BEATTY v. PRUITTHEALTH INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

LATICIA N. BEATTY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

PRUITTHEALTH INC.; ) 1:21-cv-818

PRUITTHEALTH – CAROLINA POINT, )

LLC; KURTIS JONES, in his )

individual and official )

capacity; and DELLA MERVIN, in )

her individual and official )

capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Plaintiff Laticia N. Beatty alleges one1 claim against

Defendants PruittHealth, Inc., Kurtis Jones, and Della Mervin

for unjust enrichment under the North Carolina common law. (Doc.

1.) Defendants have moved for summary judgment, (Doc. 44), and

the motion is ripe for review. For the reasons stated herein,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, except where noted, are undisputed.

1 In her Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Plaintiff abandons her breach of contract claim. (Doc.

49 at 6.)

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant PruittHealth, Inc. to be

the licensed administrator of its Carolina Point skilled nursing

facility in Durham, North Carolina in March of 2020. (Doc. 44-1

at 2–3.)2 In the State of North Carolina, skilled nursing

facilities like Carolina Point are required “to operate under an

administrator licensed by the North Carolina State Board of

Examiners for Nursing Home Administrators.” (Doc. 44-5 at 3; see

also Doc. 44-1 at 5; 10A N.C. Admin. Code 13D.2201(a).) To

satisfy this requirement, Defendants hired Plaintiff as a

salaried, full-time, licensed nursing home administrator at

Carolina Point with an annual salary of $135,000. (Doc. 44-1 at

8, 10–11; Doc. 44-3 at 2–3.)

Plaintiff attests that her name was published on

PruittHealth’s website as administrator of Carolina Point. (See

Doc. 44-1 at 37–40.) Defendant Kurtis Jones, PruittHealth’s Area

Vice President supervising Carolina Point and other facilities,

disputes this fact, declaring that he has “never personally used

[Plaintiff’s] name, nursing home administrator’s license, or

accomplishments . . . to promote the Carolina Point Facility or

2 All citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located

at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they appear

on CM/ECF.

any other PruittHealth-affiliated facility on any website or

anywhere else.” (Doc. 44-5 at 5.)

Plaintiff’s employment began on March 23, 2020, and she

contracted COVID-19 on March 30, 2020. (Doc. 44-1 at 4.) While

sick with and recovering from COVID-19, Plaintiff worked

remotely from her home. (See Doc. 44-1 at 29; Doc. 49-1 at 6.)

She attempted to return to working in person at the facility on

May 30, 2020, but experienced continued medical complications

that prevented her from being able to fully return to work.

(Doc. 44-1 at 28; Doc. 44-6 at 3-4.) By September of 2020,

Plaintiff “had been unable to report for work for several weeks

and had provided documentation stating she would be unable to

report for work until further notice and that her condition

could last at least a year.” (Doc. 44-5 at 3.)

During Plaintiff’s absence, Jones worked at Carolina Point

“on a regular basis to supervise its operations.” (Doc. 44-5 at

3; Doc. 44-1 at 34, 39.) Jones became a licensed nursing home

administrator in the State of North Carolina on August 6, 2020.

(Doc. 44-5 at 3.) On September 9, 2020, Jones replaced Plaintiff

as “interim administrator of record for the Carolina Point

Facility.” (Doc. 44-5 at 3-4; Doc. 44-3 at 5–7; Doc. 44-1 at 49-

51; Doc. 44-6 at 4.) Plaintiff received her last work-related

communication from the Carolina Point Facility on September 11,

2020. (Doc. 44-1 at 63.)

Despite the fact that Plaintiff was no longer the licensed

administrator of record for the Carolina Point facility, she

received regular paychecks at her salaried rate of $135,000 per

year until October 29, 2020. (Doc. 44-1 at 55; Doc. 44-4 at 1–

8.) She also received bonus payments and PTO payments on October

30, 2020, November 12, 2020, and January 20, 2021. (Doc. 44-1 at

55–57; see also Doc. 44-4 at 8–9.) Plaintiff did not receive

regular paychecks after October 29, 2020. (Doc. 44-1 at 55.)

Plaintiff was finally terminated on February 8, 2021. (Doc. 44-1

at 44.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging fourteen claims

against Defendants on October 21, 2021. (Doc. 1.) On August 25,

2022, this court dismissed all claims for relief except for

Plaintiff’s breach of contract (Claim Five) and unjust

enrichment (Claim Eleven) claims. (See Doc. 19 at 22, 29.)

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 44), and

supporting memorandum, (Doc. 45), on December 29, 2023.

Plaintiff filed a response on January 29, 2024, (Doc. 49), and

Defendants replied on February 12, 2024, (Doc. 50). In her

response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

abandoned her breach of contract claim as alleged in Claim Five.

(See Doc. 49 at 6 (“Plaintiff proceeds on its unjust enrichment

claim.”).)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). This court’s

summary judgment inquiry is whether the evidence “is so one-

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

“that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. If the “moving

party discharges its burden . . ., the nonmoving party then must

come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” McLean v. Patten Cmtys., Inc., 332 F.3d 714,

718–19 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)). “On summary

judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts .

. . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S.

654, 655 (1962).

A factual dispute is genuine when “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. This court must look to

substantive law to determine which facts are material; only

those facts that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Id. In addition, “the mere existence of some alleged

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48.

“[T]he non-moving party must do more than present a ‘scintilla’

of evidence in its favor.” Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty.,

Md., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim is one for unjust

enrichment3 arising under North Carolina common law principles.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals

has defined unjust enrichment as a “legal term

characterizing the result or effect of a failure to

make restitution of, or for, property or benefits

received under such circumstances as to give rise to

a legal or equitable obligation to account therefor.

It is a general principle, underlying various legal

doctrines and remedies, that one person should not be

permitted unjustly to enrich himself or herself at

the expense of another . . . .”

3 See Doc. 49 at 6.

Seraph Garrison, LLC ex rel. Garrison Enters., Inc. v. Garrison,

247 N.C. App. 115, 130, 787 S.E.2d 398, 410 (2016). “[T]he mere

fact that one party was enriched, even at the expense of the

other, does not bring the doctrine of unjust enrichment into

play. There must be some added ingredients to invoke the unjust

enrichment doctrine.” Crump v. City of Hickory, 2015 WL 1800352,

at *3 (Apr. 15, 2015) (quoting Pearce River Elec. Coop., Inc. v.

Ward Transformer Co., 116 N.C. App. 493, 509, 449 S.E.2d 202,

213 (1994)).

To establish an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must

show that: “(1) plaintiff conferred a measurable benefit to

defendant, (2) defendant knowingly and voluntarily accepted the

benefit, and (3) the benefit was not given gratuitously.” TSC

Rsch., LLC v. Bayer Chems. Corp., 552 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540

(M.D.N.C. 2008) (citing Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570, 369

S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988)).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants were unjustly enriched by

her employment because Defendants received the benefit of

Plaintiff’s nursing home administrator license as well as her

name and accomplishments, and that Plaintiff conferred those

benefits “with the expectation that Defendants would provide a

good working environment.” (Doc. 49 at 8–9.) As she puts it,

“Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment lies in the inducement

of Plaintiff to the company to use her license; to use her

credibility to staff the facility; and use her expertise to

increase the star rating.” (Id. at 9.)

Defendants raise two arguments in favor of summary

judgment. First, Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment must be

dismissed because “there is no unjust enrichment as a matter of

law where an employee is compensated for the services upon which

the unjust enrichment claim is based.” (Doc. 45 at 24.) Second,

Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is untenable because “it is

based on Plaintiff’s contention that she was denied

accommodations for her COVID-related medical issues which are

the same allegations underlying her ADA claims that have already

been dismissed by this Court.” (Id.)

1. Plaintiff’s Salary

Plaintiff asserts that, while operating under her

administrator’s license, Defendants obtained monetary benefits

using her license and her reputation. (Doc. 44-1 at 34.) These

benefits include PPP loans, Medicare/Medicaid funds, and other

funding. (Doc. 49-1 at 29-30; Doc. 44-1 at 36-39.) Specifically,

Plaintiff testified that Defendants obtained PPP funding using

her license because “I was on their payroll and they got paid.

They also got paid because I was the administrator that was —

that was my license that was there that Kurtis was working

under, until he tested and got his own.” (Doc. 49-1 at 29-30.)

As to the Medicare/Medicaid funding, Plaintiff stated that

Defendants used her license to obtain funding “[b]ecause they

kept me as the administrator of their building as on file. . . .

If you don’t have an administrator, you don’t — you cannot run

the building. You have to have an administrator license, their

credentials, their name.” (Doc. 44-1 at 35-36.)

According to Plaintiff, the monetary benefits constituted

unjust enrichment.4 However, Plaintiff was paid her salary for

the entirety of the time that Defendants operated the Carolina

Point facility under her administrator license. (See Doc. 44-1

at 57–58.) Both North Carolina precedent and courts within this

Circuit indicate that Defendants could not have been unjustly

enriched by Plaintiff “performing the job she was paid a salary

to perform:” here, serving as the licensed administrator for the

4 In her response, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants

continued to receive a benefit” after Jones replaced Plaintiff

as administrator of the Carolina Point facility because “[w]hile

they may have used Defendant Jones’ administrator license

beginning September 9, 2020, Defendants continued to receive the

benefit of Plaintiff’s expertise while she was working from

home.” (Doc. 49 at 7.) However, Plaintiff testified that she did

not work from home after September 11, 2020. (Doc. 44-1 at 63

(“[T]he last call or the last thing was September the 11th.”)).

Carolina Point facility. See Dulaney v. Inmar, Inc.,5 220 N.C.

App. 415, 725 S.E.2d 473, 2012 WL 1514746, at *4 (May 1, 2012);

McCabe v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 339, 348–49

(E.D.N.C. 2014) (quoting Dulaney, 2012 WL 1514746, at *4);

Morris v. Taylor Commc’ns. Secure & Customer Sols., Inc., 2022

WL 767040, at *5 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2022). “[W]hen an employee

is paid a salary for the services she provides, she cannot

successfully argue her employer was unjustly enriched by the

employee’s provision of such services.” Crouch v. S.C. Dep’t of

Transp., No. CV 3:18-2045, 2020 WL 3867282, at *2 (D.S.C. July

8, 2020). Plaintiff was hired as the Carolina Point licensed

administrator so that the facility could operate lawfully under

her license, and Plaintiff was paid a salary for providing this

service. Accordingly, based on the undisputed facts and the

record before the court, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants

5 Plaintiff argues that Dulaney is not relevant here because

it deals with a constructive trust “which is a different cause

of action from unjust enrichment.” (Doc. 49 at 10–11.) However,

a constructive trust is a remedy for unjust enrichment, not a

separate cause of action. See Dulaney, 2012 WL 1514746, at *3

(“A constructive trust is a fiction of equity, brought into

operation to prevent unjust enrichment through the breach of

some duty or other wrongdoing.”); see also Roper v. Edwards, 323

N.C. 461, 465, 373 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1988) (“[T]he constructive

trust is seen by American courts today as a remedial device, to

be used wherever specific restitution in equity is appropriate

on the facts.”).

were unjustly enriched at her expense, so summary judgment must

be granted in favor of Defendants.

2. ADA Discrimination Claim Facts

Defendants argue further that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment

claim “is based on Plaintiff’s contention that she was denied

accommodations for her COVID-related medical issues which are

the same allegations underlying her ADA claims that have already

been dismissed by this Court.” (Doc. 45 at 24.) This court

agrees.

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, along with her statement

of the facts in her response to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, (see Doc. 49 at 2–4), demonstrates an attempt to

bootstrap her previously-dismissed ADA discrimination claim into

her sole remaining claim for unjust enrichment:

Q: And if you received your full salary for the entire

time that you were the administrator of record for

the Carolina Point facility, then none of the

defendants in this case could have been unjustly

enriched, could they?

A: Yes, they could.

Q: How?

A: I’m not asking for my salary. I’m asking for

restitution. I’m asking for the times that I was not

allowed fair — with the harassment. . . . I’m talking

about not being allowed accommodations for my

comorbidities or my disabilities as far as the COVID,

as far as the asthma, and so it’s not the fact that

— or I was made to work when I was also being put out

of work by my doctor.

(Doc. 44-1 at 58.) Plaintiff’s conflation of an unjust

enrichment claim with the alleged facts of her ADA

discrimination claim is clear:

Q: And so why is it then that anybody who’s a licensed

nursing home administrator, couldn’t make the same

claim you’re making here today for restitution or

unjust enrichment, why couldn’t they claim the

facility got money based upon their license and even

though they received their full salary, that’s still

not enough, why couldn’t they make that claim?

A: I think . . . it depends on what happened per

person. It’s different. If they were treated badly

and they had been harassed and violated, and they had

not been given an environment where they could work

in, and if they had — I believe that they should.

***

A: . . . I feel as the things that I’ve gone through,

it is just for me to receive compensation.

(Doc. 44-1 at 65, 68.)

“Under claim preclusion, parties are barred ‘from retrying

fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior

determination, even where the claims asserted are not the

same.’” Brumby v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2010 WL 617368,

at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2010), report and recommendation

adopted by 2010 WL 3219353 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2010) (quoting

McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C. App. 48, 51,

542 S.E.2d 227, 231 (2001)). Here, Plaintiff’s purported unjust

enrichment allegations “mirror the allegations contained in a

claim that has previously been dismissed from this case with

prejudice. . . . Plaintiff may not bootstrap previously

dismissed claims into the sole remaining count in this action.”

Sonntag v. Balaam, 2010 WL 2990107, at *3 (D. Nev. May 6, 2010),

report and recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3210020 (D. Nev.

Aug. 12, 2010); see also Sherrod v. Enigma Software Grp. USA,

LLC, 2016 WL 25979, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2016) (finding

plaintiff could not “bootstrap her previously dismissed fraud

and misrepresentation claims back into the case by arguing that

her breach-of-contract claim depends upon discovering whether

Enigma’s cancellation procedure was deceptive.”).

Not only is Plaintiff’s reassertion of her ADA allegations

improper bootstrapping, but her statements also do not fulfill

the elements of an unjust enrichment claim. To survive summary

judgment, Plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as

to whether (1) she conferred a measurable benefit to Defendants,

(2) Defendants knowingly and voluntarily accepted that benefit,

and (3) she did not give the benefit gratuitously. See TSC

Rsch., LLC, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 540. Plaintiff’s testimony that,

while employed as the licensed administrator for the Carolina

Point facility, she was not allowed accommodations for her

disabilities simply does not support a finding that unjust

enrichment occurred; therefore, summary judgment must be granted

in favor of Defendants.

Vv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that

Defendants PruittHealth, Inc., PruittHealth-Carolina Point, LLC,

Kurtis Jones, and Della Mervin’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

(Doc. 44), is GRANTED.

A Judgment dismissing this action will be entered

contemporaneously herewith.

This the 20th day of September, 2024.

Wolie Palens

United States District Juse

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