STEVENSON v. THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE OF MONMOUTH

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________________

ANTHONY E. STEVENSON, :

:

Plaintiff, : Civ. No. 13:5953 (GC) (TJB)

:

v. :

:

THE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE :

OF MONMOUTH, : OPINION

:

:

Defendants. :

____________________________________:

CASTNER, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment brought by

Defendants Leonard Maxfield, Douglas Hermann, and Robert Fuller (“Defendants”). Plaintiff

Anthony E. Stevenson’s (“Plaintiff”) Verified Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants

violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using excessive force against him at Monmouth

County Superior Court on July 30, 2013. For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

a. Material Facts

On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at Monmouth County Correctional

Facility in Freehold, New Jersey. (ECF No. 131, Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts (“DSUMF”) at ¶ 1; ECF No. 132, Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts (“RSUMF” at ¶ 1.) On that date, Plaintiff was transported from Monmouth County

Correctional Facility to Monmouth County Superior Court for a child support court hearing.

(DSUMF at ¶ 2; RSUMF at ¶ 2.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff became verbally abusive

toward them in the holding cell (DSUMF at ¶ 3), but Plaintiff contends that he told the officers

that he would not cause problems.1 (RSUMF at ¶ 3 (citing ECF No. 74, Verified Am. Compl. at

¶¶ 12−14).) Sheriff’s Officer O’Neill then directed abusive and obscene language at Plaintiff.

(RSUMF at ¶ 3 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 15).) Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that he

responded to the name calling by using obscene language. (See Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 16.)

It appears undisputed that Defendant Fuller placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and leg shackles

connected to a belt prior to Plaintiff’s court appearance. (DSUMF at ¶ 4; RSMF at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff

contends, however, that Fuller placed the shackles as tightly as he could around Plaintiff’s ankles

and stated: “See how you walk in them.” (ECF No. 132, Pl. Supplemental Statement of Disputed

Material Facts “PSMF” (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 17).) As Defendants Maxfield and

Hermann escorted Plaintiff down the hallway, Plaintiff complained to both officers that his ankles

shackles were too tight and insisted that the shackles made it too difficult to continue walking.

(DSUMF at ¶ 5; RSMF at ¶ 5.) Defendants claim that Hermann checked the shackles and observed

that they were on correctly and were not too tight (DSUMF at ¶ 6); Plaintiff contends, however,

that Hermann simply bent down and looked at the shackles without determining whether they were

on correctly. (RSMF at ¶ 6 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 19).)

Maxfield asked Plaintiff if he was refusing to go to the courtroom, and Plaintiff initially

said “no” and told Maxfield his shackles were too tight. Maxfield asked Plaintiff again if he was

refusing to go to the courtroom, and this time Plaintiff said “yes.” Maxfield told Plaintiff they

1 Plaintiff relies on his Verified Amended Complaint in opposing summary judgment. See, e.g.,

Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (although a party may not rest on his or her

pleadings to create a fact issue sufficient to survive summary judgment, allegations that are based

on personal knowledge and which are in a verified complaint may be used to oppose a motion for

summary judgment because the complaint can be treated as an affidavit or declaration).

would not “put up with” Plaintiff, and he would be taken back to the holding cell. (PSMF at ¶¶ 5-

7 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 20-22).) Plaintiff tried to walk back to the holding cell but

could not do so. Plaintiff then told Defendants he would try to walk to the courtroom. (Id. at ¶ 8

(citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 23); see also RSMF at ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff contends that he crouched

down only to raise the shackles off his ankles to relieve the pain, when Hermann told him: “You’ve

been talking shit all morning.” (PSMF at ¶ 9 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 24).)

Hermann then grabbed Plaintiff by the back of the waist belt, picked Plaintiff up, and

slammed him to the floor. (RSMF at ¶ 10 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 25-26).) Hermann

then dragged Plaintiff down the corridor, causing Plaintiff to hit his head on the doorframe leading

to the foyer. (Id.) Hermann dropped Plaintiff on the floor inside the foyer, and Fuller grabbed

Plaintiff by the waist belt and dragged him through the hallway back to the isolation cells.

(PSUMF at ¶¶ 12-13 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 27-28).)

Defendants tell a different story and claim that Plaintiff verbally abused Hermann and

Maxfield and refused to move, stating that he could not walk due to the shackles. (DSUMF at ¶

8.) Plaintiff, however, denies using any abusive language. (RSMF at ¶ 8 (citing Verified Am.

Compl. at ¶ 18).) Defendants further contend that Plaintiff refused to comply with Maxfield’s and

Hermann’s order that he either continue walking to the courtroom or return to the holding cell and

would not move from the public hallway floor. (DSUMF at ¶ 9.)

The video footage from the security camera on the East Wing shows Plaintiff being

escorted by Maxfield and Hermann through a corridor door. The door has a glass window in the

top portion only. Plaintiff is almost completely obscured after he goes through the door. The

officer following Plaintiff appears to lean forward or bend down after he goes through the door.

(Exhibit G to Reardon Decl.) Approximately 45 seconds after Plaintiff goes through the door, the

video footage shows Hermann dragging Plaintiff through the door and into the foyer. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s body is motionless and somewhat curled. (Id.) Fuller then grabs Plaintiff by the belt

and drags him out of view, and the other Defendants follow. (Id; see also Verified Am. Compl. at

¶ 28.)

The parties agree that there is approximately a 42-second skip in the video just after

Defendants drag Plaintiff out of view, and Plaintiff questioned whether portions of the incident

were deleted. (DSUMF at ¶ 20; RSMF at ¶ 20.) Defendants have provided an affidavit from

Lieutenant Elijah Moore who explains that the security camera is motion activated (when it detects

a pixel change) and dumps footage to save recording space when no motion is detected. According

to Moore, the skip was caused by a lack of movement during that time period.2 (See ECF No. 127-

15, Ex. L, Moore Aff. at ¶¶ 3-13.)

Plaintiff claims that when he regained consciousness, he was laying on the floor outside

the isolation cells. (RSMF at ¶ 12 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 28-32).) Defendants attempted

to stand Plaintiff up, but he could not stand because he felt excruciating pain in his lower back and

his legs were numb.3 (Id.) Defendants then dragged Plaintiff into the isolation cell and left him

lying on the floor handcuffed and shackled with his head under the toilet. (Id.) Officers Giglio,

Fuller, and Maxfield told Plaintiff to “stop faking” and also told him that if he did not get up on

his own, they would leave him lying on the floor handcuffed and shackled until 4:30pm. (Id.)

2 Defendants have cited to the wrong exhibits in their DSUMF, and Plaintiff disputes these

allegations in his RSMF. The Court does not need to resolve the issue of what caused the skip in

the security video in order to resolve the summary judgment motion. Therefore, the Court does

not credit Defendants explanation or examine it in any detail.

3 Plaintiff alleges that he had a major surgery on his lower back on February 9, 2010. (PSMF at ¶

1 (citing ECF Nos. 129-2, 129-3; Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 37).)

Defendants claim that Giglio asked Maxfield, a certified paramedic, to evaluate Plaintiff

and that Maxfield determined that Plaintiff did not have any life threatening injuries and could be

returned to Monmouth County Correctional Institution. (DSUMF at ¶ 13.) According to Plaintiff,

Maxfield said he would assist Plaintiff but then told the other Defendants that Plaintiff was faking

and that there was nothing wrong with him. (RSMF at ¶ 13 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 34,

39-40).) Maxfield also told the other Defendants to leave Plaintiff on the floor handcuffed and

shackled and stated that Plaintiff would eventually get up on his own. (Id.)

The parties agree that Plaintiff said he could not get up due to his low back pain. (DSUMF

at ¶ 14; RSMF at ¶ 14.) Defendants claim that Officer Giglio called an ambulance. (DSUMF at ¶

14.) Plaintiff alleges that five to ten minutes after locking Plaintiff in the isolation cell, Officer

Giglio told Plaintiff that he reviewed the video footage and that Plaintiff fell to the floor on his

own and that he could stay in the cell until 4:30 p.m. Giglio also told Plaintiff “Have it your way”

and locked the cell door. (RSUMF at ¶ 14 (citing Verified Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-43).) After another

five to ten minutes, Sheriff Officers O’Neill and Fischer came to the isolation cell and told Plaintiff

the paramedics were on their way. (Id.)

