FORD v. HOOKS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

HARRIS EMANUEL FORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:19cv444

)

ERIK A. HOOKS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on (1) “DPS Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket Entry 23) (the “DPS Motion”);

(2) “Plaintiff Harris Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket

Entry 28) (“Plaintiff’s Motion”); (3) Defendant Cameron E. Gaddy’s

“Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket Entry 36) (the “Gaddy

Motion”); and (4) “DPS Defendants’ Motion to Seal Response in

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket

Entry 46), “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal

Portions of Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’

Motions for Summary Judgment and Exhibits Attached Thereto” (Docket

Entry 50), and “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal

Portions of Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of His Motion for Summary

Judgment” (Docket Entry 55) (collectively, the “New Sealing

Motions”). For the reasons that follow, the Court should grant the

DPS Motion in part, grant the Gaddy Motion in full, deny

Plaintiff’s Motion, and deny the New Sealing Motions without

prejudice.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

Alleging violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment,

Harris Emanuel Ford (the “Plaintiff”) commenced this action against

Erik A. Hooks, Kenneth E. Lassiter, J.C. Huggins, Jr.,1 Katy Poole,

Dean Locklear, Karen L. Henderson, Queen Gerald, Jerry Ingram, and

Gaddy (collectively, the “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (See Docket Entry 1 (the “Complaint”), ¶¶ 1-28, 128-35.)

Defendants answered the Complaint, asserting various defenses

(including qualified immunity) and denying liability for

Plaintiff’s injuries. (See Docket Entry 6 at 1-2, 15-18.)2

Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery (see Text Order

dated Sept. 19, 2019 (adopting, with one clarification, joint Rule

26(f) Report); Docket Entry 16 (Joint Motion to Amend Scheduling

Order, indicating progress of discovery to that point)), after

which all parties moved for summary judgment. Defendants Hooks,

Lassiter, Poole, Locklear, Henderson, Gerald, and Ingram

(collectively, the “DPS Defendants”) together sought judgment in

1 Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed his claim against

Defendant Huggins. (Docket Entry 7 at 1.)

2 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF

footer’s pagination.

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their favor on all claims (see Docket Entry 23), whereas Defendant

Gaddy separately moved for the same relief (see Docket Entry 36).

Plaintiff filed a consolidated response opposing Defendants’

motions. (See Docket Entries 48 (redacted), 51 (unredacted) .)

Defendants replied. (See Docket Entries 57 (Defendant Gaddy), 58

(DPS Defendants) .)

Plaintiff’s Motion, which seeks summary judgment against six

Defendants (Poole, Locklear, Henderson, Gerald, Ingram, Gaddy)°*

likewise stands fully briefed. (See Docket Entries 44 (redacted),

45, 47 (unredacted), 53 (redacted), 56 (unredacted).)

II. Allegations

In this action, Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ failure to

heed his requests for protective custody or otherwise ensure his

safety while incarcerated at Scotland Correctional Institution

(“SCI”). (See Docket Entry 1, 1-13.) According to the

Complaint:

Plaintiff has resided in North Carolina prisons since 2002.

(Id., 7 29.) In 2006, Plaintiff expected to serve as a government

witness in a murder prosecution, but a guilty plea resolved the

charges and obviated the need for Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id.,

30.) Still, “Plaintiff expressed to the [District Attorney]

° Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief omits any reference to

the other two Defendants, Hooks and Lassiter, both of whom

Plaintiff sued in their “official capacit[ies] for injunctive and

declaratory relief” (Docket Entry 1, 497 17-18). (See Docket Entry

33.)

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concerns about his safety in light of his potential cooperation

with the State.” (Id.) Upon a written request by the District

Attorney, the Department of Corrections moved Plaintiff to SCI.

(Id., ¶ 31.)

When Plaintiff arrived at SCI, “United Blood Nation gang

members at SCI branded [him] as an informant (a ‘snitch’) and

issued a ‘kill on sight’ order.” (Id., ¶ 32.) Staff at SCI

learned about the threat, removed Plaintiff from the general

population, and eventually transferred him to another facility.

(Id., ¶¶ 34, 37.) The pattern of threats resulting in Plaintiff’s

transfer repeated itself several times between 2008 and 2017. (See

id., ¶¶ 38–41.)

The Department of Corrections moved Plaintiff back to SCI on

March 15, 2017. (Id., ¶ 42.) That same day, Plaintiff received

another threat, which prompted him to advise staff about “the

incident and his problems with the United Blood Nation gang” and to

request protective custody. (Id., ¶¶ 43–45.) In the weeks that

followed, staff initially isolated Plaintiff but ultimately denied

his request and ordered him to return to general population. (Id.,

¶¶ 46–49.) Plaintiff opted to comply rather than receive the

disciplinary measure known as Intensive Control (ICON) status,

which would have resulted in modified housing and the loss of

various privileges. (Id., ¶¶ 49–52.) Plaintiff learned from

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prison staff that he would receive ICON status “if he requested

[protective custody] without providing names.” (Id., ¶ 53.)

Over the next two months, United Blood Nation-affiliated

inmates continued to threaten Plaintiff, who attempted to appease

them with “food, toiletries, and stamps from the canteen.” (Id.,

¶ 57.) In April or May 2017, two such affiliated inmates attacked

Plaintiff in his cell and warned him not to report his injuries.

(See id., ¶¶ 58–59.) Plaintiff initially complied but requested

protective custody twice more in May 2017 after receiving

additional threats and remaining in the same unit where the attack

had occurred. (Id., ¶¶ 60–63, 75.) Prison staff denied both

requests, and Plaintiff complied with the order to return to

general population. (Id., ¶¶ 69–70, 79–80.)

In response to each denial of protective custody, Plaintiff

filed a grievance. (Id., ¶ 81.) Several grievances challenged

Plaintiff’s continued assignment to general population and prison

staff’s handling of his grievances. (Id., ¶¶ 86–100.) Plaintiff

also wrote numerous letters and submitted forms raising his

concerns to individuals inside and outside SCI. (Id., ¶ 104.)

Prison staff denied Plaintiff’s grievances, and he remained in

general population, though in a different unit than where the

spring 2017 attack occurred. (Id., ¶¶ 86–105.)

“[O]n September 24, 2017, a United Blood Nation-affiliated

inmate named Jamal McRae ran into [Plaintiff’s] cell while

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[Plaintiff] was on his bunk and attacked [Plaintiff], stabbing him

on his face, head, neck, ear, eye, and finger.” (Id., @ 107.)

Plaintiff went to the hospital for his injuries, where “{[he]

received over 100 stitches for his scalp, neck, and facial

lacerations.” (Id., 110.) Additionally, “[Plaintiff] needed

physical therapy to regain normal movement in his hand and

fractured finger.” (Id.)

When Plaintiff returned from the hospital, prison staff

temporarily isolated him, though he spent a brief period in general

population. (Id., G7 111, 114-15.) Plaintiff continued to file

grievances about his safety at SCI until his transfer out of that

facility around November 2017. (See id., FI 111, 116-18.)

Based on the above events, the Complaint contends that all

Defendants, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, “deprived

[Plaintiff] of a safe environment.” (Id., 97 133.) In particular,

Plaintiff sued Defendants Hooks and Lassiter in their official

capacities (id., 17-18), arguing that they “were willfully and

deliberately indifferent to [Plaintiff’s] safety by failing to

establish or enforce effective policies and practices at SCI” (id.,

q 129). Plaintiff sued the remaining six Defendants in their

individual capacities (id., (41 21-26), asserting that they

“subjected [him] to conditions that posed a significant risk of

serious bodily harm or death” (id., {@ 130). The Complaint alleges

that, despite “ha[ving] actual and constructive notice of the

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significant risk of serious harm to [Plaintiff, these Defendants]

acted with deliberate indifference to that risk.” (Id., ¶ 132.)

