Smith v. North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ASHEVILLE DIVISION

1:23-cv-00218-GCM

S. SHANE SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT )

OF ADULT CORRECTION, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

__________________________________________)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Request for Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.” [Doc. 42].

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se Plaintiff S. Shane Smith (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina

currently housed at Foothills Correctional Institution (“Foothills”) in Morganton, North Carolina.

He originally filed this action in the Eastern District of North Carolina on November 16, 2022,

against Defendants North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections (NCDAC); Todd Ishee, the

NCDAC Secretary; John/Jane Doe, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coordinator; and

Teresa Jardon, the Foothills Warden, claiming that Defendants violated his rights under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 (“Rehab Act”). [Doc. 1]. On January 27, 2023, District Judge Terrence W. Boyle

ordered that this action be transferred to this Court because Foothills is in the Western District.1

[Doc. 9]. After failing this Court’s initial review, Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint

1 For reasons unknown to the Court, this matter was not opened as a new case in this District until August

16, 2023. [See Doc. 12].

in which he named the following Defendants: (1) the NCDAC; (2) Todd Ishee, “Commissioner

of Prisons;” (3) Teresa Jardon, Foothills Warden; (4) John Coleman, Director of N.C.

Correctional Enterprise (NCCE)2; (5) Sophia Feaster, Division ADA Coordinator; (6) Monica

Teague, Region ADA Coordinator; and (7) Deorain Carson, Facility ADA Coordinator. [Docs.

14, 15]. Plaintiff purported to sue all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. [See

id. at 4-6].

Plaintiff alleged as follows. Plaintiff was born without fingers and toes and has

“extremely sensitive skin.” [Id. at 8]. He has no grip with his right hand and limited grip with

his left hand. [Id.]. On his left hand, Plaintiff has what some might mistakenly assume is a

thumb, but rather is “the root from which a thumb would extend.” [Id.]. Plaintiff is very limited

in how he performs manual tasks and even the slightest alteration in their performance causes

him “excruciating physical pain and great discomfort.” [Id.]. The appendage “that is often

misidentified as a thumb is [Plaintiff’s] primary tool” for feeding, dressing, and caring for

himself, “all only if appropriately accommodated.” [Id. at 8-9].

Once in NCDAC custody, in or around 1993, prison officials provided Plaintiff numerous

disability accommodations and allowed Plaintiff to receive numerous items from family

members that were necessary for Plaintiff to perform simple daily tasks. [Id. at 6, 11]. After

nearly 15 years of incarceration, Plaintiff was transferred to a facility where officials “arbitrarily

took it upon [themselves] to rescind all of [his] previously approved disability accommodations.”

[Id.]. In 2007, Plaintiff filed a civil action under the ADA and Rehab Act in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Smith v. Beck, No. 5:07-CT-3034-FL

2 Plaintiff alleges that, as Director of the NCCE, Defendant Coleman “is responsible for the

administration, operation, and supervision of all NCCE industry plants, staff and facilities; and the

promulgation and enforcement of laws, rules, regulations, policies, and practices relevant to them.” [Doc.

15 at 4-5].

(E.D.N.C.). [Id. at 11-12]. Ultimately, that action was resolved by a Settlement Agreement (the

“Agreement”) between the Plaintiff and the NCDAC whereby the NCDAC agreed, among other

things, to provide Plaintiff with “appropriate clothing and assistive devices” for his disabilities

and the opportunity to buy other identified items at his own expense. [See Doc. 15-2 at 114-22].

In reaching this agreement, it was determined that the NCCE could not provide the items that

Plaintiff needed and that they would need to be purchased from outside vendors, such as

Walmart. The items included bed linens, boxer shorts, shirt jackets, t-shirts, pants with sufficient

pockets, a belt, bath towels and face cloths, crew socks, a digital pocket radio, radio headphones,

a nylon zippered notebook, an analog watch, and rubber-gripped pens. [Doc. 15 at 13-17]. The

clothing and linen items were to be made of 100% cotton and washed only in special detergent.

[Doc. 15-2 at 115-16].

