WELLS v. LYNCH

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHRISTOPHER M. WELLS AND )

LESLIE M. WELLS, on behalf of )

Their son, MATTHEW WELLS, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV412

)

THE MOORE COUNTY SCHOOLS )

BOARD OF EDUCATION and )

JEFFREY LEE LYNCH, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

On August 15, 2024, the United States Magistrate Judge’s

Opinion and Recommendation was filed and notice was served on the

parties in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The Moore County

Schools Board of Education (the “Board”) filed objections within

the time limits prescribed by section 636, and Plaintiffs filed a

response. (Docs. 33, 35.) Consistent with the Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation, Plaintiffs also moved for leave to file an amended

complaint that names the real party in interest and seeks punitive

damages against only Defendant Jeffrey Lee Lynch. (Doc. 32.) The

Board opposes Plaintiffs’ motion. (Doc. 37.)

Lynch, proceeding pro se, also filed objections to the

Recommendation. (Doc. 34.) Lynch’s objections do not make any

specific challenge to the Recommendation — perhaps because the

Recommendation does not address Plaintiffs’ claims against him.

Plaintiffs filed a response to his objections. (Doc. 36.) As

Plaintiffs noted in their response, Lynch did not file a motion to

dismiss and was not a party to the Board’s motion to dismiss.1

(Doc. 36 at 2.) The plain text of section 636(b)(1)(C) states

that “any party may serve and file written objections” to a

Magistrate Judge’s recommended ruling. See also Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(a)(stating that “a party may serve and file specific written

objections” to a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation) (emphasis

added). Because the court has not been referred to any authority

indicating that a party cannot object to a Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that does not concern his claims, and because

nothing in Lynch’s objections changes the substance of the court’s

ruling, the court has considered Lynch’s objections.

The Board’s objections raise three principal arguments.

First, the Board contends that the Magistrate Judge should have

applied the standard outlined in Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. School

Board, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998), to Plaintiffs’ claims under

the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act

instead of the standard employed in Shirey ex rel. Kyger v. City

of Alexandria School Board, 229 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir. 2000)

1 Perhaps in response to Plaintiffs’ observation, Lynch filed a motion

to dismiss today, September 30, 2024. (Doc. 38.) It is not ripe for

decision.

2

(unpublished table decision). Second, the Board argues that the

Magistrate Judge should have applied a “but for” causation standard

to Plaintiffs’ ADA claims rather than a “motivating factor”

causation standard. Third, the Board argues that the Magistrate

Judge should have applied a “deliberate indifference” standard to

Plaintiffs’ request for compensatory damages and that Plaintiffs

failed to meet that standard. After conducting a de novo review

of each of these objections, the court concludes that none has

merit.

Even assuming the Board is correct that the Sellers standard

applies to the Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims,

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded facts that plausibly support

the conclusion that the Board’s actions amounted to “bad faith or

gross misjudgment.” 2 141 F.3d at 529. Plaintiffs allege that the

Board “continually disregarded Lynch’s statements of concern” that

he was ill-equipped to teach Matthew Wells. (Doc. 20 ¶ 9.) They

contend that Lynch told Board agents that he was reluctant to work

2 In Sellers, the Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff must demonstrate

“bad faith or gross misjudgment” to prevail on a Rehabilitation Act claim

“in the context of education of handicapped children.” Sellers, 141

F.3d at 529. But in Shirey, the Fourth Circuit noted that Sellers “dealt

specifically with the development of appropriate Individualized

Education Plans (IEP’s) for disabled children.” 229 F.3d at *4.

Accordingly, although the allegations in Shirey dealt “with the education

of handicapped children, insofar as the activities in question [took]

place in a school and [were] directed at disabled children,” the court

declined to apply the heightened Sellers standard. Id.

3

with Matthew on three separate occasions. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 87, 93, 98–

100.) Nevertheless, Lynch was repeatedly directed to continue

working with Matthew. (Doc. 20 ¶ 100.) Eventually, Lynch thrust

the legs of a metal chair at Matthew and struck him “with an open

hand across his face and neck.” (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 104–05.) Matthew’s

teacher informed two of the Pinecrest school’s assistant

principals and the school resource officer about the incident.

(Doc. 20 ¶¶ 110, 112.) Even so, Plaintiffs assert that Lynch

returned to work the next day and was assigned as a teaching

assistant (“TA”) for a different classroom until he “voluntarily

resigned” later that day. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 128–29.)