The parties agree that the paramedics arrived at the holding cell and evaluated Plaintiff for

injuries. Plaintiff was placed in a medical chair and transported to the medical unit for further

evaluation at Monmouth County Correctional Facility. (DSUMF at ¶ 15; RSUMF ¶ 15.) Plaintiff

contends that Defendants’ rough treatment of him continued when they hoisted him out of the

medical chair and threw him into the medical van, causing him more pain. (PSMF at ¶ 33 (citing

Verified Am. Compl. at ¶ 57).) The paramedics who initially evaluated Plaintiff appear to have

spoken with the officers and recount Defendants’ version of events in the “Narrative” portion of

the report.4 (ECF No. 127-11, Ex. H at 3-4.)

Dr. Hashmi examined Plaintiff at Monmouth County Correctional Facility and provided

Plaintiff with pain medications for his back injuries. (PSMF at ¶ 36-38 (citing Verified Am. Compl.

at ¶¶ 62-64; ECF No. 129-4).)

It appears undisputed that Plaintiff was found guilty of a disciplinary charge resulting from

this incident and received 15 or 16 days of disciplinary detention. (See ECF No. 127-13, Ex. J at

4; RSMF at ¶ 18.) Defendants have provided other documents, which purportedly show that

Plaintiff has a history of disciplinary infractions that predate this incident.5 (See e.g., ECF No.

127-14, Ex. K.)

b. Procedural History

Plaintiff submitted his original complaint in this action on or about September 3, 2013.

(ECF No. 1 at 22.) The District Court screened the original complaint for dismissal under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and permitted only the Fourteenth Amendment excessive

force claims and common law assault and battery claims to proceed against Maxfield and

Hermann. (ECF Nos. 11-12.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (See

id.)

On February 24, 2017, Defendants Maxfield and Hermann filed a motion for summary

judgment. (ECF No. 42.) On March 23, 2017, the Magistrate Judge terminated the motion for

summary judgment to permit Plaintiff to view the video footage of the incident discussed above.

4 Defendants cite to the wrong exhibit in their DSUMF, and Plaintiff disputes the allegations on

that basis.

5 Defendants again cite to the wrong exhibit in their DSUMF, and Plaintiff disputes the allegations

on that basis.

(ECF No. 45.) On February 8, 2018, the Court denied summary judgment on the excessive force

claims, denied Defendants’ qualified immunity defense, and granted Plaintiff’s request to

voluntarily withdraw his state law claims. (ECF Nos. 57-58.) The Court found there were disputed

issues of material fact as to the chain of events that led to the use of force and whether Defendants

applied the force in good faith. (See ECF No. 57 at 9.)

Following discovery, Plaintiff identified Fuller as one of the officers involved in the July

30, 2013 incident. On January 7, 2019, the Magistrate Judge granted Plaintiff leave to submit an

amended complaint asserting claims of excessive force and assault and battery against Defendant

Fuller based on the video footage. (ECF No. 72 at 6-7.) On January 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed his

Verified Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 74 at 17.)

On June 21, 2019, Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment arguing

that the evidence did not support Plaintiff’s excessive force claims and that the use of force was

objectively reasonable. (ECF No. 79 at 16-26.) The Court denied the motion for summary

judgment, finding that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity and that a jury could

conclude that Defendants’ use of force was not objectively reasonable. (ECF No. 89 at 5-9; ECF

No. 90.)

On August 24, 2020, the Magistrate Judge appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. (ECF

No. 96.) On November 24, 2020, the Magistrate Judge appointed Plaintiff’s current counsel, and

counsel entered an appearance on January 11, 2021. (ECF Nos. 101, 104.) Plaintiff’s counsel

sought additional discovery, and on August 18, 2022, the Magistrate Judge ordered Defendants to

provide internal affairs, disciplinary records, and employment files for the three named

Defendants. (ECF No. 117.)

On March 24, 2023, Defendants filed their third motion for summary judgment, which this

Court terminated because it did not contain a statement of material facts pursuant to L. Civ. R.

