PENDERGRASS v. KIJAKAZI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

REBECCA P., )

Plaintiff,

v. 1:22CV491

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Rebecca P. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and

1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)),

to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying

her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under, respectively, Titles HI and XVI of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions

for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI in March 2019, alleging a

disability onset date of September 2018, later amended to July 2019. (Tr. at 15, 40, 246-61.)!

Her applications were denied initially (Tr. at 73-107) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 108-39).

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative heating de novo before an Administrative

1 Transcript citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #7].

Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. at 179-80.) On September 1, 2020, Plaintiff, along with her attorney,

attended the subsequent telephonic hearing, at which Plaintiff and an impartial vocational

expert testified. (Ir. at 15.) Following the hearing, the AL] concluded that Plaintiff was not

disabled within the meaning of the Act (Tr. at 28), and, on June 1, 2022, the Appeals Council

denied Plaintiffs request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the Commissioner’s final

decision for purposes of judicial review (Tr. at 1-6).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissionet’s denial of

social security benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). Howevet, the

scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144

(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts are not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d

396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the

AL) if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the

correct legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) @nternal brackets

and quotation omitted).

“Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993)

(internal quotation omitted). “It consists of more than a mete scintilla of evidence but may

be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001)

(internal brackets and quotation omitted). “If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a

verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34

(internal quotation omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh

conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the

[ALJ].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation omitted). “Where conflicting

evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the

responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets

and quotation omitted). “The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the

claimant] is disabled, but whether the AL]’s finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is

supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the

relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability

benefits beats the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir.

1981). In this context, “disability” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).?

“The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,

667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4), 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the

Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period

2The Social Security Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance

Program (SSDI), established by Title II of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 ef seq., provides benefits to

disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income

Program (SSI), established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 ef seg., ptovides benefits to

indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for

determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 CF.R. pt. 416 (SSI), governing these two programs ate,

in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1.

of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the

requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,

could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence

forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step

determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is

working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.

If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if

the claimant’s tmpairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, the claimant is

disabled. Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant cleats steps one and two, but

falters at step three, ie., “[i]f a clatmant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or

exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional

capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.3 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on

that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work’; if so, the claimant does not qualify

as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior

work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which “requires the [Government] to prove that

3 “REC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d

at 562 (noting that administrative regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-

related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation omitted).

The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s “ability to do

sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or

skin impatrments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “REC is to be determined by the AL] only after [the AL]] considers

all relevant evidence of a clatmant’s impaitments and any related symptoms (¢.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at

562-63.

a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite [the claimant’s]

impairments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide

“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC]

and [the claimant’s] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust

to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its

“evidentiaty burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available

in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.

Ill. DISCUSSION

In the present case, the AL] found that Plaintiff had not engaged in “substantial gainful

activity” since her amended alleged onset date of July 1, 2019. The ALJ therefore concluded

that Plaintiff met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (Tr. at 17.) At

step two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe

impaitments:

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with lumbar and lumbosacral

radiculopathy; osteoarthritis; post-traumatic stress disorder; and depressive

disorder[.]

(Ir. at 17.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments, individually or in

combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Ir. at 18-21.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed

PlaintifPs RFC and determined that she could perform sedentary work with further, non-

exertional limitations. Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except [she] can frequently

push/pull with the right upper extremity. She can occasionally climb ramps and

staits, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally stoop,

crouch, and crawl. She can frequently kneel. She can never reach overhead

with the bilateral upper extremities. She can understand, remember, and carry

out simple instructions. She can occasionally interact with supervisors and co-

workers, but never interact with the general public. She can tolerate infrequent

and gradually introduced changes in the workplace.

(Tr. at 21.) At step four of the analysis, the ALJ determined, based on the testimony of the

vocational expert, that Plaintiffs past relevant work exceeded the above RFC. (Tr. at 26-27.)

