Opinion

GAGE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Court
District Court, D. New Jersey
Filed
Mar 12, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.6%

holding that “[t]he NJDEP, as a public entity of the State of New Jersey, is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment’

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “[t]he NJDEP, as a public entity of the State of New Jersey, is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment’
  • affirming dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata
  • ‘Dismissal for failure to state a claim serves as a final judgment on the merits.”
  • A court may also review “exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record,” as well as “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

THOMAS I. GAGE,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 23-21264 (RK) (RLS)

y.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, □□ ai.,

Defendants.

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on two motions to dismiss. Defendants John

Ruschke and his employer Mott MacDonald, LLC (“Mott”), (collectively, “Ruschke”) filed a

Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 20), the Complaint of pro se Plaintiff Thomas Gage, (ECF No. 1).

Defendants New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Shawn M. LaTourette,

Christopher Squazzo, and Stephen M. Dench! (together, “NJDEP Defendants”) also filed a Motion

to Dismiss. (ECF No. 24.)? The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and resolves the

matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule

78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.

Defendant LaTourette is the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,

and Defendants Squazzo and Dench are employees of the department.

* The Court will refer to all defendants collectively as “Defendants.”

1. BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This is one of a never-ending series of complaints that Plaintiff has filed in this district?

This matter arises from Plaintiffs dispute with findings made by the New Jersey Department of

* The Honorable Michael A. Shipp, in dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint in a similar matter which will be

discussed at length below, chronicled all of Plaintiffs lawsuits in this district. See Opinion, Gage v. New

Jersey Department of Envt'l Protection and Ruschke, No. 21-10763 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2022), ECF No. 17 at

1-3 n.1 (“2022 Opinion”). The Court quotes from and supplements the list compiled by Judge Shipp:

(1) Gage v. Township of Warren, No. 09-519 (D.N.J. June 10, 2009) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for

failure of pleading);

(2) Gage v. New Jersey, No. 10-2603 (D.N.J. June 11, 2010) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for failure

of pleading), aff'd, 408 F. App’x 622 (3d Cir.);

(3) Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 11-862 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for,

among other reasons, qualified immunity), aff'd, 521 F. App’x 49 (3d Cir. 2013);

(4) Gage v. Warren Twp. Comm. & Planning Bd. Members, No. 11-1501 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 2011)

(Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for, among other reasons, res judicata and judicial immunity), aff'd, 463

F. App’x 68 (3d Cir. 2012);

(5) Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 12-777 (D.N.J. July 9, 2013) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for,

among other reasons, res judicata and imposing preclusion order), aff'd, 555 F. App’x 148 (3d Cir.

2014);

(6) Gage v. Kumpf, No. 12-2620 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2012) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for, among other

reasons, res judicata and imposing preclusion order);

(7) Gage v. Provenzano, No. 13-2256 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2013) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for, among

other reasons, res judicata and judicial immunity and imposing preclusion order), aff'd, 571 F.

App’x 111 (d Cir. 2014 );

(8) Gage v. Miller, No. 13-6985 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for, among other

reasons, judicial immunity and imposing preclusion order);

(9) Gage v. Christie, No. 14-2587 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014) (Wolfson, J.) (dismissed for violating

preclusion order);

(10) Gage v. Provenzano, No. 14-5700 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2016) (Linares, J.) (dismissed for, among

other reasons, res judicata);

(11) Gage v. N.J. Gov. Chris Christie's Admin., No. 15-6964 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2015) (Kugler, J.)