According to the Complaint, “[a]ll Defendants’ failure to provide

a safe environment . . . caused [Plaintiff’s] serious physical,

mental, and emotional injuries.” (Id., ¶ 134.)

III. The Record

In support of their respective positions, the parties

submitted numerous exhibits including affidavits; Plaintiff’s

institutional records, including the history of his transfers,

housing assignments, and infractions; Plaintiff’s requests for

protective custody and corresponding reports; various letters;

Plaintiff’s grievances and the responses; institutional records

relating to the September 24, 2017 assault; McRae’s disciplinary

history; Plaintiff’s medical records; photographs of Plaintiff’s

injuries; Defendant Gaddy’s responses to interrogatories; and

excerpts from several depositions. As relevant to the motions for

summary judgment, the record reflects the following:

A. Plaintiff’s History

Plaintiff was convicted in 2004 for first-degree rape and

received a 129-year sentence. (Docket Entry 25-2 at 2.) According

to a letter from District Attorney Seth Edwards, in 2006, Plaintiff

submitted to an interview with prosecutors concerning a then-

pending Martin County murder case. (Docket Entry 30-1 at 2.)

Plaintiff shared with prosecutors information he had learned from

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Mickey Rollins, the murder suspect, during their incarceration

together. (Id.) Plaintiff’s assistance led to the discovery of a

potential murder weapon. (Id.) District Attorney Edwards planned

to call Plaintiff as a witness, but Rollins pleaded guilty shortly

before trial. (Id. at 3.)

District Attorney Edwards communicated this same information

to the head of the North Carolina prison system in October 2006.

(Docket Entry 30-2 at 2.) The letter relays Plaintiff’s preference

for a transfer away from Central Prison (which could have housed

Rollins post-conviction). (Id.) According to District Attorney

Edwards, “[Plaintiff] requested a move . . . to the Scotland County

prison to be closer to his family.” (Id.)

Although it remains unclear where Plaintiff resided at every

point since his 2004 conviction, his sworn statement indicates

that he lived at SCI between January

2, 2008, and July 16, 2008. (See Docket Entry 30, ¶ 4; Docket

Entry 34-2 at 2.) Plaintiff avers that, during this time, SCI

staff learned that United Blood Nation gang members had ordered a

hit on Plaintiff (as a result of his status as a “snitch”).

(Docket Entry 30, ¶¶ 5–6.) This incident resulted in Plaintiff’s

transfer to a different institution, and Plaintiff recalls multiple

threats to his life and several safety-related transfers in the

years that followed. (See id., ¶¶ 6–7.)

Plaintiff returned to SCI on March 15, 2017. (Id., ¶ 8.)

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As soon as [he] entered the Blue Unit cell block, an

inmate told [him] to “check off or get blowed.” That

meant [he] would be attacked with a shank if [he] didn’t

request protective custody (PC). The inmate added,

“That’s word to Blood,” meaning that the threat was from

the United Blood Nation gang. [Plaintiff] didn’t know the

name of the inmate who made that statement to [him]

because [he] had just arrived at SCI.

(Id., ¶ 9.)

B. Requests for Protective Custody and Grievances

Plaintiff immediately reported the foregoing threat to

Defendant Ingram (the Unit Manager) and requested protective

custody. (Id., ¶ 10.) According to the Policy and Procedures of

the North Carolina Department of Public Safety:

Protective control is the reassignment of an inmate from

the general population to confinement in a secure area to

protect the inmate involved from self injury or threat of

harm by others. An inmate’s request to be placed in

protective control does not alone constitute grounds for

reassignment. The officer in charge must evaluate all the

circumstances of each case. A determination must be made

that the inmate’s request is legitimate and that

Restrictive Housing is necessary for the continued

well-being of the inmate. The only purpose for protective

control is the protection of the inmate when it is

apparent that the inmate’s life or well-being may be

threatened if the subject remains in the general

population.

(Docket Entry 31-16 at 2.) The Policy establishes procedures

governing such decisions and limits the length of time an inmate

may remain in “protective control” housing. (Id. at 2–4.)

Plaintiff participated in an interview and gave a written

statement in support of his request for protective custody.

(Docket Entry 26-3 at 2.) The written statement explains that

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Plaintiff resided at SCI in 2008

(Id. at 3.)

On March 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance in response to

the denial of protective custody to

(Docket Entry 26-9 at

3–4.) The applicable policy manual provided that “[a]ny aggrieved

inmate may submit a written grievance on Form DC-410.” (Docket

Entry 49-8 at 2.) After preliminary screening of such grievances,

prison staff must prepare an initial written response and attempt

to resolve the matter with the inmate. (Id. at 2–3.) The

administrative process allows for two phases of additional review

if the inmate’s concern persisted. (Id. at 3–4.)

(Docket Entry 26-9 at 3–4.)

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(Id. at 4–5.)

(Id. at 5.)

(Id. at 6.)

(Id. at 7.)

(Docket

Entry 34-26 at 2.)

Sometime during April 2017, United Blood Nation gang members

threatened Plaintiff for the second time since his March 2017

arrival at SCI. (Docket Entry 30, ¶¶ 9, 17.) They told him “to

‘pay rent’ or ‘get blowed,’” which “meant that [he] needed to give

them food, toiletries, and stamps or else [he] would get stabbed

with a shank.” (Id., ¶ 17.) Despite Plaintiff’s compliance with

this demand, “[a] few weeks later, two Bloods attacked [him] with

a shank in [his] cell on the Blue Unit as they called [him] a

‘snitch.’” (Id., ¶¶ 17–18.) Plaintiff declined to report his

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injuries for fear of retribution and instead “continued to ‘pay

rent’ to avoid further attacks.” (Id., ¶ 18.)

(Docket Entry 34-35 at 2.)

(Id.)

(Id.)

(Id. at 5; Docket Entry 34-36

at 2.)

(See Docket Entry 34-35 at 5

; Docket Entry 34-36 at 2 (same).)

(Docket Entry 26-4 at 4

; Docket Entry 30, ¶ 19 (“[A]nother inmate told me to

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‘check off or die.’”).)

(See

Docket Entry 26-4 at 4.)

(See id. at 2.) According to Plaintiff,

as part of the investigation, he showed McDonald and Defendants

Gaddy and Henderson letters from District Attorney Edwards

corroborating the basis for the threat to his life. (Docket Entry

30, ¶ 20.) Defendant Gaddy has denied that Plaintiff offered any

“paperwork” to substantiate his request and has maintained that

Plaintiff refused to make a statement. (Docket Entry 34-10 at 12;

Docket Entry 36-1 at 2.)

(Docket Entry 26-4 at 2.)

(Id.)

(Docket Entry 26-

10 at 2.)

(Id.)

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(Id.)

(Id.)

(Docket Entry 34-37 at 2–3.)

(Id. at 2.)

(Id. at 2–3.) The record contains no response to this

letter.

On May 25, 2017, “[Defendant] Ingram came to [Plaintiff’s]

cell and yelled at [him] for requesting [protective custody].

Within earshot of other inmates on the unit, [Defendant] Ingram

demanded to know who [Plaintiff] thought was a threat. [Plaintiff]

refused to answer his public questioning.” (Docket Entry 30,

¶ 24.)

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(Docket Entry 26-5 at 3.)

(Id.)

(Id. at 3–4.)

(Id. at 6.)

(Id.)

(Id.)

(See

Docket Entries 26-11, 34-51.)

(Docket

Entry 34-51 at 2, 4.)

(Id. at 4–5.)

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(Id. at

3.)

(Id.

at 3, 6.)

(See id. at 6–7.)

(Id. at 8–10.)

(See id. at 10.)

(See id.; Docket Entry 34-52 at 2.)

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(Docket Entry

26-11 at 2–7.)

(Id.)

(Id.)

(Docket Entry 26-10 at 4.)4

(Id. at 5.)

(Id. at 6.)

4

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(See

Docket Entry 26-11 at 8.)

(Id. at 9.)

(Id. at 10.)

C. Attack on September 24, 2017

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According to Plaintiff’s affidavit, “inmate Jamal McRae ran

into [Plaintiff’s] cell while [Plaintiff] was preparing food and

attacked [Plaintiff] with a shank. [McRae] stabbed [Plaintiff] in

the face, head, neck, ear, eye, and hand dozens of times before

[Plaintiff] was able to fend him off. McRae then ran out of

[Plaintiff’s] cell.” (Docket Entry 30, ¶ 34.) In another, later-

filed affidavit, Plaintiff averred that “[he] did nothing to

provoke McRae’s attack.” (Docket Entry 54, ¶ 4.)

Per Defendant Gaddy, McRae reported that he “act[ed] in self-

defense” (Docket Entry 37 at 3),

(see Docket Entry 24 at 5–6).

(See Docket Entry 26-6.) In response to one

of Plaintiff’s interrogatories, Defendant Gaddy recalled that McRae

“reported . . . attack[ing] [Plaintiff] over a dispute

regarding . . . legal services.” (Docket Entry 41 at 3; see also

id. (“Legal papers prepared by [Plaintiff] on behalf of [McRae]

were found in [Plaintiff’s] cell and taken into evidence by the

Laurinburg Police Department.”).)

(see Docket Entry

33 at 16), whereas DPS Defendants have challenged Plaintiff’s lack

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of evidence that the assault constituted “a gang hit” (see Docket

Entry 24 at 9–11). Defendant Gaddy has argued (and testified in

his deposition) that McRae’s status as a sex offender would have

rendered him ineligible for gang membership. (See Docket Entry 37

at 2–3.) Moreover, Defendant Gaddy attached as an exhibit excerpts

from his own deposition in which he described his investigation

into the incident and interviews with informants that led him to

disbelieve Plaintiff’s account of the attack as gang-related. (See

Docket Entry 36-1.)

D. Events Following the September Attack

After prison staff discovered Plaintiff’s injuries, they

transported him to the hospital for treatment. (Docket Entry 30,

¶ 35.)

(Docket Entry 26-6 at 4–5.) In the criminal proceeding involving

related criminal charges (assault with deadly weapon and assault

inflicting serious injury), McRae pleaded guilty (pursuant to

Alford). (Docket Entry 49-5 at 2–9.)

(See Docket Entry 34-44.)

(See id. at 2–8.)

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(Id. at 2–3.)

(Id. at 5.)

(Id. at 6–7.)

(Id. at 2.)

(Docket Entry 34-45 at

2.)

(Id.)

(Docket Entry 34-46 at 2.)

(See Docket Entry 34-2 at 2.)

5

(Docket Entry 34-47 at 2.)

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DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standards

A. Summary Judgment

“The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of establishing the

absence of such dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986).

In analyzing a summary judgment motion, the Court “tak[es] the

evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d

524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In other words, the nonmoving

“party is entitled ‘to have the credibility of his evidence as

forecast assumed, his version of all that is in dispute accepted,

[and] all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him.’”

Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)

(brackets in original) (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith,

597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)). If, applying this standard,

the Court “find[s] that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for [the nonmoving party], then a genuine factual dispute exists

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and summary judgment is improper.” Evans v. Technologies

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996).

However, “[o]Jnly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude

the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Moreover, “the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs,

conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a

motion for summary judgment.” Lewis v. Eagleton, 4:08-cv-2800,

2010 WL 755636, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing Baber v.

Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992)),

aff’d, 404 F. App’x 740 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Pronin v.

Johnson, 628 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that

“[m]ere conclusory allegations and bare denials” or the nonmoving

party’s “self-serving allegations unsupported by any corroborating

evidence” cannot defeat summary judgment). Finally, factual

allegations in a complaint or court filing constitute evidence for

summary judgment purposes only if sworn or otherwise made under

penalty of perjury. See Reeves v. Hubbard, No. 1:08cv721, 2011 WL

4499099, at *5 n.14 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 27, 2011), recommendation

adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 21, 2011).

“When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the

[C]ourt must review each motion separately on its own merits ‘to

determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a

matter of law.’” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th

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Cir. 2003) (quoting Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58,

62 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997)). The Court considers each motion

individually and “‘resolve[s] all factual disputes and any

competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable’ to the

party opposing that motion.” Id. (quoting Wightman v. Springfield

Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (lst Cir. 1996)).

B. Eighth Amendment

“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and

unusual punishments.’” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir.

2008) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII). “It is undisputed that

the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions

under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Bighth

Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The

Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials “provide humane

conditions of confinement,” which includes, among other things,

“tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (quoting

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To that end,

officials must “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners.” Brown v. North Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 612

F.3d 720, 722-23 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833).

But, “[n]ot every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of

another establishes liability against a prison official.” Id. at

723.

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“In order to make out a prima facie case that prison

conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show both

‘(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2)

deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison

officials.’” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir.

1993) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir.

1991)). “In order to demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a

prisoner must allege ‘a serious or significant physical or

emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,’ or

demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from

the prisoner’s exposure to the challenged conditions.” De’Lonta v.

Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and

citations omitted). The inquiry into the serious deprivation

“should be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent.”

Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 346 (1981)). Moreover, “an inmate must specifically describe

not only the injury but also its relation to the allegedly

unconstitutional condition.” Id. at 1381 n.9.

With regard to the second prong, deliberate indifference,

a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of

confinement unless the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the

official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “These requirements spring from the text

of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed

on an inmate cannot properly be called ‘punishment,’ and absent

severity, such punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and unusual.’”

Iko, 535 F.3d at 238.

“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard[, and] . . .

mere negligence will not meet it.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692,

695 (4th Cir. 1999). To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must

make “two showings”:

First, the evidence must show that the official in

question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of

harm. It is not enough that the officers should have

recognized it; they actually must have perceived the

risk. Second, the evidence must show that the official in

question subjectively recognized that his [or her]

actions were inappropriate in light of that risk. As with

the subjective awareness element, it is not enough that

the official should have recognized that his [or her]

actions were inappropriate; the official actually must

have recognized that his [or her] actions were

insufficient.

Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

original). “A plaintiff can meet the subjective knowledge

requirement through direct evidence of a prison official’s actual

knowledge or circumstantial evidence tending to establish such

knowledge, including evidence that a prison official knew of a

substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”

Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can also establish “a prima

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facie case of deliberate indifference” where “‘a substantial risk

of [serious harm] was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or

expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the

circumstances suggest that the defendant-official . . . had been

exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known

about it.’” Id. (brackets and ellipsis in original) (quoting

Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303).