After filing another civil rights action, Smith v. Perry, 1:16-CV-396-TDS-LPA

(M.D.N.C.), prison officials “all but stopped providing clothing which met [Plaintiff’s] specific

disability accommodation needs and completely stopped permitting [him] to purchase at [his]

expense the non-clothing and linen items [he] used as accommodation assistive devices.” [Id.;

see id. at 17-24]. “The change of [Plaintiff’s] clothing which accommodated [his] disability

served absolutely no penological purpose other than to harass, belittle, intimidate, and retaliate

against [Plaintiff] for the expression of [his] grievances and for [his] previous civil rights

litigation.” [Id. at 24-25].

After discussing his disability needs with his housing unit’s supervisory staff, supervisory

staff informed Plaintiff that Defendant Jardon had rejected his request for accommodation. [Id.

at 25]. On June 30, 2022, after discussing his disability needs with the Foothills medical

department and obtaining a referral, Plaintiff was assessed by an occupational therapist. [Id.]. It

was determined that “the requested and previously provided items were the most appropriate

accommodation for [Plaintiff’s] unique disability.” [Id.]. Shortly after his appointment with the

occupational therapist, prison officials told Plaintiff that they were not going to implement the

occupational therapist’s recommendations. [Id.]. Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted an official

NCDAC Offender Reasonable Request for Accommodation (“ADA Request”), “pleading prison

officials to provide the various items which accommodated [Plaintiff’s] disability.” [Id.].

Defendants Teague, Feaster, and Carson denied Plaintiff’s numerous ADA Requests. [Id.].

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ acts and omissions have violated his rights under the

First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the ADA and Rehab Act. [Id. at 28-30]. Plaintiff

also purported to state a claim against Defendants Ishee, Coleman, Feaster, Teague, and Jardon

for the “failure to train and/or supervise employees,” which the Court construed under the Eighth

Amendment. [Id. at 30-31]. For injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered “physical harm,

severe emotional trauma, and loss of liberty.” [Id. at 31]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory

judgment; monetary relief, including punitive damages; and injunctive relief, including the

provision of various clothing items, linens, personal care items, and permission to purchase other

items at his own expense, all as reasonable accommodations for his disabilities under the ADA.

[Id. at 32-33]. Relevant here, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehab Act claims against

Defendant NCDAC to proceed on initial review.3 [Doc. 16].

Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. [Doc. 42].

Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendants to provide him at least six (6) pairs of 100% cotton

hunter green pants “identical in structure” to Wrangler pants previously provided to Plaintiff by

3 Plaintiff’s individual capacity First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Feaster, Teague,

Jardon, and Carson also survived initial review. Plaintiff’s remaining claims and Defendants Ishee and

Carson were dismissed for the reasons stated in the Court’s initial review Order. [Doc. 16].

prison officials and at least four (4) long-sleeve 100% cotton hunter green “shirt jackets” to

“properly accommodate his disability.” [Doc. 42 at 1-2]. Alternatively, Plaintiff asks that he be

permitted to purchase the required clothing items until a hearing can be held. [Id. at 1].

In support of his motion, Plaintiff attests as follows. The NCCE manufactures the

standard clothing issued to general population inmates in North Carolina. [Doc. 42-5 at ¶ 4].

The clothing items provided by the NCCE do not accommodate Plaintiff’s most basic daily

needs. [Id.]. Plaintiff’s 2007 lawsuit in the Eastern District, in which he alleged violations of the

ADA, was resolved through the Agreement pursuant to which prison officials agreed to provide

clothing that accommodated Plaintiff’s disability. [Doc. 42-5 at ¶¶ 5-7]. Under the Agreement,

officials were to provide Plaintiff with clothing made of 100% cotton. After learning Plaintiff’s

specific needs, officials informed Plaintiff they would be acquiring his clothes through an outside

supplier. The pants purchased from the outside supplier, usually Walmart, were 100% cotton

with zippers and equipped with two front and back pockets and appropriate belt loops. These

pants met Plaintiff’s accommodation needs.4 [Id. at ¶ 8].

“At some point,” without Plaintiff’s input, prison officials changed Plaintiff’s clothing to

items that did not accommodate his disability. [Id. at ¶ 13]. The newly issued pants had no

front or back pockets, only cargo pockets that Plaintiff is physically unable to use or reach. [Id.

at ¶ 15]. Plaintiff is unable to functionally dress or undress with the NCCE-designed pants. [Id.

