DURHAM v. DAVIS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TREMAYNE DURHAM,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 19-19126 (MAS) (TJB)

OPINION

B. DAVIS, et al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sta sponte screening of pro se Plaintiff

Tremayne Durham’s civil rights complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1)

and 1915A. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion seeking a preliminary injunction. (ECF

No. 7.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint without

prejudice and will deny his motion without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner of the State of Oregon who is currently housed in New

Jersey State Prison pursuant to an interstate compact agreement. (ECF No. | at 3.) In January

2018, Plaintiff was diagnosed with lumbar stenosis, a condition which causes him back pain. (de.

at 7-8.) In May 2019, a prison doctor ordered that Plaintiff be provided a cane to assist him in

walking. (/d. at 7.) On June 18, 2019, Plaintiff reported to the prison’s medical clinic for a sick

call appointment. (/d, at 8.) When he arrived, Defendant Lewis instructed Piaintiff to wait in the

clinic’s holding room until he was called in for his appointment. (/d.) Defendant Merriel.

however, ordered Plaintiff to leave his walking cane in the clinic as prison security regulations do

not permit such devices to be taken into the holding room where prisoners might interact with one

another while awaiting their appointments. (/d. at 8; ECF No. 1-2 at 10.) Prisoners needing aid

in entering the holding room are instead permitted to use the clinic’s handrails to walk without

their equipment, although the holding room itselfis not apparently equipped with such rails. (ECF

No. 1-2 at 10.)

Following the officers’ instructions, Plaintiff left his cane and walked into the holding

room, where he remained until it was time for his appointment. (ECF No. | at 8.) When Plaintiff

tried to stand to walk to his appointment, Plaintiff's “legs suddenly gave out and he fell to the

floor.” (/d.) The clinic officers called an emergency medical! code, and Plaintiff was taken by

stretcher into the infirmary where he was provided medical treatment and pain medication. (/d. at

8-9.) Plaintiff now seeks to hold the officers and their supervisors liable for the injuries he suffered

as result of attempting to stand without his cane.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court is required to screen Plaintiffs complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § I9I5A

because Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner suing employees of New Jersey State Prison.

Pursuant to § 1915A, this Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e}(2)(B)(ii) [or § 1915A] is the same as that for dismissing

a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.

App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir, 2012) (citing Aélah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is

“required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the

facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [Plaintiff].” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d

224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint attacked by a... motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations.” Bell Atlantic v, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the Plaintiff's

“obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his *entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” /d. (citing

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)}. A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the

factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[fJactual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S, at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for misconduct alleged.” /d. “Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are

plausible is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” /d. at 679. “[W ]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ fd. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Moreover,

while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in .

their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Ine,, 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.

2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Il. DISCUSSION

In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold several corrections officers and their superiors

responsible for his injuries through two theories of liability — first, a constitutional claim raised

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on his belief that Defendants were deliberately indifferent

to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment: and second, through a claim that the

denial of the use of his cane while in the holding area amounts to a violation of either the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or the related Rehabilitation Act. This Court will address each

claim in turn.

Turning first to Plaintiff's constitutional claim, a plaintiff seeking to hold a defendant liable

for a violation of the Eighth Amendment related to a medical condition must demonstrate that the

defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). To plead such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts

indicating that he had a sufficiently serious medical need and that the named defendants engaged

in acts or omissions which indicate that they were deliberately indifferent to that need. /d. An act

or omission will amount to deliberate indifference where it indicates that the defendant “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Jd. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). An inmate’s medical need will in turn be sufficiently serious to support an

Eighth Amendment claim where the need “has been diagnosed . . . as requiring treatment or... is

so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”

Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates vy. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).

In this matter, Plaintiff essentially pleads that he arrived at the clinic for a medical

appointment, and he was required to leave his cane outside of the room in which he was made to

wait to see medical staff. Although Plaintiff certainly pleads facts indicating a medical need — his

spinal issues and back pain — he pleads no facts which would indicate that any of the named

Defendants were in any way aware that he suffered from this condition, or that Plaintiff was unable

to walk even short distances without the use of his cane. Indeed, the facts Plaintiff does plead

undercut such a theory — Plaintiff states in his complaint that he was asked to leave his cane, did

so, and successfully walked to his seat in the holding room, and that he only experienced difficulty,

and ultimately injury, upon attempting to stand up sometime later, at which point Defendants took

immediate action to help him. The mere fact that Plaintiff possessed a cane does not alone suffice

to show that the officers knew or should have known that he would be unable to comply with their

instructions or that there was an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff should he be required to walk

without his cane. Plaintiff has therefore failed to plead facts which would show that any of the

named Defendants were aware of an “excessive risk” to Plaintiff's “health or safety” that would

result from his walking a short distance without his cane, and Plaintiff therefore fails to plead that

any Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.

Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants.

In his remaining claim, Plaintiff contends that a prison policy which does not permit him

to take a cane into a holding area in the prison’s medical department amounts to a violation of his

rights under either the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. “To state a claim under either the ADA or the

[Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff] must allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability, who

was precluded from participating in a program, service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to

discrimination, by reason of his disability.” Furgess v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr.. 933 F.3d 285,

288-89 (3d Cir. 2019). Under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff is also required to allege that the

entity which allegedly discriminated against him received federal funding. See, e.g, CG v. Pa.

Dep't of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235 n.10 (3d Cir. 2013); Owens v. Armstrong, 171 F. Supp. 316,

328 (D.N.J. 2016). To establish causation sufficient to state a claim for relief under the

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that his disability was “the sole cause of

discrimination” against him, while the ADA instead requires “but for” causation. Furgess, 933

F.3d at 291 n. 25; C.G., 734 F.3d at 236 n. Il. Neither statute provides a basis for individual

liability against specific officers, see Matthews v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 613 F. App’x 163,

170 (3d Cir. 2015), and state officers are immune from suit for money damages to the extent they

are named as Defendants in their official capacity. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Pennsylvania Dep't of

Corr., 790 F. Supp. 2d 289, 305 (M.D. Pa. 2011).

Initially, the Court notes that as Plaintiff has named only individual defendants in their

individual and official capacities, and has not named the prison, N.J. Department of Corrections,

or other public entity as a defendant, all Defendants must be dismissed in their individual capacities

and any of Plaintiff's claims for money damages must in turn be dismissed. Matthews, 613 F.

App’x at 170; O'Donnell, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 305. Likewise, as Plaintiff has not pled that the

prison receives federal funding in his complaint, nor has he pled that the Defendants intentionally

discriminated against him, his official capacity claims seeking injunctive relief under the

Rehabilitation Act must likewise be dismissed. Furgess, 933 F.3d at 291 n. 25; C.G., 734 F.3d at

235 n. 10, 236 n. 11.

Turning to Plaintiffs only remaining claim - his claim seeking injunctive relief under the

ADA -— Plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable basis for relief. Even assuming that Plaintiff has

a qualifying disability, Plaintiff has not actually pled facts indicating that he was denied the ability

to participate in a service or other provision of the prison by reason of his disability. It appears

that the only service in question in this matter is access to the medical department of the prison —

but Plaintiff was not denied such access. That he injured himself in standing is certainly

unfortunate, but he was not denied care — he instead received care, albeit for the injury that resulted

from his attempt to walk. Because Plaintiff has not clearly identified the program, service, or

activity which he was allegedly denied, nor has he pled facts showing he was denied any such

service, program, or activity because of his back issues, he has failed to plead a plausible claim for

relief under the ADA, Furgess, 933 F.3d at 288-89. Plaintiffs ADA claim seeking injunctive

relief is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff in October 2020 filed a motion seeking a preliminary

injunction. (ECF No. 7.) Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should be granted

only in limited circumstances.” Novartis Consumer Health v. Johnson & Johnson — Merck

Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002). In order to show that he is entitled to

such relief, a petitioner must

demonstrate that “(1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial

will result in irreparable harm; (3) granting the injunction will not

result in irreparable harm to the defendants; and (4) granting the

injunction is in the public interest.” Maldonado v. Houston, 157

F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) (as to a preliminary injunction); see

also Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537 (D.N.J. 1999) (as to

temporary restraining order). A [petitioner] must establish that all

four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians Ass'n of America v.

independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1990).

Ward v, Aviles, No. 11-6252, 2012 WL 2341499, at *1 (D.N.J. June 18, 2012). For the reasons

expressed above, all of Plaintiff's claims will be dismissed without prejudice at this time. Plaintiff

has therefore failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims at this time, and his

motion seeking an injunction (ECF No. 7) is therefore denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and his motion seeking a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 7) is

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

MICHAEL eare

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE