CROFT v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

LAURA C., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22CV744

)

MARTIN J. OMALLEY;,! )

Commissioner of Social Secutity, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Laura C. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 205(2) of the

Social Security Act (the “Act’), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. The Parties have filed cross-motions

for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on August 14, 2019, alleging a

disability onset date of June 28, 2017. (Tr. at 15, 171-72.)? She was last insured under Title II

on December 31, 2018, so her application sought to establish disability during the period

between June 28, 2017 and December 31, 2018. Her application was denied initially (Tr. at

December 20, 2023, Martin J. O’Malley was sworn in as Commissioner of Social Security, replacing Acting

Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin J.

O’Malley should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken

to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 405(¢) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §

2 Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #7].

67-77, 86-89) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 78-85, 94-98). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested

an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Ir. at. 99-

100.) On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff, along with her attorney, attended the subsequent

telephonic hearing, at which both Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert testified. (Ir. at

15.) Following this hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the

meaning of the Act (Tr. at 26), and on July 5, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs

request for review of the decision, thereby making the AL]’s conclusion the Commissionet’s

final decision for purposes of judicial review (Tr. at 1-6).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of

social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the

scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144

(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts ate not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d

396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the

AL] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the

cottect legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (@nternal brackets

and quotation omitted).

“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)

(internal quotation omitted). “It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may

be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001)

(internal brackets and quotation omitted). “If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a

verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34

(internal quotation omitted).

“In teviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh

conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the

[AL]].” Mastto, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation omitted). “Where conflicting

evidence allows teasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the

tesponsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets

and quotation omitted). “The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the

claimant] is disabled, but whether the AL]’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cortect application of the

relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability

benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.

1981). In this context, “disability” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).°

3 “The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance

Program (SSDD), established by Title II of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 ef seq., provides benefits to

disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income

Program (SSI), established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 ef seq., provides benefits to

indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for

determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. pt. 416 (SSI), governing these two programs are,

in all aspects relevant hete, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1,

“The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,

667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the

Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period

of disability; (2) had a severe impaitment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the

tequitements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,

could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence

forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquity. For example, “[t]he first step

determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the clatmant is

working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.

If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if

the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, the claimant is

disabled. Mastto, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but

falters at step three, ie., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal ot

exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional

capacity (RFC’.” Id. at 179.4 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on

+ “REC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d

at 562 (noting that administrative regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

telated physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8

houts a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation omitted)).

The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the clatmant’s “ability to do

sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or

skin impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after [the ALJ] considers

all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (¢.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at

562-63.

that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not qualify

as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior

work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that

a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite [the claimant’s]

impaitments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the AL] must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC]

and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust

to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its

“evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available

in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.

I. DISCUSSION

In the present case, the AL] found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful

activity” from her alleged onset date of June 28, 2017 through her date last insured of

December 31, 2018. The AL] therefore concluded that Plaintiff met her burden at step one

of the sequential evaluation process. (I't. at 18.) At step two, the ALJ further determined that

Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

chronic pain syndrome, spondylosis, lumbar spine degenerative disc disease,

status post cervical fusion, cervicalgia, and obesity|,]

(Tr. at 18.) The ALJ found at step three that none of the impairments identified at step two,

individually ot in combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Ir. at 20-21.) She therefore

assessed Plaintiffs RFC and determined that Plaintiff could perform light work with the

following, non-exertional limitations:

[S]he would be limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; occasional

kneeling, crawling, crouching, and stooping; no climbing of ladders, ropes, and

scaffolds; frequent reaching overhead; no driving an automobile for completion

of job tasks; and frequent handling and fingering.

(Tr. at 21.) Based on this determination and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ

determined at step four of the analysis that Plaintiff remained capable of performing her past

relevant work as a travel agent. (Tr. at 25.) The ALJ also noted the vocational expert’s

testimony that Plaintiff “has acquired job skills that would transfer to other sedentary jobs

within the [RFC].” (Ir. at 26.) In light of these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was

not disabled under the Act. (T'r. at 26.)