4 Given the nature of Plaintiff’s disability, he regularly relies on pants pockets because he cannot carry

items in his hands like people with fingers. [Doc. 42-5 at ¶ 10]. Because of his disability, Plaintiff needs

to carry flex knuckle bandages, tweezers to manipulate smaller, more intricate items, and nail clippers to

open food packages and perform other small tasks. [Id. at ¶ 17]. When dressing himself, Plaintiff relies

on belt loops to pull up his pants and to pull together the fly to zip his pants because he cannot otherwise

grasp the pants as necessary to accomplish these tasks. [Id. at ¶ 11]. Without belt loops, it is very

difficult and sometimes painful for Plaintiff to dress and undress or use the bathroom. [Id.]. In his

unsworn memorandum, Plaintiff acknowledges that at Foothills he is allowed to wear athletic shorts while

on facility grounds. [Doc. 42-4 at 2]. He states, however, that he will not be permitted to wear these

shorts at Rutherford CC “where Plaintiff is slated to transfer.” [Id.].

at ¶ 16]. In May 2021, officials purchased Plaintiff two pairs of pants from Walmart that

accommodated Plaintiff’s disability. Additional pants were to be purchased, but never were. [Id.

at ¶¶ 19, 21]. (Presumably later) in 2021, officials confiscated those pants. [Id. at ¶ 21]. In

October 2021, NCDAC’s in-house legal counsel informed Plaintiff that he would be allowed to

keep the clothing and linen items purchased for him from Walmart, but that when these items

need to be replaced, NCDAC would utilize approved-vendor NCCE. [Id. at ¶ 21]. In-house

counsel also informed Plaintiff that the Warden acquired the items from Walmart “out of an

abundance of caution and to ensure the settlement agreements were complied with[.]” [Id.].

Every prisoner is issued shirt jackets, which are long-sleeved button-up shirts, at no cost

to the prisoner. Shirt jackets are necessary for warmth and protection from the elements.

Plaintiff has none. [Id. at ¶¶ 23-24]. Non-disabled prisoners are provided clothing appropriate to

meet theirs to participate in their respective assigned jobs and/or program assignments at no cost

to the prisoner. [Id. at ¶ 28]. Plaintiff seeks the same opportunity. [Id.].

On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff was awarded participation in the Mutual Agreement Parole

Program (MAPP). Under the MAPP, Plaintiff’s parole date is now June 1, 2027. [Id. at ¶¶ 29,

31]. The MAPP first allows Plaintiff to leave the correctional facility with a community

volunteer several times weekly to attend various community events. [Id. at ¶¶ 29-30, 33]. For

this purpose, Plaintiff is permitted to purchase clothing items at his own expense and have them

mailed or delivered to him at his facility. [Id. at ¶ 34]. If Plaintiff were to fail to meet the terms

of the MAPP, his release date could be extended or his chance at parole lost.5 [Id. at ¶ 32].

5 In his unsworn memorandum, Plaintiff also contends that, as part of his MAPP, he is being immediately

assigned to a job that requires him to leave the facility each day and that he currently has “only two pairs

of pants which adequately meet his disability needs.” [Doc. 42-4 at 2]. It is unclear if these are the same

two pairs of pants that were confiscated in 2021 or different pants subsequently obtained for the Plaintiff.

Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s motion. [Docs. 46, 46-1 to 46-7]. In addition to their

memorandum, Defendants provided the sworn testimony of Ladonna Browning, the NCDAC

Western Region Director; Sharon Jones, the General Manager of Manufacturing at NCCE; Mary

Stevens, the Chief Administrator for the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole

Commission (“Parole Commission”); and Aaron Clarke, a Parole Case Analyst with the Parole

Commission, as well as filings from and the final decision in a lawsuit Plaintiff filed in the

Superior Court of Rutherford County to enforce the terms of the Agreement (the “Rutherford

County lawsuit”). [Docs. 46-4 to 46-7]. Defendants paint a somewhat different picture of events

bringing us to the present motion: Plaintiff’s 2007 Eastern District lawsuit which, in 2011,

resulted in the Agreement whereby the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (NCDPS)6

agreed to provide Plaintiff 100% cotton clothing. [Doc. 46 at 2 (citing Doc. 46-1 at 14-22)]. In

2020, Plaintiff filed the Rutherford County lawsuit alleging breach of the Agreement. [Id. (citing

Doc. 46-1 at 5-8)]. In that action, Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction asking the court to

order the NCDPS to provide Plaintiff with Wrangler Jeans and other clothing items. [Id. at 3

(citing Doc. 46-2)]. Defendants in that action provided that, when Plaintiff was housed at

Rutherford Correctional Center (“Rutherford CC”), he had managed to obtain Wrangler Jeans

and other retail items, but that he was unable to obtain these items at Foothills. [Id. (citing Doc.

