Mills v. Roderick

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT □

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ALBERT CURTIS MILLS,

Plaintiff,

wo | Civil Action: BAH-22-2452

RICHARD RODERICK et al., .

Defendants. .

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On September 26, 2022, self-represented Plaintiff Albert Curtis Mills (“Mills”) filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied adequate time to

shower in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 12101-12213 (2018). ECF 1. Defendants Richard Roderick, O. Wayne Hill, Frank Bishop,

Sandra Holmes, E. Todd Taylor, Robert Green, Lawrence J. Hogan, North Branch Correctional

Institution (““NBCI”), Division of Correction, Inmate Grievance Office, and Department of Public

_ Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”)! filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for

Summary Judgment. ECF 14. Mills was advised of his opportunity to respond to the dispositive

motion and the risks of failing to do so. ECF 16. To date, Mills has not filed a response in

. opposition. To that end, on August 5, 2024, all Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that

the matter should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “for want of

1 The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full and correct names of Defendants.

Additionally, Mills’ Complaint against “Office of the Governor” may not proceed as the Office of

- the Governor is not a “person amenable to suit under 42 U.S:C. 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S, 58, 63 (1989).

prosecution.” 18. No hearing is necessary to determine the matters pending. See Local Rule

105.6 (D. Md. For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ dispositive Motion at ECF 14 is

granted and the "oun at ECF 18 is denied as Moot.

L BACKGROUND

4 Mills’ Allegations

In Mills’ pores ECF 1, signed September 11, 2022, he alleges that he suffers from

severe mental “ Id. at 10-14. He explains that he was prescribed Haloperido! (Haldol) to

treat his ees Id. at 18. Side effects of this medication include blurred vision, shakes or

tremors, headache, deep sedation, muscle spasms, seizures, confusion, muscle rigidity, drowsiness,

and dizziness. a at 18-21. Due to the side effects of this medication, Mills claims he needs more

shower time because he cannot complete his shower in the allotted time due to delays attributable

‘to the side stood noted above. Jd. at 21. The'lack of adequate shower time deprives Mills of

basic hygiene, dl at 44, and adversely impacted his sleep and mental health, id. at 53-54, 25. He

states that the vole regarding shower time “went on from 2008 to 2019.” Id. at 21.

2 Defendants also filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief (ECF 17), wherein they address

correspondence Mills sent to the Court regarding his access to legal welfare commissary and argue

that the Court may dismiss Mills’ Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915; may reconsider its prior

grant of pauper status; and may otherwise limit Mills’ filings. The Court finds that Mills had

access to writing materials given both his access to legal commissary and the numerous _

submissions “ny made to this Court during the relevant time period?

As to Defendants’ request to dismiss or otherwise limit Mills’ filings, given Mills’ mental

health issues, hisipro se status, and exercising the Court’s discretion, the Motion for Appropriate

Relief is denied.| The Court appreciates Defendants’ efforts to aid judicial economy, and the

summarization of Mills’ litigation history. It appears that given the resolution of some cases

recently filed by Mills, he maybe subject in the future to the filing restrictions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). See, e.g., Civil Action Nos. SAG-22-3304 and TDC-22-1640 each dismissing Mills’

complaints for failure to state a claim. .

|

Mills states that Defendant Roderick is the acting warden of NBCI when the Warden is

away. ECF 1, at 22. The Warden, Division of Correction Commissioners, and Inmate Grievance

Office dismissed Mills’ administrative grievance regarding the issue of his shower time. fd. at 22—

23. Mills claims that the dismissal of his grievance exacerbated his mental health symptoms. □□□

Mills asserts that the issue regarding his shower time violates his rights under the Eighth

Amendment, ECF 1, at 27-32, 66-72, Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 104, Rehabilitation Act, id.

at’ 73-88, and ADA, id. at 80-84. He asserts that Defendants have failed to accommodate his

mental health disability and the side effects of his medication by providing him additional shower

time. Jd. at 73-88. Mills states that “the Warden was the responsible official in charge of the

prison and was fully advised of the problem of shower time abuse. _.2 Id. at 33. Mills claims

that “the Defendants participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation by not giving the

plaintiff more shower time for his drug’s side effects.” ECF 1, at 90. He claims that Defendants

were notified of the issue by “a report or appeal” and did not remedy the problem. /d. at 91. He

alleges that “Defendants created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices

occurred so the denial of shower time because of the medication on the plaintiff of side effects.”