56.1. (ECF No. 123, 125). Defendants refiled their motion for summary judgment on June 15,

2023 without a separate Rule 56.1 statement. (ECF No. 127.) Plaintiff filed his opposition papers

on July 24, 2023, arguing, in part, that the Court should dismiss the motion for failure to comply

with the separate statement rule. (ECF No. 129.) The Court required Defendants to supplement

the record with the DVD security video and provide a separate Rule 56.1 statement, which

Defendants provided on January 11, 2024. (ECF No. 131.) Plaintiff also provided an amended

response to Defendants Rule 56.1 statement. (ECF No. 132.) The matter is now fully briefed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

At summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the burden shifts to the non-

moving party, who must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” and

a dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “If reasonable minds could differ

as to the import of the evidence,” summary judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 250-51. “In

considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility

determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s

evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Marino v.

Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). “Where

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,”

no genuine issue for trial exists and summary judgment shall be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Defendants are not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment Excessive Force Claims

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment excessive force claims because the undisputed facts show that they took action to

restore discipline in an objectively reasonable manner, based on the facts and circumstances of this

case. (ECF No. 127-2, Moving Brief at 13.)

The Court begins by delineating between Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive

force claims. The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners from any force applied

“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty.,

8 F.4th 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). To be

liable under the Eighth Amendment, the defendant must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” and the conduct must be objectively harmful enough to violate the Constitution. Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989), the Supreme

Court observed that “[i]t is clear . . . that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from

the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Id. (citing See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 535–539 (1979). Subsequently, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400 (2015), the

Supreme Court clarified that the subjective portion of the Eighth Amendment standard does not

apply to pretrial detainees. Id. (“The language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature of the

claims often differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot

be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 398

n.11).) Thus, “‘a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used

against him was objectively unreasonable.’” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 194 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at

396-97).

In Kingsley, the Court further clarified that the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fourth

Amendment, exclusively employs an objectively-reasonableness standard and that the defendant’s

subjective intent is immaterial. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396-97. Objective reasonableness turns on

the “facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (citation and

quotation omitted). “A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. (citation omitted). Those circumstances include “the relationship between the need

for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort

made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem

at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively

resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. “Thus, a court must consider the legitimate interests that

stem from the government’s need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,

appropriately deferring to policies and practices that in the judgment of jail officials are needed to

preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Id. (quotations

omitted) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)).

Here, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims because they

used appropriate measures to address the challenge presented at the

time of the alleged incident with the Plaintiff who had[] used

obscene language toward Defendants since his arrival that morning,

(2) refused to follow Defendants’ orders while in route from his

holding cell to the courtroom for his child support hearing; and (3)

obstructed his transport from his holding cell to the courtroom by

crouching down in the public, unsecure hallway and refusing to

move.

(ECF No. 127-2, Defendants’ Moving Br. at 13.) Each of these facts, however, is disputed by

Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he did not verbally abuse Defendants in the moments leading up

to the incident and denies refusing to move. Plaintiff contends that he repeatedly told Defendants

his shackles were too tight and he bent down briefly to fix the shackles. Plaintiff further claims

that, in response, Hermann grabbed Plaintiff by the back of the waist belt, picked Plaintiff up, and

slammed him to the floor. Hermann then dragged Plaintiff through the door and into the foyer,

causing Plaintiff to hit his head on the doorframe leading to the inside foyer. After Hermann let

go of Plaintiff, Fuller dragged Plaintiff by his waistbelt through the hallway to the isolation cell.

Defendants claim that the security footage refutes Plaintiff’s version of events. In Jacobs,

the Third Circuit succinctly summarized the standard in cases involving security footage:

At summary judgment, a district court must construe the evidence

and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83

(3d Cir. 2018). In qualified-immunity cases, that “usually means

adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts,” Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372 (2007), unless “no reasonable jury could believe it,” id. at

380. But the existence of a security video presents an “added

wrinkle.” Id. at 378. In cases where there is a reliable video

depicting the events in question, courts must not adopt a version of

the facts that is “blatantly contradicted” by the video footage. Id. at

380.