Plaintiffs also allege other misconduct. First, they contend

that the Board did not tell Matthew’s parents that Lynch struck

Matthew. (Doc. 20 ¶ 118, 120.) In the wake of the incident,

Plaintiffs repeatedly sought information about it from Pinecrest

employees. (Doc. 20 ¶ 116 (alleging Plaintiffs asked Pinecrest’s

principal “if something was wrong” on the day of the incident);

¶ 120 (alleging that Plaintiffs asked Matthew’s teacher for

information about the incident the next day); ¶ 121 (alleging

Plaintiffs emailed Pinecrest’s principal but received no reply);

¶ 122 (alleging Plaintiffs called Pinecrest’s principal and

explicitly asked about the incident); ¶ 124 (alleging Plaintiffs

asked Matthew’s teacher about the incident again after the Moore

4

County Police Department reported that Matthew was assaulted).

But at every turn, the Board’s agents allegedly declined to provide

information about the incident. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 118, 125–27.)

Plaintiffs assert that Board, acting in bad faith, intentionally

concealed the incident from them and sought to capitalize on

Matthew’s inability to “verbalize what had occurred.” (Doc.

¶ 115.)

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Matthew’s educational

experience worsened after the incident. Plaintiffs claim that

prior to the incident, Matthew “would frequently join other

students in a group setting for his learning.” (Doc. 20 ¶ 58.)

But after the incident, he “was almost always isolated from his

peers and forced to spend the vast majority of his time alone with

only his teacher and a TA.” (Doc. 20 ¶ 59.) While the Board

characterizes the change as additional support “in the form of

increased time with only his teacher and a TA,” Plaintiffs argue

that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that such a

significant alteration to Matthew’s schooling without his

“parents’ knowledge or involvement” was a gross misjudgment or

done in bad faith. K.D. ex rel. J.D. v. Starr, 55 F. Supp. 3d

782, 791 (D. Md. 2014)(citing N.T. v. Balt. City Bd. Of Sch.

Comm’rs., No. JKB-11-356, 2011 WL 3747751, at *6–8 (D. Md. Aug.

23, 2011) (unpublished)).

5

At this stage, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the

Board’s actions amounted to “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” See

Sellers, 141 F.3d at 529; see also L.P. ex rel. J.P. v. Wake County

Board of Education, No. 5:20-CV-481, 2022 WL 2813038, at *4 n.5

(E.D.N.C. July 18, 2022) (unpublished).

As for the applicable causation standard, the Magistrate

Judge identified and applied the appropriate standards to

Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. As the

Recommendation noted, the Fourth Circuit has declined to abrogate

Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999), and has

continued to apply the motivating factor standard to ADA Title II

claims. Neal v. East Carolina University, 53 F.4th 130, 150 (4th

Cir. 2022). Accord Bone v. Univ. of North Carolina Health Care

Sys., No. 1:18-cv-994, 2021 WL 395547, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 4,

2021) (unpublished), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL

3196437 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2021) (unpublished). The Magistrate

Judge concluded that Plaintiffs pleaded that Matthew was

discriminated against “solely” because of his disability, which

was sufficient to satisfy the causation standard of both the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act. See Thomas v. Salvation Army S. Territory,

841 F.3d 632, 641 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that the Rehabilitation

Act’s causation requirement is stricter than that of Title II of

the ADA); (Doc. 30 at 18.). The complaint alleges that if Matthew

6

had not been disabled, he would not have been assigned Lynch as

his TA, Lynch would not have used force on him, he would not have

been sequestered from his peers in the wake of the incident, and

he would not have been required to attend a different school.

(Doc. 20 ¶¶ 148–49, 154–55, 157, 164–65, 170, 181—82.) Thus, the

complaint plausibly alleges that the Board discriminated against

Matthew solely on the basis of his disability.