46-3)]. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for defendants in that matter, finding as

a matter of law that defendants had satisfied the terms of the Agreement. [Id. (citing Doc. 46-

3)].

Ladonna Browning, NCDAC Western Region Director, generally oversees all prison

facilities in the Western Region. [Doc. 46-4 at ¶ 2: Browning Dec.]. Browning is familiar with

6 The relevant arm of the NCDPS is now known as the NCDAC.

the Plaintiff and with prison operations. [Id.]. Browning attests that while Plaintiff was assigned

to Rutherford CC he was able to obtain Wrangler Jeans and other retail clothing in error. This is

because, at the time, Rutherford CC did not have a copy of the Agreement. When Plaintiff was

transferred to Foothills, compliance with the Agreement was more carefully managed. [Id. at ¶

3]. There is currently no plan to transfer Plaintiff back to Rutherford CC and any such transfer

would have to be approved by Browning. While the MAPP includes a recommendation that

Plaintiff be transferred to Rutherford CC, such transfer depends on availability and is not

guaranteed. [Id. at ¶ 3].

NCCE provides prisoner clothing. [Doc. 46-4 at ¶ 4]. The provision of prisoner clothing

by NCCE allows for “the security of knowing where clothing is sourced and its design, for the

orderly operations of procurement, and maintaining uniformity among the prison population.”

[Id.]. Offenders are not allowed to shop for retail clothing. When offenders are assigned to work

release jobs, they wear prison clothes. If alternative clothing is required by the employer, NCCE

can provide the clothing and there is no need for an outside purchase. [Id.]. This is also true for

community passes. Nearly 100% of community passes are to attend community church services

or NA or AA meetings. Offenders usually wear prison clothes to these activities. If Plaintiff

were to need civilian style clothing or special work clothing due to the preferences of a church or

employer, the clothing items would be made by special order through the NCCE. [Id. at ¶ 5].

The only opportunity immediately available to the Plaintiff is a Community Volunteer pass,

which depends on availability and finding a sponsor. [Id. at ¶ 6]. Plaintiff has no community

passes set up at this time. [Id. at ¶ 5]. Although Plaintiff has been approved for immediate work

assignments offside, he is not eligible for work release until June 2025 and his home leave does

not begin until June 2026. [Id.; Doc. 46-6 at ¶ 10: Stevens Dec.]. According to Mary Stevens,

Chief Administrator for the Parole Commission, Plaintiff’s MAPP agreement does not specify

any clothing requirements for his MAPP program participation. [Doc. 46-6 at ¶¶ 1, 11].

Moreover, Aaron Clarke, Plaintiff’s Parole Case Analyst, testifies that he is unaware of any

special clothing requirements with the MAPP agreements. He further testifies that if any

offender were unable to comply with their MAPP agreement through no fault of their own, they

would not be considered noncompliant. [Doc. 46-7 at ¶¶ 2-3: Clarke Dec.].

According to Sharon Jones, NCCE General Manager of Manufacturing, NCCE can

manufacture any clothing necessary to meet Plaintiff’s needs. [Doc. 46-5 at ¶ 2: Jones Dec.].

While prison clothing uses buttons, not zippers, NCCE can modify clothes for the Plaintiff to use

Velcro instead. Pants can also be made with additional belt loops with pockets in various places

or with elastic waists. In short, NCCE can design and make any garment necessary. [Id. at ¶ 3].

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before the entry of a final judgment, a court may enter a preliminary injunction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65(a). “The traditional office of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo and

to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit ultimately to preserve the court’s

ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” United States v. South Carolina, 720

F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary

remedy” that “may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such

relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.E.2d 249

(2008). Preliminary injunctions are afforded before trial at the discretion of the district court. In

re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524-26 (4th Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish (1) that he is likely to

succeed on the merits; (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an injunction is in

the public interest. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346

(4th Cir. 2009); see Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. When the constitutional violation is “likely,” several

of these factors are satisfied. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330,

346 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc). That is, when “there is a likely constitutional violation, the

irreparable harm factor is satisfied” because “the loss of constitutional freedoms, ‘for even

minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitute irreparable injury.’” Id. (quoting Mills v.