(dismissed with prejudice for violating preclusion order and judicial immunity), aff'd, No. 15-3382

(3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2016);

(12) Gage v. N.J. Office of Atty Gen., No. 16-2790 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2016) (Linares, J.) (dismissed

for, among other reasons, immunity);

(13) Gage v. Somerset County, No. 16-3119 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2017) (Martinotti, J.) (dismissed with

prejudice for want of jurisdiction), a.ff’d, No. 17-1303 (3d Cir. May 26, 2017);

(14) Gage v. Somerset County, No. 19-9097 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2020) (Shipp, J.) (dismissed for

insufficient service), appeal dismissed, No. 20-1110 (3d Cir. June 4, 2020);

(15) Gage y, State of New Jersey, No. 19-9098 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2019) (Shipp, J.) (dismissed for

violating preclusion order), aff'd, No. 20-1075 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2020);

(16) Gage vy. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co., No. 19-20396 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2022) (Shipp, J.)

(dismissed with prejudice for failure of pleading);

Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”). In late 2019, Plaintiff purchased a parcel of land in

Hopatcong, New Jersey. (““Compl.,” ECF No. 1 § 27.) Plaintiff thereafter, in May 2020, “filed a

Land Use Application for a minor development,” likely attempting to develop the land. Ud. □ 4.)

A private engineer for the Hopatcong’s Land Use Board, determined that Plaintiff's application

failed to address municipal codes concerning wetlands and other critical areas. (/d. { 5.) Plaintiff

requested a hearing with the Land Use Board, who approved Plaintiff's application only if he

confirmed that his development would not disturb any wetlands. 7d. 9-10.) Plaintiff thereafter

requested a decision from NJDEP regarding whether his property contained wetlands. U/d. 11.)

In response, Defendants issued a “letter of interpretation” to plaintiff stating that they had

“determined that State open waters, freshwater wetlands and their associated transition areas are

present” on Plaintiff's property. Ud. 9 17, see also ECF No. 27, Ex. G.)* Plaintiff did not appeal

this determination through the statutory appeals process pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:7A-21. (See ECF

No. 27, Ex. G.) Instead, Plaintiff chose to initiate this litigation. Plaintiff asserts fourteen causes

of action in this Complaint, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Federal and New Jersey

Constitutions.

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 30, 2022, for some reason, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in the District

of Columbia District Court. (ECF No. 1.) Ruschke filed a Motion to Dismiss, (“Ruschke Mov.

(17) Gage v. Lynch, No. 20-16236 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2020) (Arleo, J.) (dismissed with prejudice for failure

to state a claim); aff'd, No. 23-1168 Gd Cir. Aug. 17, 2023); and

(18) Gage v. N.J. Envil. Protection et al., No. 21-10763 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2022) (Shipp., J.) (dismissed for

failure to state a claim).

4 As the specific factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are at times unclear, the Court also relied

on the Letter of Interpretation, which was attached as an exhibit to NJDEP’s Motion to Dismiss. See Pension

Ben. Guar. Corp. vy. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (A court may also

review “exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record,” as well as “undisputedly authentic

document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based

on the document”).

Br.,” ECF No, 20), as did NJDEP Defendants, who also moved to dismiss based on improper

venue, (“NJDEP Mov. Br.,” ECF No. 24). Plaintiff filed a motion in opposition to Ruschke’s

motion, (ECF No, 21), as well as an opposition to NJDEP’s motion, (ECF No. 29). Ruschke and

Mott filed supplemental memoranda in support of their motion, (ECF Nos. 25, 26, 33), and NJDEP

filed a reply, (ECF No. 30).° On September 27, 2023, the Honorable Carl J. Nichols, U.S.D.J.,

transferred this case to the District of New Jersey. (ECF Nos. 34, 35.) Following transfer to this

Court, the Motions to Dismiss were reopened and are now ripe for disposition.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. FEDERAL RULE OF CrviL PROCEDURE 12(B)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a

complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss, a court must first determine whether the party presents a facial or factual attack to the

jurisdiction, because that distinction determines how the pleading is reviewed. See Mortensen □□□

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “A facial attack concerns an

alleged pleading deficiency whereas a factual attack concerns the actual failure of a plaintiffs

claims to comport factually with the jurisdictional prerequisites.” Young vy. United States, 152 F.

