Opinion

Barnette v. Eady-Williams

Court
District Court, W.D. North Carolina
Filed
Sep 25, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.5%

a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim

How later courts described this case

  • a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that support each element of the claim
  • conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of material fact are not sufficient
  • prosecutorial immunity only applies to the extent that prosecutors serve as advocates for the State

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:24-cv-00501-MR

ANUNEAKAS A. BARNETTE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

KAREN EADY-WILLIAMS, et al., ) ORDER

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the pro se

Amended Complaint [Doc. 9]. The Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

[Doc. 7].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, who is presently a pre-trial detainee at the

Mecklenburg County Detention Center, filed this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 On July 30, 2024, the Court dismissed the Complaint

on initial review, and the Plaintiff was granted the opportunity to amend. [Doc.

8]. The Amended Complaint is now before the Court for initial review. [Doc.

9].

1 The case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of North Carolina; it was transferred to this District, where venue lies. [Docs. 1, 4].

The Plaintiff again names as Defendants Susan Surles, his criminal

defense attorney; Judge Karen Eady-Williams, a North Carolina Superior

Court judge; Spencer B. Merriweather III, the district attorney for

Mecklenburg County; and Dallas Pastirik, an assistant district attorney.2

[Doc. 9 at 2-3].

He claims that the Defendants violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights in the following ways: Judge Eady-Williams

delayed his bond hearing, imposed excessive bond, refused to replace his

appointed counsel, denied him a “fair chance period in the court to go home

lost all,” and “judged” him for “something [he] done [his] time for 20 years

ago…” [id. at 5]; attorney Surles failed to get him a swift bond hearing, could

not come see him because her driver’s license had expired, failed to give

him his indictments and file motions, is “working together” with the “DA,”

refuses to acknowledge that certain charges were dismissed, yells and

argues with him, and has done nothing to get him out of “mental health” [id.

at 6]; and DA Merriweather and ADA Pastirik are allowing charges to stand

against the Plaintiff unlawfully, drew up documents without proper

2 He names Defendant Surles in her individual capacity and the remaining Defendants in

their official capacities.

signatures, failed to give Plaintiff his indictments, are working with his

attorney, and are breaking the law and violating his rights [id. at 7]. As injury,

the Plaintiff alleges:

My mental state has gotten worst I’m on more medications,

some the jail don’t treat. My over all health is bad I got a issue

I’ve had with my testicles that stay like something is kicking me

all the time something they don’t treat.

[Id. at 8] (errors uncorrected). The Plaintiff seeks damages and for the

Defendants to be “held accountable for their actions” and to be “put in

[Plaintiff’s] shoes…” [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must

review the Amended Complaint to determine whether it is subject to

dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore,

under § 1915A the Court must conduct an initial review and identify and

dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether a complaint

raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se

complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a

district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which

set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

The Plaintiff again asserts claims against a North Carolina judge and

prosecutors, as well as his own criminal defense attorney. Defendants Eady-

Williams, Merriweather, and Pastirik are immune from suit, and Defendant

Surles is not a state actor under § 1983, for the same reasons that were

discussed in the Order on initial review of the Complaint [See Doc. 8 at 5-6].

It appears that the Plaintiff is attempting to avoid dismissal by

contending that the prosecutors and his attorney are “working together.”

[Doc. 9 at 7]. An “otherwise private person acts ‘under color of’ state law

when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of

federal rights.” Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (citing Dennis v.

Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (prosecutorial immunity only applies to the extent that

prosecutors serve as advocates for the State). To establish a civil conspiracy

under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendants “acted jointly in

concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of

the conspiracy which resulted in [plaintiff's] deprivation of a constitutional

right.” Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir.

1996); see Hafner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 576 n. 6 (4th Cir. 1992). An

essential element in any conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his

constitutional rights is an agreement to do so among the alleged co-

conspirators. Ballinger v. North Carolina Ag. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001

(4th Cir. 1987) (1985 case). Without such a meeting of the minds, the

independent acts of two or more wrongdoers does not amount to

a conspiracy. Murdaugh Volkswagen v. First Nat’l Bank, 639 F.2d 1073 (4th

Cir. 1981). Where the complaint makes only conclusory allegations of

a conspiracy under § 1983 and fails to demonstrate any agreement or

meeting of the minds among the defendants, the court may properly dismiss

the complaint. See Woodrum v. Woodward County Okl., 866 F.2d 1121 (9th

Cir. 1989); Cole v. Gray, 638 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1981). General allegations

that defendants entered into an agreement, without sufficiently alleging

plausible grounds to infer such an agreement, fail to state

a § 1983 conspiracy claim. Wiggins v. 11 Kew Garden Court, 497 F. App’x

262 (4th Cir. 2012).

Here, the Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations fail to plausibly

demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy between the prosecutors and

attorney Surles. As such, the Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants

cannot proceed for the same reasons discussed on initial review of the

Complaint. [Doc. 8 at 5-6].

Even if the Plaintiff had named a Defendant against whom this action

could proceed, the Amended Complaint would fail initial review because the

Plaintiff’s citation to the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

and his vague and conclusory allegations expressing dissatisfaction with the

state court proceedings do not state any plausible § 1983 claim. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th

Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific allegations of

material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193,

201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or indirectly, that

support each element of the claim); [see also Doc. at 8 (discussing habeas

corpus)].

The Court will dismiss this action with prejudice because the Plaintiff

has already been allowed to amend his Complaint once and has again failed

to state a claim for relief. See Green v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 790 F. App’x

535, 536 (4th Cir. 2020).

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Amended Complaint fails initial review pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ili) and 1915A, and this action is dismissed with

prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Amended Complaint [Doc. 9]

fails initial review, and this action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: September 25, 2024

ie ey

Chief United States District Judge Ale

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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