LANE v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

AISHA L., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22CV964

)

MARTIN J. OMALLEY;,! )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Aisha L. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the

Social Security Act (the “Act’), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. The Parties have filed cross-motions

for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on October 27, 2020, alleging a

disability onset date of January 27, 2020. (Tr. at 15, 169-70.)? Her application was denied

initially (I'r. at 57-62, 76-80) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 63-70, 82-86). ‘Thereafter,

1 On December 20, 2023, Martin J. O’Malley was sworn in as Commissioner of Social Security, replacing Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin J.

O’Malley should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken

to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 US.C. §

405(g).

2 Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #4].

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). (Tr. at 87.) On December 9, 2021, Plaintiff, along with her non-attorney

teptesentative, attended the subsequent hearing, at which Plaintiff and an impartial vocational

expert testified. (Tr. at 15.) Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. at 26-27), and, on September 16, 2022, the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiffs request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the

Commissionet’s final decision for purposes of judicial review (Tr. at 1-6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of

social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the

scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144

(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts ate not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d

396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the

ALJ if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the

correct legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cit. 2012) (internal brackets

and quotation omitted).

“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)

(internal quotation omitted). “It consists of more than a mete scintilla of evidence but may

be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001)

(internal brackets and quotation omitted). “If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a

verdict were the case before a juty, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34

(internal quotation omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh

conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the

[AL]].” Mastto, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation omitted). “Where conflicting

evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the

responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets

and quotation omitted). “The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the

claimant] is disabled, but whether the AL]’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cortect application of the

relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability

benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.

1981). In this context, “disability” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).?

3 “The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance

Program (SSDI), established by Title II of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 ef seq., provides benefits to

disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income

Program (SSI), established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 ef seg., provides benefits to

indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for

determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 C.E.R. pt. 416 (SSD, governing these two programs are,

in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1.

“The Commissioner uses a five-step ptocess to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,

667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the

Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period

of disability; (2) had a severe impaitment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the

requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,

could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence

forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquity. For example, “[t|he first step

determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the clatmant is

working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.

If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if

the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, the claimant is

disabled. Masttro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but

falters at step three, ie., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal ot

exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional

capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.4 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on

4+ “REC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d

at 562 (noting that administrative regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8

houts a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation omitted)).

The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s “abtlity to do

sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or

skin impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers

all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impaitments and any related symptoms (¢.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at

562-63.

that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify

as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior

work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that

a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite [the claimant's]

impairments.” Hines, 453 F 3d at 563. In making this determination, the AL] must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC]

and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust

to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its

“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available

in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.

DISCUSSION

In the present case, the AL] found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful

activity” since January 27, 2020, her alleged onset date. The ALJ thetefore concluded that

Plaintiff met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (Tr. at 17.) At step

two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impaitments:

Lisfranc fracture of the left foot, hypertension, obesity, neuritis, and complex

regional pain syndrome|[,]

(Tr. at 17.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments, individually or in

combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Ir. at 18-20.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed

Plaintiffs RFC and determined that she could perform sedentary work with further

limitations. Specifically, the AL] found as follows:

[Plaintiff can] sit for up to 6 hours; stand and walk for up to 2 hours; can

occasionally use tramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch; can

frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel; [and] can tolerate no exposute to

workplace hazards or extreme heat or cold.

(Tr. at 20.) At step four of the analysis, the ALJ determined, based on the testimony of the

vocational expert, that Plaintiff's past relevant work as a phlebotomist exceeded the above

RFC. (Tr. at 25.) However, the AL] concluded at step five that, given Plaintiffs age,

education, work experience, and RFC, along with the testimony of the vocational expert

tegatding those factors, Plaintiff could perform other jobs available in the national economy

and therefore was not disabled under the Act. (It. at 26.)

Plaintiff now contends that, in assessing her RFC, the ALJ “failed to account for

Plaintiff's need to elevate her left lower extremity (LLE’)” or, in the alternative, “provide an

adequate and supportable explanation as to why he did not find” that Plaintiff required “this

specific accommodation.” (PIl.’s Br. [Doc. #9] at 1, 9.) In terms of function-by-function

analysis, she specifically argues that the ALJ’s decision fails to provide an “accurate and logical

bridge” from the evidence about Plaintiffs foot impairment to the RFC assessment. (PL’s Br.

at 11-13) (citing Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir 2018)).

As Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p instructs, “[t]he RFC assessment must first

identify the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related

abilities on a function-by-function basis,” including the functions listed in the regulations.

Social Security Ruling 96-8p: ‘Titles I] and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in

Initial Claims, SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 34475, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 July 2, 1996).

