The opinion
Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
A.S. individually and o/b/o E.S.,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 20-8495
v. OPINION
PLAINFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on
Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint (“AC”), D.E. 29, and Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, D.E. 30. The Court reviewed the parties’ submissions1 in support and in opposition and
decided the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED, and Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED.
1 Plaintiff’s brief in support of her motion for summary judgment, D.E. 29-1 (“Pl. Br.”);
Defendant’s brief in opposition, D.E. 31 (“Def. Opp.”); Plaintiff’s reply brief in further support of
her motion, D.E. 33 (“Pl. Reply”); Defendant’s brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment, D.E. 30-1 (“Def. Br.”); Plaintiff’s brief in opposition, D.E. 32 (“Pl. Opp.”); and
Defendant’s reply brief in further support of its motion, D.E. 34 (“Def. Reply”). Plaintiff also
relies on her Statement of Material Facts, D.E. 25-1 (“PSOMF”) as well as the Certification of
Thomas J. O’Leary, D.E. 29-2 (“O’Leary Cert.”) and the attached exhibits. Defendant relies on
its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, D.E. 24 at 2-3 (“DSOMF”) as well as the Certification
of Robert E. Levy, D.E. 30-2 (“Levy Cert.”) and the attached exhibits.
I. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff is the parent of E.S., a student with disabilities who resides in the area served by
the Plainfield Board of Education (“Plainfield BOE”). DSOMF ¶¶ 1-2. During the 2017-18 and
2019-20 academic years, E.S. was a student at Cresthaven Academy Charter School (“Cresthaven
Academy”), a public charter school located within the Plainfield BOE’s district. PSOMF ¶¶ 3-5.
During the relevant period, E.S. was eligible for special education and related services. Id. ¶ 2.
In February 2018, the Cresthaven Academy Child Study Team formulated an
Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) calling for E.S. to be placed at Calais School, a private out-
of-district school. Id. ¶ 6. The Plainfield BOE subsequently filed a due process petition against
A.S. and Cresthaven Academy challenging this determination (the “First Due Process Petition”).
Id. ¶ 7. Shortly thereafter, Cresthaven Academy filed an emergent relief application seeking a
declaration that Calais School serve as E.S.’s “stay put” placement while the parties litigated the
claims. Id. ¶ 8. In December 2018, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving the
dispute for the remainder of the 2018-19 academic year. Id. ¶ 9. The settlement agreement
provided that the Plainfield BOE would withdraw the First Due Process Petition without prejudice
and that Plaintiff and Cresthaven Academy would waive any statute of limitation defenses in the
event the Plainfield BOE re-filed its due process petition over any program formulated for E.S.
after the expiration of the IEP in place. Id. ¶ 10.
In June 2019, the Cresthaven Academy Child Study Team formulated an IEP calling for
E.S. to be placed at Calais School for the 2019-20 academic year. Id. ¶ 11. The Plainfield BOE
2 The factual background is taken from PSOMF; DSOMF; the O’Leary Cert. and attached exhibits;
and the Levy Cert. and attached exhibits. As Defendant has not submitted a responsive statement
of material facts, the Court accepts as true the statements set forth in PSOMF for purposes of this
Opinion.
again filed a due process petition challenging the determination (the “Second Due Process
Petition”). Id. ¶ 12. The Plainfield BOE sought an order directing Cresthaven Academy to amend
the IEP, compelling a psychological evaluation, and confirming that Cresthaven Academy be
E.S.’s “stay put” placement during the pendency of the dispute. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. On May 6, 2020,
counsel for Cresthaven Academy emailed counsel for Plaintiff and the Plainfield BOE advising
that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) appeared to be suggesting that the parties discuss a
potential settlement. Id. ¶ 17; O’Leary Cert., Ex. D. Counsel for the Plainfield BOE responded:
“Thank you, Sandra. I’ll think about it, but I think we’ve explored most every possible solution.”