Plaintiff now raises two challenges to the ALJ’s RFC assessment. Specifically, she

contends that the AL] erred by failing to (1) “perform a proper function-by-function

evaluation of Plaintiffs ability to handle and finger with the non-dominant [left upper

extremity] when formulating her RFC,” and (2) “analyze and account for Plaintiff's medication

side effects in the RFC.” (PL’s Br. [Doc. #11] at 4, 8.) After a thorough review of the record,

the Court finds that neither of Plaintuffs arguments require remand.

A. Function-by-function assessment

Plaintiff first argues that, in assessing her RFC, the AL] erred by failing to perform a

function-by-function evaluation of evidence relating to Plaintiffs ability to sit, despite

evidence suggesting greater limitations. As Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p instructs,

“Tt]he RFC assessment must first identify the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions

and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis,” including the

functions listed in the regulations. Social Security Ruling 96-8p: Titles I] and XVI: Assessing

Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 34475, 1996

WL 374184, at *1 July 2, 1996). “Only after such a function-by-function analysis may an ALJ

exptess RFC in terms of the exertional levels of work.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179

(4th Cit. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). Further, the “RFC assessment must include a

narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific

medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily acttvities,

observations).” SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34478, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. An ALJ must

“both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and build an accurate and logical bridge

from that evidence to his conclusion.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)

(internal brackets, emphases, and quotation omitted).

The Fourth Circuit has noted that a per se rule requiting remand when the ALJ does not

perform an explicit function-by-function analysis “is inappropriate given that remand would

prove futile in cases where the ALJ does not discuss functions that are ‘irrelevant or

uncontested.”” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v.

Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). Rather, remand may be appropriate

“where an AL] fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite

contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the AL]’s analysis

frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177).

The court in Mascio concluded that remand was appropriate because it was “left to guess

about how the ALJ artived at his conclusions on [the claimant’s] ability to perform relevant

functions” because the ALJ had “said nothing about [the claimant’s] ability to perform them

for a full workday,” despite conflicting evidence as to the claimant’s RFC that the ALJ did not

address. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637.

Hete, as set out above, Plaintiff challenges the AL]’s analysis of evidence relating to

Plaintiffs ability to handle and finger frequently with her left upper extremity. This contention

largely rests upon Plaintiffs subjective complaints, which the ALJ found “not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Ir. at 22.) Under

the applicable regulations, the AL]’s decision must “contain specific reasons for the weight

given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be

clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator

evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Social Security Ruling 16-3p, Titles H and XVI:

Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10 (Oct. 25,

2017) (“SSR 16-3p”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Moreover, in Arakas v. Commissioner,

Social Security, 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit clarified the procedure an ALJ

must follow when assessing a claimant’s statements:

When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, ALJs must use the two-step

framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029

(Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical

evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment” that could reasonably

be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.

Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the AL] must assess

the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they

affect the claimant’s ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step,

objective evidence is ot requited to find the claimant disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016

WL 1119029, at *4-5. SSR 16-3p recognizes that “symptoms cannot always be

measuted objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic

techniques.” Id. at *4. ‘Thus, the ALJ must consider the entite case record and

may “not distegard an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence

does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5.

983 F.3d at 95 (internal brackets omitted). Thus, the second part of the test requires the AL]

to consider all available evidence, including Plaintiffs statements about her pain, in order to

evaluate “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects

her ability to work.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. This approach facilitates the ALJ’s ultimate goal,

which is to accurately determine the extent to which Plaintiffs pain or other symptoms limit

her ability to perform basic work activities. Relevant evidence for this inquiry includes

Plaintiff's “medical history, medical signs, and laboratory findings,” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595, as

well as the following factors set out in 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529:

(i) [Plaintiffs] daily activities;

Gi) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [Plaintiffs] pain or

other symptoms;

(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication

[Plaintiff] take[s] or [has] taken to alleviate [her] pain or other symptoms;