In other words, “[p]rison officials are deliberately

indifferent if they are aware that ‘the plaintiff inmate faces a

serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily

yet they fail to do so.’” Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 236 (4th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Brown, 612 F.3d at 723). On the other hand,

“prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate

health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded

reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not

averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Phrased “in terms of duty or

deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot

be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”

Id. at 845.

C. Section 1983

“Under [Section] 1983, a state actor may be liable if he

‘subjects, or causes to be subjected’ an individual ‘to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution.’ As a general matter, a law officer may incur

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[Section] 1983 liability only through affirmative misconduct.”

Randall v. Prince George’s Cty., 302 F.3d 188, 202 (4th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1981)).

“[Section] 1983 must be ‘read against the background of tort

liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences

of his actions.’” Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (Ath Cir.

1977) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). “[I]t

must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted

personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.’” Wright

v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Vinnedge,

550 F.2d at 928)).

II. Analysis

A. The Summary Judgment Motions

1. The DPS Motion

DPS Defendants have sought summary judgment on the grounds

that Plaintiff can prove neither causation nor deliberate

indifference, each a necessary showing for his eighth-amendment

claim. (See Docket Entry 24 at 2.) The brief in support of the

DPS Motion asserts that Plaintiff’s own conduct precipitated

McRae’s attack and that McRae’s alleged gang involvement played no

role. (Id. at 9-11.) That brief further argues that Plaintiff has

failed to satisfy either prong of the eighth-amendment inquiry:

that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm or that DPS

Defendants knew about and disregarded this risk. (Id. at 15-19.)

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In particular, that brief emphasizes that the initial threat

preceded the attack by more than ten years and that Plaintiff’s

failure to provide sufficient information to prison officials

hindered their investigation. (Id. at 16–18.) According to that

brief, Plaintiff’s forecast of evidence amounts to no more than

mere negligence on the part of each Defendant. (Id. at 18–19.)

Additionally, that brief contends that Defendants Poole and

Locklear bear no Section 1983 liability given their minimal

participation in the alleged deprivation. (Id. at 11–14.)

Finally, that brief claims entitlement to summary judgment for

Defendant Lassiter because he has retired, leaving him without

“authority to enforce any injunctive relief the Court may provide.”

(Id. at 19.)

In his consolidated response opposing both defense motions for

summary judgment, Plaintiff addressed each of the above arguments.

First, Plaintiff’s response cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

25(d) for the proposition that Defendant Lassiter’s successor, Todd

Ishee, automatically replaces Defendant Lassiter as a party upon

the latter’s retirement. (Docket Entry 51 at 5 n.1.) Plaintiff’s

response further challenges DPS Defendants’ reliance on

inadmissible hearsay to argue that Plaintiff’s conduct caused McRae

to attack him. (Id. at 17–21.) According to Plaintiff’s response,

he has satisfied the first prong of the eighth-amendment inquiry

(substantial risk of serious harm) because an associate of the

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United Blood Nation gang actually inflicted serious injuries upon

Plaintiff. (Id. at 21–22.) With respect to the second prong

(deliberate indifference), Plaintiff’s response highlights the

supposed obviousness of the risk and the failures by Defendants

Poole, Locklear, Ingram, Gaddy, Henderson, and Gerald to properly

investigate Plaintiff’s concerns. (Id. at 22–26; see also id. at

26 (“It was eminently foreseeable that Ford—who alerted the

[individual-capacity] Defendants to a Blood threat on his life and

begged for protection—would be stabbed by a member or associate of

the Bloods.”).) Finally, Plaintiff’s response asserts waiver as to

any argument for summary judgment by the official-capacity

Defendants (Hooks and Ishee) because the brief in support of the

DPS Motion fails to address Plaintiff’s official-capacity theory.

(Id. at 27–28.)

2. The Gaddy Motion

Adopting by reference portions of the DPS Motion’s

accompanying brief, the brief in support of the Gaddy Motion

advocates for judgment in Defendant Gaddy’s favor on grounds

similar to the DPS Motion. (See Docket Entry 37 at 2.) Defendant

Gaddy’s brief maintains that McRae’s assault did not stem from gang

affiliation and that no Defendant displayed “a ‘sufficiently

culpable state of mind.’” (Id. at 2–3 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834).) Plaintiff’s consolidated response affords no individualized

treatment to the Gaddy Motion, instead contending that “[the DPS

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Motion and the Gaddy Motion] fail for the same reasons.” (Docket

Entry 51 at 5 n.2.)

3. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff has requested entry of judgment in his favor against

the six individual-capacity Defendants: Poole, Locklear, Henderson,

Gerald, Ingram, and Gaddy. (See Docket Entry 29 at 5.)

Plaintiff’s brief in support argues that the conditions of

Plaintiff’s confinement at SCI posed a substantial risk of serious

harm; that each Defendant disregarded the risk despite their

awareness of it; and that qualified immunity fails to shield any of

those Defendants from Section 1983 liability. (Id. at 18–27.)

More specifically, Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief

maintains that “[Plaintiff] was at ‘substantial risk’ of serious

harm because he was seriously harmed.” (Id. at 19 (emphasis in

original).) As proof of each Defendant’s actual knowledge of that

risk, Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief points to his numerous

requests for protective custody, grievances, and letters. (Id. at

19–22.) According to Plaintiff, the individual-capacity Defendants

unreasonably disregarded the risk by failing to investigate and

grant Plaintiff’s requests for protective custody. (Id. at 22–25.)

To overcome the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff’s summary

judgment brief asserts that the undisputed facts establish an

eighth-amendment violation and that “[Plaintiff’s] right to

protection from other inmates was clearly established in 2017.”

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(Id. at 25.) Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief contends that

“[t]he factual circumstances in Farmer, Makdessi [v. Fields, 789

F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2015)], and Cox are sufficiently ‘similar’ to

this case that [Defendants Poole, Locklear, Henderson, Gerald,

Ingram, and Gaddy] must have been on notice that their conduct was

unlawful.” (Docket Entry 29 at 26–27.)

DPS Defendants responded in opposition, arguing that Plaintiff

has not met his burden to show that the record would compel any

reasonable juror to find in his favor. (Docket Entry 44 at 2–3.)

That response restates problems with Plaintiff’s theory of

causation, characterizes his logic as circular, and challenges the

notion that DPS Defendants actually “form[ed] the opinion that

Plaintiff was at risk.” (Id. at 4–7.)

Defendant Gaddy filed a separate response, disputing both

“Plaintiff’s bare allegation [that] the assault was gang-related”

and Plaintiff’s contention that his serious injury proves a

substantial risk of serious harm. (Docket Entry 45 at 3.)

According to Defendant Gaddy’s response, the individual-capacity

Defendants lacked a “culpable state of mind” because “[they] did

their best to ascertain whether a threat against Plaintiff existed

and, if so, from whom.” (Id. at 3–4 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834).)

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B. Preliminary Matters

First, the parties have disputed what evidence the Court may

consider to resolve their dueling dispositive motions. Plaintiff’s

consolidated response argues that “Defendants base their arguments

[for summary judgment in their favor] on inadmissible hearsay.”

(Docket Entry 48 at 17.) In particular, Plaintiff’s response

challenges Defendants’ reliance on McCrae’s unsworn, out-of-court

statements concerning the motive for the September 2017 attack.

(Id. at 17–19.) In reply, DPS Defendants and Defendant Gaddy

contended that McRae’s narrative fits within one or more hearsay

exceptions. (Docket Entry 57 at 2 n.1; Docket Entry 58 at 2 n.1.)