8 F.4th at 192 (cleaned up). Here, the video footage itself does not show, as Defendants contend,

Plaintiff cursing at Defendants or crouching down and refusing to move. Indeed, after Plaintiff

goes through the door, he moves out of view of the glass window, and, at best, the officer following

Plaintiff appears to stoop or bend down. Once the door opens, however, the video shows Hermann

dragging Plaintiff by his waistbelt. Plaintiff’s body appears motionless and remains that way as

Fuller drags him out of view. Because the security video does not blatantly contradict Plaintiff’s

version of events, the Court adopts Plaintiff’s account for purpose of summary judgment and its

qualified immunity analysis below.6

Under Kingsley, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ use of force was objectively

unreasonable. First, if they accept Plaintiff’s version of the incident, jurors could conclude that

Defendants did not need to use any force or minimal force and “were not facing a disturbance or

any other threat to [courthouse] security.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195 (explaining that use of force

occurred 15 minutes after fight among inmates had ended and the circumstances were calm). A

reasonable factfinder could also conclude, if accepting Plaintiff’s version of events, that Plaintiff

posed no threat to the officers or the public when he bent down to adjust his ankle shackles because

he was handcuffed and shackled throughout the incident and had agreed to keep trying to walk to

the courtroom. Moreover, nothing in the security footage suggests that Plaintiff was resisting or

combative. The initial security footage shows Plaintiff walking slowly and the later footage shows

him motionless as he is dragged through the door and then out of view. As explained in Jacobs,

“[u]nder this set of facts, a jury could find that there was no penological need for any additional

force,” making the decision to slam Plaintiff to the ground, as Plaintiff alleges, and drag him back

to the holding cell “wholly gratuitous and objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 195–96.

Under the circumstances presented, there remain genuine disputes of material fact with

respect to the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used, the

extent of the Plaintiff’s injury, the severity of the security problem at issue, the threat reasonably

perceived by the officers, and whether Plaintiff’s conduct justified the use of force. See Kingsley,

6 As noted earlier, the video skips a portion of the incident, but there is no reason to believe that

the recorded portions are otherwise unreliable.

576 U.S. at 397. For these reasons, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the

Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims.

b. Defendants are not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Even if the Court uses the

Eighth Amendment Standard

Defendants also claim they are entitled to qualified immunity. An award of qualified

immunity protects a government official from civil liability and suit “insofar as [his] conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002). This inquiry is limited to the law at the time of the incident, as “an official could not be

reasonably expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. To

overcome a defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, the court must determine: “(1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at

the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (cleaned up);

see also Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 848 F.3d 549, 557 (3d

Cir. 2017) (“We first determine whether a right has been violated. If it has, we then must decide

if the right at issue was clearly established when violated such that it would have been clear to a

reasonable person that her conduct was unlawful.”). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s explanation

in Pearson v. Callahan, those inquiries need not be addressed in sequence; instead, courts are

entitled to “exercise their sound discretion” and decide which issue to first address. See 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009). The defendant official is entitled to qualified immunity if either prong is not

satisfied. See id. at 244-45.

In qualified immunity cases, courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff “unless a video ‘blatantly contradict[s]’ that version of the facts.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196

n. 8 (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380); see also Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (3d Cir. 2022). In

order for the right to be clearly established, “[then-]existing precedent must have placed the ...

constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741; see also Dist. of Columbia v.

Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Courts “typically look to Supreme Court precedent or a consensus

in the Courts of Appeals to give an officer fair warning that his conduct would be unconstitutional.”

Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017). “If the law was clearly established, the

immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know

the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.

Defendants argue that the Eighth Amendment standard controls this Court’s qualified

immunity analysis because the Supreme Court had not yet decided Kingsley in 2013 when the

incident occurred.7 They further argue that it was reasonable for Defendants to believe that their

conduct toward Plaintiff was governed by the Eighth Amendment standard for excessive force

based on the prevailing Third Circuit precedent.8

The defendants in Kingsley made a similar argument after the Supreme Court remanded

the matter to the Seventh Circuit:

The defendants next suggest that they should be able to avoid retrial

because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Their argument is a

nuanced one. In their view, the decision of the Supreme Court,

resolving a circuit split in its decision in this case, altered the

substantive law of liability. Because there was a division among the

7 Plaintiff does not object to analyzing his claims under the Eighth Amendment.

8 Fifteen years prior to Kingsley, the Third Circuit held, in relevant part, that “the Eighth

Amendment cruel and unusual punishments standards ... apply to a pretrial detainee’s excessive

force claim arising in the context of a prison disturbance.” Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 347

(3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In this specific context, the Third Circuit

precedent required pretrial detainees to show not only that force was excessive, but also that the

force was applied maliciously and sadistically, which mirrors the test under the Eighth

Amendment. Here, as explained below, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants did not use

force to quell a prison (or courthouse) disturbance.

circuits on the state of the law at the time that they acted, they

contend that they cannot be held liable for their actions.