However, the ALJ concluded at step five that, given Plaintiffs age, education, work

experience, and RFC, along with the testimony of the vocational expert regarding those

factors, Plaintiff could perform other jobs available in the national economy and therefore was

not disabled under the Act. (Tr. at 27-28.)

Plaintiff now challenges the AL]’s mental RFC assessment.* Specifically, Plaintiff raises

four overlapping claims all of which challenge the AL]’s assessment of evidence relating to

Plaintiffs limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. First, Plaintiff argues that the

AL] failed to account for Plaintiffs limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace in the

RFC assessment in accordance with Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). Second,

Plaintiff alleges that the AL] failed to adequately evaluate the opinion evidence from the state

agency psychological consultants regarding Plaintiffs limitations in concentration, persistence,

and pace. ‘Third, Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence fails to support the RFC

determination with respect to concentration, persistence, and pace. Finally, Plaintiff contends

that the RFC failed to include mental limitations from the consultative examination,

particularly with regard to concentration, persistence, and pace. Because these arguments ate

heavily overlapping, and in some instances repetitive, the Court addresses them together.

4 Plaintiff does not raise any claim regarding the physical limitations, so this appeal addresses only Plaintiff's

mental limitations.

In the present case, the ALJ determined at step three of the sequential analysis that

Plaintiff has moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. In Mascio v. Colvin,

the Fourth Circuit explained that, where moderate limitations in concentration, persistence,

and pace are reflected at step three, the ALJ should address those limitations in assessing the

RFC or should explain why the limitations do not affect the claimant’s ability to work. The

Fourth Circuit specifically held that “an AL] does not account for a clatmant’s limitations in

concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine

tasks or unskilled work.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638 (internal quotation omitted). ‘This is because

“the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter

limitation would account for a clatmant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.”

Id. The Fourth Circuit further noted that

[plethaps the AL] can explain why Mascio’s moderate limitation in

concenttation, persistence, ot pace at step three does not translate into a

limitation in [claimant]’s residual functional capacity. For example, the ALJ may

find that the concentration, persistence, or pace limitation does not affect

[claimant]’s ability to work, in which case it would have been appropriate to

exclude it from the hypothetical tendered to the vocational expert. But because

the AL] here gave no explanation, a remand is in order.

Id. (internal citation omitted). However, as previously noted in other cases in this District, the

Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mascio

does not broadly dictate that a claimant’s moderate impairment in

concentration, persistence, or pace always translates into a limitation in the

RFC. Rather, Mascio underscores the AL]’s duty to adequately review the

evidence and explain the decision. ...

An ALJ may account for a clatmant’s limitation with concentration, persistence,

ot pace by restricting the claimant to simple, routine, unskilled work where the

tecotd supports this conclusion, either through physician testimony, medical

soutce statements, consultative examinations, ot other evidence that is

sufficiently evident to the reviewing coutt.

Tolbert v. Colvin, 1:15CV437, 2016 WL 6956629, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2016) (finding

that RFC limitations to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks with simple, short instructions, in a

job that required making only simple, work-related decisions, involved few workplace changes,

and requited only frequent contact with supervisors, co-workers, or the public” sufficiently

accounted for a plaintiffs moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in light

of the AL]’s explanation throughout the administrative decision) (quoting Jones v. Colvin, No.

7:14CV00273, 2015 WL 5056784, at *10-12 (W.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2015)); see also Sizemore v.

Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 80-81 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument under Mascio

where the ALJ relied on the opinion of the state agency psychologist that, notwithstanding

moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, the plaintiff could sustain

attention sufficiently to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks with additional limitations);

Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 121-22 (4th Cir. 2020) (same, and noting that Mascio “did

not impose a categorical rule that requires an ALJ to always include moderate limitations in

concentration, persistence, or pace as a specific limitation in the RFC”’).

Here, as in Mascio, the ALJ found moderate limitations in concentration, persistence,

ot pace at step three of the sequential analysis. (Tr. at 20.) Later in the sequential analysis, the

ALJ formulated a mental RFC indicating that Plaintiff “can understand, remember, and carty

out simple instructions” and “can tolerate infrequent and gradually introduced changes in the

workplace.” (Tr. at 21.) Plaintiff now argues that, in making this RFC finding, the ALJ did

not fully account for Plaintiffs ability to stay on task due to her moderate difficulties with

concentration, persistence, or pace.

