023

WL 2264266, at *3. As a result, those claims against the State remain barred by Eleventh

Amendment immunity.

B. Title VII, ADA, & NJLAD Claims

The State argues that the complaint still does not satisfy federal pleading standards for

Hobbs’s anti-discrimination claims. The Court agrees.

The elements of a Title VII discrimination claim are “(1) the plaintiff is a member of a

protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought to attain or retain; (3) she suffered

an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give

rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” Goode v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 11-6960,

2015 WL 1924409, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2015) (citing Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d

Cir. 2008)). The elements of an ADA claim for disability discrimination are similar: that she “(1)

has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action

because of that disability.” Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). And for failure-to-hire claims like Hobbs’s, the

plaintiff must also specifically show that “under circumstances that raise an inference of

discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications similar

to plaintiff to fill the position.” Hobbs, 2023 WL 2264266, at *6 (quoting Suri v. Foxx, 69 F. Supp.

3d 467, 478 (D.N.J. 2014)).

Little has changed since the Court ruled that Hobbs’s previous complaint did not plead

allegations satisfying the above-noted elements. Hobbs still bases her Title VII and ADA claims

on allegations that “Defendants described and classified [her] to employers as an African American

woman who is an incompetent troublemaker with a criminal record and a bipolar person” and that

she was denied potential employment as a result. (ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 82-85.) She still only vaguely

describes the employers that rejected her applications. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 62, 65, 74, Attachment 4

(alleging that she “applied for nearly 100 jobs within the State of New Jersey,” where “the

prospective employers included government employer[s], contract employers, as well as private

companies,” such as “Colleges, Universities, State jobs, contractor jobs, local jobs, and

employment agencies in the state of New Jersey”).) And she still does not describe with any

meaningful specificity the circumstances surrounding the rejections.

After a careful review of the complaint, the Court sees only two allegations specifying lost

employment opportunities. First, Hobbs alleges that she was denied “a position at the Department

of Human Services that [she] was well qualified for and should have [obtained] had” the

prospective employer honored her “State Veterans Preference,” yet “they hired a non-veteran over

[Hobbs].” (Id. ¶ 77.) Second, the amended complaint references an earlier filing in which Hobbs

lists at least 13 of her job applications for various positions in various state agencies. (See id. ¶ 76

(incorporating ECF No. 13-1 into the complaint by reference).)5 Neither of these allegations cure

the pleading defects that the Court previously identified. The allegations still do not state necessary

details of her discrimination claims, such as “what grounds were stated for the denials, or whether

those employers filled the relevant positions with individuals of similar qualifications.” Hobbs,

2023 WL 2264266, at *6. So, as with her previous complaint, the amended complaint does not

allege “information to support an inference that those opportunities were lost because of a

protected characteristic such as race or disability.” Id.6

As for Hobbs’s NJLAD claim, the State is shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity in

federal court. See Prass v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 651 F. Supp. 3d 764, 771 (D.N.J. 2023)

(“[T]he text of NJLAD does not contain language that waives the State’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity in federal court.” (citations omitted)); see also Chee-Wah v. Maurer, 663 F. App’x 194,

198 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of NJLAD claim against NJCSC and its employees on

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds). As a result, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction

over Hobbs’s NJLAD claim against the State.

Therefore, Hobbs’s employment discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADA, and

NJLAD are dismissed without prejudice.

5 Courts reviewing a motion to dismiss may consider, among other things, documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference. See Winer Fam. Tr. v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 327

(3d Cir. 2007).

6 The separate filing, which exceeds 70 pages, does not delineate information from which

the Court could infer that Hobbs was intentionally discriminated against when she was denied the

positions. If the separate filing includes details supporting such an inference, it was incumbent on

Hobbs to bring those details to the Court’s attention. See United States v. Shulick, 18 F.4th 91,

113 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.” (quoting

Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006))).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the State’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; Hobbs’s

constitutional and NJLAD claims against the State are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction; Hobbs’s Title VII and ADA claims against the State are DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and Hobbs’s motion

for summary judgment is DENIED as moot. The Court gives Hobbs a final opportunity to cure

the deficiencies in her complaint against the State.’ Hobbs must then serve the newly added

defendants with copies of the summons and most recent complaint, or risk dismissal of the action

against any unserved defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a defendant is not served within 90

days after the complaint is filed, the court . .. must dismiss the action without prejudice against

that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.”). An appropriate Order

follows.

Dated: nmo2S, 2024 (out.

ORGEATE CASTNER

ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7 See Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co., 39 F.3d 70, 74 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting, where

plaintiff sought to add facts to a twice-amended complaint, “three attempts at a proper pleading is

enough”); Doe v. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 477 (D.N.J. 2001) (“Leave

should be granted absent a showing of . . . ‘repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed ....’” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))); Treppel v. Biovail

Corp., Civ. No. 03-3002, 2005 WL 2086339, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (declining leave to

amend after plaintiff “already had two bites at the apple and they have proven fruitless[]”).

11