R.M. v. MINA CHARTER SCHOOL OF LEE COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

R.H. and DAWN RACHELL )

HENDERSON,1 )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV00160

)

MINA CHARTER SCHOOL OF LEE )

COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss the

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 13.) The

court issued Plaintiff Dawn Rachell Henderson a Roseboro2 letter,

notifying her of her right to respond and the possibility that a

failure to do so may result in dismissal of the case. (Doc. 17.)

Henderson moved for additional time to respond to the motion to

dismiss (Doc. 18), and her request was granted. (Text Order dated

May 1, 2024.) But she never filed a response, and the time for

doing so has expired. For the reasons set forth below, the motion

1 The docket styles the case “R.M.,” but Defendants point out and the

state court complaint reveals, that the correct initials are “R.H.”

(Doc. 13 at 1 n.1.) Oddly, Henderson referred to “Plaintiff[s] R.M. and

[Henderson]” in one of her filings. (Doc. 18.) “R.H.” appears to be

correct, and the court will so refer to Plaintiff.

2 Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).

to dismiss will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 2, 2024, Henderson filed her complaint in the

Superior Court of Lee County, North Carolina, against MINA Charter

School of Lee County (“the School”), the School’s Board of

Directors, and two School employees: Ciera Dixon and Dr. Shawn

Williams. 3 (Doc. 1-2.) Defendants timely removed the action to

this court based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a) (Doc. 1) and subsequently filed the

present motion to dismiss. (Doc. 13.) Henderson was granted an

extension until June 7, 2024, to respond to the motion to dismiss,

but to date has not done so.

The facts alleged in the complaint, which the court accepts

as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, show the

following:

R.H. is a seven-year-old girl who has been diagnosed with

autism, ADD, and anxiety. (Doc. 7 at 1.) Henderson has primary

physical custody of R.H. and shares joint legal custody with R.H.’s

mother. (Doc. 7 at 22.)

From July 2021 to September 1, 2022, R.H. attended the School.

3 Plaintiffs failed to serve Williams within 90 days after filing the

complaint, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

Plaintiffs received notice of this failure and were advised that failure

to respond within 14 days could result in dismissal of the action without

prejudice. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiffs did not respond, and the action was

dismissed without prejudice as to Williams. (Doc. 20.)

(Doc. 7 at 2.) During that period, Henderson and the School had

a series of disagreements about R.H.’s educational program. (Doc.

7 at 2.) After R.H. was left alone in an office in the proximity

of an unmonitored exit door, Henderson asked the School to place

her in a different classroom. (Doc. 7 at 2.) The School denied

this request, but R.H. was eventually placed in a classroom for

students with disabilities. (Doc. 7 at 2.)

Henderson learned of a series of altercations involving R.H.

and D.M., a classmate. (Doc. 7 at 2–3.) On two occasions, D.M.

took R.H.’s crayons from her while she was drawing. (Doc. 7 at

2.) Henderson alleges that R.H. was punished for the incident

instead of D.M. (Doc. 7 at 2.) On a separate occasion, Henderson

alleges that D.M. took R.H.’s toy boat and it was never returned.

(Doc. 7 at 2.) Henderson acknowledged in her complaint that she

“was not overly alarmed” by these events. (Doc. 7 at 2.) But she

became more alarmed at the beginning of the 2022-2023 academic

year when she received reports that D.M. had hit, kicked, and

threatened R.H. (Doc. 7 at 3.) After Henderson received these

reports, she noticed that R.H. was withdrawn and reluctant to

attend school. (Doc. 7 at 3.)

On August 4, 2022, an incident led Henderson to share her

concerns with the School’s administration. (Doc. 7 at 3.)

