federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
How later courts described this case
- federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”
- “Bivens and its progeny do not waive sovereign immunity for actions against the United States; it implies a cause of action only against federal officials”
- court not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JAQUAN WHITFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 4:24-CV-00115 SEP
)
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jaquan Whitfield’s Amended Complaint. Doc. [6]. Having
determined that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Id. at 679. The Court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal
conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v.
Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court not required to “accept
as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court
should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). But even pro se complaints must
“allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d
1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15 (federal courts not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have
formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be
“interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jaquan Whitfield, a pretrial detainee housed at St. Louis County Justice Center
in Clayton, Missouri, filed an initial complaint in this action on January 23, 2024. Doc. [1].
Plaintiff filed the complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Federal Government, Chad
Nixson (Jail Administrator, Pemiscot County Jail in Caruthersville, Missouri); Scott Spurlock
(Director, Pulaski County Jail in Ulin, Illinois); Jason Woosley (Director, Grayson County Jail in
Litchfield, Kentucky); Tommy Greenwell (Sheriff, Pemiscot County Jail in Caruthersville,
Missouri); and Robert Helman (Chairman, Pulaski County Jail in Ulin, Illinois). Plaintiff sued
Defendants in their individual capacities only.
The Court ordered Plaintiff, on September 13, 2024, to amend his complaint to address
certain defects. See Doc. [5]. For example, Plaintiff asserted that his due process rights were
violated when he was held “illegally” in Pemiscot County Jail by Defendants Nixson and
Greenwell from June through December of 2021, during which time he was not adequately
treated for Crohn’s Disease. Doc. [1] at 5. But Plaintiff failed to indicate how Nixson and
Greenwell were responsible for the alleged illegality of his detention or for any purported
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in this matter on September 30, 2024. Doc. [6].
The sole named Defendant in the Amended Complaint is the Federal Government, i.e., the
United States of America. Id. at 2. Plaintiff states that he is suing the Federal Government in its
official capacity. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the Federal Government violated his due process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by “neglect[ing] [his] chronic illness” of Crohn’s Disease. Id.
at 4. He asserts in conclusory fashion that each facility he was housed in neglected him
medically in relation to his chronic illness. Id. But he fails to articulate what the Federal
Government did to cause medical neglect of his chronic medical issues. Plaintiff also asserts in
conclusory fashion that the “federal government also violated my due process on other
reasonable charges I am facing and still facing to this day because of the two years in federal
custody.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in an amount of eight million dollars. Id. at 8.
Discussion
Plaintiff filed this action on a Court-provided form for bringing allegations pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute that provides a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected
civil rights.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation of that right
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). Plaintiff here does not allege that any particular person violated his federally protected
rights while acting under color of state law.1 His § 1983 claim thus lacks an essential element.
In case Plaintiff intends to sue Attorney General Merrick Garland and not the Federal
Government as a whole, the Court has considered whether the Amended Complaint states a valid
claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). It does not. The Amended Complaint does not assert a cause of action that the Supreme
Court has previously recognized under Bivens, and expanding Bivens is “now a ‘disfavored’
judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 121 (2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675).
And even if this case was the type for which a Bivens remedy was available, it would be
dismissed. The Court must assume that Plaintiff sues Attorney General Garland in his official
capacity; an official capacity Bivens suit is effectively a suit against the United States; and a
Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States due to sovereign immunity. Buford
1 Plaintiff also neglects to identify specific individuals at federal facilities who allegedly failed to provide
adequate medical care for his chronic illness. Liability under § 1983 is personal. See Frederick v.
Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017). “Government officials are personally liable only for their
own misconduct.” S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, § 1983 liability
“requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri,
442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)).
Plaintiff’s failure to connect a specific defendant to the alleged deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs is fatal to his claim for relief.
Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268
(8th Cir. 1982) (“Bivens and its progeny do not waive sovereign immunity for actions against the
United States; it implies a cause of action only against federal officials”).
For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. This case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A
separate Order of Dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this 7“ day of October, 2024.
ALL Mee
SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE