The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:24-cv-00004-RJC-SCR
STEPHEN ROBEY AND DOROTHY )
ROBEY, AS LAWFUL GUARDIANS )
AD LITEM FOR MINOR CHILD J.R., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
) ORDER
v. )
)
CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG )
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.
No. 3), the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”), (Doc.
No. 9), Plaintiffs’ Objection to the M&R, (Doc. No. 11), and other documents of record.
For the reasons explained below, the Court ADOPTS the M&R and GRANTS in
part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Neither party has objected to the Magistrate Judge’s statement of the factual
and procedural background of this case. Therefore, the Court adopts the facts as set
forth in the M&R.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court may assign dispositive pretrial matters, including motions to
dismiss, to a magistrate judge for “proposed findings of fact and recommendations.”
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) & (B). The Federal Magistrate Act provides that a district
court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). However, “when objections to strictly legal issues are raised
and no factual issues are challenged, de novo review of the record may be dispensed
with.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). De novo review is also not
required “when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct
the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations.” Id. Likewise, merely reiterating the same arguments made in the
pleadings or motion submitted to the Magistrate Judge does not warrant de novo
review. See United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 620–21 (4th Cir. 2007); Durkee
v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742, 747 (W.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d sub
nom., Durkee v. Geologic Sols., Inc., 502 F. App’x 326 (4th Cir. 2013).
The standard of review for a motion to dismiss is well known. “A motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint,’ including
whether it meets the pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2).” Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v.
Quicksilver LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 535, 542 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (quoting Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009)). A complaint attacked under Rule
12(b)(6) will survive if it contains enough factual matter “to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). An
allegation is facially plausible if it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specific facts are not
necessary, and the statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration
omitted). Additionally, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must “view the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,” Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7
F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and refrain from weighing the facts or
assessing the evidence. Potomac Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Takoma
Acad. Alumni Ass’n, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (D. Md. 2014). Nonetheless, a court
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,”
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), and though the Court views the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a complaint tendering “naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement” cannot proceed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. DISCUSSION
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court judge
shall make a de novo determination of any portion of an M&R to which specific
written objection has been made. Plaintiffs object to the M&R’s finding that the
Complaint fails to allege a policy or custom attributable to the Defendant Board. (Doc.
No. 11 at 3). Plaintiffs further object to the M&R’s finding that the Complaint fails to
allege sufficient facts to pierce Principal Harrill’s and Superintendent Hill’s public
official immunity. (Id. at 6–7).
A. Policy or Custom Attributable to the Board
With respect to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against the Board based on a
theory of widespread custom or usage, the M&R concluded that Plaintiffs failed to
allege a policy or custom attributable to the Board. (Doc. No. 9 at 10–11). The M&R
reasoned that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts of a persistent and widespread
practice of failing to respond to and notify parents of similar instances or that the
Board had actual or constructive notice of such practice. (Id. at 11). Rather, as the
M&R points out, Plaintiffs rely only on the single incident involving J.R. and the
resulting school meeting. (Id.). The M&R further concluded that Plaintiffs’ theory
that the Board is liable for failure to train similarly fails because Plaintiffs fail to
allege sufficient facts of a pattern of similar alleged constitutional violations by
untrained employees and again rely only on the single incident involving J.R. (Id.
at 12).
Plaintiffs now object on grounds that “[i]t is reasonable to conclude that the
‘municipality subscribes to a custom, policy, or practice’ for this type of grossly
negligent, reckless, or intentional behavior to have occurred, of failing to notify the
parents, failing to notify any agency, or failing to take any action whatsoever in the
face of these serious circumstances.” (Doc. No. 11 at 3). Plaintiffs reiterate that a
“policy or custom can be shown by omission or practice” and that the “omission is the
failure to train, the lack of constitutional procedural and substantive due process
afforded J.R. and her parents, in this case, as well as mandated by the General
Statues 115C-376.5, and manifested in the failure of Hodges, Harrill or Hill to notify
the Robeys or any competent agency, of the serious risks to J.R.’s best interest and
well-being.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiffs now submit that “there is a practice that is so
persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”
(Id.). And Plaintiffs argue that the Board’s actions do not constitute “mere
negligence.” (Id.). Rather, Plaintiffs claim that “there is a deliberate indifference here
to the rights of J.R. and her parents, to be subjected to this grossly negligent, reckless
or intentional actions and omissions.” (Id.). Plaintiffs reiterate that the Board’s
“disregard of known or obvious consequences” is “not acceptable.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs fail to state a specific objection directing the Court to a specific error
in the M&R or otherwise rebut its sound reasoning. And to the extent that Plaintiffs
restate arguments already presented to the Magistrate Judge or assert that the M&R
fails to sufficiently acknowledge those arguments, de novo review is not required.
Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. Nevertheless, having reviewed the record and the parties’
arguments, the Court finds that the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge should
be adopted. Plaintiffs’ objections do not address their failure to allege facts sufficient
to demonstrate a persistent and widespread practice of failing to respond to and notify
parents of similar instances, that the Board had actual or constructive notice of such
a practice, or a pattern of similar alleged constitutional violations by untrained
employees. Rather, Plaintiffs’ objections focus predominantly on the incident
involving J.R. and the resulting school meeting. Plaintiffs’ general reference to “other
suicides in the Board’s district,” “the rise in teenage suicide,” and indication that one
such suicide was “referenced in the Complaint” does not change the outcome. (Doc.
No. 11 at 3–5). Accordingly, the Court adopts the M&R’s recommendation to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim against the Board.
B. Public Official Immunity – State Law Claims Against Individual
Defendants
With respect to Plaintiff’s state law claims against the individual defendants,
the M&R concluded that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to pierce Principal
Harrill’s and Superintendent Hill’s public official immunity. (Doc. No. 9 at 23). The
M&R reasoned that Hill is only mentioned in the caption of the Complaint as a party
and that the only conduct specifically attributed to Harrill is that she was allegedly
present at a single resulting internal meeting following the incident involving J.R.
(Id.). The M&R went on to explain that “[n]owhere in the Complaint does it
specifically allege that Harrill or Hill, as opposed to conclusory grouping of
Defendants together, were aware of the meeting between Hodge and J.R. or that J.R.
was engaged in self-harm until the meeting that occurred after Plaintiffs raised their
concerns to school administrators.” (Id. (citing R.A., 36 F.4th at 545–46 (concluding
that plaintiff failed to allege malice to overcome public official immunity because
there were no allegations of intent to injure, and noting mere reckless indifference is
insufficient to show constructive intent to injure such that failure to report or take
corrective action in response to teacher’s alleged abuse did not amount to malice as
alleged))).
Plaintiffs object on grounds that “the Complaint and facts allegted [sic] does
outline the timeline of events with specificity.” (Doc. No. 11 at 6). Plaintiffs further
claim that their Complaint and jurisdictional affidavit “have a timeline of events.”
(Id. at 7). Plaintiffs submit that the Complaint and affidavit “are sufficient” because
both Hill and Harrill either knew, or should have known, of the incidents in
question. (Id.).
Plaintiffs again fail to state a specific objection directing the Court to a specific
error in the M&R or otherwise rebut its sound reasoning. And to the extent that
Plaintiffs restate arguments already presented to the Magistrate Judge or assert that
the M&R fails to sufficiently acknowledge those arguments, de novo review is not
required. Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. Nevertheless, having reviewed the record and the
parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
should be adopted. The Court agrees with the M&R’s conclusion that “[b]ecause there
are no factual allegations in the Complaint, as opposed to mere conclusory statements
as to how Harrill and Hill acted with malice or corruption, Harrill and Hill are
entitled to public official immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law claims.” (Doc.
No. 9 at 23–24). Accordingly, the Court adopts the M&R’s recommendation to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Harrill and Hill in their individual capacities.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Magistrate Judge’s M&R, (Doc. No. 9), is ADOPTED;
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 3), is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Specifically,
a. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims and state law claims against the Board only;
b. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ state
law claims against Superintendent Crystal L. Hill and Principal
School Tracey Harrill in their individual capacities;
c. Defendants’ Motion is DENIED without prejudice to be re-raised at
a later stage of the litigation with respect to Plaintiffs’ state law
claims against school counselor Adrian Hodge in her individual
capacity;
d. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ direct
claim under the North Carolina Constitution;
e. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims
against the individual Defendants in their official capacities only;
f. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ request
for punitive damages against the Board only.
Signed: September 30, 2024
Otef$ 4 Cr Of
Robert J. Conrad, Jr. ‘ey
United States District Judge “ee