Henderson dropped R.H. off at the School that morning. (Doc. 7 at

3.) Y’Mecca Graves, the teaching aide for R.H.’s class, picked

R.H. up from the front office; Graves was accompanied by D.M. at

the time. (Doc. 7 at 3.) When R.H. saw D.M., she began screeching

and crying and wanted to return home. (Doc. 7 at 3.) In response

to the commotion, Defendant Dixon entered the hallway and

approached the group. (Doc. 7 at 3.) Henderson explained to Dixon

that R.H. was afraid of D.M., and Dixon responded that the students

were “in the same class.” Henderson claims this remark amounted

to telling R.H. to “deal with it” and alleges that Dixon’s behavior

was “unprofessional, aggressive and out of line.” (Doc. 7 at 3.)

On the following morning, Henderson sent an email to Dixon,

Defendant Williams, and another School administrator that

“admonished” Dixon and “demand[ed] a full investigation into what

was happening” with D.M. and R.H. (Doc. 7 at 3–4, 53–57.) Williams

responded within an hour and stated that he would follow up later

with a fulsome response. (Doc. 7 at 58.) Dixon did not respond.

(Doc. 7 at 3.)

When Henderson went to the School to pick up R.H. that

afternoon, Dixon allegedly ranted that Henderson’s email

jeopardized her job and livelihood. (Doc. 7 at 3.) Despite

Henderson’s efforts to extend an “olive branch,” Dixon treated her

with “open hostility” and vowed to keep her at a distance. (Doc.

7 at 3–4.) This incident made Henderson “fearful for her physical

safety” when Dixon was present. (Doc. 7 at 4.)

One week later, Williams responded to Henderson’s email and

requested that the School and Henderson schedule a meeting. (Doc.

7 at 4.) Henderson agreed but requested that Dixon be excluded.

(Doc. 7 at 4.) On the day the meeting was scheduled to take place,

Williams told Henderson that he could no longer attend and Dixon

would attend in his stead. (Doc. 7. at 4.) Henderson, fearing

for her safety, attended the meeting remotely. (Doc. 7 at 4.)

She claims that the meeting was “pointless.” (Doc. 7 at 4.)

Henderson also alleges that Dixon continued to be “openly hostile”

toward her throughout the meeting and during a subsequent private

conversation between the two. (Doc. 7 at 4.) After the meeting,

Henderson decided that the “only way to keep [R.H. safe]” was to

disenroll her from the School. (Doc. 7 at 4.) But she sent R.H.

back to the School the following week to comply with “the

compulsory attendance law.” (Doc. 7 at 4.)

Soon after R.H. returned to school, Graves asked to speak

with Henderson in private. (Doc. 7 at 4–5.) Graves told her that

D.M. had been attacking, hitting, and threatening R.H. nearly

daily, and the School’s administrators directed staff to conceal

the incidents. (Doc. 7 at 5.) Henderson informed the School that

she was withdrawing R.H. the following day. (Doc. 7 at 5.)

Shortly thereafter, Henderson filed a complaint with the

United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights.

(Doc. 7 at 5.) The parties attempted to mediate their dispute,

and Henderson claims they agreed to settle the dispute for $12,500.

(Doc. 7 at 6.) But no payment was made because the School had

inadequate insurance coverage. (Doc. 7 at 6.) This action

followed.4

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue, among other things, that the complaint

should be dismissed because it fails to comply with Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 10 and 11, which require that pleadings be

signed and consist of numbered paragraphs and separated counts.

(Doc. 14 at 13.) Henderson has not responded to the motion to

dismiss.

This court’s local rule provides, “If no response brief is

filed within the time required by this rule, the motion will be

considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily

will be granted without further notice.” M.D.N.C. L.R. 7.3(k).

This rule is strictly enforced, even against pro se parties. See,

e.g., Crisp v. Allied Interstate Collection Agency, 149 F. Supp.3d

589, 592 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 2016). Although Henderson has failed to

respond, the Fourth Circuit requires the court to review any

dispositive motion to determine whether it has merit. Stevenson

v. City of Seat Pleasant, 743 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2014)

(“Even though [plaintiffs] did not challenge the motions to

dismiss, we note that the district court nevertheless has an

4 Henderson does not allege that the School breached any agreement to

settle the dispute.

obligation to review the motions to ensure that dismissal is

proper.”).