PSOMF ¶ 18; O’Leary Cert., Ex. D. One week later, during a video status conference, counsel for
the Plainfield BOE informed the ALJ that the Second Due Process Petition would be withdrawn
with prejudice. PSOMF ¶ 19. The next day, on May 14, 2020, the Plainfield BOE submitted a
letter to the ALJ withdrawing the petition with prejudice. Id. ¶ 22; O’Leary Cert., Ex. E. The
letter did not reference a settlement between the parties, id.; PSOMF ¶ 23, and the parties did not
enter into a written settlement agreement as to the Second Due Process Petition. Id. ¶ 21.3
After the Plainfield BOE voluntarily withdrew the Second Due Process Petition, Plaintiff
sent a demand for attorneys’ fees, DSOMF ¶ 7, but the parties were unable to reach a resolution,
O’Leary Cert., Ex. F at 2-3. On July 8, 2020, Plaintiff commenced the present litigation seeking
payment of attorneys’ fees associated with the Second Due Process Petition. DSOMF ¶ 8. On
June 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint; Defendant subsequently filed an Answer.
Id. ¶¶ 15-16. The present motions followed.
3 Defendant asserts in its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts that the matter “was settled out
of court” on May 14, 2020. DSOMF ¶ 6. However, Defendant did not dispute Plaintiff’s
contention that there was no written settlement agreement between the parties with respect to the
claims brought in the Second Due Process Petition. Nor has Defendant provided the Court with
documentation of any such written settlement agreement.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law” and is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes
over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude granting a motion for summary judgment.
Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party’s
evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)); see
also Saldana v. KmartCorp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (the court must “view the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party”). A court’s role in deciding a motion for
summary judgment is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter but rather “to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its
motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After the moving party adequately supports its motion,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,
or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To
withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify
specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250. “[I]f the non-movant’s evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is ‘not significantly probative,’ the
court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d
523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)).
Ultimately, there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” if a party “fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,”
however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Prevailing Party
Count I of the AC asserts that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees as a
“prevailing party” under the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B). AC ¶¶
6-16. Plaintiff argues that she is a prevailing party because Defendant’s withdrawal of the Second
Due Process Petition with prejudice resulted in an enforceable, material alteration of the parties’
legal relationship. Pl. Br. at 7. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party because
she was not awarded relief by a court, Def. Br. at 7-8, and because there was no judicially
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, Def. Reply at 5. In support, Defendant
relies on John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Delaware Cty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2003)
and Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001). Def. Br. at 7-8; Def. Reply at 4-5. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not a
prevailing party because the order issued in connection with Cresthaven Academy’s4 emergent
relief application provided only temporary relief. Def. Br. at 8-10. The Court does not address
4 Defendant refers to “the District’s emergent relief petition,” Def. Br. at 9, which appears to be in
error, as the Order addressed the Plainfield BOE’s First Due Process Petition and Cresthaven
Academy’s emergent application and cross-petition. See Levy Cert., Ex. A at 2.
Defendant’s latter argument, as it concerns an order issued in connection with the First Due Process
Petition, see Levy Cert., Ex. A at 2, which is irrelevant to the present dispute over attorneys’ fees
relating to the Second Due Process Petition.
The Court previously summarized in detail the Third Circuit’s findings in John T. in its
May 21, 2021 Opinion and Order. See D.E. 14 at 5-6. In brief, the plaintiff-appellant appealed
the district court’s decision denying his motion for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. John T., 318
F.3d at 551. The parties had previously litigated, among other things, whether the defendant school
district was obligated to continue providing services to the plaintiff in a private school. Id. at 549-
50. During the course of the litigation, through out-of-court negotiations, the parties developed a
mutually acceptable IEP. Id. at 551. “Having thereby achieved the primary objective of his
litigation,” the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint and argued that he was entitled to
attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” under 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B). Id.