(v) Treatment, other than medication, [Plaintiff] recetve[s] or [has] received

for relief of [her] pain or other symptoms;

(vi) | Any measures [Plaintiff] use[s] or [has] used to relieve [het] pain or other

symptoms (e.g., lying flat on [her] back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes

evety hout, sleeping on a boatd, etc.); and

(vii) Other factors concerning [Plaintiffs] functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

In the present case, as instructed by the regulations, the AL] considered the entire case

record and explained the reasons for deviating from Plaintiffs statements regarding the impact

of her symptoms on her ability to work. Whether the AL] could have reached a different

conclusion based on the evidence is irrelevant. The sole issue before the Court is whether

substantial evidence supports the AL]’s decision. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773,

775 (4th Cir. 1972) (“[T]he language of § 205(g) precludes a ae novo judicial proceeding and

tequites that the court uphold the Secretary’s decision even should the court disagree with

such decision as long as it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.” (internal footnote omitted)).

Here, the ALJ reviewed the medical evidence, the opinion evidence, Plaintiff's

testimony, and the record, and explained the analysis of Plaintiff's subjective complaints.

Notably, the ALJ recounted Plaintiffs testimony that

she had [a] cervical fusion procedure prior to the period at issue and has

experienced constant neck pain radiating to the shoulders and left arm, left arm

attophy and weakness, back pain radiating to the left hip, and bilateral hand and

foot numbness... She tated her neck pain as 7 or 8 out of 10 before

medication, and 2 or 3 out of 10 after medication.

(Tr. at 22.) However, the ALJ ultimately determined that Plaintiffs “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent

with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 22.) In particular, the

ALJ explained that all of Plaintiffs treatment notes ftom the relevant time period reflected full

upper extremity strength bilaterally, as well as normal sensory testing, muscle bulk, tone,

teflexes, and range of motion in both arms. (Tr. at 23-24, 292, 319, 326, 337, 344, 349-50.)

Accordingly, the ALJ found no evidence supporting Plaintiff's reports of left arm muscle

atrophy and weakness. Nevertheless, the ALJ acknowledged that EMG testing in August 2018

“showed mild left-side carpal tunnel syndrome” and that Plaintiff continued to experience

tadiating neck pain on her left side due to her residual cervical spine issues. (Tr. at 23.) As

teflected in Plaintiffs testimony, however, medication significantly improved her symptoms.

(Tr. at 22, 41, 323.)

Most importantly, the opinion evidence in this case supports the ALJ’s determination

that Plaintiff could perform frequent handling and fingering with her left hand. The state

10

agency medical consultants at the initial and reconsideration levels both opined that Plaintiff

could perform light work with a further limitation to frequent gross manipulation, Le.,

handling, with her left upper extremity. (T'r. at 24, 74, 82.) Moreover, neither consultant

found that Plaintiff required any level of fingering limitation. (Tr. at 74, 82.) The ALJ found

the consultants’ opinions “generally persuasive,” but specifically noted that she included

“additional limitations” to Plaintiffs RFC assessment in light of further information in the

complete record, including a limitation to frequent fingering. (Tr. at 21, 24-25.) No opinion

evidence or other medical evidence suggests a need for greater restrictions regarding Plaintiff's

left hand.

The ALJ thus specifically addressed Plaintiffs handling and fingering limitations, and

in setting the RFC the AL] explicitly relied upon (1) the state agency opinions, (2) the imaging

studies which were consistent with the agency opinions, (3) the conservative treatment

measures reflected in the records, and (4) the “generally normal physical examination findings

of record during the period at issue.” (T'r. at 24.)

Plaintiff nevertheless contends that, while the ALJ recounted objective findings and

other portions of the medical record, “[w]hat is missing in the AL]’s decision is the analysis

connecting the facts to the ultimate conclusion.” (PL’s Br. at 7.) Specifically, she argues that

the AL] did “not build a logical bridge to her conclusion regarding how /requently [Plaintiff]

could handle and finger with [her left upper extremity].” (Pl’s Br. at 7.) However, this

argument fails to consider the ALJ’s inclusion of, and reliance on, the state agency consultants’

opinions. The consultants, whom the ALJ acknowledged as physicians with “substantial

experience applying Social Security disability law and policy,” reviewed Plaintiffs entire

11

medical record and concluded, based on both Plaintiffs subjective reports and the objective

findings, that Plaintiff remained capable of frequent handling during the time petiod at issue.

