ROBINSON v. FRICK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

GREGORY ROBINSON, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22CV28

)

MR. J. FRICK, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Mr. J. Frick’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docket Entry 29) and an accompanying Motion to Seal (Docket Entry 32).

Plaintiff Gregory Robinson, Jr. has not filed a response to Defendant’s motions. Rather,

during the time in which a response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion was due,

Plaintiff filed a motion entitled, “Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Summary Judgment Motion Filed

by Defendant.” (Docket Entry 34.) Defendant thereafter filed a response to Plaintiff’s

motion. (Docket Entry 35.) All matters are ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below,

the Court will recommend Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted. The Court

further finds the motion to stay summary judgment motion should be denied as moot and the

motion to seal should be denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about January 12, 2022, Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, filed

a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he named Mr. J. Frick, a Piedmont

Prison Emergency Response Team (“PERT”) commander, and Ms. Williams, the interim

warden, as defendants. (See Compl., Docket Entry 2). In an order and recommendation, the

Court recommended the action be dismissed without prejudice to allow Plaintiff to file a new

complaint to correct noted deficiencies, including naming proper defendants with facts

showing personal involvement by the defendants in the events alleged. (Docket Entry 3).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint naming Mr. Frick as the sole defendant and

alleging violations in connection with a handcuffing incident. (See Am. Compl., Docket Entry

7.) Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his rights under the 4th and 8th Amendment to the

Constitution with arguments sounding primarily in excessive force. (Id. at 3,6.)1 He also makes

a general reference to deliberate indifference. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of being

handcuffed behind his back for a period of three and a half hours he suffered injury to his left

wrist and was subsequently diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. (Id. at 5, 8.) Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint does not allege Defendant cuffed him, but he claims Defendant ordered

him to be handcuffed and denied a request to remove the handcuffs. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff has

sued Defendant in his official and individual capacity. (Id. at 3.) He seeks monetary damages

as well as declaratory relief. (Id. at 5).

On July 31, 2023, Defendant filed an answer to the Amended Complaint. (Docket

Entry 14.) On August 24, 2023, a scheduling order was entered which set a discovery deadline

for February 26, 2024. (Docket Entry 15.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for joinder

and reimbursement of funds, asking the Court to join the instant case with another case arising

1 Unless otherwise noted, all citations in this memorandum opinion to documents filed with

the Court refer to the page numbers located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they

appear on CM/ECF.

from the same alleged incident, but involving different defendants. (Docket Entry 17.) On

March 6, 2024, while the motion for joinder was still pending, Plaintiff filed a motion to

suspend the discovery deadline and a motion to appoint counsel. (Docket Entries 19, 20.)2

Defendant opposed the motion to suspend discovery noting the time for discovery had

expired before Plaintiff filed the motion and Plaintiff was unable to show excusable neglect or

another basis to extend the discovery period. (Docket Entry 25). On March 7, 2024, the

undersigned entered a recommendation that Plaintiff’s motion for joinder and reimbursement

of funds be denied, which was later adopted by order of the Court. (Docket Entries 22, 36.)

On March 28, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment along

with a memorandum, declarations, and medical records in support. (Docket Entries 29, 30,

31.) Defendant also filed a motion to seal the medical records which is currently before the

Court. (Docket Entry 32.) Although a letter was sent to Plaintiff on March 29, 2024, in

accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F. 2d 309 (4th Cir 1975), informing Plaintiff of the

requirements for filing a response, (Docket Entry 33), he has not filed a response to the motion

for summary judgment or a request for additional time to do so. The letter alerted Plaintiff,

in part, that “failure to respond, or if appropriate, to file counter affidavits or evidence in

rebuttal within the allowed time, may cause the court to conclude that the respondent’s

contentions are undisputed.” (Id. at 1.)