Lastly, Plaintiffs plausibly pleaded that the Board was

deliberately indifferent to ongoing violations of Matthew’s

federal rights. Like the Magistrate Judge, the court assumes,

without deciding, that Plaintiffs must demonstrate the Board was

deliberately indifferent to violations of the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act to recover compensatory damages. (Doc. 30 at

22.) Deliberate indifference is “knowledge that a federal

protected right [was] substantially likely to be violated” and a

“failure to act despite that knowledge.” Koon v. North Carolina,

50 F.4th 398, 405 (4th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs

plausibly pleaded both elements. They assert that Jane Cummings,

the director of Pinecrest’s program for students with

disabilities, and Ms. Cobb, Matthew’s teacher, knew that Lynch was

apprehensive about teaching Matthew. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 87–88, 93, 98–

100.) Lynch told Cummings that he was unequipped to serve as

Matthew’s TA after he received background information regarding

7

Matthew’s condition. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 87–88.) After he began working

with Matthew, Lynch “almost immediately” expressed discomfort with

the arrangement to Cobb and reiterated his concerns to Cummings.

(Doc. 20 ¶¶ 93, 98–99.) Despite Lynch’s vocal reticence, Cummings

sent Lynch back to work with Matthew. (Doc. 20 ¶ 100.) In sum,

Plaintiffs allege that Cummings, “an official with authority to

address [Matthew’s] problem,” had knowledge that Matthew’s federal

rights pursuant to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act were at risk

while Lynch was in his classroom but failed to take appropriate

corrective action. Koon, 50 F.4th at 407. At this stage of the

litigation, that suffices. Whether Plaintiffs can demonstrate

that the Board’s response to Lynch’s actions amounted to deliberate

indifference remains for another day.

The Board also argues that Plaintiffs should not be granted

leave to file an amended complaint because the amendment would be

futile. (Doc. 37.) Relying on the same arguments it made in its

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ existing complaint, the Board

contends that Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint fails

to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). (Doc. 37 at 2–3.) The Board concedes that the only

differences between the proposed amended complaint and the

existing complaint are that the proposed complaint “substitutes

Matthew as the real party in interest with his parents as his next

8

friends,” as suggested by the Magistrate Judge, and “clarifies the

punitive damages claim is against [Lynch], not the Board.” (Doc.

37 at 2.) Otherwise, the Board concedes that the “substantive

allegations” of the proposed second amended complaint are

identical to those of the current complaint. (Doc. 37 at 2.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that a plaintiff

may amend a complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days

after the earlier of (1) service of a responsive pleading or (2)

service of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b),

(e), or (f). After that period, a party may amend only with either

the opposing party's written consent or leave of court. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(2); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)

(noting that “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is

within the discretion of the District Court”). While district

courts have discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend, the

Fourth Circuit has interpreted Rule 15(a) to provide that “leave

to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would

be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on

the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been

futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted); Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (same).

A claim may be futile “if the proposed change advances a claim

or defense that is legally insufficient on its face,” in which

9

case “the court may deny leave to amend.” Williams v. Little Rock

Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 225 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Charles

A. Wright & Arthur Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civil, § 1487, at

637 (1991)) (alterations adopted); see Joyner v. Abbott

Laboratories, 674 F. Supp. 185, 190 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (same). “To

determine whether a proposed amended complaint would be futile,

the Court reviews the revised complaint under the standard used to

evaluate a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Amaya

v. DGS Constr., LLC, 326 F.R.D. 439, 451 (D. Md. 2018) (citing

Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir.

2011)). In other words, “[a] motion to amend a complaint is futile

‘if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.’”

Pugh v. McDonald, 266 F. Supp. 3d 864, 866 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (quoting

James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment is not futile. The Magistrate

Judge and this court have already concluded that the allegations

(which do not differ from those of the current complaint) survive

the Board’s motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs’ proposed

amended complaint, which merely substitutes the named party in

interest and drops a claim that the Magistrate Judge concluded

(and the Board concedes) should be dismissed, does not alter that

conclusion. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a

second amended complaint (Doc. 32) will be granted.

10

The court has appropriately reviewed the portions of the

Magistrate Judge’s report to which objections were made and has

made a de novo determination, which is in accord with the

Magistrate Judge’s report. The objections are therefore

overruled, and the court adopts the Recommendation as noted herein.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Moore County Schools

Board of Education's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 23)

is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as

it relates to Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against the

Board, but otherwise is DENIED.3

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to

amend their complaint (Doc. 32) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are

DIRECTED to file their proposed second amended complaint filed

with its motion for leave to amend (Doc. 32-1) forthwith.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

United States District Judge

September 30, 2024

3 Plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint implements the

Recommendation’s finding as to the punitive damages claim and does not

include such a claim against the Board. (Doc. 32-1.) It does, however,

continue to seek punitive damages from Lynch. (Doc. 32-1 at 35.)

11