(Tr. at 24.) The ALJ, noting that the opinions were “consistent with the imaging studies,

consetvative treatment measures, and generally normal physical examination findings of

tecotd during the period at issue,” found them “generally persuasive,” a finding that Plaintiff

does not challenge. (It. at 24.) Accordingly, the ALJ adopted the frequent handling

limitations opined by the consultants when formulating Plaintiffs RFC assessment. Although

the consultants also opined that Plaintiff required no limitations in fingering, the ALJ included

the additional limitation to frequent left hand fingering in the RFC based on Plaintiffs

subjective complaints. Because the ALJ was entitled to rely on the opinion evidence to create

a “logical bridge” linking the evidence to her RFC findings, and because the AL]’s reasoning

and analysis is fairly traceable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds no basis

for remand.

B. Side effects

Plaintiff's argument regarding side effects proves equally unpersuasive. “As set out

above, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to “analyze and account for Plaintiffs medication

side effects in the RFC.” (Pl’s Br. at 8.) Like Plaintiffs first challenge, this contention tests

largely on the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiffs subjective complaints. Specifically, as recounted

by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that her mental impairment symptoms were “generally under

conttol, but medication” caused tiredness and Plaintiff further testified “that pain cause[d]

concentration difficultfies] when reading.” (Tr. at 22, 47-50.) However, at step two of the

sequential analysis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiffs impairments caused “no more than

12

mild limitations in her ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace.” (T't. at 19.) In

making this finding, the AL] explained as follows:

[Plaintiff] testified that her daily activities include using a computer. Further,

her function report indicates that she is able to count change, as well as spend

about four hours performing chores, including dusting and putting laundry in

the dryer. Additionally, [Plaintiff] had generally normal mental status

examination findings during the period at issue, including intact attention, intact

fund of knowledge, and linear, coherent[,] and goal-directed thought process.

(Tr. at 19) (internal citation to record omitted) (citing Tr. at 229, 316, 319, 322, 326, 331, 337,

344, 349, 352, 358). The AL] similarly found that Plaintiff had only a mild limitation in

“understanding, remembering, ot applying information.” Specifically, the ALJ explained that:

In her function report, [Plaintiff] indicates that she could count change, and

shop for items by mail, by computer, or in person. Additionally, [Plaintiff] had

generally normal mental status examination findings during the period at issue,

including intact memoty, intact associations, normal language, and ability to

answet questions appropriately. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that

the claimant would have no more than mild limitations in her ability to

understand, remember, or apply information.

(Tr. at 19) Gnternal citations to record omitted) (citing Tr. at 230, 291-92, 316, 319, 322, 326,

331, 337, 344, 349, 358). Because the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments caused no

more than mild limitations in any three “paragraph B” criteria, she concluded that Plaintiffs

mental impaitment was non-sevete. (Tr. at 18-20.) In doing so, the ALJ again noted Plaintiffs

testimony “that her symptoms were generally controlled with medications.” (Tr. at 18.)

Later in the administrative decision, the ALJ addressed Plaintiffs mental symptoms

when discussing the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants. Although the

consultants concluded that Plaintiffs file “provided insufficient evidence with which to

evaluate [Plaintiffs] claim,” the AL] found this conclusion unpersuasive, noting that the

consultants’ opinions were “not based upon a review of the full record.” (Tr. at 25.) However,

13

the ALJ further noted that Plaintiffs “generally normal mental status examination findings

during the period at issue, discussed above, ate consistent with no more than mild limitations

in her ability to perform basic mental work activities.” (T't. at 25) (citing Tr. at 291-92, 316,

319, 322, 326, 331, 337, 344, 349, 358).