On April 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay asking the Court to delay ruling on

the motion for summary judgment until the court addressed his outstanding motions involving

2 Plaintiff also sought a request for a ruling on his then-pending motion for joinder and

reimbursement of funds. (See Docket Entry 21.)

discovery and joinder. (Docket Entry 34.) In an order entered on April 24, 2024, the Court

denied the motion to suspend discovery deadline and the motion to appoint counsel. (Text

Order dated 4/24/2024.) Even after Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel and

motion to suspend discovery deadline were denied on April 24, 2024, and the order adopting

the recommendation of this Court on the motion for joinder and reimbursement was entered

on May 13, 2024, Plaintiff has failed to file a response to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. Nor has Plaintiff otherwise sought an extension to file any response. Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is now ripe for ruling.

II. BACKGROUND

The claims in the Amended Complaint arise out of incidents that occurred at Piedmont

Correctional Institution on or about October 1, 2019, when the PERT team was conducting

a search of the canteen area. (See generally Am. Compl.) According to Plaintiff’s allegations,

Plaintiff was handcuffed by Officer Honbarrier based on an order given by Defendant. (Id. at

5.) Officer Honbarrier escorted Plaintiff to a holding cell and placed him in the cell “with

handcuffs tightly on” with four “canteen men” also in handcuffs. (Id.) Officer Honbarrier

left the area, and Plaintiff and the other inmates were watched by Officer Shuler. (Id. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff alleges he and the other inmates repeatedly asked Officer Shuler to remove

the handcuffs “being that Plaintiff was behind closed and look [sic] doors and the discomfort

of being handcuffed behind the back became painful because the handcuffs appeared tight

and as the minutes kept passing it felt like the handcuffs was becoming tighter.” (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff said Officer Shuler stated the decision to remove the handcuffs was not his because

it was a PERT operation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges a “call was made to Officer Frick the

Defendant, who said leave Plaintiff in handcuffs.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends he made multiple

requests to have the handcuffs removed. (Id. at 7.) He said he was kept in tight handcuffs

behind his back for the three and a half hours he and the other inmates were held in the

holding cell. (Id.) He alleges the tightness of the cuffs was not necessary to maintain order

and “[c]learly this was an act that looks like it was done maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.” (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff alleges after several hours he was escorted back to the canteen area where

Defendant Frick, another officer, and Ms. Covery, the canteen supervisor, were present. (Id.

at 7.) As Defendant Frick and the other officer searched the canteen, Plaintiff says he asked

Defendant Frick to remove the handcuffs. (Id.) He says, “[i]t was at this moment when

Officer Frick removed the handcuffs while I stood no more than four steps in the canteen

door behind the Defendant while Defendant continued to search the canteen clearly indicating

that Plaintiff was no threat to anyone.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the treatment was cruel and

unusual and involved deliberate indifference. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that because of the tight handcuffs he “sustained a lifelong injury that

brings about pain throughout Plaintiff’s left forearm and wrist daily.” (Id. at 5.) He says he

reported the injury, and he was seen by the inside medical team for swelling and numbness in

his hand and wrist. (Id.) Plaintiff states that when he was seen by an outside doctor, he was

diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome. (Id. at 8.)

Based upon a thorough review of the Complaint, the Court concludes Plaintiff alleges

a claim of excessive force against Defendant because Plaintiff was handcuffed too tightly. (Id.

at 6, 7, 9.) Plaintiff also makes a reference to deliberate indifference which the Court construes

as a claim alleging deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement. (Id. at 7.)

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is

unable to show Defendant violated any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In support of the

motion Defendant attaches a declaration on his own behalf stating that on October 1, 2019,

he was a correctional officer who was conducting a search of the canteen areas at Piedmont

Correctional Institution. (Declaration of John Frick ¶¶ 2-3, Docket Entry 30-2.) He says while

the search was carried out the inmates working in the canteen were handcuffed and placed in

a holding cell. (Id. ¶ 3.) He says that was done based on a decision of the warden. (Id.) He

says he was not the officer who handcuffed Plaintiff, and he was never made aware during the

search of any issues with the inmates, or told the inmates wanted to be removed from

restraints. (Id.)

