The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
No. 7:24-CV-471-D
S.Y. and C.Y., individually, and as )
guardians of their minor child, )
CAY,, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
ov. ) ORDER
)
SAMPSON COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. ).
On May 29, 2024, C.Y. and S.Y, individually, and as guardians of the minor child C.A.Y.
(collectively, “plaintiffs”) filed a complaint in Sampson County Superior Court against (1)
Sampson County Board of Education (“Sampson County”), (2) Jamie King (““King”’), in his official
capacity as superintendent, (3) Melanie Smith (“Smith”), individually and in her official capacity
as principal, (4) Pam Westbrook (“Westbrook”), individually and in her official capacity as
assistant principal, (5) Shannon Williams (“Williams”), individually and in her official capacity as
school counselor, and Catherine Ruiz (“Ruiz”), individually and in her official capacity as teacher
(collectively, “defendants”) [D.E. 1-1]. On June 12, 2024, defendants removed the action to this
court [D.E. 1]. On June 19, 2024, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint [D.E. 12] and filed
a memorandum in support [D.E. 13]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On July 9, 2024, plaintiffs
responded in opposition [D.E. 15] and voluntarily dismissed multiple claims in their complaint
[D.E. 16]. On July 23, 2024, defendants replied [D.E. 21].
Plaintiffs allege (1) a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the North Carolina
Constitution, Article 1, Section 15 against Sampson County and King in his official capacity, (2)
a substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution against Smith and Williams in both their official and individual
capacities, (3) an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution against Smith and Williams in their official capacities, (4) a
failure-to-train claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution against Sampson County, (5) a negligence claim under North Carolina law against
Ruiz and Williams in their individual capacities, (6) a negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim under North Carolina law against Ruiz and Williams in their individual capacities, and (7) a
false imprisonment claim under North Carolina law against Smith and Williams in their individual
capacities. See [D.E. 1-1] 160-166, 185-91, 199-243; [D.E. 16] 1. As explained below, the
court grants in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismisses plaintiffs’ federal claims, declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims, and remands the action to
Sampson County Superior Court.
C.Y. (mother) and S.Y. (father) are the parents of C.A.Y., a six-year-old girl, who was
enrolled in special education at Plain View Elementary School (“Plain View”) in Sampson County,
North Carolina. See Compl. [D.E. 1-1] J 1, 3—7. In fall 2022, C.A.Y. attended kindergarten at
Plain View until she was asked to leave due to behavioral issues. See id. at 72. In fall 2023,
C.A.Y. again attended kindergarten at Plain View. See id. at 75.
On January 6, 2023, plaintiffs sought an individualized education plan (“IEP”) for C.A.Y.
See id. at | 76. On January 23, 2023, plaintiffs met with an unknown person and learned that
C.A.Y. performed below grade: level expectations and could not focus on an academic task for
more than a few minutes, even with “constant redirection.” Id. at ]77. Smith, Ruiz, and Emily
Bullard (a special education teacher) served as the IEP team and recommended a formal evaluation
concerning adaptive behavior and speech. See id. at { 78. In March 2023, plaintiffs engaged a
psychologist to assess C.A.Y. See id. at | 79. The psychologist diagnosed C.A.Y. with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder combined type (“ADHD”) and recommended that C.A.Y.’s teachers _
put homework assignments in writing, make checklists, keep the school’s website up to date
concerning homework assignments, speak slowly, provide information in small units, use brain
breaks or movement and exercise, and develop a routine for turning in assignments. See id. at ff
80-81.
On March 14, 2023, Plain View completed a psychological evaluation of C.A.Y. See id. at
4 82. On March 31, 2023, with teacher and parental input and information from the psychological
evaluations, Plain View developed a written IEP for C.A.Y. See id. at J 83. The IEP recognized
C.A.Y.’s needs for specialized instruction in math, speech, language, motor skills, and adaptive
behavior. See id. at J 84. Plain View noted that it could not provide “consultation and/or training
for school staff to meet the unique needs of C.A.Y.” Id. at J 85.
On October 5, 2023, Ruiz reported to Smith that C.A.Y. slapped another student. □□□ □□□
at J 86. C.A.Y received a 2.6 hour in-school suspension for her actions. See id. at J 89.
On November 6, 2023, C.A.Y. disrupted reading class, refused to cooperate with her
teacher, threw markers on the floor, and refused to pick them up. See id. at ]90. C.A.Y. received
a 45-minute “calm down” period for her actions. Id. at J 93.