“Only after such a function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express RFC in terms of the

exettional levels of work.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation omitted). Further, the “RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion

describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g.,

laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-

8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34478, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. An ALJ must “both identify evidence that

supports his conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge from that evidence to his

conclusion.” Woods, 888 F.3d at 694 (internal brackets, emphases, and quotation omitted).

The Fourth Circuit has noted that a per se rule requiring remand when the ALJ does not

perform an explicit function-by-function analysis “is inappropriate given that remand would

prove futile in cases where the AL] does not discuss functions that are ‘irrelevant or

uncontested.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v.

Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). Rather, remand may be appropriate

“where an AL] fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite

contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis

frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177).

The court in Mascio concluded that remand was appropriate because it was “left to guess

about how the ALJ arrived at his conclusions on [the claimant’s] ability to perform relevant

functions” because the AL] had “said nothing about [the claimant’s] ability to perform them

for a full workday,” despite conflicting evidence as to the claimant’s RFC that the ALJ did not

address. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637.

Here, Plaintiff contends that the AL]’s failure to include limitations expressly relating

to Plaintiffs left foot swelling—or to explain their absence from the RFC assessment—

renders his decision unsupported by substantial evidence. However, as set out below, the ALJ

sufficiently explained his reasons for discounting the need for additional restrictions, including

left foot elevation. In particular, the ALJ explained that the record as a whole, including the

treatment notes, objective testing, and medical opinion evidence, reflected that Plaintiff could

still perform sedentary work, and as patt of that analysis the ALJ found that the record failed

to substantiate Plaintiff's subjective complaints that she needed to elevate her leg to waist

height throughout the workday.

With respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiffs allegations regarding her symptoms,

under the applicable regulations, the ALJ’s decision must “contain specific reasons for the

weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence,

and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the

adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Social Security Ruling 16-3p: Titles I] and

XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10

(Oct. 25, 2017) (“SSR 16-3p”); see_also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Moreover, in Arakas_v.

Commissioner, Social Security, 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit clarified the

procedure an ALJ must follow when assessing a claimant’s statements:

When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, ALJs must use the two-step

framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029

(Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical

evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment” that could reasonably

be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.

Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess

the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they

affect the claimant’s ability to work and whether the claimant 1s disabled. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step,

objective evidence is required to find the claimant disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016

WL 1119029, at *4-5. SSR 16-3p recognizes that “symptoms cannot always be

measuted objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic

techniques.” Id. at *4. Thus, the ALJ must consider the entite case record and

may “not disregard an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence

does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5.

983 F.3d at 95 (internal brackets omitted). Thus, the second part of the test requires the ALJ

to consider all available evidence, including Plaintiffs statements about her pain, in order to

evaluate “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects

her ability to work.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. This approach facilitates the AL]’s ultimate goal,

which is to accurately determine the extent to which Plaintiffs pain or other symptoms limit

her ability to perform basic work activities. Relevant evidence for this inquiry includes

Plaintiffs “medical history, medical signs, and laboratory findings,” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595, as

well as the following factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529:

(1) [Plaintiffs] daily activities;

(i) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [Plaintiff's] pain or

other symptoms;

@ii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication

[Plaintiff] take[s] or [has] taken to alleviate [her] pain or other symptoms;

(v) ‘Treatment, other than medication, [Plaintiff] receive[s] or [has] recetved

for relief of [her] pain or other symptoms;

(vi) | Any measures [Plaintiff] use[s] or [has] used to relieve [her] pain or other

symptoms (e.g., lying flat on [her] back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes

every hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and

(vit) Other factors concerning [Plaintiffs] functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

In the present case, as instructed by the regulations, the ALJ considered the entire case

record and explained the reasons for deviating from Plaintiffs statements regarding the impact

of her symptoms on her ability to work. Whether the AL] could have reached a different

conclusion based on the evidence is irrelevant. The sole issue before the Court 1s whether

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773,

775 (4th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he language of § 205(g) precludes a de novo judicial proceeding and

requites that the court uphold the Secretary’s decision even should the court disagree with

such decision as long as it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.” (internal footnote omitted)).

Here, the AL]’s decision reflects that he (1) thoroughly reviewed the medical evidence,

the opinion evidence, and Plaintiff's testimony and (2) sufficiently explained his analysis of

Plaintiff's subjective complaints.