District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted)). The

final two factors are satisfied when there is a likely constitutional violation because “the public

interest favors protecting constitutional rights” and “a state is in no way harmed by issuance of a

preliminary injunction which prevents the state from enforcing restrictions likely to be found

unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 191 (4th

Cir. 2013)). Thus, where a constitutional violation is “likely,” the inquiry collapses into the first

factor, the likelihood of success on the merits. See Mahmoud v. McKnight, 2023 WL 5487218,

at *14 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2023), affirmed 102 F.4th 191 (4th Cir. 2024).

In his Amended Complaint in this matter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated

his rights under the ADA and the Rehab Act by refusing to provide (and/or to allow him to

purchase at his own expense) various clothing items, linens, and personal care items that have, at

least at one time or another during Plaintiff’s incarceration, been provided to and/or accessible

by him to accommodate his disability. [See Doc. 15]. In the pending motion, Plaintiff asks the

Court to order Defendants to provide him with at least six (6) pairs of Wrangler pants or their

structural equivalent and at least four (4) shirt-jackets. [Doc. 42]. Plaintiff advises these items

can be purchased at outside retailers like Walmart, J.C. Penney’s, or Cabela’s. [Id. at 2].

A. Shirt-Jackets

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion as to the shirt-jackets. Plaintiff’s request for this

item has nothing to do with the action before the Court. Plaintiff did not allege and has not now

shown that shirt-jackets are necessary to accommodate his disability. Rather, he alleges that they

are provided to all prisoners for warmth and to protect from the elements and that he currently

has none. The implication from Plaintiff’s materials is that he now needs shirt-jackets because

his MAPP agreement allows for additional opportunities to leave the facility. While Plaintiff

may be entitled to shirt-jackets as a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, their alleged denial is

unrelated to his disability or to the pending action. As such, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion on this issue.

B. Wrangler pants

In the pending motion, Plaintiff contends that his disability requires Wrangler pants,

which can be purchased from outside retailers. [Doc. 42]. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

similarly alleges the need for retail clothing to accommodate his disability. [Doc. 15]. To be

awarded injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

To demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, “[a] plaintiff need not establish a

certainty of success, but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial.” Di

Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017).

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reasons of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines “public entity”

to include “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, … or other

instrumentality of a State.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)). “[T]his term includes state prisons.” Id. (citing Pennsylvania Dept. of

Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998)).

To establish a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

he has a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

some public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which he was otherwise qualified; and

(3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Miller v.

Hinton, 288 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). States are obligated to

make “reasonable modifications” to enable the disabled person to receive the services or

participate in programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The duty of reasonable

accommodation, however, must also consider whether the institution’s actions are related to

legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987);

Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1050 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (noting that courts have applied

Turner to ADA and Rehab Act claims). A plaintiff must also establish an actual injury from any

alleged ADA or Rehab Act violation. See Rosen v. Montgomery Cty. Md., 121 F.3d 154, 158

(4th Cir. 1997).

The Rehabilitation Act provides that “no otherwise qualified individual with a disability

… shall, solely by reason of [his] disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the

benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The analysis under the Rehab Act is generally the

same as under the ADA. Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 214 (4th Cir.

2002). Claims under the Rehab Act, however, require a showing of discrimination “solely by

reason of” disability, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), while under the ADA, a plaintiff must only show

discrimination “by reason of” disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As such, the causation standards are

“significantly dissimilar.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d

474, 498 n.17 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Here, while the Court deemed Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive the low frivolity

bar, he has not shown that because of his disability he was denied the benefits of services of state

prisons or participation in programs or activities for which he was otherwise qualified. That is,

while Plaintiff alleges that his life is made more difficult and complicated by standard-issue

prison clothing that does not accommodate his disability, he has not shown that he has been

unable to participate in prison programs or receive the benefit of services non-disabled prisoners

receive.7 Rather, in the pending motion, Plaintiff alleges in essence that he is fearful that he will

be unable to meet the specifications or requirements of his MAPP agreement because he does not

have Wrangler pants with the appropriate pockets. Plaintiff, however, does not connect this

accommodation with any requirement of the MAPP program. Moreover, Defendants’ evidence

establishes that Plaintiff will not be deemed noncompliant with his MAPP agreement if he is

unable to comply because of something outside of his control. [Doc. 46-7 at ¶ 3]. Defendants’

evidence also shows that NCCE can design and manufacture clothing to meet Plaintiff’s

particular needs, whether for everyday wear inside prison walls or on work release assignments.