Id. He contends that Defendants created a policy or custom that resulted in the refusal of more

shower time. /d. at 92. He also claims that Defendants were “grossly negligent in supervising

subordinates.” Jd. He states that Defendants are responsible for the policy that requires the same

shower time for all prisoners, Jd. at 97. .

B. Defendants’ Response

Defendants filed a motion ‘seeking dismissal of the Complaint or, in the alternative,

summary judgment. ECF 14-1. Defendants explain that the complaint should be dismissed: (1}

because it is barted by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches; (2) Defendants are

entitled to Bei Amendment immunity; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (4)

Mills failed to a administrative remedies; (5) Mills has failed to state a claim; and (6) all

Defendants are ve to summary judgment?

In pper of their Motion, Defendants submitted institutional administrative remedy

complaint me) records, ECF 14-3; Commissioner of Correction ARP appeal records, ECF 14-

4; Inmate Grievance Office records, ECF 14-5; and pertinent portions of Mills’ medical.records,

ECF 15.4 | :

The record evidence demonstrates that Mills filed an ARP on September 6, 2019 (ARP-

NBCI-1844-19), complaining that he needed more time to shower due to the side effects of his

prescribed medication, Haldol. ECF 14-3. The ARP was investigated and it was determined that

Mills was not on|jany medication that would require that he receive more than the fifteen-minute

allotted shower time. Jd. at 2. As such, the ARP was dismissed, Jd. Mills appealed this decision

to the Commissioner of Correction, who dismissed the appeal on October 3, 2019 after finding

that there was no evidence to substantiate Mills’ claim that it was medically necessary that he

| .

CO

3 Because Defendants are otherwise entitled to summary judgment and because of the ongoing

nature of the alleged violation, the Court need not and therefore does not address Defendants’

argument that the|Complaint is time barred.. The Court also does not address Defendants’ argument

that they are mye to qualified immunity. .

‘As to the affirmative defense that Mills failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the evidence _

before the Court demonstrates that Mills filed an ARP and appealed its dismissal to the

Commissioner and to the Inmate Grievance Office, which is all that is required. Inmates housed

at an institution operated by DPSCS may avail themselves of the administrative grievance process

designed for inmate complaint resolution. See generally Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. §§ 10-201

et seq. (2008 ne Vol.); Md. Code Regs. 12.07.01.01B(1) (defining ARP).

4 Defendants moved to seal Mills’ medical records. ECF 13. The Motion, unopposed by Mills, is

GRANTED. -

receive additional shower time. ECF. 14-4, at 2. Mills filed an appeal of that dismissal with the

- Inmate Grievance Office on November 1, 2019. ECF 14-5, at 1] 2; id at 9. Mills was directed □

to provide “missing paperwork or [an] explanation” related to his claim. /d. at 1 [§ 3-4. He did

. notdoso. Id. 93. The IGO independently investigated whether Mills had’a medical order or an

accommodation for additional shower time, but the Office of Inmate Health/Clinical Services

confirmed that he did not have such an Order. Ja.; ECF 14-5, at 5-8. It was also confirmed that -

Mills had been noncompliant with his prescription for Haldol since October 2019. ECF 14-5, at □

6. The appeal was dismissed as without merit. Jd. at 1 44.

According to Defendants, and without opposition from Mills, there is no evidence in Mills’

medical records that he required additional shower time. ECF 15-1.

IL STANDARD OF REVIEW |

Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6),:or that summary judgment should be granted in, their favor pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

56. Defendants’ motions are styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the

alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Motions styled in this manner

implicate a court’s discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Kensington Vol. Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md.

2011}. Conversion of ‘a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d) is

. .permissible where plaintiff has “actual notice” that the motion may be disposed of as one for

summary judgment. See Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61

(4th Cir. 1998). When a movant expressly captions its motion to dismiss or “in the alternative” as

one for summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court’s consideration,

.

the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur as the court

_ “does not have obligation to notify parties of the obvious.” Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261.

Because peda filed their motions as a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for

summary judginent, Mills was on notice that the Court could treat the motions as seeking summary

judgment. aceoldingy the Court will review Mills’ claims against Defendants under the Rule

5 6(a) standard wk will consider the exhibits filed in support of the dispositive motion at ECF 14.