The tecord reflects that Plaintiff fractured several bones in her left foot in a January

2020 fall. She underwent two surgeries, the first in February 2020 to repair the fractures, and

the second in June 2020 to remove midfoot hardware. (See Tr. at 21-22.) During the hearing,

Plaintiff testified that she could not return to her prior work as a phlebotomist because it

involved constantly walking from room to room, and she has swelling and pain in her left foot

when she walks on it for long periods of time. (Tr. at 39-40.) Plaintiff stated that she could

walk for 30-to-45 minutes on a flat surface, but then the pain would become excruciating and

her foot would be extremely swollen. (Tr. at 41.) Plaintiff stated that elevating the foot does

not alleviate all of her pain and swelling, but that it takes it to a place where she can deal with

the pain a little better. (Tr. at 41-42.) She further testified that her typical day involves periods

of 30-45 minutes of normal activity including standing and walking, followed by an hour and

a half of leg elevation in a recliner or in bed. (I't. at 47.) However, she also testified that she

did not “have any problems sitting” because she could sit in a normal upright position without

putting any pressure on her left foot if she was “sitting just in a seated position.” (Tr. at 45-

46.)

The AL] noted Plaintiffs testimony “that she has to elevate her leg for most of the

day.” (Tr. at 21.) However, the ALJ noted that she was “able to drive without difficulty” and

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is “able to perform activities of daily living” (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ ultimately found, based on

the record as a whole, that the extent to which Plaintiffs foot pain and swelling limited her

ability to work was not as extensive as Plaintiff alleged, and that her “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent

with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this

decision.” (Tr. at 21.)

As part of the analysis, the ALJ undertook an extensive review of the medical evidence

(Tr. at 21-24), noting that the records reflect that after Plaintiff's surgery in June 2020, it was

recommended that she stop wearing the orthopedic boot and begin working on weightbearing

and physical therapy to increase range of motion and circulation and reduce swelling, but

Plaintiff continued to wear the boot and was discharged from physical therapy for failing to

show up for three visits. (T't. at 22; see also Tr. at 301, 308, 310, 317, 318, 321, 327, 738.) In

addition, the ALJ noted that the treatment records reflect that Plaintiff's limitations were based

on “difficulty and pain with weightbeating, standing, and walking.” (Tr. at 22; see also Tr. at

300, 307, 308, 330, 332, 341, 343, 699, 748.)5 The ALJ further noted that subsequent records

beginning in 2021 continued to recommend stiff-soled shoes, physical therapy, and

compression socks for swelling, which Plaintiff failed to do. (Tr. at 23, 693-94.) The AL] also

5In this regard, Plaintiff's treatment records reflect that her limitations were based on standing and walking,

and that she could not return to work at her prior position because it involved extensive standing and walking.

(Tr. at 317 (“[P]atient is still not able to return to work, unless a strict sedentary duty position becomes _

available”); 343 (“Patient works for [NJovant as a phlebotomist. Patient works a 12 hour shift with weight

bearing approximately 80% of the time. Patient has pain with standing, walking, and stairs. Patient is currently

unable to work due to inability to complete work duties at this time”); 633 (“Discussed with her and happy to

fill out any and all paperwork moving forward since she cannot tolerate more than 20-30 minutes of standing

as result of her prior injury” (emphasis omitted)).) As discussed below, the AL] addressed these limitations in

the REC by limiting Plaintiff to only sedentary work.

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noted that records and x-rays in 2021 reflected that her original injury was healed, and in

August 2021 her podiatrist, Dr. Goecker, opined that her residual foot pain was nerve pain

rather that posttraumatic arthropathy. (Tr. at 23, 632-33, 650, 706-07.) Plaintiffs podiatrist,

Dr. Goecker, performed diagnostic nerve blocks, one of which alleviated Plaintiffs foot pain,

allowing her left foot “to be touched and tange-of motion exercises to be performed.” (Tr. at

24, 706-07). In light of this result, “Dr. Goecker recommended aggtessive physical therapy

for desensitization training [while Plaintiffs] foot is anesthetized.” (Tr. at 24, 707.) However,

when Plaintiff returned to physical therapy in September 2021, “she discharged herself from

therapy after one visit due to left foot pain” rather than completing the recommended three

months. (Tr. at 24, 754.)

The AL] then concluded that:

The above findings demonstrate that the claimant suffered fractures in her left

foot that healed over time. However, she was left with residual nerve pain.

There is evidence that the claimant’s impairments would cause some limitations,

but the record does not demonstrate that her impairments would preclude her

from performing work within the parameters of the residual functional capacity,

which limits the claimant to less than the full range of work at the sedentary

level. For instance, the claimant testified that she must elevate her leg for most

of the day, but the objective evidence does not support this allegation. Physical

therapy records encouraged the claimant to be more active and to stop wearing

her boot. Based on the overall evidence of record, the undersigned finds that

the residual functional capacity fully accounts for limitations caused by the

claimant’s impairments.