Despite the ALJ’s express consideration of Plaintiffs mental complaints, including her

testimony regarding treatment and side effects, Plaintiff now atgues that “the RFC does not

make an allowance for off-task time, lying down during the day, absenteeism, or a limitation

to unskilled work due to the sedating effects of [Plaintiffs] medications, and the ALJ never

explains why [Plaintiffs] testimony was not supported by the record in this respect.” (Pl.’s Br.

at 9) (internal citation to record omitted). As noted above, AL] acknowledged Plaintiffs

testimony that her medications made her tired, that she slept “a lot,” and that her pain affected

her ability to concentrate. (Tr. at 22, 50, 54-55, 56, 57.) Nevertheless, as set out in response

to Plaintiffs first argument, substantial evidence supports the AL]’s evaluation of Plaintiff's

subjective complaints. As the fact finder, the ALJ has the sole responsibility for evaluating a

claimant’s subjective complaints, and a claimant’s allegations alone will not establish that she

is disabled. Craig, 76 F.3d at 592-93, 594-95; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ has the discretion

to weigh a claimant’s complaints against the evidence and reject them, and she did so in this

case.

Here, the ALJ repeatedly noted Plaintiffs normal mental status findings throughout

the relevant period. (Tr. at 19, 25, 318-19, 322, 326, 337, 349.) Moreover, no treatment notes

ot medical opinion evidence suggests the need for “off-task time, lying down during the day,

absenteeism, or a limitation to unskilled work due to the sedating effects of [Plaintiff's]

14

medications,” as she now claims. (Pl.’s Br. at 9.) As support for these limitations, Plaintiff

points to the third-party opinion of her father, who reported that Plaintiff had difficulties with

memory, completing tasks, and concentration. (Tr. at 215.) However, the ALJ ultimately

concluded that Mr. C.’s statement did “not outweigh the accumulated medical evidence

tegatding the extent to which [Plaintiff's] impairments limit her functional abilities” (Tr. at 25),

and Plaintiff does not directly challenge this analysis. Instead, Plaintiff simply argues that the

AL} failed to account for PlaintifPs medication side effects in the RFC, and “did not even

attempt to discount [Plaintiffs] testimony regarding” these side effects. (Pl’s Br. at 10.) As

discussed above, a plain reading of the ALJ’s decision belies this assertion. Again, Plaintiff,

who beats the burden of proving disability, presents no medical evidence to support the

mental limitations she argues wete warranted by her testimony. Moreover, even Plaintiff's

own testimony professing tiredness and concentration difficulties fails to specifically indicate

a need for “off-task time, lying down during the day, absenteeism, or a limitation to unskilled

work” as Plaintiff now suggests. (See Pl.’s Br. at 9.) Because the ALJ expressly noted Plaintiffs

consistently normal mental findings as a basis for discounting her subjective complaints and

further explained her basis for finding only mild concentration difficulties at length in her

analysis at step three of the sequential analysis (see Tr. at 19, 25), the Court concludes that

substantial evidence supports the RFC in this case.

To the extent that Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to reconsider and re-weigh the

evidence presented, it is not the function of this Court to te-weigh the evidence ot reconsider

the AL]’s determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence. As noted above,

“lwihere conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is

15

disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472

(internal brackets and quotation omitted). Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether a

different fact-finder could have drawn a different conclusion, or even “whether [Plaintiff] is

disabled,” but rather, “whether the ALJ's finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported

by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a cortect application of the relevant law.”

Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. Here, the AL] reviewed the evidence, explained her decision, and clearly

explained the teasons for her determination. ‘That determination is supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Plaintiff has not identified any errors that require remand, and

Plaintiffs Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner should therefore be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision finding no

disability is AFFIRMED, that Plaintiffs Dispositive Brief [Doc. #11] is DENIED, that

Defendant’s Dispositive Brief [Doc. #16] is GRANTED, and that this action is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

This, the 18** day of March, 2024.

/s/ Joi Elizabeth Peake

United States Magistrate Judge

16