On November 22, 2023, C.A.Y. laid on the floor screaming and crying and spat at a
teacher’s assistant after she failed to complete an assignment. See id. at | 94. When the
administration could not get C.A.Y. under control, her classmates were taken out into the hallway
while C.A.Y. was placed in a 30 minute “chill out.” Id. at § 97.
On November 27, 2023, C.A.Y. ate chocolate candy, crackers, ham, a Little Debbie coffee
cake, and a bag of fruit loops for lunch. See id. at 98. Shortly after eating, C.A.Y. distracted
other students in Ruiz’s math class, refused to sit with the group, and pushed Ruiz. See id. Ruiz
texted Plain View’s office, called CY. (who told her to call S.Y.), and called S.Y. See id. After
C.AY. talked to S.Y., C.A.Y. went to the resource room and received a treat for behaving. See id.
Ruiz reported that C.A.Y.’s negative behavior seemed consistently linked to her “HIGH sugar
intake at lunch.” Id.
On December 4, 2023, C.A.Y. pulled on Ruiz, trying to make her fall. See id. at 100. A
school resource officer intervened and took C.A.Y. on a walk. See id. C.A.Y. returned to the
classroom with two lollipops, which Ruiz did not allow her to eat in the classroom. See id, Later,
C.A.Y. went to her resource session. See id. C.A.Y. returned from her resource session with
chocolate. See id.
On December 5, 2023, C.A.Y. acted “unruly,” ripped tape off the floor being used for a
class activity, and removed ornaments from the classroom Christmas tree. Id. at | 102. A resource
teacher intervened and took C.A.Y. to the resource room. See id. Nonetheless, Westbrook and
Williams needed to intervene when C.A.Y. did not calm down. See id. Smith gave C.A.Y. one
hour of “chill out” time. Id. at J 105.
On February 12, 2024, C.A.Y. refused to attend music class with her resource teacher. See
id. at { 106. The resource teacher took C.A.Y. to Smith’s office. See id. C.A.Y. crawled and
screamed on the office floor and would not listen to Smith, Williams, or Westbrook. See id. Then,
C.A.Y, “started hitting adults” and threw markers. Id. Someone called C.Y. See id. Eventually,
C.A.Y. went to a conference room for 45 minutes. See id.
On March 19, 2024, C.A.Y. refused to “go to her group” following Ruiz’s class. See id. at
109. C.A.Y. threw a pencil, took items off a shelf and threw them across the floor, and screamed.
See id. Smith and Williams removed C.A.Y. from the classroom for a 30 minute “chill out.” Id.
at J 112.
On March 22, 2024, a special education teacher, Pollock, gave C.Y. and S.Y. C.A.Y.’s
proposed IEP. See id. at FJ 142-48. On March 28, 2024, the IEP became effective. See id. at J
146.
On March 27, 2024, C.A.Y. sat in class screaming and crying. See id. at 7113. Smith and
a teacher called C.Y., who failed to calm C.A.Y. See id. Smith and a social worker moved C.A.Y.
to a small classroom, where she continued to scream, kick the social worker, and cry. See id. As
result, Smith told C.Y. to pick C.A.Y. up from school. See id.
On April 10, 2024, at 1:10 PM, C.A.Y. came nearly Taeetnenose with Ruiz and asked,
“What are you going to do?” Id. at § 116. C.A.Y. threw pens and pencils off Ruiz’s desk. See id.
Ruiz convinced C.A.Y. to return to her desk. See id. Ruiz walked with C.A.Y. to C.A.Y.’s desk.
See id. C.A.Y. began trying to kick Ruiz. See id. In order to calm C.A.Y., Ruiz asked C.A.Y. to
make good choices or draw a picture. See id. While C.A.Y. was distracted, Ruiz sought support
from another teacher or staff. See id. While Ruiz stood in the door, C.A.Y. suddenly charged at
her. See id. A fellow school employee, Mrs. Parsons, thwarted C.A.Y.’s attack and took C.A.Y.
out of the classroom on a walk. See id. At 1:15 PM, someone called C.Y. to pick up C.A.Y. from
school. See id. at 115. When C.Y. picked up C.A.Y., she noticed an abrasion on C.A.Y. from
her right temple to her cheek. See id. at J 123. Smith informed C.Y. that C.A.Y. scratched herself.