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2015) (remand decision). The Seventh Circuit

rejected the defendants’ argument because Kingsley eliminated only the mental state requirement

and the standard for the amount of permissible force remained the same:

If we were to accept the defendants’ argument here, we would

untether the qualified immunity defense from its moorings of

protecting those acting in reliance on a standard that is later

determined to be infirm. Here, before and after the Supreme Court’s

decision in this case, the standards for the amount of force that can

be permissibly employed remain the same. To accept the defense of

qualified immunity here, we would have to accept the dubious

proposition that, at the time the officers acted, they were on notice

only that they could not have a reckless or malicious intent and that,

as long as they acted without such an intent, they could apply any

degree of force they chose. As we have noted, however, the law

clearly established that the amount of force had to be reasonable in

light of the legitimate objectives of the institution.

Kingsley, 801 F.3d at 832–33; see also Hopper v. Phil Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 755 (6th Cir. 2018)

(rejecting this type of argument on similar grounds).

Although the Third Circuit has not addressed this exact issue, in Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96,

a panel of the court applied Kingsley (and not the Eighth Amendment standard) in denying

qualified immunity to officers who struck an unarmed, compliant, and non-threatening pretrial

detainee even though that incident also predated Kingsley. Thus, it is at least questionable whether

the Eighth Amendment standard governs this Court’s qualified immunity analysis.

Even if the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment,

however, Defendants are still not entitled to qualified immunity. The unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain is considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. As noted above, an Eighth Amendment claim has an objective and

subjective component. Id. at 8. That is, the defendant must act with a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind,” and the conduct must be objectively harmful enough to violate the Constitution. Wilson,

501 U.S. at 298. When evaluating excessive force claims, the key inquiry is “whether force was

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 480 (3d Cir. 2018). In making

this inquiry, courts examine a number of factors: “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the

relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of injury

inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by

responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts to temper the

severity of a forceful response.”9 Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). “The

objective component of the excessive force inquiry is met when “the inmate’s injury was more

than de minimis.” Ricks, 891 F.3d at 480 (citing Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 345).

As noted above, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in

conducting it’s qualified immunity analysis. See Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 192. For purposes of this

motion only and because the video footage does not blatantly show otherwise, the Court credits

Plaintiff’s allegations in his Verified Amended Complaint that Defendant Fuller overtightened

Plaintiff’s ankle shackles and that Plaintiff bent down to adjust the ankle shackles after telling

Defendants Hermann and Maxfield that the ankle shackles were painful and too tight. The Court

also credits Plaintiff’s allegations in the Verified Amended Complaint that Defendant Hermann

responded by knocking Plaintiff to the ground, causing him to hit his head and lose consciousness,

and dragging him through the door, and that Fuller then dragged Plaintiff back to the holding cell,

accompanied by the other Defendants.

9 Notably, the relevant factors mirror the factors in Fourteenth Amendment cases. See Kingsley,

576 U.S. at 397 (considerations include the relationship between the need for the use of force and

the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to

temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting).

With respect to the first two Whitley factors, a jury could find that there was only a need

for minimal force or no force at all when Plaintiff bent down to fix his ankle shackles, which

Defendants knew were too tight. A jury could also find that Defendant Hermann’s decision to

throw Plaintiff to the ground and drag him through the door to the foyer was excessive under the

circumstances, and that Fuller also used excessive force when he continued to drag Plaintiff, who

was motionless and allegedly unconscious, back to the isolation cell.10

Defendants appear to focus on the third Whitley factor—“the extent of the injury inflicted.”

See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106. The Supreme Court has held that “the use of excessive physical force

against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not

suffer serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 34, 38 (2010) (“Injury and force. . . are. . .

imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.”); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (“When

prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of

decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.”) (citation

omitted); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining de minimis nature of

injuries may cast doubt on prisoner’s account of the incident but that is an issue of fact to be

resolved by the fact finder based on all of the evidence). Even a “de minimis” use of force could

be “constitutionally significant” where the force is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”

Brooks, 204 F.3d at 107 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10). For purposes of this motion, Plaintiff

has provided sufficient evidence of injury, and whether Plaintiff’s injuries were minor or serious

is an issue to be resolved by a jury.