According to Defendant Gaddy, numerous exceptions under Federal

Rule of Evidence 803 “apply to both the statements made by McRae

directly to [Defendant] Gaddy as well as the records generated by

McRae and prison officials when interviewing him soon after the

attack.” (Docket Entry 57 at 2 n.1 (characterizing statements as

present sense impressions, excited utterances, and then-existing

mental and emotional conditions and asserting that documentary

materials constitute business records and recorded recollections).)

“[T]he practical question presented by a motion for summary

judgment is whether the case presents a genuine issue of fact for

trial rather than whether the parties have put their evidence in

final form.” United States HUD v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales

Mgmt., 64 F.3d 920, 926 n.8 (4th Cir. 1995). “The [C]ourt may

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consider materials that would themselves be admissible at trial,

and the content or substance of otherwise inadmissible materials

where the ‘the party submitting the evidence show[s] that it will

be possible to put the information . . . into an admissible form.’”

Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790

F.3d 532, 538 (4th Cir. 2015) (ellipses in original) (quoting 11

James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.91[2] (3d ed.

2015)); see also Jones v. Western Tidewater Reg’l Jail, 187 F.

Supp. 3d 648, 654 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“[F]acts in support of or

opposition to a motion for summary judgment need not be in

admissible form; the [Rule 56] requirement is that the party

identifies facts that could be put in admissible form.” (internal

quotation omitted)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and

the accompanying advisory committee note, “[i]f the nonmovant

objects to the court’s consideration of ‘material cited to support

or dispute a fact,’ the movant has the burden ‘to show that the

material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible

form that is anticipated.’” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P.,

790 F.3d at 538–39 (internal citations omitted).

Here, Defendants have not carried this burden. Turning first

to Defendant Gaddy’s forecasted testimony, the record reveals no

“present sense impression” by McRae, who gave no “statement

describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or

immediately after . . . perceiv[ing] it.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)

-35-

(emphasis added). According to and deposition

testimony, no Defendant spoke to McRae in the moments immediately

following the assault. (See

; Docket Entry 36-1

at 4 (testimony from Gaddy denying presence at SCI when McRae

attacked Plaintiff).) Nor did McRae provide “[a] statement

relating to a startling event or condition, made while . . . under

the stress of excitement that it caused.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(2)

(emphasis added). On this score, Defendant Gaddy recalled McRae

“tear[ing] up” during an interview but offers no time frame for

this encounter. (Docket Entry 57 at 2 n.1.) Finally, to the

extent any McRae statement describes what caused his mental or

emotional condition, such statement fails to qualify under this

exception because “statements about the declarant’s reasons for

having that state of mind are inadmissible.” United States v.

Wenjing Liu, 654 F. App’x 149, 153–54 (4th Cir. 2016).

Consequently, Defendant Gaddy’s expected testimony concerning

McRae’s out-of-court statements constitutes inadmissible hearsay,

an improper basis for summary judgment.

As concerns the documents themselves (such as the

investigative file pertaining to the assault), neither proffered

hearsay exception warrants admission of the materials. Although

the records themselves may qualify as business records, the

documents contain embedded hearsay. Specifically, by creating the

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investigative file, prison staff made out-of-court statements

(first-level hearsay); any statement within such file (such as

McRae’s conversations with staff) constitutes second-level hearsay.

“[E]ach part of [a] combined statement[] [must] conform[] with an

exception to the rule [against hearsay].” Fed. R. Evid. 805. As

explained above, Defendants have failed to demonstrate a basis for

admitting any of McRae’s out-of-court statements. Finally, the

exception for recorded recollections bears no relevance here. This

exception requires a showing “that (1) the witness once had

knowledge about the matters in the document, (2) the witness now

has insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately, and

(3) the record was made at a time when the matter was fresh in the

witness’ memory and reflected the witness’ knowledge correctly.”

United States v. Shorter, Nos. 98-4822, 98-4823, 1999 WL 631244, at

*2 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1999). The record lacks any competent

evidence that McRae no longer remembers his motive for the attack.

The briefing on this subject relates only to whether the

Federal Rules of Evidence render inadmissible the material as

presented. In other words, Defendants have failed to explain any

anticipated admissible form of the evidence upon which they rely.6

Under these circumstances, given that no hearsay exception permits

the admission of Defendant Gaddy’s testimony on this score or the

records containing McRae’s account, such material does not

6 Defendants appear not to have deposed McRae or otherwise

secured his sworn testimony.

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constitute evidence upon which the Court can grant summary

judgment. For these reasons, this Recommendation depends on

neither McRae’s out-of-court statements via Defendant Gaddy nor the

institutional records pertaining to the investigation (to the

extent they contain inadmissible hearsay from McRae).

Second, as Plaintiff correctly has observed, by operation of

Rule 25, Todd Ishee became a party upon Defendant Lassiter’s

retirement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). His joinder occurred

automatically, without need for an Order from this Court. See id.

(“The court may order substitution at any time, but the absence of

such an order does not affect the substitution.”). The Court

should direct the Clerk to effect this substitution.

Third, Plaintiff appropriately has noted that, despite the

asserted breadth of the DPS Motion, the supporting brief fails to

challenge Plaintiff’s official-capacity theory as to Defendants

Hooks and Lassiter (now Ishee), whom Plaintiff sued for injunctive

relief. Under this Court’s Local Rule 7.3, “[a]ll motions shall

state with particularity the grounds therefor.” The Court should

decline to grant summary judgment to the official-capacity

Defendants because they have failed to present or develop an

argument advocating this result. See Hughes v. B/E Aerospace,

Inc., No. 1:12CV717, 2014 WL 906220, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7,

2014) (“A party should not expect a court to do the work that [the

party] elected not to do.”).

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C. Plaintiff’s Injury

No Defendant has disputed that Plaintiff suffered serious

physical injuries as a result of McRae’s attack; however, questions

remain about whether those injuries alone demonstrate that

Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and whether the

attack occurred as a result of that risk.

As to the first question, Supreme Court authority clarifies

that the failure-to-protect inquiry considers the seriousness of

the risk of assault, not merely the extent of injury when an

assault has already occurred. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (“For a

claim . . . based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must

show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial

risk of serious harm.” (emphasis added)). “This objective inquiry

‘requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that

the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates

contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to

such a risk.’” Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016)

(third emphasis in original) (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36).

However, the Farmer Court declined to decide the “point [at which]

a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for

Eighth Amendment purposes.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 n.3. Absent

further guidance from the Supreme Court, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sometimes has assessed only the

gravity of an injury for purposes of the first objective prong.

~39-

See Raynor, 817 F.3d at 128–29 (describing, “[f]or the

objective-injury prong,” parties’ conflicting accounts of gravity

of injury); Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (“In this case, it is

uncontested that [the plaintiff] suffered significant physical

injuries as a result of the other inmate’s attack.”). Both Raynor

and Brown considered the degree of risk as part of the second-prong

deliberate indifference inquiry. See Raynor, 817 F.3d at 129–30;

Brown, 612 F.3d at 723. In light of this binding precedent, for

purposes of this matter, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff’s

showing of serious injury satisfies the objective prong. However,

such a ruling fails to conclusively establish that Plaintiff faced

a substantial risk of serious harm or that Defendants disregarded

such risk.