See id. at ¢ 124. C.A.Y. told C.Y. Smith shoved her into a wall, picked her up by her arms, and
placed her in a closet. See id. at FJ] 125-26. C.A.Y. also had bruises on her arms and legs. See id.
at J 127.
On April 11, 2024, C.Y. confronted Smith concerning C.A.Y’s allegations. See id. at { 129.
Smith denied pushing C.A.Y. See id. at { 130. C.Y. demanded to see footage from Plain View’s
cameras. See id. at 131. Smith denied that Plain View had cameras. See id. C.Y. called the
sheriff. See id. at { 133. The Sampson County Sheriff’s Office found a camera and footage at
Plain View. See id. at J] 133-34. The camera footage showed Smith and Williams carrying C.A.Y.
by her arms and legs and placing her in an unlocked closet for approximately five minutes. See
id. at FJ 115-16, 126, 135.
C.A.Y. received a one hour in-school detention for her behavior on April 10, 2024. See id.
at J] 119. On April 18, 2024, Plain View gave C.Y. and S.Y. copies of the office referral for this
incident. See id. at J 121.
On April 17, 2024, C.A.Y entered the physical education classroom late and began yelling.
See id. at § 137. Eventually, C.A.Y. began a cup-stacking activity like her classmates. See id.
After ten minutes, C.A.Y. refused to continue cup stacking and knocked over her cups. See id.
Anna Naylor, the gym teacher, took C.A.Y’s cups away. See id. C.A.Y. began shouting. See id.
Eventually, another teacher escorted the rest of the class out of the gym, where C.A.Y. remained
screaming. See id. Eventually, C.A.Y. calmed down. See id. Someone at Plain View called C.Y.
to pick up C.A.Y. See id. C.Y. received a 2.6-day out-of-school suspension for this incident. See
id. at J 138. While Plain View stated this was C.A.Y.’s fourth disciplinary incident, C.Y. claimed
she never received notices. See id. at J] 139-40. Plain View again provided the notices to C.Y.
See id. at FJ 140-41.
Plaintiffs allege that physical restraint and seclusion of C.A.Y. violate C.A.Y.’s IEP, section
504, and C.A.Y.’s behavior intervention plan. Plaintiffs also allege that defendants used
unreasonable force against C.A.Y. See id. at J] 149-50.
IL.
Plaintiffs brings some claims against Sampson County and some claims against Sampson
County employees in both their individual and official capacities. A claim against a public official
sued in his or her official capacity is essentially a claim against the government entity the official
represents. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors
Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 307 n.13 (4th Cir. 2006); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783
(4th Cir. 2004). Thus, plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim against King in his official capacity
in count one, the substantive due process claim against Smith and Williams in their official
capacities in count two, and the equal protection claim against Smith and Williams in their official
capacities in count three are functionally brought against Sampson County. See Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 469 (4th Cir.
2013). Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ official capacity claim against King in count
one, their official capacity claim against Smith and Williams in count two, and their official
capacity claim against Smith and Williams in count three.
Il.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s legal and factual sufficiency.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
554-63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S.
30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the
facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Massey v.
Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of
Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint’s legal conclusions,
“unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302
(quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, a plaintiff’s factual allegations must
“nudge[] [her] claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into
“plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. . . [is] a context
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on judicial experience and common sense.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[WJhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint does not suffice. Id.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials
“attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs.
Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).
A court also may consider a document submitted by a moving party if it is “integral to the
complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity” without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment. Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. “[I]n the event of conflict
between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . . , the exhibit prevails.”
Id. (quotation omitted); see Fayetteville lave v. Com. Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir.
1991), Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of public records. See, e.g.. Fed. R. Evid.
201; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts. Ltd., 551U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Phillips v. Pitt Cnty.
Mem’! Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs allege numerous section 1983 claims, including a procedural due process claim
against Sampson County, a substantive due process claim against Smith and Williams in both their
official and individual capacities, an equal protection claim against Smith and Williams in their
official capacities, and a failure-to train claim against Sampson County. See Compl. {J 160-66,
185-91, 199-220. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see City of Escondido
v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42-44 (2019) (per curiam); Kisela vy. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 103-08
(2018) (per curiam); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 & n.7 (2018); Hernandez
v. Mesa, 582 U.S. 548, 554 (2017) (per curiam); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 150-51 (2017);
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11-13 (2015) (per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825-27
(2015) (per curiam); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015); Carroll v. Carman,
574 USS. 13, 16-17 (2014) (per curiam); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012); Camreta
v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 707 (2011); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); King v. Riley,
76 F.4th 259, 264-68 (4th Cir. 2023); Sharpe v. Winterville Police Dep’t, 59 F.4th 674, 682-84
(4th Cir. 2023); Burns-Fisher v. Romero-Lehrer, 57 F.4th 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2023); Tobey v. Jones,
706 F.3d 379, 385 (4th Cir. 2013). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); see Kisela,
584 U.S. at 103-04; Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63; Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 151-52; White v. Pauly, 580 U.S.