The Third Circuit first clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon applied
to the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. Id. at 556. The John T. court specifically highlighted the
Supreme Court’s finding that a party benefitting from a settlement agreement could be a
“prevailing party” provided that “the change in the legal relationship of the parties was in some
way judicially sanctioned.” Id. (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605 (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Third Circuit then ruled, in relevant part, that the plaintiff was not a prevailing
party by virtue of having obtained an acceptable IEP through out-of-court negotiations because
“this result was not ‘judicially sanctioned’ as required by Buckhannon,” and “no court has
endorsed the agreement with a ‘judicial imprimatur.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S.
at 605).
Plaintiff contends that John T. is factually distinguishable because the plaintiff there
obtained temporary and preliminary relief that was not merits-based. Pl. Br. at 8. The Court
disagrees. The John T. court did find that a preliminary injunction and contempt order enforcing
the preliminary injunction were insufficient to confer prevailing party status because they provided
only interim relief not based on the merits. But that issue is not before the Court. Relevant here
is whether Plaintiff may be considered the prevailing party in connection with the Plainfield BOE’s
voluntary withdrawal of its Second Due Process Petition. To this end, the Third Circuit found that
a negotiated IEP obtained out of court and the plaintiff’s subsequent voluntary dismissal of the
case lacked “judicial imprimatur.” John T., 318 F.3d at 560 (internal quotation omitted). Here,
the Plainfield BOE’s voluntary withdrawal of the Second Due Process petition with prejudice
allowed E.S. to be placed at Calais School for the 2019-20 academic year. Thus, Defendant’s
voluntary withdrawal changed the legal relationship of the parties but “this result was not
‘judicially sanctioned.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605). Accordingly, under
John T. and Buckhannon, Plaintiff cannot be considered a prevailing party.
This result is consistent with CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 578 U.S. 419 (2016),
which Plaintiff cites for the proposition that the Supreme Court “has not articulated a precise test
for when a defendant is a prevailing party.” Id. at 422 (cited in Pl. Opp. at 8). While this may be
so, the Supreme Court has made clear that “the ‘touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be
the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties,’” which “must be marked by ‘judicial
imprimatur.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Independent
School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 and Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605). Plaintiff’s contention that
she “did better” than the plaintiff in CRST because she obtained an enforceable material change in
the parties’ legal relationship ignores the Supreme Court’s clear requirement that this change must
be judicially sanctioned in some manner to confer prevailing party status. See id.; Buckhannon,
532 U.S. at 605.
However, several court cases cited by Plaintiff do support her argument that she is the
prevailing party by virtue of the Plainfield BOE’s voluntary withdrawal with prejudice of the
Second Due Process Petition. See Pl. Br. at 10-11; Pl. Opp. at 7-8; Pl. Reply at 6. For instance,
in Carter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2014), the court
considered whether the voluntary dismissal of some claims, coupled with the district court’s grant
of summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims, rendered the defendants prevailing parties.
The Second Circuit held that the defendants had prevailed as to all claims because the plaintiffs
were barred from relitigating any of those claims, resulting in a material alteration of the parties’
legal relationship. Id. at 166. Similarly, in Internet Media Interactive Corp. v. Shopify Inc., Civ.
No. 20-416, 2020 WL 6196292 (D. Del. Oct. 22, 2020), the relevant issue was whether the
plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice rendered the defendant a prevailing party. The
Internet Media court noted that “[a]lthough the dismissal here did not require the Court’s approval
(or any action by the Court)…the import of ‘with prejudice’ is that Defendant can no longer be
subject to the particular claim [ ] asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Id. at *3. Thus, the court
reasoned, the legal relationship of the parties had been materially altered such that the defendant
could be considered a prevailing party. Id.5 Plaintiff also relies on J.B. ex rel. H.S. v. San Jose
Unified Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 12-06358, 2013 WL 1891398 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2013), in which the
court considered whether the school district’s voluntary withdrawal of its due process complaint
5 The Internet Media court—a district court within the Third Circuit—did not discuss John T. ex
rel. Paul T. v. Delaware Cty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2003) or apply its instruction
that the change in the legal relationship between the parties must be judicially sanctioned to confer
prevailing party status. See id. at 560.
without prejudice was sufficient to confer prevailing party status upon the student. There, the court
held that “if a dismissal without prejudice nevertheless precludes refiling a complaint, it alters the
legal relationship of the parties; this ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’
may be sufficient to find that one party is the prevailing party.” Id. at * 3. The J.B. court went on
to find that although the school district had withdrawn its complaint without prejudice, it was
precluded from refiling its complaint because to do so would constitute unnecessary delay; thus,
the district’s voluntary withdrawal changed the legal relationship of the parties, enabling a finding
that the student was the prevailing party. Id. at *4.
