“[E]ach of these four factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.”
How later courts described this case
- “[E]ach of these four factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
*
KAREN ELIZABETH *
CAMPBELL McGAGH, *
*
Plaintiff, *
* Civ. No. MJM-24-1015
v. *
*
THE SUPREME COURT *
OF MARYLAND, et al., *
*
Defendants. *
*
* * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Self-represented plaintiff Karen Elizabeth Campbell McGagh brings civil suit against the
Maryland Supreme Court, all seven Justices of the Maryland Supreme Court, Governor Wes
Moore, and various other state officials, alleging that the court committed perjury by reinstating
her criminal conviction, which had been overturned by the then-named Maryland Court of Special
Appeals. Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 10. Pending before the Court is McGagh’s
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 4. No hearing is necessary to resolve the
motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to “prevent the Maryland Supreme
Court from engaging in off-the-record discussions or using unofficial channels to negotiate cases.”
ECF No. 4 at 3. To warrant such relief, Plaintiff “must establish (1) that she is likely to succeed
on the merits, (2) that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
(3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) that a[] [TRO] is in the public interest.”
Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). “All four
requirements must be satisfied.” Cantley v. W. Virginia Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth., 771 F.3d
201, 207 (4th Cir. 2014) (brackets omitted) (citation omitted). McGagh’s request for injunctive
relief is denied because she does not satisfy all four factors.
McGagh cannot show that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims. It is well
established that a judge, in performing his or her official functions, has absolute immunity from
all litigation. E.g., Gibson v. Goldston, 85 F.4th 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Judicial immunity is
strong medicine.”). This absolute immunity is afforded even where an order is marred by
procedural error, or a where a judge is alleged to have acted with malice or for a corrupt purpose.
See id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978), and Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). Justices of the Maryland Supreme Court are judicial officers who enjoy
absolute immunity. Regarding the defendants who are not covered by judicial immunity (to the
extent they are even proper defendants in this case), they are afforded sovereign immunity, which
shields the state government and state officials from suit in connection to the discharge of their
duties. E.g., Godwin v. Cnty. Com’rs of St. Mary's Cnty., 260 A.2d 295, 299 (Md. 1970). McGagh
fails to identify conduct by any of the defendants that exceed their official functions. Plaintiff is
thus unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claims.
McGagh’s motion for a TRO may be denied based solely on her failure to show a likelihood
of success on the merits of her claims, see Henderson for Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bluefield Hosp.
Co., LLC, 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[E]ach of these four factors must be satisfied to
obtain preliminary injunctive relief.”); however, the Court finds she has also failed to demonstrate
other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. First, McGagh has failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of suffering irreparable harm if the relief is not granted. A movant seeking preliminary
injunctive relief must show irreparable harm that is “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and
imminent.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Grp., 952 F.2d 802, 912 (4th Cir. 1991)
(citation omitted). Here, McGagh fails to demonstrate any likelihood that the defendants will
engage in “extrajudicial conversations” that are likely to affect her in any way. The harms she
alleges are, at best, purely speculative. Lastly, McGagh has failed to demonstrate that the balance
of equities is in her favor or that an injunction would be in the public interest. To the contrary, a
TRO issued by a federal court that invades the inner workings of a state court and its judicial
officers would subvert foundational principles of federalism, comity, and separation of powers,
and interfere with the defendants’ performance of their official duties, which would clearly run
counter to the public interest.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for a Temporary Restraining (ECF
No. 4) is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court TERMINATE McGagh’s demand for
preservation of evidence (ECF No. 5) as a motion. This demand is not directed to this Court, and
the Court does not construe it as a motion or as any matter properly before this Court.
Finally, the Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff.
It is so ORDERED this 6th day of September, 2024.
/S/
Matthew J. Maddox
United States District Judge