Supp. 3d 337, 345 (D.N.J. 2015). In reviewing a facial attack, “the court must only consider the

allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein . . . in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). On this posture,

a court presumes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and “the burden of establishing the

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). By contrast, in reviewing a factual attack, the court

> Plaintiff filed a response at ECF No. 34.

may weigh and consider evidence outside of the pleadings. Const. Party of Pennsylvania v.

Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014).

Facial attacks typically occur prior to the defendant answering the complaint and the parties

engaging in discovery. See Askew v. Trustees of Gen. Assembly of Church of the Lord Jesus Christ

of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 417 3d Cir. 2012) (“As the defendants had not answered

and the parties had not engaged in discovery, the first motion to dismiss was facial.”). As

Defendants contest whether the facts as pled in the Complaint establish standing, the Court

construes Defendants’ challenge as a facial challenge. See Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358 (holding that

a facial attack “contests the sufficiency of the pleading’) (quoting In re Schering Plough Corp.

Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012)). The Court applies the same analysis “when considering

a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1) or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6).” Petruska v. Gannon Uniy., 462 F.3d 294, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006).

B. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court may dismiss a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” For a complaint to survive dismissal

under this rule, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550

USS. at 570). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint must

be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable inference to be

drawn therefrom.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).

However, the Court “need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions” or allegations

“involv[ing] fantastic factual scenarios lacking any arguable factual or legal basis” or that “surpass

all credulity.” Degrazia v. F.B.L., No. 08-1009, 2008 WL 2456489, at *3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2008),

aff'd, 316 F. App’x 172 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Restatements of

the elements of a claim are legal conclusions, and therefore, are not entitled to a presumption of

truth.” Valentine v, Unifund CCR, Inc., No. 20-5024, 2021 WL 912854, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 10,

2021) (citing Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir. 2011)).

A court must only consider “the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of

the public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are

based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. Furthermore, “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulistic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation

marks omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the

factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009),

The Third Circuit has advised that courts should apply procedural rules, like Rule 8,

“flexibl[y]” to pro se plaintiffs. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013).

Indeed, this caution is “driven by the understanding that implicit in the right of self-representation

is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants

from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training.” Higgs v.

Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (cleaned up); see

also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers... .”

(citation omitted)).

Il. DISCUSSION

A. RUSCHKE

The Court first turns to Ruschke’s Motion to Dismiss. Ruschke move to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), contending, inter alia, that Plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel. (Ruschke Mov. Br. at 5—9.)

1. Res Judicata

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a party from pursuing a second suit against the same

adversary based on the same cause of action. Jn re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).

“A party seeking to invoke res judicata must establish three elements: (1) a final judgment on the

merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies, and (3) a subsequent suit based

on the same cause of action.” McLaughlin v. Bad. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indust. Health Benefit

Plan, 686 F. App’x 118, 121 Gd Cir. 2017) (citing Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225).

For purposes of determining what constitutes a “cause of action” to satisfy the third

element, a court looks to “the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various

legal claims.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 261 (3d Cir. 2010). “[T]he focus is

on ‘whether the acts complained of were the same, whether the material facts alleged in each suit

were the same, and whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such allegations

were the same.’” Shah vy. United States, 540 F. App’x 91, 94 (d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lubrizol

Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991)). “It is not dispositive that a plaintiff

asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two actions.” Blunt v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261); see also

Matrix Distribs., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy, No. 18-17462, 2020 WL 7090688, at *4

(D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2020) (although the legal theories in two lawsuits were not identical, the later was

claim barred because the suits “involve[d] a ‘common nucleus of operative facts’” and thus the

same claim (quoting Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 8S. Ct. 1589,

1594 (2020))).

Although res judicata is typically raised as an affirmative defense, it may be considered on

a motion to dismiss if its applicability can be determined from the face of the complaint and any

documents properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Walzer v. Muriel, Siebert & Co., 221

F, App’x 153, 155 (Gd Cir. 2007) (citing Connelly Found. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 461

F.2d 495, 496 (3d Cir. 1972)). For the purposes of this motion, the Court may take judicial notice

of the pleadings and orders from the prior proceedings in order to establish the nature and scope

of prior proceedings between the parties. See also Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir,

1970) (“Where a motion to dismiss is made on the basis of collateral estoppel, it is usually

necessary for the court to examine the record of the prior trial.”); Toscano v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins.