Henderson appears pro se. Thus, her complaint “should not be

scrutinized with such technical nicety that a meritorious claim

should be defeated.” Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th

Cir. 1978). But the liberal construction of a pro se litigant's

filing does not require the court to ignore clear defects in it,

Bustos v. Chamberlain, No. 3:09-1760, 2009 WL 2782238, at *2

(D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), or to become an advocate for the pro se

party, Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir.

1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278

(4th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[d]istrict judges are not mind

readers”). Moreover, pro se parties are expected to comply with

applicable procedural rules. See Chrisp v. Univ. of N.C.-Chapel

Hill, 471 F. Supp.3d 713, 715–16 (M.D.N.C. 2020) (requiring pro se

plaintiff to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

Here, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is meritorious.

Defendants point out multiple deficiencies in the complaint,

including its non-compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The complaint does not “state its claims . . . in

numbered paragraphs,” nor does it state “each claim . . . in a

separate count,” which violates Rule 10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

It is also unsigned and lacks the information required by Rule 11.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (requiring that “[e]very pleading, written

motion, and other paper must be signed . . . by a party personally

if the party is unrepresented” and “state the signer’s address, e-

mail address, and telephone number”). Rule 11 provides that “[t]he

court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly

corrected after being called to the attorney’s or party’s

attention.” Id. (emphasis added). Defendants called these defects

to Henderson’s attention in their motion to dismiss, but Henderson

did not endeavor to correct them. Although Henderson is a non-

lawyer, she must still abide by the legal standards, rules of

procedure, and deadlines applicable to all litigants. See Dewitt

v. Hutchins, 309 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“[P]ro se

litigants are not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules

of procedure or court-imposed deadlines.” (quoting Jones v.

Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994))). These include, as

noted above, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

requires parties to sign their pleadings.

Consequently, Defendants’ motion to dismiss warrants

dismissal of the action without prejudice at this stage. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Given Henderson’s pro se status, the court would be remiss

not to point out several additional deficiencies in the complaint

should she contemplate re-filing the action.5 First, Henderson,

5 By noting these deficiencies, the court does not intend the list to be

exhaustive.

as a non-lawyer, may not bring claims on behalf of her

granddaughter proceeding pro se. See Myers v. Loudoun County Pub.

Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[N]on-attorney parents

generally may not litigate the claims of their minor children in

federal court.”). Myers’s bar aims to prevent “well-meaning, but

legally untrained” individuals from inadvertently prejudicing the

legal rights of minor children. Id. Second, the complaint

references the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act

(“IDEA”); as Defendant point out, any purported claims predicated

on violations of the IDEA must be exhausted. E.L. ex rel. Lorsson

v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 513–14 (4th

Cir. 2014) (stating that “a plaintiff must exhaust her

administrative remedies” before bringing an IDEA action in federal

court). The current complaint does not reference any efforts by

Plaintiffs to exhaust North Carolina’s available administrative

remedies. Third, Henderson references statutes that do not contain

private rights of action. For example, the complaint references

the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C.

§ 1232g, and the North Carolina School Violence Prevention Act

(“NCSVPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat §§ 115C-407.15 to -407-16. Those

statutes do not provide for a private right of action for

individuals. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276, 287

(2002) (FERPA); Benjamin v. Sparks, 173 F. Supp. 3d 272, 291

(E.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d, 986 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2021) (NCSVPA);

L.C. ex rel. Dunbar v. Charter Schs. USA at Cary, LLC, No. 5:24-

Cv-66, 2024 WL 3470835, at *4 (E.D.N.C. July 19, 2024) (NCSVPA).

Finally, as Defendants note, the complaint does not specify which

claims are asserted on behalf of R.H. and which are individually

asserted by Plaintiff Henderson. (Doc. 14 at 2.) Nor does it

clarify which claims are asserted against which Defendants. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 10(b).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Doc. 13) is GRANTED, and the complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

October 24, 2024