Here, the Plainfield BOE is barred from reasserting the claims contained within the Second
Due Process Petition because its voluntary withdrawal of the petition was with prejudice.
Therefore, as in Carter, Internet Media, and J.B., Defendant’s voluntary withdrawal resulted in a
material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship. However, while the above cases indeed
support the argument that Plaintiff is a prevailing party under the present circumstances, the Court
is bound by the Third Circuit’s decision in John T., which instructs that the prevailing party issue
requires that the change in the parties’ legal relationship be judicially sanctioned. 318 F.3d at 560.
As discussed, it was not. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party for the
purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision. Accordingly,
Count I of the AC is dismissed.
B. Frivolous Claims
Count II of the AC seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the IDEA’s fee-
shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B), on the basis that the Second Due Process Petition
was frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless. AC ¶¶ 17-30. The AC does not specify which
subsection of the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision applies. However, in her summary judgment
briefing, Plaintiff refers to the subsection of the fee-shifting provision entitling a prevailing parent
to attorneys’ fees, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), and argues that an award of fees is warranted
under the standard set forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Pl.
Br. at 12-18. Defendant maintains that the Second Due Process Petition was brought in good faith
and not frivolous, and in any event, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs
under the IDEA for frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless claims brought by the Plainfield BOE.
Def. Br. at 10-11.
To the extent Count II of the AC seeks relief under 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), the same
subsection of the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision underlying Count I of the AC, Plaintiff’s claim
fails because Plaintiff is not a “prevailing party” under such provision for the reasons discussed
above. Accordingly, the Court does not address whether the Christiansburg standard applies to a
prevailing parent seeking attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. Moreover, while Plaintiff argues that
she is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the more stringent standard set forth in Christiansburg, Pl.
Br. at 17-18, she simultaneously maintains that Christiansburg “does not apply in this case because
Congress intended for prevailing parents to recover attorneys’ fees in special education litigation,”
id. at 13. Thus, Plaintiff takes inconsistent positions as to the relevance of Christiansburg.
Compare id. with Def. Opp. at 5-6; Def. Br. at 11.6
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C.
§1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II), the subsection of the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision that addresses frivolous,
6 The Court notes, however, that Christiansburg does not appear to support the conclusion that a
party may be deemed the prevailing party under the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision merely because
the complaint brought against the party was frivolous. Rather, as Defendant notes, Christiansburg
created an additional requirement for the award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant in
certain types of cases. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
unreasonable, or foundation-less claims brought by a parent, the Court finds that Plaintiff falls
short. The IDEA states, in relevant part, as follows:
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in
its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs...(I]} to a prevailing State educational agency or local
educational agency against the attorney of a parent who files a
complaint or subsequent cause of action that is frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, or against the attorney of a
parent who continued to litigate after the litigation clearly became
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation[.]
20 U.S.C. §1415()(3)(B)G). The statute expressly provides that the court may award attorneys’
fees based on the filing or continued litigation of a frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless
complaint to a prevailing State or local educational agency against the attorney of a parent. The
provision, however, does not provide the same relief to parents. Here, Plaintiff is not a State or
local educational agency, but a parent. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the
IDEA based upon the allegedly frivolous due process petition brought by the Plainfield BOE.
For the foregoing reasons, Count II of Plaintiffs AC is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (D.E. 29) is
DENIED, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (D.E. 30) is GRANTED. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: April 28, 2022.
C\ S WOOD V a f
Joht\Michael Vazquez, U.S\D4. □
1]