In addition to Defendant’s declaration, Defendant has provided the declaration of

Officer Honbarrier. (Declaration of Justin Honbarrier, Docket Entry 30-3.) Officer

Honbarrier indicates he was the correctional officer who handcuffed Plaintiff at the time of

the search. (Id. ¶ 3.) He indicates it is common practice to restrain inmates with handcuffs

while a search of an inmate’s area is being conducted. (Id.) He says he handcuffed Plaintiff,

made sure the handcuffs “were not too tight” and took Plaintiff to the holding cell where the

other canteen workers were also held. (Id.) He then returned to the canteen area to assist in

the search. (Id.) He says during the search he was never notified of any problems with the

inmates or told the inmates wanted their handcuffs removed while in the holding cell. (Id.)

Both Defendant and Officer Honbarrier declare that after the search was concluded “the

inmates were released from the holding cell and normal operations resumed.” (Frick Decl. ¶

3; Honbarrier Decl. ¶ 3.)

Defendant has provided a copy of an incident report related to the search of the

canteen which contains a statement from Officer Shuler. Officer Shuler indicated that while

he was watching the inmates, Plaintiff asked for the door to the holding cell to be open to

allow some air, and Officer Shuler complied. (Docket Entry 30-1 at 7.) Officer Shuler said

Plaintiff never asked him to remove his handcuffs. (Id.) Defendant has also included some

of Plaintiff’s medical records. (Docket Entry 31.) The records reflect that upon awaking the

day after the search, Plaintiff complained of tingling and throbbing in his wrist to his fingertips

which he attributed to being handcuffed behind the back the day before. (Id. at 2.) The

records indicate that the provider noticed “a small slight red area on both wrist [sic], non

tender to touch,” and his hand grip in both hands was “equal and strong.” (Id.) A report from

approximately six weeks later indicates Plaintiff had received a diagnosis of left carpal tunnel

syndrome. (Id. at 3.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay

The Court first turns to Plaintiff’s motion entitled, “Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Summary

Judgment Motion Filed by Defendant.” (Docket Entry 34.) Plaintiff asks the Court to “grant

stay of summary judgment motion filed by Defendant until all other motions are resolved

before this Honorable Court.” (Id. at 2.) In support, Plaintiff argues he has multiple

outstanding motions that “are critical to the proceedings in this case.” (Id. at 1.) He notes

issues raised in motions relating to discovery and his attempt to join this case with another

case. (Id.) Defendant has opposed the motion arguing the motions that Plaintiff claimed

needed to be resolved before summary judgment can proceed have been ruled upon. (Docket

Entry 35).

Plaintiff’s motion to stay was filed on April 17, 2024, while Plaintiff’s motion to

suspend discovery deadline (Docket Entry 19) and motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry

20) were still pending before the Court. Also during that time, a final order as to the

undersigned’s recommended ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for joinder and reimbursement of

funds had not yet been entered, which Plaintiff had filed objections. (See Docket Entries 22,

27).

At this time, all the outstanding matters upon which Plaintiff based his request for a

stay of Defendant’s summary judgment motion have been ruled on by the Court. Plaintiff’s

motion to suspend discovery and motion to appoint counsel were denied by the Court in an

order entered on April 24, 2024 (see Text Order dated 4/24/2024), and an order was entered

on May 13, 2024, adopting the recommendation of the undersigned with respect to the motion

for joinder. (Docket Entry 36.) The order denied the motion for joinder and denied as moot

the motion for reimbursement of funds. (Id.) Consequently, as the grounds upon which

Plaintiff requested the stay have been resolved, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied as moot.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court next turns to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary

judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving

part is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Zahodnick v. Int’l Bus.

Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). The party seeking summary judgment bears

the initial burden of coming forward and demonstrating the absence of genuine issue of

material fact. Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm’rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-

moving party must affirmatively demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact which

requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for

a fact finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

(1986); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the moving

party can bear his burden either by presenting affirmative evidence or by demonstrating the

non-moving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331

(Brennan, J., dissenting).

When making the summary judgment determination, the Court must view the

evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913; Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196

(4th Cir. 1997). However, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere

allegations or denials, and the court need not consider “unsupported assertions” or “self-

serving opinions without objective corroboration.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80

F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on several grounds. First, Defendant

contends that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s official capacity claims. (Docket Entry 30

at 5-6.) Second, Defendant contends that he lacked any personal involvement in any alleged

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 7.) Next, Defendant argues that there was

no violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth or Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 8-21.) Last, Defendant

asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 21-22.) The undersigned will address

the arguments below.3

Sovereign Immunity

The Court first considers Defendant’s argument the claims against him in his official

capacity are barred by sovereign immunity. (Id. at 5-6.) The Eleventh Amendment prohibits

actions in federal court against a state unless the state has consented to suit or unless Congress

has lawfully abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d

842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is

not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). It

follows that just as “the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a state in federal

court,” it also bars suit against state officials in their official capacity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Here, Defendant Frick is an employee of the State of North Carolina

and immunity has not been waived. Therefore, the claims against him in his official capacity

seeking damages are barred and should be dismissed.

3 Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion. Per the local

rules, a motion such as this should “be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and

ordinarily will be granted without further notice.” L.R. Civ. P. 7.3(k). However, “in considering a

motion for summary judgment, [the Court] ‘must review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine

from what it has before it whether the moving part is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law.’” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp.¸599 F.3d 403, 409 n.8 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Custer v. Pan Am

Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).

Personal Involvement

Defendant next argues the claims should be dismissed because he lacked personal

involvement in the situation leading to the alleged injury. (Docket Entry 30 at 7.) “To

establish individual liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must affirmatively show the ‘official

charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.’” Wright v. Hill, No. 1:03-

CV-109, 2004 WL 1618591, at *4 (M.D.N.C. July 16, 2004) (citing Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d

841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Defendant did not personally participate in the conduct giving rise to the alleged injury.

Defendant correctly states it is undisputed he did not apply the handcuffs to Plaintiff, did not

take him to the holding cell, and did not watch him while he was in the holding cell. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant was involved because he ordered the cuffs to be placed on Plaintiff. He

also alleges when he asked Officer Shuler to remove the handcuffs Officer Shuler said he

could not because Defendant said no. However, these unsupported allegations are

contradicted by the only evidence before the court. In the incident report for the search,

Officer Shuler stated Plaintiff “never asked me to remove his handcuffs.” (Docket Entry 30-

1 at 7.) He indicates the only request Plaintiff made was for him to open the door for air, and

Officer Shuler complied. (Id.) In addition, Defendant Frick states in his declaration that the

decision to restrain the inmates with handcuffs and place them in a holding cell during the

search was “made by the warden at Piedmont CI.” (Frick Decl. ¶ 3.) He also states he was

never notified during the search of any problems with the inmates or that any inmate wanted

to have the restraints removed while in the holding area. (Id.) Plaintiff did not verify his

Amended Complaint, failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and has not

otherwise presented evidence to support his claims or counter Defendant’s arguments or

evidence. “At this stage, Plaintiff cannot rely solely upon his allegations . . . to survive summary

judgment.” Fordham v. Keller, No. 1:13-CV-617, 2017 WL 1091876, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 22,

2017); Edwards v. Norfolk S. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 277, 280 (W.D. Va.) (“In order to resist a

motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations in his complaint,

but must counter the evidence produced by the defendants.”), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1385 (4th Cir.

1994). Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact showing Defendant had personal

involvement in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights.