73, 79-80 (2017); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12; Taylor, 575 U.S. at 825; Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 611;
Carroll, 574 U.S. at 17.
In analyzing qualified immunity, the court asks (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has
alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the right at issue
was clearly established at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at
232 (quotations omitted); see Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014); Lewis v. Carabello, 98
F4th 521, 530 (4th Cir. 2024); Knibbs_v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 214 (4th Cir. 2022);
Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe ex rel. Johnson v. §.C. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2010). The qualified-immunity analysis need not proceed
in a particular sequence, and the court may exercise its “sound discretion in deciding which of the
two prongs . . . should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see King, 76 F.4th at 265. Qualified immunity shields a
defendant if the answer to either prong is “no.” See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011);
10
Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by
Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Bostic v. Rodriguez, 667 F. Supp. 2d 591, 605-06 (E.D.N.C. 2009).
“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (cleaned
up); see Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2021) (per curiam); King, 76 F.4th at 265;
Sharpe, 59 F.4th at 682-84. Although a case need not be directly controlling, “existing precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at
741; see Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 4-6; Reichle, 566 U.S. at-664; King, 76 F.4th at 266-68;
Sharpe, 59 F.4th at 682-84.
To determine whether a government official’s conduct violates clearly established law, a
court must first specifically define the right. See, e.g., City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12—
13 (2021) (per curiam). Then, based on that specifically defined right, the court must determine
whether existing precedent placed the statutory or constitutional question “beyond debate.”
Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (quotation omitted). “It is not enough that a rule be suggested by then-
existing precedent; the rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear to a reasonable
[official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Bond, 595 U.S. at 12
(quotation omitted); see Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63. A government official is entitled to qualified
immunity “unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 584
USS. at 104 (quoting Luna, 577 U.S. at 13); Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63-66. Nonetheless, courts should
not “assume that government officials are incapable of drawing logical inferences, reasoning by
11
analogy, or exercising common sense. Harris v. Town of S. Pines, 110 F.4th 633, 644 (4th Cir.
2024) (quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court has “not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qualify
as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 66 n.8; see Kisela,
584 U.S. at 103-08; Taylor, 575 U.S. at 825-27; Sheehan, 575 USS. at 613-14; Carroll, 574 U.S.
at 16-17. In the Fourth Circuit, existing precedent includes precedent of the United States
Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, and the highest court of the state in which the action arose.
See, e.g., Sharpe, 59 F.4th at 683; Dean for & on behalf of Harkness v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407,
417 (4th Cir. 2020); Doe ex rel. Johnson, 597 F.3d at 176; Wilson v. Kitte, 337 F.3d 392, 402-03
(4th Cir. 2003) abrogated on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 22. It also includes “a consensus
of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.” Sharpe, 59 F.4th at 683. □
A.
In count one, plaintiffs allege that Sampson County violated C.A.Y.’s procedural due
process rights by not providing an opportunity for a review or appeal of her short-term suspension.
See Compl. FJ 160-66; cf. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. “The procedural component of due
process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.” D.B. v. Cardall, 826 F.3d 721,
741 (4th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege that some state action deprived her of a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest without adequate procedural safeguards. See Sansotta v. Town of Nags □□□□□
724 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2013). This inquiry involves two steps: “the first asks whether there
exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second
12
examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”
Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted); Sansotta, 724 F.3d
at 540.
“Protected liberty interests may arise from two sources—the Due Process Clause itself and
the laws of the States.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460. Protected property interests, on the other
hand, derive not from the Constitution but from “existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972); see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976). Regardless of the interest claimed, “an individual claiming a protected _
interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it,” as opposed to “an abstract need or desire”
or a “unilateral hope.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (quotations and citations omitted); see Pittman
v. Wilson Cnty., 839 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1988).