Federal ale of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted

“if the movant slows that there is no genuine dispute as to. any material fact and the movant is

entitled to sadgmbo as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether

the evidence resets a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether

it is so one-sided hat one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v, Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 US. 242, asls2 (1986). □

“Once a Joon for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party

has the burden sthnowing that a genuine factual dispute exists.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh

House, Inc., 603 | . Supp. 3d 369, 373 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co! v. Zenith

Radio Corp., rps 574, 585-86 (1986). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the "pamowns party.’” Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir.

2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A fact

.is material. if it 1 oh affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting

Anderson, 477 Us at 248), Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment

Anderson, hn USS. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). | -

. The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per

curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and the Court “may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence,” Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 603 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing

Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007)). For this reason, summary

judgment ordinarily is inappropriate when there is conflicting evidence because it is the function

of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness credibility. See Black &

Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton

Med. Cir., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002).

At the same time, the Court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from

proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir

2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)). “The existence □□□□ -

scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations or denials,

without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.” Progressive Am. Ins.

Co., 603 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing Tom v. Hospitality Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th

Cir. 2020)).

The Court is mindful, however, that Mills is a self-represented litigant. A federal court

must liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants to allow them to fully develop potentially

meritorious cases. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But liberal construction does

not mean a court can ignore.a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim.

See Weller v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). A court cannot assume

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

7.

TI. DISCUSSION .

. Al Personal participation + .

Mills alleges that the Warden, unidentified Commissioners of the Division of Correctien,

and unidentified employees of the Inmate Grievance Office wrongly dismissed his grievance.

However, it is well settled that liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal participation by

a defendant in the constitutional violation. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001).

Mere review of inmate grievances is insufficient to state a claim because, in short, the denial of a

grievance does not alone give rise to liability. See Gallagher v Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069

(10th Cir. 2009) ong the allegation that warden “rubber stamped” grievances was not enough

to establish personal participation) (citing Whitington v. Ortiz, 307 F. App’x 179, 193 (10th Cir.

2009)); Vhtetbn, 307 F. App’x at 193 (“[D]jenial of the grievances alone is insufficient to

establish peony participation in the alleged constitutional violations.”)

To the extent Mills seeks to hold Defendants liable solely because of their supervisory

roles, those claims also cannot proceed. The doctrine of respondeat superior’ does not apply in

§ 1983 claims. |See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d- 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (disclaiming

respondeat ee liability under § 1983). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based: on

ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘areco guition that supervisory

indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the

constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.”” Baynard v. Malone, 268

F.3d 228, 235 (Ath Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d:368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984)).

> Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine that provides an employer is liable in certain instances

for the wrongful acts of an employee. See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).

Ultimately, to establish supervisory liability under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that:

(1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in

conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk. of constitutional injury to citizens like the

plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate

indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an

affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury

suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw vy. Stroud, 13 □□□ 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).

Such evidence is lacking in this case. Mills claims against the supervisory defendants are

wholly conclusory and divorced from any factual allegations in his Complaint. Plaintiff must

allege facts that, if proven, would establish such liability. Mills has failed to plead such facts as

he points to no action (or inaction) on the part of supervisory defendants that resulted in a

constitutional injury.

Mills alleges that there is a “policy” regarding showers that caused him harm, but he

provides no evidence in support of that allegation. A claim for an alleged violation of

constitutional rights may be premised on an allegation that a policy or practice has caused the

injury alleged. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); see also

Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1985). To sustain such a

claim, however, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a constitutional violation, see Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding that jury’s finding that a police officer

inflicted no constitutional injury on the plaintiff removed any basis for municipal liability against

city and members of police commission), and (2) any constitutional violations were proximately

caused by a policy, custom, or practice of the defendants, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

Mills’ i assertions that there is a policy that results in disabled inmates being

denied access to ace showers is unsupported by the evidence. Indeed, it appears from the record

that while there Ly be a general fifteen (15) minute limit to showers at his facility, this time

_ limitation can velovtended if necessary. ECF 14-5, at 8. Mills fails to identify this policy but, in

any event, fails sei the basis for the assertion that it violates the law. Regardless, there is no