As set out above, remand is not required under Mascio where the AL]’s discussion of,

and reliance on, substantial record evidence adequately explains why the plaintiffs moderate

limitation at step three did not translate into any additional RFC restrictions. In this case, the

AL) explained his analysis at length, based on Plaintiffs activities, her treatment notes, the

consultative examination, and her mental status examination, and concluded that:

Given the record, the undersigned finds that the claimant only has a moderate

limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. The undersigned

has accounted for this moderate limitation in the below-described residual

functional capacity. She can understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions. She can tolerate infrequent and gradually introduced changes in

the workplace.

(Tr. at 20.) Thus, the ALJ specifically explained his analysis and explained that Plaintiffs

moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace were accounted for in the RFC

limiting her to work involving only simple instructions and involving only infrequent and

eradually-introduced changes in the workplace.

In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ also relied on the opinion evidence from the state

agency psychological consultants, Drs. Madelyn Miranda-DeCollibus and Linda Tyrrell, who

found that Plaintiff “was capable of understanding and retaining at least simple instructions;

can maintain concentration, persistence, and pace to stay on tasks for 2-hour periods during a

typical 8-hour workday, as required to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks; can

interact in a workplace setting with occasional social contact and/or interaction with

supetvisors, co-workers, and/or the public; and can adjust to routine workplace changes

introduced in a gradual manner in a non-stressful work environment.” (Tr. at 25-26, 84-86,

101-03, 118-19.) The AL] found these opinions persuasive and set out his reasoning.

The undersigned finds that the opinions of the State agency mental consultant,

Dr. Madelyn Miranda-DeCollibus, Psy.D., are persuasive. In opinions at the

initial level dated February 25, 2020, Dr. Mitanda-DeCollibus opined that the

claimant would have some mental limitations stemming from her mental

impairments. Specifically, Dr. Miranda~DeCollibus found that the claimant was

capable of understanding and retaining at least simple instructions; can maintain

concentration, persistence, and pace to stay on tasks for 2-hour periods during

a typical 8-hour workday, as required to perform simple, routine, and repetitive

tasks; can interact in a workplace setting with occasional social contact and/or

interaction with supervisors, co-workers, and/or the public; and can adjust to

routine workplace changes introduced in a gradual manner in a non-stressful

work environment. Her opinions ate persuasive because they are consistent

with and supported by the medical evidence of record. As discussed above, the

recotd supports some limitations with regard to the claimant’s mental

impairments, but not to the degree that the claimant has alleged. Dr. Miranda-

DeCollibus adequately accounted for some of the claimant’s subjective

complaints when viewed in light of the objective medical evidence.

Similarly, the undersigned finds that the opinions of the State agency mental

consultant, Dr. Linda ‘Tyrrell, Psy.D., ate persuastve. In opinions at the

reconsideration level dated April 28, 2020, Dr. Tyrrell opined that the claimant

would have some mental limitations stemming from her mental impairments.

Dr. Tyrrell essentially adopted the opinions of Dr. Miranda-DeCollibus at the

initial level. For similar reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that the

opinions of Dr. Tyrrell are persuasive because they ate consistent with and

supported by the medical evidence of record.

at 25-26) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff challenges the consideration of this opinion evidence, arguing that the ALJ did

not specify how each restriction was weighed or addressed, particularly the determination that

Plaintiff could “stay on task for 2-hour periods.” However, in Sizemore v. Berryhill, the

Fourth Circuit considered a nearly identical state agency opinion and similar contention that

the ALJ had failed to provide for the limitations opined by the state agency psychologist.