Co., 288 F. App’x 36, 38 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (res judicata defense “may be raised and

adjudicated on a motion to dismiss and the court can take judicial notice of all facts necessary for

the decision”); cf Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181

F.3d 410, 426 Gd Cir. 1999) (“[O]n a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of another

court’s opinion—not for the truth of the matter asserted, but for the existence of the opinion.”).

The Court finds that res judicata bars Plaintiffs claims in this case. As mentioned above,

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in 2021 on the same facts against similar defendants in this same district.

The Court takes judicial notice of Judge Shipp’s 2022 Opinion which clearly disposed of Plaintiff's

claims. See Simoni v. Luciani, 872 F. Supp. 2d 382, 390 (D.N.J. 2012) (‘Dismissal for failure to

state a claim serves as a final judgment on the merits.”) Many of the parties in the former suit are

the same as the present action—-NJDEP and Ruschke were both named in the prior suit. Third,

Plaintiff raises many of the same claims in his previous suit as he does here. Plaintiff reasserts

eleven claims in this suit, including for violations of Sections 1983 and 1985. (Compare Compl.

59-175 with Complaint, Gage v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and

Ruschke, No. 21-10763 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2022), ECF No. 1 ff] 55-166 (2021 Complaint”).) The

factual allegations in the 2021 Complaint complained of the same actions arising out of the same

transaction as the Complaint here. Plaintiff discusses his purchase of a property at lot 15, Block

11112 in Hopatcong, his May 2020 Land Use Application, and Defendants’ requirement that

Plaintiff adhere to the requirements for major land use developments and obtain the necessary

permits. (See 2021 Compl. 19; 32, 3441.) In fact, many of the paragraphs in Plaintiffs

Complaint in this case appear to be copied and pasted from his 2021 Complaint. (Compare Compl.

{4 10-12 with 2021 Compl. 41-43.)

Judge Shipp found that Plaintiff's claims were clearly barred under the sovereign immunity

doctrine of the Eleventh Amendment and that no exceptions to the doctrine applied. (See 2022

Opinion at 5.) In addition, Judge Shipp held that Ruschke was entitled to qualified immunity

because Ruschke engaged in a discretionary action that he was entrusted to perform as a state

official and did not violate any of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (See id. at 7.)

Plaintiff adds three new causes of action in his Complaint in the case at bar—a common

law official misconduct claim against Ruschke, a Fifteenth Amendment claim against all

Defendants, and a failure to supervise claim against NJDEP, LaTourette, and Mott. However, the

fact that Plaintiff has added new theories of recovery in the instant action is “not dispositive,”

Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277, because the “underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims,” are

identical, Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261.

Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff added new Defendants does not somehow allow Plaintiff

to avoid the res judicata doctrine. The Third Circuit has explained that “res judicata may be

invoked against a plaintiff who has previously asserted essentially the same claim against different

defendants where there is a close or significant relationship between successive defendants”—also

referred to as “privity.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 966 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting

Gambocz v. Yelenesics, 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972)). Courts have found privity to exist where

there is an employer-employee relationship between defendants, and thus the doctrine of res

judicata applies. See Est. of Moore vy. Roman, No. 18-16345, 2019 WL 4745073, at *4 (D.N.J.

Sept. 27, 2019) (collecting cases for the proposition that employers and employees are in privity).

As such, the Court finds that res judicata applies to Plaintiff's claims here, and therefore, the

Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed.°

° Even if the Court were to find that res judicata did not apply to the newly named defendants, another

preclusion doctrine—collateral estoppel—would preclude those claims. Collateral estoppel, or issue

preclusion, “prevents relitigation of a particular fact or legal issue that was litigated in an earlier action.”