As to causation of Plaintiff’s injury, the parties disagree

about (i) Plaintiff’s supposed provocation of McRae’s attack and

(ii) McRae’s alleged Blood affiliation. By affidavit, Plaintiff

denies provoking McRae. (Docket Entry 54, ¶ 4.) In support of the

opposite conclusion, Defendants rely in large part on inadmissible

hearsay, which the Court should decline to consider for the reasons

previously discussed. However, Defendants offer limited, seemingly

admissible evidence to counter Plaintiff’s sworn assertions: prison

staff found McRae’s legal materials in Plaintiff’s cell (Docket

Entry 41 at 3),

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.7 Such evidence cuts against the sudden,

unprompted encounter that Plaintiff suggests but fails to entitle

Defendants to summary judgment.8

(See Docket Entry 33 at 16

.)

Despite challenging Defendants’ use of inadmissible evidence,

Plaintiff fails to acknowledge his own reliance on hearsay,

identify a hearsay exception, or propose the anticipated admissible

form of the material. See Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P.,

790 F.3d at 538 (describing evidence courts may consider for

7 Plaintiff’s response on these subjects fails to overcome

the factual dispute. First, the response asserts that the Court

should exclude as hearsay Defendant Gaddy’s contention that

Plaintiff served as McRae’s jailhouse lawyer. (Docket Entry 48 at

19.) True enough, McRae’s statement on this point constitutes

hearsay, but the hearsay rule cannot shield from the jury

underlying non-hearsay facts (such as the discovery of McRae’s

legal materials in Plaintiff’s cell). Second, Plaintiff’s response

states that “the video skips shortly before the attack, masking

[McRae’s] entrance [into Plaintiff’s cell].” (Id. at 13.) The

recording (which skips periodically) permits that inference but

fails to foreclose the possibility that McRae spent significant

time in Plaintiff’s cell prior to the attack (contrary to

Plaintiff’s account).

8 In contrast, conclusive proof that Plaintiff provoked McRae

likely would doom Plaintiff’s Motion and spell victory for

Defendants. See Richardson v. Mitchell, No. 3:06cv48, 2008 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 112415, at *13–16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2008) (dismissing

failure-to-protect claims by plaintiff who faced discipline for

fighting with other inmates); see also Hailey v. Kaiser, No.

99-7046, 1999 WL 1009614, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (finding

no proximate or legal cause for Eighth Amendment claim brought by

inmate who admitted role as initial aggressor).

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summary judgment purposes). In any event, the Court should not

view McRae’s gang affiliation, if any, as outcome-determinative;

Defendants may have acted with deliberate indifference even if

McRae never associated with the Bloods, or Defendants may have

acted reasonably even if McRae had such affiliation.

Ultimately, because these topics may involve credibility

determinations, the Court should decline to adopt either side’s

version for purposes of any summary judgment motion. Uncertainty

over what caused McRae to attack Plaintiff (Plaintiff’s

provocation, McRae’s gang affiliation, or something else) renders

improper summary judgment for either party on this basis.

D. Deliberate Indifference

As explained above, for purposes of deliberate indifference,

the obviousness of a risk may support an inference of actual

knowledge; an official may “not escape liability if the evidence

showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he

strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of

risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843

n.8. To exemplify such a situation, Farmer hypothesized an

official who possesses “a high probability of facts indicating that

one prisoner has planned an attack on another but resists

opportunities to obtain final confirmation.” See id. “To

establish that a risk is ‘obvious’ . . . a plaintiff generally is

required to show that the defendant ‘had been exposed to

-42-

information concerning the risk and thus must have known about

it.’” Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

However, a prison official may demonstrate deliberate

indifference even without deeming an inmate “especially likely to

be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the

assault.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (emphasis added). Some risks

to an inmate’s health or safety appear clear even absent a

particularized warning (or advance notice from the inmate at all).

see id. at 848 (“[T]he failure to give advance notice is not

dispositive. Petitioner may establish respondents’ awareness by

reliance on any relevant evidence.”)}). In Farmer, the Supreme Court

described Farmer as “a ‘non-violent’ transsexual who, because of

[her] ‘youth and feminine appearance’ is ‘likely to experience a

great deal of sexual pressure’ in prison.” Id. (internal quotation

omitted). In contrast, in Makdessi v. Fields, 716 F. App’x 148

(4th Cir. 2017), Makdessi’s medical problems, stature, and age

failed to constitute such an obvious risk. See id. at 154 (“The

magistrate and district court did not clearly err in crediting

[prison officials’] testimony as establishing that [they] believed

that any risk suggested by Makdessi’s physical condition ‘was

insubstantial or nonexistent.’” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844)).

In instances when the inmate lacks a self-evident

vulnerability, courts sometimes have discerned deliberate

-~43-

indifference when officials ignored an inmate’s requests for

protection or failed to isolate inmates from their identified

enemies. For example, the Fourth Circuit permitted an inmate’s

eighth-amendment claim to proceed when he alleged that a staff

member directed him to retrieve cleaning supplies from a “Housing

Block,” despite the staff member’s knowledge that the area housed

another inmate who “harbored a grudge against [the plaintiff

inmate].” Brown, 612 F.3d at 722. The other inmate attacked Brown

after Brown complied with the staff member’s order. Id.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit denied qualified immunity to prison

officials who first disregarded an inmate’s warning about other

inmates who wanted to harm him and then ignored the inmate’s pleas

for help as the aggressors broke into his recreation cage and

attacked him. Odom v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765,

767–68 (4th Cir. 2003).

Inversely, “prison officials cannot endeavor to protect an

inmate from threats that the inmate refuses to identify or expound

upon.” Farmer v. Lyons, Civ. Action No. PWG-18-567, 2018 WL

3585208, at *4 (D. Md. July 26, 2018). Courts in the Fourth

Circuit have granted summary judgment for prison officials in

failure-to-protect cases when the officials lacked sufficient

information concerning the threat perceived by an inmate. See,

e.g., Mbewe v. C.D.C., No. AW-12-cv-3138, 2013 WL 4495816, at *4

(D. Md. Aug. 20, 2013) (“No detailed information regarding real or

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potential threats or future acts of physical harm was communicated

to MCIH staff prior to the July 2012 incident.”). In Brown v. Rowan

County Detention Center, No. 1:09-CV-573, 2012 WL 5338574 (M.D.N.C.

Oct. 30, 2012), prison officials prevailed at summary judgment when

the failure-to-protect claim arose from a denial of protective

custody. Id. at *5–6. Brown had sought such a housing assignment

based on “threatened gang violence,” but never “provided specific

information to any Defendant about who made threats against him or

what those threats were.” Id.

In light of the above principles, the Court should evaluate

the information available to each Defendant, which depends (to a

significant degree) on details provided by Plaintiff in his

requests for protective custody and grievances. For purposes of

the DPS Motion and the Gaddy Motion, the Court must decide (in

light of the authority discussed previously) whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, any reasonable

juror could determine that (i) Defendants actually knew about and

disregarded a substantial risk to Plaintiff and (ii) that

Defendants understood that their response to the risk remained

inadequate. As concerns Plaintiff’s Motion, the inquiry centers on

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Defendants, any reasonable juror could deny that Defendants acted

with such deliberate indifference.9 Given the forecast of evidence

9 A conclusion that the evidence supports a finding of

deliberate indifference (thus denying summary judgment for

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relating to each Defendant’s subjective awareness, the Court should

grant summary judgment for all six individual-capacity Defendants.

1. Defendant Poole

As evidence of Defendant Poole’s subjective awareness of facts

from which she must have inferred a substantial risk of serious

harm, Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief10 points to

(Docket Entry 33 at 20;

Docket Entry 34-35 at 2.) Viewed in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the record shows that Defendant Poole, as the employee

“responsible for the ‘total operations’ of the prison, including

security,” directed Defendant Gerald to address Plaintiff’s

concerns but failed to follow up. (Docket Entry 48 at 24

.)

On this record, no reasonable juror could find that Defendant

Poole possessed the requisite awareness of a substantial risk to

Plaintiff.

Defendants) permits but does not require judgment for Plaintiff.

10 Plaintiff’s consolidated response opposing Defendants’

motions for summary judgment contains similar assertions. (Compare

Docket Entry 33, with Docket Entry 51.)

-46-

(Docket

Entry 34-35 at 2.) Faced with such a generalized complaint,

Defendant Poole directed her subordinates to ensure a proper

investigation, to respond to Plaintiff, and to file a copy of the

response. The record contains no indication that Defendant Poole

knowingly mishandled the matter. Even if a reasonable juror could

conclude that Defendant Poole should have done more, no such juror

could characterize her state of mind as “deliberate indifference.”

Therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment for Defendant

Poole.

2. Defendants Locklear and Henderson

To show Defendant Locklear’s deliberate indifference,

Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief highlights that Defendant

Locklear declined to engage in meaningful review in providing the

Step Two answer for three of Plaintiff’s grievances. (Docket Entry

29 at 23–24.) As concerns Defendant Henderson, she supposedly

evinced deliberate indifference by denying, without analysis,

Plaintiff’s second grievance. (Id. at 24.) DPS Policy requires a

Facility Head or designated staff member to “investigate the

grievance.” (Docket Entry 49-8 at 3.)

Defendant Locklear handled Plaintiff’s first, second, and

fourth grievances, which disclosed the following information:

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(See Docket Entry 26-9 at 3–5; Docket Entry 26-10

at 2; Docket Entry 26-11 at 2–7.)

(Docket Entry 26-9 at 6; Docket Entry 26-10 at 4.)

(Docket Entry

26-11 at 8.)

The record shows Defendant Henderson played a role only with

Plaintiff’s second grievance. (See Docket Entry 26-10 at 4.)

(See id. at 2.)

-48-

(Id. at 4; Docket Entry 26-4 at 2.)

(See Docket Entry 26-10 at 2 (second grievance

received May 21, 2017); Docket Entry 26-5 at 2 (third request for

protective custody dated May 25, 2017).)

(See Docket Entry 26-4 at 2; Docket

Entry 26-5 at 6.)

Based on the information reasonably available to Defendants

Locklear and Henderson, no reasonable juror could conclude that

Plaintiff faced an obvious risk or that Defendants Locklear or

Henderson displayed willful blindness. Plaintiff’s showing falls

short of “a high probability of facts indicating that one prisoner

has planned an attack on another.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.

Even if Defendants Locklear and Henderson could have taken

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additional action to learn whether Plaintiff faced a real threat —

or even if a reasonable juror could decide that they should have —

their inaction fails to meet the high standard of deliberate

indifference. Plaintiff’s wide-ranging complaints suffered from

significant vagueness, and he declined to lend credibility to his

account by offering verifiable details to substantiate his

subjective fears, considerations that preclude relief. See Farmer,

2018 WL 3585208, at *4 (“Not only does that refusal [to identify

his assailants] thwart any honest attempts to address Mr. Farmer’s

stated safety concerns, it also detracts from the credibility of

the claims raised.”). Presenting his grievance in this manner

deprived Defendants Locklear and Henderson an “opportunit[y] to

obtain . . . confirmation” of any threat to Plaintiff’s safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8; see also Farmer, 2018 WL 3585208, at

*4 (“While this Court recognizes that naming one’s assailants in a

prison setting may involve a degree of risk, correctional officials

cannot be held responsible for allegedly failing to protect an

inmate from perceived enemies if the inmate refuses to cooperate by

identifying the source of the threats.”). Because no reasonable

juror could find that Defendants Locklear or Henderson “strongly

suspected,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8, an obvious risk to

Plaintiff’s safety, they demonstrated no deliberate indifference.

Accordingly, the Court should enter judgment on this basis in favor

of Defendants Locklear and Henderson.

-50-

3. Defendant Gerald

Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief and consolidated response

argue that Defendant Gerald failed to appropriately address

Plaintiff’s concern for his safety despite her knowledge of threats

from United Blood Nation gang members. (See Docket Entry 29 at 24;

Docket Entry 48 at 26.) Defendant Gerald handled Plaintiff’s third

and fourth grievances. (See Docket Entry 34-32 at 2 (Step One

response to fourth grievance); Docket Entry 34-51 at 2–10

(signature indicating receipt of third grievance).) Like Defendant

Locklear, who also played a role in the fourth grievance, Defendant

Gerald received notice of

(See Docket Entry 26-11 at 2–7.) As with Defendant Locklear,

Defendant Gerald’s knowledge of those concerns fails to establish

any deliberate indifference; no reasonable juror could conclude

that Defendant Gerald must have deduced a substantial risk to

Plaintiff, based on such matters.

However, Defendant Gerald’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s situation

exceeded that of Defendant Locklear. On May 18, 2017, while

Plaintiff’s second protective custody request remained pending,

Defendant Poole sent a message to Defendant Gerald asking her to

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(Docket Entry 34-36 at 2.)

Beyond the belated note entered into the correspondence tracking

system more than two years later, the record fails to reflect any

action by Defendant Gerald in response to this directive.

Additionally, because Defendant Gerald signed for Plaintiff’s

third grievance on June 1, 2017, she learned more about Plaintiff’s

perspective on the situation, including that:

(Docket Entry 34-51 at 2–10.)

(See

Docket Entry 34-52 at 2.) Defendant Gerald testified in her

deposition that she could not remember what action she took, if

any, in response to the information contained in Plaintiff’s third

grievance. (Docket Entry 34-16 at 7.)

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On this record, a reasonable juror could conclude that

Defendant Gerald actually realized the risk posed to Plaintiff’s

safety (though Plaintiff’s articulated fear, on its own, fails to

establish an objective risk). Nonetheless, the record contains

insufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that

Defendant Gerald “actually . . . recognized that [her] actions were

insufficient.” Parrish ex rel. Lee, 372 F.3d at 303. As with

other aspects of the deliberate indifference standard, “it is not

enough that the official should have recognized that his actions

were inappropriate.” Id. (emphasis in original). When Plaintiff

expressed these concerns to Defendant Gerald, staff had begun

processing Plaintiff’s second grievance and his third request for

protective custody. Defendant Gerald need not have believed these

measures would fail to adequately address the issue. For this

reason, the Court should grant the DPS Motion with respect to

Defendant Gerald.

4. Defendant Ingram

Per Plaintiff, Defendant Ingram’s deliberate indifference

hinges on his lack of investigation into and eventual denial of

Plaintiff’s first protective custody request. (Docket Entry 29 at

20, 24.)

(Docket Entry 34-12 at 2.)

-53-

(Id.) Defendant Ingram limited his investigation to a

review of Plaintiff’s statement, which failed to identify any

inmates who had threatened him. (See Docket Entry 34-6 at 4–18.)

Plaintiff’s statement alone falls short of allowing the

inference that Defendant Ingram actually perceived a substantial

risk to Plaintiff’s safety or that Defendant Ingram willfully

provided an inadequate response. As in Mbewe and Brown, Plaintiff

offered scant information, which cuts against the credibility of

the threat and prevents further investigation or verification. A

reasonable juror could not determine that Defendant Ingram

recognized a substantial risk solely because Plaintiff communicated

his subjective fear. Therefore, the Court should grant the DPS

Motion as it relates to Defendant Ingram.