A public school student in North Carolina has a property interest in a free public education,
and “the temporary suspension of a public school student implicates [the student’s] right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.” E.W. v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:09-CV-198,
2010 WL 1286215, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 16, 2010) (unpublished), report and recommendation
adopted in part, No. 5:09-CV-198, 2010 WL 1286218 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2010) (unpublished);
see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975); Brattain v. Stanly Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No.
1:19CV1037, 2020 WL 6364718, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 2020) (unpublished). “[D]ue process
requires, in connection with a suspension of [ten] days or less, that the student be given oral or
written notice of the charges against [her,] and[] if [she] denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present [her] side of the story.” Goss, 419U.S. □
13
at 581. “In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred.” Id, at 582. Nonetheless, “recurring
situations arise” in which the Fourteenth Amendment does not require “prior notice and hearing.”
Id. For example, a student “whose presence poses . . . an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic
process may be immediately removed from school.” Id. In such a case, “the necessary notice and
rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable.” Id. at 582-83.
Under the North Carolina Constitution, “[t]he people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 15.
Generally, “no short-term suspension shall be imposed upon a student without first providing the
student an opportunity for an informal hearing with the principal.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-
390.6(a). “The principal may impose a short-term suspension without providing the student an
opportunity for a hearing,” however, if the presence of the student “substantially disrupts or
interferes with the education of other students or the maintenance of discipline at the school.” Id.
§ 115C-390.6(b). In these cases, “the notice of the charges and informal hearing . . . shall occur
as soon as practicable.” Id. After the imposition of the short-term suspension, “[t]he principal
shall provide notice to the student’s parent[s] of any short-term suspension, including the reason
for the suspension and a description of the alleged student conduct upon which the suspension is
based.” Id. § 115C-390.6(c). “The notice shall be given by the end of the workday during which
the suspension is imposed when reasonably possible, but in no event more than two days after the
suspension is imposed.” Id. “The notice shall be given by certified mail, telephone, facsimile, e-
mail, or any other method reasonably designed to achieve actual notice.” Id. “In the final analysis,
the balance of rights and interests to be struck in the disciplinary process is a task best left to local
414
school systems, operating, as they do, within the parameters of state law.” Wofford v. Evans, 390
F.3d 318, 324 (4th Cir. 2004); see E.W., 2010 WL 1286215, at *8.
Plaintiffs allege that Sampson County denied C.A.Y. a process to appeal her short-term
suspensions and thereby failed to provide procedural due process. See Compl. | 163-64; □□□□□
15] 6-9. Under North Carolina law, however, an appeal process existed that plaintiffs failed to
pursue. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-45(c)(1-2); Hensley v. Johnston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:07-
CV-231, 2010 WL 5437240, at *11-12 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 23, 2010) (unpublished); Copper ex rel.
Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 789, 688 S.E.2d 426, 429 (2010). Thus, plaintiffs fail to
plausibly allege that Sampson County violated C.A.Y.’s procedural due process rights.
Accordingly, the court fismisees plaintiffs’ claim in count one under section 1983 and the
Fourteenth Amendment. In light of this conclusion, the court need not address defendants’
argument under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
B.
In count four, plaintiffs allege Smith and Williams in both their official and individual
capacities violated C.A.Y.’s substantive due process rights. See Compl. {J 185-91. “[L]iberty
from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982) (quotation omitted); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997); Hall v.
Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Restraint cases require balancing an individual’s
liberty interest against a state interest in using the restraint. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320-24;
HLH. ex rel. H.F. v. Moffett, 335 F. App’x 306, 313 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). The question is
15
not simply whether restraint infringes a liberty interest, “but whether the extent or nature of the
restraint” violates due process. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
Under North Carolina law, “physical restraint” means “the use of physical force to restrict
the free movement of all or a portion of a student’s body.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-391.1(b)(8).
Physical restraint of students by school personnel is reasonable in certain circumstances including:
a. As reasonably needed to obtain possession of a weapon or other
dangerous objects on a person or within the control of a person.
b. As reasonably needed to maintain order or prevent or break up a fight.
c. As reasonably needed for self-defense.
d. As reasonably needed to ensure the safety of any student, school
employee, volunteer, or other person present, to teach a skill, to calm or
comfort a student, or to prevent self-injurious behavior.
e. As reasonably needed to escort a student safely from one area to another.
f. If used as provided for in a student’s IEP or Section 504 plan or behavior
intervention plan.
g. As reasonably needed to prevent imminent destruction to school or
another person’s property.
Id. § 115C-391.1(c)(1). “Except as set forth in [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-391.1(c)(1)], physical
restraint of students shall not be considered a reasonable use of force, and its use is prohibited.”