Nor can Plaintiff succeed insofar as he may be alleging Defendant is liable based on

his supervisory role. A theory of respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits. See

Mondell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798-99 (4th

Cir. 1994). A supervisor may be liable for the actions of a subordinate if:

(1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his

subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and

unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the

plaintiff;

(2) the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so

inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit

authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and

(3) there was an “affirmative causal link” between the

supervisor’s inaction and the constitutional injury suffered by the

plaintiff.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit has held that

[o]rdinarily, [a plaintiff] cannot satisfy his burden of proof by

pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents, for a supervisor

cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering

every conceivable occurrence within the area of his

responsibilities. Nor can he reasonably be expected to guard

against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained

employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the

misconduct. A supervisor’s continued inaction in the face of

documented widespread abuses, however, provides an

independent basis for finding he either was deliberately

indifferent or acquiesced in the constitutionally

offensive conduct of his subordinates.

Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted). As noted above,

Defendant has submitted declarations showing he did not ever receive information there was

an issue with Plaintiff during the time of the search or that Plaintiff requested his handcuffs

be removed. There is no indication Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of any

alleged harm. Nor is there any allegation or evidence of occurrences beyond this single isolated

incident. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Defendant’s

liability based on his supervisory role. Summary judgment should thus be granted in favor of

Defendant as he lacked personal involvement or knowledge of a risk that would give rise to

supervisory liability.

Eighth Amendment Claims

Defendant also argues the motion for summary judgment should be granted because

Plaintiff is unable to establish his Eighth Amendment rights were violated under either an

excessive force or a conditions of confinement claim.

1. Excessive Force

Plaintiff asserts that excessive force was used against him because the handcuffs were

too tight and unnecessary because the inmates were in a closed holding cell. The Eighth

Amendment protects prisoners from “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Thompson

v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 97 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). Prison

officials have an “an affirmative “obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee

[inmate’s] safety.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

When evaluating an excessive force claim, the Court “must determine ‘whether force

was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.’” Id. at 98 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). To

make this determination, the Court considers two elements: “whether the prison official acted

with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and whether the deprivation

suffered, or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Iko

v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has set forth a list of non-

exclusive factors to assist courts in determining whether an officer has acted with a culpable

state of mind: “(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need

and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that

the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity

of a forceful response.” Iko, 530 U.S. at 239 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).)

(internal quotations omitted).

The record establishes Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs while in a holding cell with

other inmates during the search of the canteen area. According to Officer Honbarrier “it is

common practice that while the PERT Team is conducting a search of any inmate’s area (cell

or work area), that the inmate be restrained with handcuffs while the search is completed.”

(Honbarrier Decl. ¶ 3.) Officer Honbarrier also states he “ensured the handcuffs were not

too tight.” (Id.) Both Defendant and Officer Honbarrier state that “after the search of the

canteens was completed, the inmates were released from the holding cell and normal

operations resumed.” (Frick Decl. ¶ 3; Honbarrier Decl. ¶ 3.)

As discussed above, the record establishes Defendant did not personally handcuff

Plaintiff or otherwise use any type of force against him. The only evidence in the record

indicates the handcuffs were applied in keeping with routine practices of the PERT Team, and

the use of restraints was reasonable where four inmates were together in a holding area.

Plaintiff and the other inmates were only cuffed for the period of the search, and there is no

evidence the cuffs were place with an intention to cause harm. Plaintiff even states that when

he was no longer in the holding cell and he directly asked Defendant to remove his cuffs,

Defendant did so right away. (Am. Compl. at 7.) Officer Honbarrier’s declaration and Officer

Shuler’s statement in the incident report supports Defendant’s declaration that he was never

alerted to any problem or concerns from the inmates during the time of the search. Therefore,

no reasonable jury could find with respect to Defendant that any actions he took were done

“maliciously or sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Plaintiff cannot establish

the necessary subjective component of the Eighth Amendment excessive force analysis, and

having so found, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim.

See, e.g., Tyler v. Poole, No. 1:17-CV-1142, 2020 WL 758116, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2020),

adopted by 2020 WL 1527923 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2020).

2. Conditions of Confinement

Although Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint focuses primarily on his allegations of

excessive force, Plaintiff also states that Defendant was responsible for “cruel and unusual

punishment and deliberate indifference.” (Id. at 7.) Insofar as Plaintiff may be attempting to

claim he was subject to deliberate indifference in how he was confined during the search he is

also unable to show a genuine issue of material fact exists to survive summary judgment.

“The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits, ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ applies

to claims by prisoners against correction officials challenging conditions of confinement.”

Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (2019) (citations omitted). Eighth Amendment condition-

of-confinement claims are evaluated using a two-part test that has an objective and subjective

component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A successful Eighth Amendment

claim contains two elements: the deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” and

the prison official must have demonstrated a “deliberate indifference to inmate health or

safety.” Id. at 834. The deprivation must result in “extreme” deprivation. See Scinto v.

Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Only an ‘extreme deprivation’ is actionable under

the Eighth Amendment.”). A prison official is not liable “unless the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to

present an issue of material fact with respect to the conditions of confinement. (Docket Entry

30 at 15.) He argues that Plaintiff is unable to show Defendant acted with deliberate

indifference or that Plaintiff suffered a serious deprivation. (Id. at 15-19.)

The undisputed information before the Court is that Plaintiff and the other inmates

were placed in handcuffs and held together in a holding cell for a period of three and half

hours while the canteen was searched. As soon as the search was completed the men were

released. Plaintiff concedes he was only cuffed during the duration of the search. Therefore,

even based on Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations there is no evidence of an excessive risk of

serious harm or serious deprivation. Moreover, the only evidence before the Court shows

Plaintiff never complained or made any officer aware he thought the handcuffs were too tight

or uncomfortable. Defendant did not apply the handcuffs and there is no evidence in the

record to support he was ever told or otherwise aware of an issue affecting Plaintiff’s health

and failed to properly respond. Further, as noted above, Plaintiff states that when he

personally asked Defendant to remove the handcuffs, Defendant did so.4 Therefore, Plaintiff

cannot succeed in showing Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious risk to

Plaintiff’s health during the time he was confined during the search. Consequently, Defendant

should be granted summary judgment as to any Eighth Amendment claim challenging the

condition of confinement.

D. Fourth Amendment Claim

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff in conclusory fashion refers to the Fourth

Amendment as a basis for his claims. (Docket Entry 7 at 3.) In the Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant asserts that he did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment. As

Defendant contends, Plaintiff, who only makes a broad reference to the Fourth Amendment,

does not make it clear how he believes his rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated.5

(Docket Entry 30 at 8.)

4 There is no indication Defendant was asked to remove the handcuffs for any particular

reason. Plaintiff merely alleges he asked Defendant to remove the handcuffs and Defendant Frick

removed them. (Docket Entry 7 at 7.)

5 Pro se complaints are to be liberally construed in assessing sufficiency under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007). However, even under this liberal

The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV.

“Given the realities of institutional confinement,” a detainee’s reasonable expectation of

privacy would necessarily be “of diminished scope.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979).

It is well established with respect to searches of prison cells that “prisoners have no legitimate

expectation of privacy and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches

does not apply in prison cells.” See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984). Accordingly,

there is no genuine issue of material fact that the search of the canteen area of the prison

would not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment should be granted with respect to any claims based on the Fourth Amendment.

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendant also asserts he has qualified immunity to shield him from any claims.

(Docket Entry 30 at 21-22.) Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982); see also Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006)

(“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from

personal-capacity liability for civil damages under § 1983[.]” (emphasis added)). Thus, the

traditional two-step qualified immunity inquiry requires a court to determine: “(1) whether the

construction, “generosity is not fantasy,” and the Court is not expected to plea a plaintiff’s claims for

him. Pender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 159 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1998).

official violated a constitutional right; and if so, (2) whether the right was ‘clearly established’

at the time of its violation.” Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 Fed. App’x 541, 546-47 (4th

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In evaluating qualified immunity, a court initially may determine

whether the plaintiff has alleged or shown a violation of a constitutional right at all. See Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Further, “[b]ecause qualified immunity is designed to shield

officers not only from liability but from the burdens of litigation, its establishment at the

pleading or summary judgment stage has been specifically encouraged.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973

F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992).

