Aalaam v. Graham

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-CV-00226-KDB-SCR

ANWAR A. AALAAM,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

LAWRENCE DALE GRAHAM,

Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on its own motion, pursuant to its inherent authority

to ensure a case is not frivolous. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint – which asserts numerous

state and federal law claims against the North Carolina state court judge who presided over his

divorce proceedings – the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are indeed frivolous. By well-

established authority Defendant Judge Lawrence Graham has absolute judicial immunity from

Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims will be DISMISSED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Although Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, every filing in this Court is subject

to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to confirm that a plaintiff has standing

and the case is not frivolous. See Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012); Ferguson

v. Wooton, 741 F. App'x 955 (4th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases and explaining that “[f]rivolous

complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the district court's inherent authority, even when

the plaintiff has paid the filing fee” and that “dismissal prior to service of process is permissible

when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a patently frivolous complaint”); Smith v.

Kagan, 616 F. App'x 90 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Frivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant

to the court's inherent authority, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee); Fitzgerald v. First

E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–364 (2d Cir. 2000). “[I]t is well established that

a court has broad inherent power sua sponte to dismiss an action, or part of an action, which is

frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.” Brown v. Maynard, No. L–11–619, 2011 WL

883917, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2011) (citing cases). Therefore, a court has “the discretion to

dismiss a case at any time, notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee or any portion thereof, if

it determines that the action is factually or legally frivolous.” Id.

Finally, this Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a

less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);

King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal

construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts

which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining

pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action – describing himself as a “vessel”1 and the

“registered agent and beneficiary of the legal fiction Anwar A. Aalaam” – against Lawrence

Graham, a North Carolina state District Court Judge who presided over Plaintiff’s North Carolina

1 Because of the other clear grounds requiring dismissal of this action, the Court will not address

Plaintiff’s standing to pursue this action as a “vessel” or “legal fiction” rather than as a “person,”

but notes that under Article III, a federal court may resolve only “a real controversy with real

impact on real persons.” B.R. v. F.C.S.B., 17 F.4th 485, 492–93 (4th Cir. 2021) quoting

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) (emphasis added).

divorce action, Sara A. Aalaam v. Anwar A. Aalaam (Case No. 24 CVD 1757) (Iredell County,

NC District Court). (Doc. No. 1). Both Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of North Carolina. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Graham “breached [his] duties” under his judicial oath under the North

Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct by “labeling Plaintiff as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a

defamatory label designed to discredit Plaintiff's legal arguments, and by refusing to consider

Plaintiff's valid legal filings and evidence.” He asserts a multitude of state and federal claims,

including “Defamation of Character, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Abuse of Process, Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), Fraud or Misrepresentation, Civil Conspiracy, Violation

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Breach of Trust, Trustee Malfeasance, Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith

and Fair Dealing, Judicia Misconduct, Violation of Due Process, Violation of Equal Protection

Rights, Negligence, Gross Negligence and Obstruction of Justice.”

III. DISCUSSION

“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising

out of his judicial actions.” Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, a judge's

entitlement to absolute immunity applies “even when such [judicial] acts are in excess of their

jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly,” Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 356 (1978), so long as such actions were not taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction

over the subject-matter.” Id. at 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099 n.6 (citation omitted). “Like other forms of

official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment

of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). The Court in Mireles recognized two

exceptions to the long line of cases recognizing absolute judicial immunity. These include “actions

not taken in the judge's judicial capacity” and “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11–12, 112 S.Ct. 286. Neither of these exceptions is

pleaded or applicable in this case, which relates to a routine divorce action in North Carolina

District Court. Therefore, Defendant Judge Graham has immunity from Plaintiff’s claims.

Also, Plaintiff's tort and constitutional challenges to the decisions of the North Carolina

Court related to Plaintiff’s divorce are barred from review in this Court by the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine. Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars such losing parties “from seeking what in substance

would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the

losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.” Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 287 (2005). Only the United States Supreme

Court is empowered to “reverse or modify” a state court judgment. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923).

This case falls squarely within the narrow contours of that doctrine, namely “cases brought

by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Id. at 284. The relief sought here clearly requires this Court to revisit the merits of

Judge Graham’s rulings. If Plaintiff is of the opinion that Judge Graham erred in his handling of

his divorce and claims of parental rights, he should have appealed those decisions within the North

Carolina courts. See Skillings v. Knott, 251 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1003–04 (E.D. Va. 2017) (dismissing

similar action).

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiffs claims in this action are DISMISSED; and

2. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: October 21, 2024

Ltpatd

Kenneth D. Bell ey,

United States District Judge % ie of