Id. § 115C-391.1(c)(2). Likewise, “[p]hysical restraint shall not be considered a reasonable use of
force when used solely as a disciplinary consequence.” Id. § 115C-391.1(c)(2).
Under North Carolina law, “seclusion” means “the confinement of a student alone in an
enclosed space” from which the student is either “[p]hysically prevented from leaving by locking
hardware or other means” or “[n]ot capable of leaving due to physical or intellectual incapacity.”
Id. § 115C-391.1(b)(10). “Time-out” means “a behavior management technique in which a student
is separated from other students for a limited period of time in a monitored setting.” Id. § 115C-
391.1(b)(11).
16
Plaintiffs allege that on March 19, 2024, March 27, 2024, and April 10, 2024, Smith and
Williams physically restrained and removed C.A.Y. from multiple classrooms and placed her in
seclusion in violation of her substantive due process rights. See Compl. ff 187-89. On March
19, 2024, C.A.Y. refused to “go to her group” following Ruiz’s class. See id, at] 109. C.A.Y.
threw a pencil, took items off a shelf and threw them across the floor, and screamed. See id. Smith
and Williams removed C.A.Y. from the classroom using physical restraint for a 30 minute “chill
out.” Id. at ff 112, 168. Plaintiffs allege that this physical restraint was not necessary to “ensure
the safety of another.” Id. at ¢ 169. When C.A.Y. threw pencils and items from the shelves,
however, C.A.Y. endangered everyone in the classroom. Moreover, C.A.Y.’s behavior rose to the
level of criminal misdemeanor assault. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33. Furthermore, Smith and
Williams took C.A.Y. to another classroom and remained there with her. See Compl. fff 112, 168.
C.A.Y.’s separation from her peers does not constitute “seclusion” under North Carolina law. See
N.C Gen. Stat. § 115C-391.1(b)(10). Moreover, “time-out” is permitted. See id. § 115C-
391.1(b)(11). Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the March 19, 2024 incident
involved unlawful physical restraint in violation of section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
On March 27, 2024, C.A.Y. sat in class screaming and crying. See Compl. ff 113. Smith
and another teacher called C.Y., who failed to calm C.A.Y. See id. Smith and a social worker then
moved C.A.Y. to a small classroom, where C.A.Y. continued to scream, kick the social worker,
and cry. See id. As a result of C.A.Y.’s behavior, Smith told C.Y. to pick C.A.Y. up from school.
See id.
To maintain order, a teacher may remove a screaming and crying child from the classroom.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-391.1(f). C.A.Y.’s actions on March 19, 2024, permitted the inference
17
that she would again engage in violent behavior. On March 27, 2024, C.A.Y. did act violently
when she repeatedly kicked the social worker. See id. at J 113. Furthermore, Smith and the social
worker removed C.A.Y. to a different classroom and remained there with her. See id. C.A.Y.’s
separation from her peers does not rise to the legal standard for “seclusion” under North Carolina
law. See N.C Gen. Stat. § 115C-391.1(6)(10). Moreover, “time-out” is permitted. See id. § 115C-
391.1(b)(11). Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the March 27, 2024 incident
involved unlawful physical restraint in violation of section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
On April 10, 2024, at 1:10 PM, C.A.Y. was upset and came nearly nose-to-nose with Ruiz
and asked, “What are you going to do?” Compl. { 116. C.A-Y. then threw pens and pencils off
Ruiz’s desk. See id. Ruiz convinced CAY. to return to her desk, and Ruiz tried to walk C.A.Y.
to her desk. See id. C.A.Y., however, began trying to kick Ruiz. See id. In an effort to calm
C.A.Y., Ruiz asked C.A.Y. to make good choices and draw a picture. See id. With C.A.Y.
distracted, Ruiz sought support from another teacher or staff. See id. As Ruiz stood in the door,
C.A.Y. suddenly charged at Ruiz. See id. Mrs. Parsons thwarted C.A.Y.’s attack and took C.A.Y. .
out of the classroom for a walk. See id. At some point, Smith and Williams carried C.A.Y. by her
arms and legs and placed C.A.Y. in an unlocked closet for approximately five minutes. See id. at
GJ 115-16, 126, 135.
Given that C.A.Y. attempted to kick Ruiz and charged at her, Ruiz could remove C.A.Y. to
ensure Ruiz’s safety and the safety of the other children. As for seclusion, Smith and Williams
placed C.A.Y. alone in an unlocked closet for approximately five minutes. See id. at 126, 135.
Even viewing the compliant in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, plaintiffs fail to plausibly
allege that Smith or Williams locked C.A.Y. in the closest or physically prevented C.A.Y. from
18
leaving the closet. Cf. N.C Gen. Stat. § 115C-391.1(b)(10). Accordingly, plaintiffs fail to plausibly
allege that on April 10, 2024, Smith or Williams unlawfully used physical restraint to violate
C.A.Y.’s rights under section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Alternatively, even if Smith and Williams violated C.A.Y.’s rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment by placing her in an unlocked closet for approximately five minutes, plaintiffs fail to
plausibly allege that Smith and Williams’s conduct violated clearly established law under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit has held “that a reasonable teacher would know that
maliciously restraining a child in her chair for hours at a time interferes with that child’s
constitutional liberty interests.” Moffett, 335 F. App’x at 314 (emphasis added); see Hall, 621 F.2d
at 613. The Supreme Court, however, recognizes that some restraint is acceptable. See Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 323. Even viewing plaintiffs’ complaint in the light most favorable to them, plaintiffs
fail to plausibly allege Smith and Williams violated plaintiffs’ clearly established rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Tellingly, plaintiffs cite no case from the United States Supreme Court,
the North Carolina Supreme Court, or the Fourth Circuit that would have placed Smith and
Williams’s conduct “beyond debate.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (quotation omitted); see Bond, 595
U.S. at 12; Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63. Simply put, Moffett is distinguishable, and “existing precedent”
did not “squarely govern the specific facts at issue.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (cleaned up);
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13; Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63-66. In reaching this conclusion, the court does
not condone placing an upset and unruly elementary school child in an unlocked closet for
approximately five minutes. Rather, the court “faithfully” applies “binding” qualified immunity
precedent despite the qualified immunity precedent being “controversial” and “criticized.” King,
76 F.4th at 270, Thus, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim in count four.
19
C.
Plaintiffs allege Smith and Williams in their official capacities violated C.A.Y.’s equal
protection rights. See Compl. □□ 199-206. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Smith and Williams
punished C.A.Y. for disrupting class, throwing pencils and markers, screaming and crying, spitting,
and hitting and kicking Williams because she has special needs. See id. at J] 204-05.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[nJo State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that “he has been
treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment
was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v, Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648,
654 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Purposeful discrimination “implies that the
decisionmaker . . . selected or affirmed a particular course of action at least in part “because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm’r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Ifa plaintiff demonstrates intentional unequal treatment, the
court must then determine whether the treatment is “justified under the requisite level of scrutiny.”
Morrison, 239 F.3d at 654.
Under North Carolina law, spitting on, hitting, or kicking another person constitutes
misdemeanor assault. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33; A.G. v. Fattaleh, 614 F. Supp. 3d 204, 226
(W.D.N.C. 2022). Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Sampson County treated C.A.Y. differently
from any students with or without special needs who similarly disrupted class, threw objects, and
assaulted others during school. See, e.g., Harmon v. Cumberland Cnty Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp.
3d 500, 507 (E.D.N.C. 2016). Thus, plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Sampson County
20
violated C.A.Y.’s equal protection rights. Accordingly, the court dismisses count six, and the court
need not address defendants’ Monell argument.
D.
In count seven, plaintiffs allege a failure-to train claim against Sampson County. See
Compl. ff 207-20. The alleged failure to train concerns training school personnel about children
with special needs. See id.
A municipality is not vicariously liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by its
employees. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
In certain narrow circumstances, however, a municipality may be liable under section 1983 for
failure to adequately train or supervise its employees. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 59-63 (2011); Harris, 489 U.S. at 388-92. To establish such a claim, a plaintiff must prove
that (1) a municipality employee actually violated the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory rights,
(2) the municipality’s failure to properly train or supervise the subordinates amounts to “deliberate
indifference” to the rights of the plaintiff, and (3) this failure to train or supervise actually caused
the subordinates to violate the plaintiff’s rights. Connick, 563 U.S. at 59-63; see Canton, 489 U.S.
at 388-92; Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,
1389-90 (4th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frazier, No. 4:12-CV-290, 2013 WL 5739091, at *2-3
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 22, 2013) (unpublished); Cooper v. Brunswick Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 896 F. Supp.