As discussed above, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional

rights by Defendant. Therefore, the undersigned concludes Defendant Frick is entitled to

qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s claims against him. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412, 415 (4th

Cir. 2007) (finding that “[i]f [an official] did not violate any right, he is hardly in need of any

immunity and the analysis ends right then and there”); Parker v. Burris, 2015 WL 1474909, at

*8 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2015) (finding that “the absence of evidence supporting a finding that

a constitutional violation occurred satisfies the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis”),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:13CV488, 2015 WL 2169148 (M.D.N.C. May 8,

2015), aff’d, 623 F. App’x 82 (4th Cir. 2015).

V. MOTION TO SEAL

Lastly, the Court turns to Defendant’s motion to seal. (Docket Entry 32). In the

motion, Defendant asks the Court to issue an order to seal Defendant’s Exhibit D, copies of

Plaintiff’s North Carolina Department of Public Safety medical records relevant to the case.

The records are currently filed under seal. (Docket Entry 31).

Because Plaintiff’s medical records were submitted in connection with the Motion for

Summary Judgment pending before the court, the documents are a judicial record, and the

right of access is protected under the First Amendment. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267-

68 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, the granting of such motion is proper only when a compelling

government interest is shown, and the sealing of the documents is narrowly tailored to meet

the compelling interest. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988)

(citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). In considering the issue,

the court must

[W]eigh the appropriate competing interests under the following procedure: it

must give the public notice of the request to seal and a reasonable opportunity

to challenge the request; it must consider less drastic alternatives to sealing; and

if it decides to seal it must state the reasons (and specific supporting findings)

for its decision and the reasons for rejecting alternatives to sealing.

Va. Dept. of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004). A motion to seal cannot

rest on conclusory allegations but must “present specific reasons in support of its position.”

Id. at 575.

The motion to seal was filed in the docket on March 28, 2024, and therefore, there has

been a reasonable opportunity for interested parties to address the matter. Plaintiff has not

responded to, or joined in, the motion. Defendant asserts the documents should be sealed

because they are medical records “deemed confidential under applicable law.” (Docket Entry

32 at 1.) This statement is the entirety of the explanation presented by Defendant to support

sealing the records. The Court recognizes there is a government interest in protecting medical

information. See Fulp v. Columbiana Hi Tech, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-1169, 2018 WL 1027159, at

*10 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2018). However, there is no blanket exception to the First

Amendment right to access for medical records, and there are times unsealing medical records

is appropriate. See, e.g., Musgrove v. Moore, No. 1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL 19977408, at *2

(M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2022). The submitted medical records are limited to three pages of

information, all relevant to the injuries alleged in the Amended Complaint. (See Docket Entry

7 at 5, 8.) Moreover, the records provide minimal information beyond that already shared by

Plaintiff in the Amended Complaint and Defendant in support of his Motion for Summary

Judgment. (See Docket Entry 7 at 5, 8; Docket Entry 30 at 4.) Therefore, any privacy concerns

are diminished. Consequently, the undersigned cannot find the need to seal the medical

records has been shown to be compelling, and Defendant’s motion to seal will be denied.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons state herein,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docket Entry 29) be GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Summary Judgment

Motion (Docket Entry 34) is DENIED AS MOOT, and Defendant’s Motion to Seal (Docket

Entry 32) is DENIED. The Court directs the Clerk to unseal the records filed at Docket

Entry 31.

/s/ Joe L. Webster

United States Magistrate Judge

September 3, 2024

Durham, North Carolina