Sizemore, 878 F.3d at 80. In Sizemore, similar to the present case, the state agency

psychologist opined that the claimant had moderate difficulties with regard to concentration,

persistence or pace, but “would generally be able to maintain attention for at least two hours

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at a time as needed to do simple, routine tasks and was thus mentally capable of independently

performing basic, routine tasks on a sustained basis.” Id. at 80-81 (internal brackets and

quotations omitted). The ALJ in Sizemore relied on that opinion in setting the RFC, which

limited the claimant to performing “simple one, two-step tasks” in a low stress work

environment with no public contact. Id. The ALJ did not include an RFC limitation related

to maintaining attention for two hours at a time, but the Fourth Circuit rejected Sizemore’s

Mascio challenge and rejected the contention that a remand was required for failure to

accommodate all the limitations identified by the State agency physician. Id.

Similarly, in the present case, the state agency psychologists concluded that Plaintiff

“can maintain concentration, persistence and pace to stay on tasks for 2 hour periods during

a typical 8 hour workday, as required to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks” (Tr. at 85,

118), and that she can “meet the basic mental demands of work on a sustained basis despite

any limitations resulting from identified [impairments]” (Tr. at 86). When recounting the state

agency consultants’ findings, the AL] specifically noted the finding that Plaintiff could

“maintain concentration, persistence, and pace to stay on tasks for 2-hour periods during a

typical 8-hour workday, as required to perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.” (Tr. at

25-26). The ability to concentrate for two houts at a time falls within the general requirements

for ordinary work, as defined by the SSA’s own policies and procedures.* The ALJ specifically

5 The agency’s Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) provides that any job, including

unskilled work, requires “[t]he ability to maintain concentration and attention for extended periods (the

approximately 2-hour segments between arrival and first break, lunch, second break, and departure), POMS

DI 25020.010 B.2.a., and further lists the ability to “maintain attention for extended periods of 2-hour segments

(concentration is not critical)” among “Mental Abilities Critical For Performing Unskilled Work,” POMS DI

25020.010 B.3.d. See also, e.g., Tucker v. Saul, No. 1:18CV481, 2019 WL 3581795, at *5-6 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 6,

2019).

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included limitations in the RFC addressing the limitations noted by the state agency

consultants, limiting Plaintiff to only simple instructions and only infrequent and gradually

introduced changes. As in Sizemore, the ALJ’s decision appropriately relied on the opinion

evidence from the state agency consultants, and did not fail to accommodate a limitation

identified by the state agency consultants. See also Brown v. Kijakazi, 1:20CV1151, 2022 WL

943692, at *5-6 (Feb. 25, 2022) (rejecting similar challenge).

In a telated argument, Plaintiff asserts that the AL] failed to properly account for the

findings of the consultative psychological examiner, Dr. Chad Ritterspach, when assessing

Plaintiffs ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace. As the ALJ correctly

recounted in his decision, Dr. Ritterspach concluded that Plaintiffs “ability to sustain attention

to perform simple repetitive tasks appears mildly /moderately impaired.” (Tr. at 26, 560.) The

ALJ found Dr. Ritterspach’s opinion “mostly persuasive,” noting that “it is mostly consistent

with and supported by the medical evidence of record.” (Tr. at 26.) However, the AL] further

explained that Dr. Ritterspach’s “use of ‘mildly’ and ‘moderately’ impaired is vague from a

functional standpoint and difficult to quantify functionally.” (Tr. at 26.) Plaintiff now argues

that “[t]his statement does not explain why there were no further limitations in the MRFC to

account for [Plaintiff's] moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace.” (PL.’s

Br. [Doc. #11] at 11.) However, neither Plaintiff nor Dr. Ritterspach suggested any additional

limitations. Moreover, the ALJ included an extended explanation of his analysis of Dr.

Ritterspach’s opinion, based on the substance of the consultative examination.