Seborowski y. Pittsburgh Press Co., 188 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1999). For collateral estoppel to apply, five

elements must be met: “(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication; (2) the issue was actually

litigated; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination was essential to the earlier

Judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to

the earlier proceeding.” Kaetz y. United States, No. 22-3469, 2023 WL 2706841, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 30,

2023). As discussed above, Plaintiff's previous Complaint presented the issue of whether Defendants’

actions in denying his permit were reasonable and violated any laws. The fact that Defendant added three

new causes of action does not change this analysis. See Dowdell v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey,

94 F. Supp. 2d 527, 540 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that claim preclusion “require[s] a plaintiff to present all

claims arising out of the same occurrence in a single suit.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, the issue was

actually litigated as evidenced by Judge Shipp’s 2022 Opinion, discussed above. Third, there was a final

judgment on the merits, such that Plaintiff “has had his day in court on an issue.” Hart v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., No. 21-14644, 2022 WL 1963666, at *3 (D.N.J. June 6, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-2229, 2023 WL 3244574

(3d Cir. May 4, 2023) (quoting Farah v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n as Tr. for WAMU Mortg. Pass-Through

Certificates Series 2006-AR7 Tr., No. 15-2602, 2021 WL 363703, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2021)). Finally, the

issue of Defendants’ actions concerning Plaintiff's land was essential to the earlier judgment, as it was the

basis of Plaintiff's suit. Finally, Plaintiff is the same party as in his 2021 Complaint.

B. NJDEP DEFENDANTS

The Court next briefly turns to NJDEP Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. NJDEP Defendants

move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). They contend that, as

a state entity, the NJDEP is entitled to sovereign immunity and is thus immune from suit. (See

NDJEP Mov. Br. at 8-11.) NJDEP Defendants also claim that the individual defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity and are likewise immune from suit. (See id. at 12-17.) For the

reasons discussed below, the Court agrees and will grant NJDEP Defendants’ Motion.

1. Sovereign Immunity of NJDEP

“(T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject

matter jurisdiction.” Blanciak v, Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996).

The Amendment states: ““The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend

to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.

Sovereign immunity under “the Eleventh Amendment does not permit a damages action against a

state in federal court.” Dukes v. New Jersey Transit Corp., No. 16-08947, 2018 WL 1378726, at

*5 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2018). Not only has this amendment “been interpreted to make states generally

immune from suit by private parties in federal court,” but this protection also “extends ‘to state

agencies and departments.’” Perez v. New Jersey, No. 14-4610, 2015 WL 4394229, at *4 (D.N.J.

July 15, 2015) (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d

Cir.2001)). Unless a party waives its sovereign immunity, “a court is without subject matter

jurisdiction over claims against ... agencies or officials in their official capacities.” Treasurer of

New Jersey v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012).’

7“A waiver of sovereign immunity must be express and unambiguous to confer subject matter jurisdiction

on a court.” Treasurer of New Jersey, 684 F.3d at 396. Here, Plaintiff does not argue NJDEP waived its

To determine whether an “entity is properly characterized as an arm of the state” and thus

entitled to sovereign immunity, courts in the Third Circuit have applied a three-factor test:

“(1) whether the payment of the judgment would come from the state; (2) what status the entity

has under state law; and (3) what degree of autonomy the entity has.” Bowers vy. Nat'l Collegiate

Athletic Ass'n, 475 F.3d 524, 545-56 (3d Cir. 2007). Numerous courts applying this test have held

that NJDEP is an arm of the state. Bellocchio v. New Jersey Dep’t of Env't Prot., 16 F. Supp. 3d

367, 384 (D.N.J. 2014), aff'd, 602 F. App’x 876 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that “[t]he NJDEP, as a

public entity of the State of New Jersey, is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment’);

Strategic Env’t Partners, LLC y. Bucco, 184 F. Supp. 3d 108, 121-22 (D.N.J. 2016) (“Sovereign

immunity thus bars the Court from hearing the federal claims Plaintiffs assert against the NJDEP.”)

