BYRD v. GUILFORD COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

AUSTIN WAYNE BYRD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV872

)

GUILFORD COUNTY, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1) (the

“Application”), filed in conjunction with his pro se Complaint

(Docket Entry 2). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned

will grant the Application for the limited purpose of recommending

dismissal of this action.

RELEVANT STANDARDS

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To

address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that

“the [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]Jourt

determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii).

A plaintiff “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,” id., when the complaint does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of

the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id.’

' Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally

construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must

be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine

Twombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and

conclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th

(continued...)

BACKGROUND

Asserting claims (via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) under the First,

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as 18 U.S.C.

§ 1701, “HIP[A]A Privacy [Rule],”2 and “[o]ther laws that protect

the confidentiality of legal, medical mail, and financial mail”

(Docket Entry 2 at 3),3 Plaintiff initiated this action against

three defendants: (1) Guilford County, (2) Guilford County

Detention Center, and (3) Guilford County Sheriff’s Department

(collectively, the “Defendants”) (see id. at 2). According to

Plaintiff’s Complaint:

Guilford County Detention Center illegally withheld a

piece of mail . . . that was delivered to the G[uilford

]C[ounty ]D[etention ]C[enter] front desk, reception

area, or mail room at 10:00 am on June 14, 2023 in

Greensboro, NC[,] with legal documents that contained

confidential medical mail. Item never made it to

inmate . . . . [Mail] tamper[ing ] violated

[Plaintiff’s] 4th [A]mendment rights . . . . 1st mailed

1(...continued)

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro se

complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of the

Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint

. . . ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must

plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than

the mere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551

U.S. at 94; then Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

2 For legibility reasons, this Memorandum Opinion uses

standardized capitalization in all quotations from Plaintiff’s

materials.

3 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

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package was mail theft, the 2nd package [was] mail

tampering[;] both falling under 18 USC 1701... .

(Id. at 4.)

The Complaint requests relief, in the form of, inter alia,

“$100,000 for mental suffering,” and “[a]l officers involved

fired.” (Id.)

DISCUSSION

To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must

allege factual matter showing “that [he was] deprived of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that

the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50

(1999); see also Jones v. Chandrasuwan, 820 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir.

2016) (“Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,

but rather provides a method for vindicating federal constitutional

and statutory rights.”).

I. Guilford County

To begin, the Complaint names Guilford County as a defendant

(see Docket Entry 2 at 2), but contains no allegations against

Guilford County specifically (see id. at 1-16). Rather, the

Complaint contains vague allegations against various individuals

and entities. (See, e.g., id. at 4 (asking for “Agent T. Harrelson

to be “fired or suspended” without developing further factual

allegations against him).) Although “Congress did intend

municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom [Section] 1983 applies,” Monell v.

Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (emphasis

omitted), to state a viable Section 1983 claim against Guilford

County (either directly or via an official capacity claim against

it/employee(s)), “it must be shown that the actions of [persons

employed by Guilford County] were unconstitutional and were taken

pursuant to a custom or policy of [Guilford County],” Giancola v.

State of W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550 (4th Cir.

1987) (observing that official capacity suits actually target

employing entity) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92). See Board

of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)

(“[The Supreme Court] ha[s] required a plaintiff seeking to impose

liability on a [local governmental body] under [Section] 1983 to

identify a [local governmental] ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused

the plaintiff’s injury.”). Importantly, “‘a municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor or, in other

words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on

a respondeat superior theory.’” Avery v. Burke Cnty., 660 F.2d

111, 114 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).

Therefore, Section 1983 liability can only attach to Guilford

County if “execution of [its] policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Collins v. City

of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 121 (1992) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff must show that a

“constitutional injury [wa]s proximately caused by a written policy

or ordinance, or by a widespread practice that is ‘so permanent and

well settled as to constitute a “custom or usage” with the force of

law.’” McFadyen v. Duke Univ., 786 F. Supp. 2d 887, 954 (M.D.N.C.

2011) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127

(1988)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 703 F.3d 636 (4th Cir.