(T'r. at 24 (emphasis added).) Thus, the ALJ considered and directly addressed Plaintiffs

claims, including specifically regarding the need for elevating her leg, in light of the testimony

and the medical record.

In het briefing, Plaintiff cites numerous instances in which her providers recommended

leg elevation and icing as treatment for her foot pain and swelling as evidence that she required

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such limitations in her RFC assessment. (Pl.’s Br. at 5-8.) However, these records reflect that

Plaintiff was given instructions for “strict elevation” and no weightbearing only for the first 8-

10 weeks after her surgery. (It. at 377, 380, 387, 393.) The later records reflect that Plaintiff

teported that her foot was tight “at the end of the day which improves with elevation,” and

her providers recommended she continue the icing and elevation, which appears to involve

only elevation as needed at the end of the day, not a requirement for “strict elevation” like the

period immediately after the surgery. (Tr. at 289, 292, 630, 633, 691, 699, 702.)

In addition, Plaintiffs assertion ignores her providers’ additional recommendations and

Plaintiff's failure to follow them. As Defendant correctly notes, Plaintiffs treating providers

tepeatedly explained to Plaintiff “that she needed to get out of the walking boot to prevent

further decompensation of the foot” (Def.’s Br. [Doc. #13] at 4), in order to address the pain

and swelling, and she was directed to switch to stiff-soled shoes (Tr. at 295, 304, 315, 317,

327). Despite this recommendation from July 2020 forward, Plaintiff continued to wear her

walking boot for as late as January 2021, and then later in 2021 wore flip-flops rather than

suppottive shoes. (I't. at 295, 304, 315, 644-46, 747, 749.) As documented above, she also

failed to comply with recommendations regarding physical therapy. (See Tr. at 22-24.) The

ALJ also explained that Plaintiffs continued foot pain primarily stemmed from neurological,

rather than orthopedic, causes (Tr. at 23, 24, 633, 706-07).

Ultimately, the ALJ set the RFC based on the record as a whole, and specifically

included the limitation to sedentary work. As part of the analysis, the AL} considered the

opinions of the state agency physicians, who concluded that Plaintiff was capable of medium

work. The ALJ found these opinions not persuasive in light of Plaintiffs limitations related

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to standing and walking, and instead limited her to sedentary work. This limitation to

sedentaty work is consistent with Plaintiffs testimony that she did not have “any problems

sitting” but that standing and walking caused pain and swelling. (Tr. at 39, 41, 45-46.) This

limitation to sedentary work is also consistent with her reported daily activities and with her

function teports noting no limitations in sitting. (I't. at 21, 202, 222-25.) This limitation is

also consistent with the medical records reflecting that Plaintiffs limitations were based on

““wweightbearing, standing, and walking,” as noted above. Further, the limitation to sedentary

would also avoid the prolonged walking or standing that would result in swelling, as

described by Plaintiff. (Tr. at 39, 41.)

To the extent Plaintiff testified regarding additional limitations, and specifically to the

extent Plaintiff contends that she must elevate her foot to waist-height throughout the

workday, the AL] did not find that the record supported that contention, based on (1)

Plaintiffs own testimony and function reports regarding her daily activities (Ir. at 21), (2) the

medical records reflecting that Plaintiffs limitations were based on “weightbearing, standing,

and walking,” which were addressed by the limitation to sedentary work (I't. at 22), (3)

Plaintiff's failure to follow other recommendations to address the pain and swelling (T'. at 24),

and (4) the fact that the pain was determined to be netve pain (Tr. at 23), as discussed above.

Thus, the ALJ thoroughly considered the evidence in making an evaluation of Plaintiffs

alleged symptoms and explained his reasoning, and then undertook a function-by-function

analysis in setting the RFC. Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to reconsider and re-weigh the

evidence presented. However, it is not the function of this Court to re-weigh the evidence ot

reconsider the ALJ's determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence. As noted

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above, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant

is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472

(internal brackets and quotation omitted). Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether a

different fact-finder could have drawn a different conclusion, or even “whether [Plaintiff] is

disabled,” but rather, “whether the AL]’s finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported

by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”

Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. Here, the AL] reviewed the evidence, explained his decision, and clearly

explained the reasons for his determination. That determination is supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Plaintiff has not identified any errors that require remand, and

Plaintiffs Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner should therefore be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision finding no

disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiffs Dispositive Brief [Doc. #9] is DENIED, that

Defendant’s Dispositive Brief [Doc. #13] is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

This, the day of March, 2024.

/s/ Joi Elizabeth Peake

United States Magistrate Judge

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