Lawson v. K2 Sports USA, No. 08-6330, 2009 WL 995180, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2009) (same).

This immunity also applies to individual NJDEP officials acting in their official capacity “because

‘such a suit is no different from a suit against the State itself.’” Bucco, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 121

(quoting Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273, 280 (D.N.J.2013)). As such, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's federal law claims against NJDEP are barred by sovereign immunity.

The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's state law claims against NJDEP. The supplemental

jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “does not ‘authorize district courts to exercise courts to

exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute

immunity, and NJDEP Defendants’ motion argues otherwise. Two other exceptions to sovereign immunity

exist: “Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its power to enforce the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Antonelli v. New Jersey, 310 F. Supp. 2d 700, 713 (D.N.J. 2004), aff'd, 419 F.3d

267 (3d Cir. 2005). However, Congress did not do same in passing Section 1983. Jd. at 714. In addition,

sovereign immunity may be waived pursuant to the Ex Parte Young doctrine. This doctrine only applies,

however, in suits for prospective, injunctive relief concerning violations of federal law. Jd. at 712 (citing

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Plaintiffs suit only concerns damages, and thus the Ex Parte Young

exception does not apply. See Bucco, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 122.

expressly excludes such claims.’” Figueroa v. City of Camden, 580 F. Supp. 2d 390, 405 (D.N.J.

2008) (quoting Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S, 533, 541, (2002)), As NJDEP has

not waived its sovereign immunity, any state law claims are barred by this doctrine as well. See

Bucco, 184 F. Supp. 3d at 122 (state law claims barred under sovereign immunity).

2. Qualified Immunity of the Individual NJDEP Defendants

Plaintiffs suit also names three individuals—LaTourette, Squazzo, and Dench—who hold

various positions within NJDEP.® The qualified immunity doctrine “shield[s] government officials

performing discretionary functions... ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Harlow vy.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity is not a “mere defense to liability” but

rather “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Therefore, it is important to “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest

possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (quoting Hunter

y. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). A court hearing a claim to qualified immunity must

determine both whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutional right and whether

the right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. Pearson vy.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (discussing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

At various points in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that NJDEP Defendants violated the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. (See, e.g., Compl. ff 25, 190.) At best, Plaintiff

contends that NJDEP Defendants violated his constitutional rights by “depriving Plaintiff of his

8 While Plaintiff does not differentiate between asserting claims against the three individual defendants in

their official versus individual capacity, in order to construe Plaintiffs pro se Complaint liberally, the Court

will analyze Plaintiff's claims under either theory.

right of freedom to build... on his property.” (/d. J 62.) Of note, Plaintiff contends that NJDEP

“imposed on Plaintiff's application the alleged requirements for major developments instead of a

minor development,” thus requiring Plaintiff to obtain approvals from NJDEP. (/d. J 8.) The Court

finds both allegations without merit.

The Equal Protection Clause states that no State shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To prevail on an equal

protection claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that s/he has been treated differently from

persons who are similarly situated.” Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010)

(quoting Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 221 Gd Cir.2003)). In certain circumstances, a plaintiff

may assert an equal protection claim under a “class of one” theory. Jd. To do so, a plaintiff must

show that intentional treatment “differently from others similarly situated and that there [was] no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Jd. at 337-38 (quoting Village of Willowbrook vy.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Here, even construing Plaintiffs Complaint liberally, it contains

no allegations that he was treated differently than any other persons, let alone that Defendants did.

not have a rational basis for their actions. As such, Plaintiffs equal protection claim fails.

Plaintiff's Due Process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment also fails. The Due Process

Clause states that “no state shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.’” Toussaint v. Szeto, No. 22-2446, 2022 WL 1541545, at *2 (D.N.J. May 13, 2022)

(quoting U.S. Const. amend XIV)). There are both substantive and procedural components of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Uniy., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff does not specify which aspect he believes Defendants have violated, so the Court will

address both.