2d 432, 451-53 (E.D.N.C. 2012); Smith v. Atkins, 777 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966-67 (E.D.N.C. 2011).
“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62
(quotation omitted); see Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (collecting cases).
21
Because plaintiffs do not plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation, plaintiffs’
failure-to-train claim in count seven fails. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
799 (1986) (per curiam); Waybright v. Frederick Cnty., 528 F.3d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 2008); Wilson
v. Flynn, 429 F.3d 465, 469 n.* (4th Cir. 2005); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 398 (2015); Belcher v, Oliver,
898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990).
Alternatively, count seven fails because plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that Sampson
County caused a constitutional deprivation through an official policy or custom. See, e.g., Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Carter v. Morris,
164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999). Notably, not every municipal official’s action or inaction
represents municipal policy. Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether the municipal official
possessed final policymaking authority with respect to the action or inaction. See, e.g., Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); Riddick v. Sch. Bd., 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir.
2000). Furthermore, even if a section 1983 plaintiff can identify the requisite final authority, a
municipality is not liable simply because a section 1983 plaintiff “is able to identify conduct
attributable the municipality.” Riddick, 238 F.3d at 524. Instead, a section 1983 “plaintiff must
also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’
behind the injury alleged.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (emphasis removed); Harris, 489 U.S. at 389;
Riddick, 238 F.3d at 524. Hence, in order to avoid imposing respondeat superior liability on
municipalities, a section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly allege that “a municipal decision reflects
deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right
22
will follow the decision.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 411; see Harris, 489 U.S. at 392; Riddick, 238 F.3d
at 524; Carter, 164 F.3d at 218.
‘Deliberate indifference is a very high standard — a showing of mere negligence will not
meet it.” Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695. Deliberate indifference requires “proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action [or inaction].” Brown, 520 U.S. at 410.
Moreover, even if a section 1983 plaintiff can show the requisite culpability, a section 1983
plaintiff also must show “a direct causal link between the municipal action [or inaction] and the
deprivation of federal rights.” Id. at 404. Deliberate indifference and causation are separate
requirements. Id.
Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege in count seven final policymaking authority or
deliberate indifference. See, e.g., id.; Riddick, 238 F.3d at 524-26. Thus, count seven fails.
- Alternatively, plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a “direct causal link” between “a
specific deficiency in training and the particular violation alleged.” Buffington v. Baltimore
County, 913 F.2d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 1990). It does not suffice to allege “that an injury . . . could
have been avoided if an officer had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the
particular injury-causing conduct” because “[sJuch a claim could be made about almost any
encounter.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. Instead, a plaintiff must plausibly allege specific training
deficiencies and either (1) that inadequately trained employees engaged in a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct, or (2) that a violation of a federal right is a “highly predictable
consequence of a failure to equip [government] officers with specific tools to handle recurring
situations.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-09; see Harris, 489 U.S. at 391; Cornfield v. Consol. High
Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993); Hill v. Robeson Cnty., 733 F. Supp. 2d
23
676, 686-88 (E.D.N.C. 2010). In the second situation, the need for “more or different training”
must be “so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights
that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”
Harris, 489 U.S. at 390.
_ Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any specific training deficiencies or a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plurality
opinion); Broderick, 225 F.3d at 456; Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 713-14 (4th
Cir. 1999); Spell, 824 F.2d at 1391. Likewise, nothing in plaintiffs’ complaint suggests that a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is a highly predictable consequence of Sampson County’s
current policies and training concerning children with special needs. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 194-96 (1984); Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2010). Accordingly,
the court dismisses count seven.
IV.
The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the federal claims. The court has
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the state-law claims.
A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim when (1)
“the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;” (2) “the claim substantially predominates
over” the federal claim or claims; (3) the court has “dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction;” or (4) other “exceptional circumstances” present “compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1)-(4). Additionally, a court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction when “values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” make
retaining jurisdiction inappropriate. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988),
24
superseded on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C.. Inc., 239
F.3d 611, 616-17 (4th Cir. 2001); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1995).
__ The court has dismissed all federal claims. “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law
claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S.
at 350 n.7; see Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-law claims and dismisses those claims without prejudice. See
Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7.
Vv.
In sum, the court GRANTS IN PART defendants’ motion to dismiss [D.E. 12], DISMISSES
plaintiffs’ federal claims, DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state-
law claims, and REMANDS the action to Sampson County Superior Court.
SO ORDERED. This 4{ day of October, 2024.
se at
United States District Judge
25