Beatty v. Warren

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 1:22-cv-00105-MR

GARY LEE BEATTY, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) MEMORANDUM OF

vs. ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

FNU WARREN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Donald Grindstaff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 34] and “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment” [Doc. 37].

I. BACKGROUND

The incarcerated Plaintiff Gary Lee Beatty, Jr., proceeding pro se, filed

this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents that allegedly

occurred at the Craggy Correctional Institution.1 [See Doc. 1: Compl.]. The

Plaintiff’s notarized Amended Complaint passed initial review on a claim that

Defendant Donald Grindstaff retaliated against him on April 11, 2022. [Doc.

17: Am. Compl.; Doc. 19: Order on Initial Review]. Specifically, the Plaintiff

1 The Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Maury Correctional Institution.

alleges that Defendant Grindstaff retaliated against him for filing a grievance

regarding a property search by asserting a “fabricated” disciplinary infraction

against him. [Doc. 17: Am. Compl. at 13]. The Plaintiff seeks nominal and

punitive damages. [Doc. 17: Am. Compl. at 5].

The Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on May

29, 2024. [Doc. 34: MSJ]. Thereafter the Court entered an Order in

accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising

the Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response to the summary

judgment motion and of the manner in which evidence could be submitted to

the Court. [Doc. 35: Roseboro Order]. On June 15, 2024,2 the Plaintiff filed

“Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” and supporting documents.3

[Doc. 37: Plaintiff’s “MSJ”]. The Plaintiff subsequently explained that Docket

Entry 37 was intended as a response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, and not as an independent dispositive motion. [See Doc. 40].

These matters are ripe for disposition.

2 Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (establishing the prisoner mailbox rule);

Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying prisoner

mailbox rule to § 1983 case).

3 The “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” is not verified, so it cannot be considered

on summary judgment as a forecast of evidence. [See Doc. 37 at 18 (signed to “the Best

of [Plaintiff’s] knowledge”); see also Doc. 1: Unverified Complaint]. In considering the

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will consider relevant portions of

the Plaintiff’s verified filings, as well as other relevant portions of the record. [See, e.g.,

Doc. 17: Am. Compl.; Doc. 37-1: Plaintiff’s Decl.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the

Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.

App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply

show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)

(footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some

alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be

no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-28, 106 S. Ct.

2505 (1986). When opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version

of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is a summary of the relevant portions of the undisputed

forecast of evidence.

The Plaintiff was transferred to the Craggy CC on April 11, 2022. Upon

arrival, his property was searched, and excess batteries were seized. [Doc.

17: Am. Compl. at 13]. Officers Grindstaff and Trantham searched the

Plaintiff’s property for a second time and seized additional batteries. [Id.].

The Plaintiff objected to this second search, asked for a sergeant, requested

a grievance form from Officer Grindstaff, and filed a grievance about the

second search. [See Doc. 34-3: MSJ Ex at 2 (April 11, 2022 Grievance)].

On April 11, 2022 at 1:00 p.m., Officer Grindstaff reported that the

Plaintiff used profanity during the second search. [Doc. 34-4: MSJ Ex at 8

(Offense and Disciplinary Report)]. Sergeant McGee investigated the

incident and gathered witness statements. Defendant Grindstaff and Officer

Trantham confirmed that the Plaintiff used profanity during the second

search, while the Plaintiff denied the same. [See Doc. 34-4: MSJ Ex at 10

(Grindstaff’s witness statement); id. at 14 (Trantham’s witness statement);

id. at 12 (Plaintiff’s witness statement). Sergeant McGee concluded that the

Plaintiff should be charged with a B-24 infraction for using profane language.

[Id. at 4]. The summary of the charge states:

ON 4/11/22 AT APPROXIMATELY 1234 HRS. OFFICER

DONALD GRINDSTAFF WAS WORKING IN BUILDING 2.

INMATE GARY BEATTY … APPROACHED THE BARS

ASKING QUESTIONS CONCERNING WHY HIS PROPERTY

WAS SEARCHED AGAIN. OFFICER GRINDSTAFF

INFORMED HIM THAT HE HAD TOO MANY BATTERIES.

INMATE BEATTY THEN STATED “YOURE A FUCKING IDIOT.”

INMATE BEATTY WILL BE CHARGED WITH A B-24 FOR

USING PROFANITY TOWARDS STAFF. INMATE BEATTY

CHECKED YES ON WRITTEN STATEMENTS, LIVE

WITNESSES, AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE BUT DID NOT GIVE

ANY NAMES. NO PLEA WAS ENTERED THIS CASE HAS

BEEN REFERRED TO THE DHO.

[Id. at 8]. The Plaintiff acknowledged that the charge and his rights were

explained to him on April 13, 2022. [Id.]. He was brought before DHO Mull

for a disciplinary hearing on April 20, 2022. [Id.]. The Plaintiff pleaded guilty

to the B-24 infraction, and he was sanctioned for his conduct.4 [Id.; Doc. 11-

4: Plaintiff’s Decl. at ¶ 11; Doc. 34-4: MSJ Ex at 1 (Offender Info. Screen)].

4 The Plaintiff states that DHO Mull coerced his plea. [Doc. 11-4: Plaintiff’s Decl. at ¶¶ 9-

11]. However, no claim against DHO Mull passed initial review. [See Docs. 14, 19].

IV. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, the Plaintiff explains that the “Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment” [Doc. 37] was intended to serve as a Response to

the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, rather than as an

independent dispositive motion. [See Docs. 40, 41]. The “Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment” will, therefore, be construed as a Response to

Defendant Grindstaff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Clerk will be

instructed to update the docket accordingly.5

The Court now turns to the merits of Defendant Grindstaff’s Motion. An

inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free from

retaliation for filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855 F.3d

533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d 89,

110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment right to

complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper treatment

by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717 Fed. App’x

271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).

To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2)

5 Had the “Plaintiff’s Motion…” proceeded as a dispositive motion, it would be denied for

the reasons discussed infra.

the defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment

rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.

2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Retaliation claims brought by

prisoners, however, are treated with skepticism because every act of

discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it responds directly to

prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

Here, the undisputed forecast of evidence demonstrates that an

investigation was conducted, evidence was gathered demonstrating that the

infraction occurred, and the Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the infraction. The

Plaintiff’s bare assertion that Defendant Grindstaff had a retaliatory motive

to accuse him of a disciplinary infraction is insufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact. No reasonable jury could find that the infraction was

caused by Defendant Grindstaff’s retaliatory motive in light of the conduct

that the Plaintiff admitted by pleading guilty. See, e.g., Prince v. Gang, No.

GJH-20-535, 2022 WL 596802 (D. Md. Feb. 28, 2022) (granting summary

judgment on claim that officers retaliated by issuing infractions and upholding

them on appeal where the inmate pleaded guilty to those infractions); Green

v. Sacchet, No. WMN-02-1835, 2002 WL 32639150 (D.Md. Dec. 10, 2002)

(the mere fact that defendants issued an infraction around the time the

inmate submitted a grievance did not support an inference of retaliatory

intent, where the evidence reflected that the infractions would have been

issued regardless). Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment will be granted.

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, because the Plaintiff has not forecast any evidence that

Defendant Grindstaff violated a constitutional or statutory right, he would also

be entitled to qualified immunity on the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the “Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment” is construed as a Response, the Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 34] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to terminate Docket Entry 37 and

to re-docket the “Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment” as a Response

to Docket Entry 34.

Signed: September 23, 2024

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS

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