[Doc. 46-5 at ¶ 3]. As such, clothing from outside retailers is unnecessary to meet Plaintiff’s

7 In fact, in his memorandum, Plaintiff acknowledges that while inside prison walls he is allowed to wear

athletic shorts (presumably with the pockets he needs) to accommodate his disability. [Doc. 42-4 at 2].

While Plaintiff is concerned that he will be transferred to Rutherford CC where he will be unable to wear

these shorts or that he will be ill-equipped to meet the requirements of his MAPP agreement with his

current supply of clothing, the Defendants’ evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff can and will be provided

the clothing he needs to accommodate his disability outside of Foothills, whether at Rutherford CC or to

participate within the terms of the his MAPP agreement.

disability needs. While in the past, Plaintiff has been successful in his efforts to have prison

officials meet his needs by procuring specific clothing from outside retailers, these items are not

required by the Agreement, nor does the evidence before the Court now show they are required

to meet Plaintiff’s needs.

Plaintiff has also failed to show that he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the

relief he seeks. To prove this element, Plaintiff must show that the irreparable harm is “neither

remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Direx Israel, Ltd. V. Breakthrough Med.

Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991). Without a clear showing that the plaintiff will suffer

imminent, irreparable harm, the Court cannot grant preliminary injunctive relief. Di Biase v.

SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (a “possibility of irreparable harm is insufficient to

satisfy the movant’s burden). Here, Defendants have shown that no special clothing is required

for Plaintiff to perform work release functions or to participate in community passes. Rather,

standard-issue prison clothing is the norm. Defendants, again, have also shown that NCCE can

produce any clothing Plaintiff needs to perform these aspects of his MAPP agreement.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to meet the third element for preliminary injunctive

relief. That is, Plaintiff has not shown that the balance of equities tip in his favor. Plaintiff’s

stated need for Wrangler jeans and retail shirt-jackets that prison officials would have to

purchase from outside retailers is significantly offset by the prison facility’s need to maintain

order and security and provide consistent prison clothing to the prison population. While the

clothing Plaintiff requests would perhaps be the most suitable and desirable for him, prisons have

a strong interest in consistency among prisoners. Defendants can meet Plaintiff’s needs through

clothing designed and produced by NCCE specifically for the Plaintiff while still of the same

basic style, color, and material of the clothing of other prisoners.

Moreover, the equities further tip in Defendants’ favor because the primary purpose of

injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending trial. When a plaintiff seeks an order

altering the status quo before the case even begins, it is called “mandatory” injunction, which are

highly disfavored. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 235 (4th

Cir. 2014). Because mandatory preliminary injunctions do not preserve the status quo, they

“should be granted only in those circumstances when the exigencies of the situation demand such

relief.” Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Here, rather than maintain the

status quo, Plaintiff asks the Court to order prison officials to expend relatively substantial effort

and resources to purchase the requested clothing for Plaintiff. Given the absence of any

exigencies here, such relief is highly disfavored, and the Court will not order Defendants to

comply at this stage of the litigation.

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that the injunction is in the public interest. In this regard,

Plaintiff alleges only that “it is always in the public interest for prison officials to obey the law,

especially the Constitution.” [Doc. 42-4 at 5 (citations omitted)]. While this is certainly true,

Plaintiff has not preliminarily shown that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights or

that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his ADA or Rehab Act claims. Moreover, “the

public interest is best served if courts do not get involved with the daily operations of a prison or

sheriff’s office, especially prior to the finding of a constitutional violation.” Bartlett v. Smith,

2019 WL 1051185, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 5. 2019). See Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268

(4th Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that absent the most extraordinary circumstances, federal

courts are not to immerse themselves in the management of state prisons.”).

Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the elements for preliminary injunctive relief, the

Court will deny his motion. In making this ruling, however, Defendants are admonished that any

future failure to provide Plaintiff clothing he needs to accommodate his disability through special

order with the NCCE, particularly on his transfer to Rutherford CC and/or as needed to fulfill his

MAPP agreement outside prison walls, will be adversely viewed by the Court.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff's Request for Temporary Restraining

Order and/or Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 42] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: July 18, 2024

y y

Graham C. Mullen ee

United States District Judge mt

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