“To state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest included within the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide

‘due process of law.’” Toussaint, 2022 WL 1541545, at *2 (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown,

ASS F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006)).

Plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to sustain a due process claim. It appears

Plaintiff contends that Defendants deprived him of his “freedom” by determining that wetlands

were present on his property. (Compl. ff 63-64.) However, Plaintiff had a state procedural remedy

available to him, which he chose not to avail himself of. As discussed above, Plaintiff may appeal

the board’s finding that his property contained wetlands. (See ECF No. 27, Ex. G.) There is no due

process violation where a plaintiff has the opportunity to appeal. See Rizzo v. Connell, No. 10-

4136, 2012 WL 32206, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2012) (denying due process claim where the plaintiff

chose “not to avail himself of it”)

Similarly, Plaintiff fails to plead a substantive due process violation. To make out a

substantive due process claim, “a plaintiff must prove the particular interest at issue is protected

by the substantive due process clause and the government’s deprivation of that protected interest

shocks the conscience.” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. Of Philadelphia Bd Of Educ.,

587 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Substantive due process claims “do not arise

out of state-created liberty interests;” these rights “are founded not upon state law but upon deeply

rooted notions of fundamental personal interests derived from the Constitution.” Steele v. Ciechi,

855 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2009).

However, even assuming Plaintiff alleged that the NJDEP Defendants denied him the permits to

develop his land, which he has not, “a landowner’s disagreement over a municipality’s decision as

to a permit application or zoning decision is insufficient to state a substantive due process claim.”

Lane v. Easttown Twp., No. CV 20-5761, 2021 WL 4453625, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2021).

Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a due process violation. As such, the

Court finds that the individual NDJEP Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.’

Cc. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

The court need not dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend if amendment would

be “inequitable or futile.” See Columbus LTACH Memt., LLC v. Quantum LTACH Holdings, LLC,

No. 16-6510, 2019 WL 2281632, at *4 (D.N.J. May 29, 2019) (dismissing with prejudice because

plaintiff had repeatedly failed to correct the same deficiency in his pleading); Callaway v. New

Jersey State Police Troop A, No, 12-5477, 2015 WL 1202533, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2015)

(dismissing claims with prejudice where “the underlying circumstances from [the relevant factual

period] have not substantially changed” and Plaintiff had previous opportunities to plead his

claims); Henry v. City of Allentown, No. 12-1380, 2013 WL 6409307, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2013)

(“[A] District Court may exercise its discretion and refuse leave to amend if such amendment

would be futile, particularly when a plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to improve the

pleadings.”). Moreover, when lawsuits are barred by res judicata, such as the case at bar, the Third

Circuit has found that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Jackson v. Dow Chem. Co., 518 F.

App’x 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff's claims were

barred by res judicata); Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009)

(same).

Ruschke seeks the Court to sanction Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 11 to prevent him from filing further

complaints. In a prior Opinion denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration in the 21-10763 matter,

Judge Shipp warned Plaintiff that sanctions may be filed in the future. (See 21-10763, ECF No. 25 at 3 n.1).

The Court declines to assess sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 at this time. However, the Court notes that this

is Plaintiff's second strike. If there is a third strike, the Court will not hesitate to impose sanctions on

Plaintiff. An argument can be made that such are overdue.

Generally, this Court will avail a pro se plaintiff a particular liberality in allowing them

attempts to amend their complaint. However, in light of the serial nature of Plaintiffs unsuccessful

filings in this district, coupled with the fact that this case is a resuscitation of a previously dismissed

case by Judge Shipp, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The underlying facts

of Plaintiff's two complaints did not change. Thus, allowing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint

would only serve to needlessly extend this litigation, and subject the Defendants to additional cost

in added time, attention and financial expense. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint

with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff? s Complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice. Lo) /

ROBERT Kt RSCH □□

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 12, 2024

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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