5. Defendant Gaddy

Plaintiff’s summary judgment brief asserts that Defendant

Gaddy displayed deliberate indifference by denying Plaintiff’s

first grievance without a proper investigation, despite the

information available to Defendant Gaddy. (See Docket Entry 29 at

20–21, 24). In particular, Plaintiff highlights that Defendant

Gaddy declined to call Plaintiff’s prior facility, that he showed

Defendant Gaddy “documentation of the threats against him,” and

that Defendant Gaddy held the position of “[security risk group]

sergeant.” (Id. at 24; Docket Entry 48 at 25.)

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Because Defendant Gaddy handled Plaintiff’s first grievance,

he learned the following information:

(Docket Entry

34-17 at 2–4.)

As compared to the corresponding protective custody request,

the first grievance adds few additional details and fails to

correct the identified deficiency:

As in Brown, Plaintiff

declined to provide information that Defendant Gaddy could have

used to verify any threat or confirm the justification for

Plaintiff’s fear. No reasonable juror could determine, based on

Plaintiff’s generalized concerns, that Defendant Gaddy recognized

a substantial risk of serious harm or that he failed to avert a

danger despite his ability to do so. As a result, the Court should

grant the Gaddy Motion.

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E. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because Plaintiff

cannot establish that the DPS Defendants or Defendant Gaddy

violated Plaintiff’s eighth-amendment rights, qualified immunity

protects those Defendants from liability.”

F. The New Sealing Motions

In connection with their summary judgment motions, both

parties previously sought to seal certain materials. (See Docket

Entry 32 (“Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Portions

of Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment

and Exhibits Attached Thereto”); Docket Entry 38 (“DPS Defendants’

Motion to Seal Certain Exhibits Filed in Support of Motions for

Summary Judgment”); Docket Entry 39 (“Memorandum of Law in Support

'l The Fourth Circuit has “long . . . recognized the ‘special

problem’ raised when the objective qualified immunity standard is

applied to an Eighth Amendment violation that requires wrongful

intent in the form of ‘deliberate indifference.’” Brooks v.

Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 119 n.6 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rish v.

Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1098 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997). Some “courts

have held that when forecasted evidence is adequate to raise a

genuine issue of fact concerning a prison official’s unreasonable

response to actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm, the

qualified immunity inquiry drops from the case.” Rish, 131 F.3d at

1098 n.6.

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of DPS Defendants’ Motion to Seal”).)12 Upon review, United States

District Judge Loretta C. Biggs granted the DPS Defendants’ sealing

motion (Docket Entry 38) and sealed the following documents: Docket

Entries 24, 26, 26-3 through 26-7, 26-9 through 26-16, 29, 33, 34,

34-1 through 34-55, and 35. (Docket Entry 43.)13

The New Sealing Motions propose sealing of additional briefs

and related attachments. Specifically, DPS Defendants seek to

maintain under seal their response (Docket Entry 47)14 opposing

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. (Docket Entry 46 at 1.) For

his part, Plaintiff requests that the following documents remain

under seal: (1) his consolidated response (Docket Entry 51)

opposing the DPS Defendants’ and Defendant Gaddy’s respective

motions for summary judgment; (2) four exhibits (Docket Entries

52-1, 52-2, 52-3, and 52-4) filed in connection with Plaintiff’s

consolidated response; and (3) Plaintiff’s reply (Docket Entry 56)

in support of his own summary judgment motion. (Docket Entry 50 at

1–2; Docket Entry 55 at 1–2.) As grounds for sealing such

documents, DPS Defendants have invoked Rule 10(c) of the Federal

12 In accordance with this Court’s Local Rule 5.4, DPS

Defendants filed a memorandum in support of Plaintiff’s sealing

motion (Docket Entry 32) as well as their own motion (Docket Entry

38), given DPS Defendants’ status as “the party claiming

confidentiality.”

13 The above-cited Order thereby granted the relief sought by

Plaintiff’s sealing motion (Docket Entry 32).

14 DPS Defendants erroneously cite Docket Entry 44, the

public, redacted version of their response.

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Rules of Civil Procedure, thus incorporating by reference the

earlier-filed memorandum (Docket Entry 39) in support of the

since-granted motion to seal (Docket Entry 38), and forecasted the

filing of an additional memorandum in support of the New Sealing

Motions. (See Docket Entry 46 at 2.)

However, DPS Defendants filed no such memorandum. (See Docket

Entries dated Aug. 10, 2020, to present.) The earlier-filed

memorandum fails, on its own, to justify the New Sealing Motions,

as it presents no tailored justifications for sealing the later-

filed record materials. (See Docket Entry 39.) This Court’s Local

Rule 5.4(d) provides for denial of a motion to seal when “the party

claiming confidentiality fails to file a Brief.” As a result, the

Court should deny the New Sealing Motions without prejudice to

submission of a new, properly supported sealing motion.

Additionally, the previously sealed material (and some

material addressed by the New Sealing Motions) plays a critical

role in the above analysis of summary judgment issues in that the

Recommendation discusses the contents of several sealed exhibits

(and items proposed for sealing). For that reason, the undersigned

redacts the Recommendation consistent with the Court’s Order

sealing Docket Entries 24, 26, 26-3 through 26-7, 26-9 through

26-16, 29, 33, 34, 34-1 through 34-55, and 35. (See Docket Entry

43.) However, “the First Amendment right of access extends to a

judicial opinion ruling on a summary judgment motion.” Company Doe

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v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014). “The

generalized need for public access reaches its apex when a matter

has reached the adjudication stage.” Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP

v. Orian, 662 F. Supp. 2d 130, 133 (D.D.C. 2009); see also In re

McCormick & Co., MDL Docket No. 2665, 2017 WL 2560911, at *1

(D.D.C. June 13, 2017) (“The presumption in favor of public access

is especially strong for judicial orders and opinions.”); Revise

Clothing, Inc. v. Joe’s Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 3961,

2010 WL 339784, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2010) (noting that

judicial opinions directly affect adjudication). “Redacting

statements that are critical to a court’s analysis would

substantially impede the public right of access to judicial

opinions.” In re McCormick & Co., 2017 WL 2560911, at *1. In

light of the foregoing principles, the undersigned recommends that

the Court permit public access to the unredacted Recommendation, if

adopted.

CONCLUSION

Defendants Poole, Locklear, Henderson, Gerald, Ingram, and

Gaddy have established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law

on Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims. Only the official-

capacity claims against Defendants Lassiter and Ishee should

survive summary judgment. Additionally, the New Sealing Motions

lack adequate support on this record, as DPS Defendants filed no

supportive brief and otherwise offered no justifications specific

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to the materials they seek to seal. Finally, the redactions above

reflect the current state of the public record, but the undersigned

recommends disclosure to the extent necessary to explain the basis

for the Court’s ultimate ruling.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the DPS Motion (Docket Entry

23) be GRANTED with respect to Defendants Poole, Locklear,

Henderson, Gerald, and Ingram.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Gaddy Motion (Docket Entry

36) be GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion (Docket

Entry 28) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the New Sealing Motions (Docket

Entries 46, 50, 55) be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of a

new sealing motion after the Court has determined what disclosures

must occur in connection with the resolution of the summary

judgment motions.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court authorize public

docketing of the unredacted version of this Recommendation.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

November 18, 2020

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