10 Maxfield was present for the use of force and did not intervene to stop Defendants Hermann or

Fuller. Defendants have not argued that individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

or qualified immunity based on their respective roles in the incident, and the Court does not address

issues not raised by the parties.

The fourth Whitley factor requires the Court to consider the extent of the threat presented

by the inmate to the safety of staff and other inmates as reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials based on the facts known to them. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009).

Here, Defendants claim that they dragged Plaintiff out of the public hallway to restore order and

diffuse a security threat. A reasonable jury could find, however, that Defendants were not faced

with a disturbance or security threat if they credited Plaintiff’s claims that he merely bent down to

fix his shackles, which were too tight, and did not sit in the hallway, refuse to continue walking to

the courtroom, or use obscenities against the officers. Moreover, the comments Defendants

allegedly made to Plaintiff prior to and after the incident suggest that they may have acted out of

malice or frustration with Plaintiff.

Finally, with respect to the fifth Whitley factor, there is no suggestion that Defendants

sought to temper their use of force.

The Court next addresses whether the law was clearly established in 2013. In answering

this question, Courts first define the right allegedly violated with a “high degree of specificity”

and then ask, “whether that right was clearly established at the time of its alleged violation.”

Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2024); Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 228 (3d Cir.

2023). “Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is

unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). “Thus, the central question is

whether the existing law gave the officer ‘fair warning’ that his particular conduct was unlawful.”

Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (quoting Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011)).

Here, Plaintiff was cuffed and shackled for the duration of the incident and claims that he

reached down briefly to adjust his ankle shackles after repeatedly telling Defendants that the

shackles were too tight. Plaintiff contends that Defendants responded by slamming Plaintiff to the

ground, causing him to hit his head on the door, and dragging him by his waistbelt back to the

holding cell. At issue is whether Defendants were on notice in 2013 that this particular conduct

was unlawful. See Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the

central question is whether the existing law gave the officer “fair warning” that his particular

conduct was unlawful) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 740).

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment prohibits officers from

exposing inmates to gratuitous force divorced from any legitimate penological purpose. See Hope,

536 U.S. at 738; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). Here, Plaintiff was cuffed and shackled

for the duration of the incident and arguably presented no threat to Defendants or the public when

he allegedly bent down to adjust his shackles. By 2013, any reasonable officer would have known

that it was unlawful under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to throw a shackled and

handcuffed prisoner to the ground and drag him across the floor by his waist belt because the

prisoner was having difficulty walking and bent down to adjust his shackles. See Giles v. Kearney,

571 F.3d 318, 326-327 (3d Cir. 2009) ((“[A]t the time of the incident in 2001, it was established

that an officer may not kick or otherwise use gratuitous force against an inmate who has been

subdued; see also McDowell v. Sheerer, 374 F. App’x. 288, 293 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[B]y 2004, it was

established that an officer may not ... use gratuitous force against an inmate who has been

subdued.”); Cowart v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We have little difficulty

concluding that in 2009, the time of the incident, it was well-established, in sufficiently similar

situations, that officers may not ‘use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has already been

subdued ... [or] incapacitated’” pursuant to the Eighth Amendment (alteration and omission in

original)); Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 419 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[S]ince at least 2009, the use of

violence against a subdued and non-resisting individual has been clearly established as excessive,

regardless of whether the individual had been placed in handcuffs.”) (arrestee); Skrtich v. Thornton,

280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (“By 1998, our precedent clearly established that government

officials may not use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has been already subdued or, as in

this case, incapacitated.”) (convicted prisoner).

In sum, the Court finds that under the Whitley factors, Defendants are not entitled to

qualitied immunity on prong one. And because a prisoner’s right to avoid gratuitous use of force

by corrections officers was clearly established by 2013, the Court also denies qualified immunity

on prong two.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this Opinion, summary judgment is DENIED. Prior to setting a

trial schedule, the Court will refer this matter to the Magistrate Judge for settlement discussions

and administratively terminate this case pending the outcome of those discussions.

DATED: May 3, 2023 Gag Catron

GEORGETTE CASTNER

United States District Judge

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