2012). However, the Complaint does not allege that any policy or

custom of Guilford County or its officials caused any of the

challenged events or otherwise harmed Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry

2 at 1-16.)

Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim against Guilford

County, necessitating dismissal of any such claims under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Guilford County Detention Center & Sheriff’s Department

Additionally, the Complaint names Guilford County Detention

Center and Guilford County Sheriff’s Department as defendants.

(See Docket Entry 2 at 2.) However, they do not qualify as legal

entities subject to suit and/or persons within the meaning of

Section 1983.

“State law dictates whether a governmental agency has the

capacity to be sued in federal court. There is no North Carolina

statute authorizing suit against a county’s sheriff’s department.”

Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419-20 (M.D.N.C. 2004)

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(internal citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Jail

Sheriff’s Dept., No. 1:15cv91, 2016 WL 5417399, at *2 (M.D.N.C.

Aug. 19, 2016) (concluding that Orange County Jail and Orange

County Sheriff’s Department do not qualify as “entit[ies] capable

of being sued in federal court”), recommendation adopted, 2016 WL

5415755 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2016); Capers v. Durham Cnty. Sheriff

Dept., No. 1:07cv825, 2009 WL 798924, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 23,

2009) (holding that “Durham County Sheriff Department is not a

legal entity capable of being sued”); Parker v. Bladen Cty., 583 F.

Supp. 2d 736, 740 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (dismissing Section 1983 claims

against Bladen County Sheriff’s Department because it “lacks legal

capacity to be sued,” as no North Carolina “statute authoriz[es]

suit against a North Carolina county’s sheriff’s department”). To

remedy that issue, Plaintiff could potentially name the Sheriff of

Guilford County as a defendant, but any such claim would still fail

to state any claim for relief. The Complaint describes no personal

involvement by the Sheriff in the alleged violations and theories

of respondeat superior or liability predicated solely on a

defendant’s identity as a supervisor do not exist under Section

1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

Claims against Guilford County Detention Center suffer from a

similar flaw. Section 1983 imposes liability only on “persons” who

violate a plaintiff’s federally protected civil rights, but

Guilford County Detention Center “is a building and not a person.”

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Allen v. Correct Care Sols., No. 1:21cv146, 2021 WL 954624, at *2

(M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2021), recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 949633

(M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2021), aff’d, 853 F. App’x 858 (4th Cir. 2021);

see also Allen v. Durham Cnty. Magis. Off., No. 1:20cv90, 2021 WL

6755021, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Durham County Detention

Facility do[es] not qualify as [a] legal entit[y] subject to

suit.”), recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 286817 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 5,

2022), aff’d, 2022 WL 2987941 (4th Cir. July 28, 2022). Even if

Plaintiff substituted the Guilford County Sheriff, as the person

responsible for Guilford County Detention Center, the Complaint

contains no factual matter showing any conduct by the Sheriff in

the operation of Guilford County Detention Center which violated

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. (See

Docket Entry 2 at 1-16.)

Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief

as to these two Defendants, warranting dismissal under

Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. Mail Theft, Tampering, and Confidentiality-Related Claims

For reasons stated in the preceding sections, the Complaint

fails to state any claim against Defendants. Assuming for the

purposes of discussion each Defendant qualified as a person subject

to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff’s claims regarding mail theft and

tampering or other confidentiality rules/laws remain deficient.

The Complaint does not develop factual allegations against

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Defendants other than the “1st mailed package was mail theft[ and]

the 2nd package [was] mail tampering.” (Docket Entry 2 at 4; see

id. at 1-16.) “As such, Plaintiff’s allegations [of mail theft and

tampering or confidentiality violations] do not rise above the

level of mere speculation.” Studivent v. Lankford, No. 1:10cv144,

2010 WL 1568451, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2010), recommendation

adopted, 2012 WL 1205722 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 2012).

Thus, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure

to state a claim pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

CONCLUSION

This action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1913(e)(2)(B)(ii).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application (Docket

Entry 1) is GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT

TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failing to state a claim.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

March 1, 2024

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