Rivers v. Iredell County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

STATESVILLE DIVISION

5:24-cv-00154-GCM

MAURICE D. RIVERS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) ORDER

)

IREDELL COUNTY, )

)

Defendant. )

____________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e) [Doc. 1], Plaintiff’s Motions for Appointment of Counsel [Docs.

4, 6], and Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [Doc.

5]. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2, 9].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff Maurice D. Rivers (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee currently housed at

the Iredell County Jail in Statesville, North Carolina. He filed this action on June 24, 2024,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Iredell County. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges that,

between February 11, 2024 and June 15, 2024, he was indicted twice in Iredell County “on the

exact same offence and issued two seperate court dates and two seperate bond amounts,” which

are excessive. [Id. at 4-5 (errors uncorrected); see Doc. 1-1 at 3]. Plaintiff purports to state

claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article 1, Section

27 of the North Carolina Constitution, which prohibits excessive bail. [Id. at 3]. He claims

various emotional injuries and lost income. [Id. at 5]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks dismissal of all

charges and $1 million “for emotional damages and loss of wages.” [Id.].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the Complaint to determine

whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A

requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the court must

identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the

complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint raises an

indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such

as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).

Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district court to

ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which set forth a claim that is cognizable

under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

III. DISCUSSION

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a “person” acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v.

Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against Defendant Iredell County in the first

place. Local governing bodies “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or

injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes

a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body's officers.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see Mt. Healthy

City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (Eleventh Amendment immunity

“does not extend to counties or similar municipal corporations.”). Municipal liability under §

1983 cannot be predicated upon a respondeat superior theory. Burgess v. Goldstein, 997 F.3d

541, 562 (4th Cir. 2021). Liability arises only when the offensive acts are taken in furtherance of

municipal policy or custom. Id.; see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (a

municipality can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the “moving force” behind

the constitutional violation) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)). Here,

Plaintiff has failed to allege that any acts were taken in furtherance of a municipal policy or

custom. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against Defendant Iredell County and

the Court will dismiss this Defendant.

Moreover, it also appears that Plaintiff remains detained related to the alleged charges. In

Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state

criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. 401 U.S.

37, 43-44 (1971). Under the Younger abstention doctrine, abstention is proper in federal court

when (1) there is an ongoing state court proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state

interests; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity to present the federal claims in the

state proceeding. Emp’rs Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Shannon, 65 F.3d 1126, 1134 (4th Cir. 1995).

Here, given that Plaintiff remains detained and that it appears that the state court proceeding is

ongoing, the Court must abstain from interfering in the ongoing state proceedings. The Court,

therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim for relief. The Court, therefore, will also deny Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive

relief because Plaintiff has plainly failed to show likelihood of success on the merits. See Real

Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009)

The Court, however, will allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to show why his

Complaint is not precluded under Younger and to otherwise state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, if the facts support such amendment. Plaintiff is admonished that this Court has no

authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to order that his state charges be dismissed.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Also pending are Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel. [Docs. 4, 6]. There is

no absolute right to the appointment of counsel in civil actions such as this one. Therefore, a

plaintiff must present “exceptional circumstances” in order to require the Court to seek the

assistance of a private attorney for a plaintiff who is unable to afford counsel. Miller v.

Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). The existence of exceptional circumstances in

each case “hinges on characteristics of the claim and the litigant.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d

160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984). To make this determination, a court must collectively assess “(1)

whether the plaintiff asserts a claim that is not frivolous, (2) the difficulty of the claim, and (3)

whether the plaintiff can present the claim considering the skill required to do so and the

plaintiff’s individual abilities.” Jenkins v. Woodard, 109 F.4th 242, 248 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing

Brock v. City of Richmond, 983 F.2d 1055, 1055 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). “The district

court’s failure to make these assessments is legal error.” Id. Where a pro se plaintiff presents a

colorable claim but “lacks the capacity to present it” in light of the objective complexity of the

claim and the plaintiff’s subjective abilities, the case presents “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at

247 (quoting Whisenant, 739 F.2d at 162).

In this case, however, the Plaintiff has not yet even demonstrated that this claim will pass

initial review, much less that it has potential merit. Until that has been shown, the Court cannot

assess the complexity of the claim or what skill may be required to prosecute the same.

Therefore, at this stage, the Plaintiff has failed to meet any of the requirements for establishing

exceptional circumstances necessitating the appointment of counsel.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial

review. The Court will allow Plaintiff thirty (30) days to amend his Complaint, if he so chooses,

to properly state a claim upon which relief can be granted in accordance with the terms of this

Order. Any amended complaint will be subject to all timeliness and procedural requirements and

will supersede the Complaint. Piecemeal amendment will not be permitted. Should Plaintiff fail

to timely amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order, the Court will dismiss this action

without prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails initial review under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief and

shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in accordance with the terms of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days in which to

amend his Complaint in accordance with the terms of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to so amend

his Complaint, the matter will be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Iredell County is DISMISSED as a

Defendant in this matter.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions [Docs. 4, 5, 6] are DENIED.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to mail Plaintiff a blank prisoner § 1983 form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: August 20, 2024

Lbal

Graham C. Mullen

United States District Judge “ee