The claimant underwent a psychological consultative examination on February

5, 2020 with Dr. Chad Ritterspach, Psy.D. She reported subjective complaints

about her depression and PTSD. She stated that her neurologist prescribes her

medication and that she has attended some counseling. She reported that she

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would have her first appointment with a new provider soon, but that she has

never been in a psychiatric hospital. The record does not show that the claimant

had an appointment for any mental health treatment with her purported new

provider. On mental status examination, the claimant performed faitly well with

objective findings that were not entirely consistent with her subjective

complaints or alleged degree of limitation. She was willing to answer questions,

provided all information, and appeared to be a reliable informant. She repeated

five digits forward, was able to recall 3/3 words immediately, and 1/3 after a

short delay. With a category, she was able to name the other 2 words in the

short delay exercise. Her speech was articulate and of normal volume and her

pace of speech was within normal limits. Her recent and remote memory

appeared to be intact. She was able to spell “world” backwards. She was able

to name large U.S. cities. She was able to perform mental calculations. Her

attitude and demeanor were pleasant and she engaged with the examiner. She

showed no exaggerating or evasiveness. Her activity level was appropriate for

a clinical interview. She was neatly dressed. Her hygiene/grooming was

appropriate. Her thought processes were logical/grounded and her thought

content was appropriate for mood and circumstances. She was oriented to time,

person, place, and situation. She showed adequate judgment and insight.

The undersigned finds that the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr.

Ritterspach, is mostly persuasive. In an opinion dated February 5, 2020, Dr.

Ritterspach found that the claimant had the following limitations: her ability to

understand, retain, and following instructions 1s mildly impaired; her ability to

sustain attention to perform simple repetitive tasks is mildly/moderately

impaited; ability to relate to others, including co-workers and supervisors, is

moderately impaired; and her ability to tolerate stress/pressutes associated with

daily work activity is moderate impaired. His opinion is mostly persuasive

because it is mostly consistent with and supported by the medical evidence of

recotd. His use of “mildly” or “moderately” impaired is vague from a functional

standpoint and difficulty to quantify functionally. The above-described residual

functional capacity better reflects the ability [of] the claimant to perform work-

telated activities from a mental standpoint. Nonetheless, his opinion is not

necessarily inconsistent with the above-described residual functional capacity.

(Ir. at 25, 26) (internal citations omitted). The AL] thus clearly analyzed and weighed the

evidence from the consultative examination and the opinion evidence from Dr. Ritterspach,

but concluded that the absence of any specific functional limitations in the opinion made it

difficult to quantify or incorporate, and that the RFC tncorporating more specific functional

13

limitations better reflected Plaintiffs work-related abilities. The ALJ also noted that given the

vague nature of Dr. Ritterspach’s opinion, in his view the RFC was not inconsistent with the

opinion. These are reasonable conclusions that allow the Court to follow the AL]’s analysis.

In short, Plaintiff fails to show that the AL]’s treatment of Dr. Ritterspach’s opinion resulted

in any error, let alone error requiring remand.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff generally contends that the AL]’s decision was not

supported by substantial evidence, it 1s clear that the AL] had sufficient evidence supporting

the determination, including the opinions from the state agency consultants, and the ALJ fully

explained his analysis. (Tr. at 25-26.) In addition, the ALJ explained his conclusion that the

medical evidence of record was not consistent with Plaintiffs subjective complaints regarding

her symptoms and the degree of limitation, in light of her normal mental status exams and her

lack of formal mental heath treatment from a mental health professional. (Tr. at 24-25.) While

Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s evaluation, Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to

reconsider the decision and re-weigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion than the

ALJ. However, it is not the function of this Court to re-weigh the evidence or reconsider the

AL)’s determinations if they ate supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, “[w]here

conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the

responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets

and quotation omitted). Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether a different fact-finder

could have drawn a different conclusion, or even “whether [Plaintiff] is disabled,” but rather,

“whether the ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence

and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589.

14

Here, the AL] reviewed the evidence, explained his decision, and supported that explanation

with substantial evidence. Plaintiff has not identified any errors that requite remand, and

Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner should therefore be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissionet’s decision finding

no disability be AFFIRMED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc.

#10] be DENIED, that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. #14] be

GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice.

This, the 25t day of August, 2023.

__/s/ Joi Elizabeth Peake

United States Magistrate Judge

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