_ constitutional i here and Mills has not demonstrated that he had a medical necessity fora

_ longershower. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Mills raises constitutional claims against state employees as well as against state agencies □

NBCI, Division be Correction, Inmate Grievance Office, and DPSCS. Under the Eleventh

"Amendment of al United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and its departments are immune

from citizen wit in federal court absent state consent (or Congressional action). See Pennhurst

Sch. & Hash v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Claims against State employees acting

in their official sabato are also subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity because a suit against

the state actor is | ntamount to a suit against the state itself. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,

471-72 (1985). | stmough the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain

types of cases brought in state courts, ... it has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment to i in federal court.” Pevia vy. Hogan, 443 F. Supp. 3d 612, 632 (D. Md. 2020).

Accordingly, wake constitutional claims against the individually named Defendants in. their . .

official capacities as well as his constitutional claims asserted against NBCI, Division of □

Correction, ronal Grievance Office, and DPSCS are subject to dismissal.

10

C. Injunctive Relief

Mills also seeks injunctive relief.° A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary

restraining order must establish the following elements: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that-the

balance of equities tips in the party’s favor; and (4) why the injunction is in the public interest. □

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Failure to establish one of these

elements is fatal to the request for injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed below, Mills has □

failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits. Therefore, his request for injunctive

relief must be denied. .

D. ADA and the Rehabilitation Act □

Mills alleges that his rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were violated when

he was denied the ability to take longer showers. Title JI of the ADA provides that “no qualified

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation □□□□ □□

be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o

otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States... shall, solely by reasonof — -

her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subj ected

to discrimination under any. program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . 29

U.S.C. § 794(a). These statutes generally are construed to impose the same requirements due to

the similarity of their language. Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1999).

° This relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t-of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (noting that “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued

for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for

prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’”) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473

159, 167 n.14 (1985)).

1]

To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiffs must

show that: (1) and have a disability; (2) they were either excluded from participation in or denied

the benefits of pi entity’s services, programs, or activities for which they were otherwise

qualified; and 6) the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the

disability. See Nat 7 Fed’n of the Blind v. Lamone, 813 F.3d 494, 502-03 (4th Cir. 2016).

cnt her by Title II includes “a failure to make reasonable modifications” that are

“necessary” to provide a disabled individual with “full and equal enjoyment” of the facility’s

services. Halper v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2012). Title II

of the ADA set to state prisons. See Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)

(stating that sslte prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of ‘public entity... .””),

Mills’ sal fails for two reasons. First, because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply □

solely to public ait Mills’ claims under these statutes cannot proceed against the individually

named Defendants See 42 USC. § 12131(1) (stating that “[t]he term ‘public entity’ means...

any State or ool government [or] any department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State or States or local government”); Baird, 192 F.3d at 471 (upholding the

dismissal of avd claims against individuals because Title II recognizes a cause of action only

against public valiies not private individuals); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir,

2002) (joining al Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that “a plaintiff cannot bring an -

action under 42 lsc § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate □□□□□□

created by Title | of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”).

Second, allegations in the Complaint provide no basis to conclude that the failure to

arrange for Mills ° receive longer showers was because of a disability or represented a failure

provide a reasonable accommodation. Even assuming that Mills’ mental health condition qualifies

12 oo oe

as a disability under these statutes, he has not alleged facts that would support a conclusion that

any of the named Defendants had any intent to discriminate based on that disability. Nor does the

record before the Court demonstrate that his mental health condition and/or the prescription of

Haldol required that he be provided longer showers. In fact, the record demonstrates that Mills

did not have a medical requirement for longer showers and therefore the record supports the

finding that none of the named Defendants, or any other correctional employees, were required to

provide a reasonable accommodation but didnotdoso.

Because the individually named Defendants are not proper defendants for the ADA or

Rehabilitation claims, and the record evidence does not support Mills’ contention that he required

an accommodation of longer showers, the Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as

to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims as to all Defendants.

Eighth Amendment

Milis also alleges that the denial of longer showers violated his Eighth Amendment rights

because it exacerbated his mental illness. Defendants argue that Mills has not alleged sufficient

facts to support a claim that any of the named Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment. The Court agrees with Defendants.

The Eighth Amendment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while

imprisoned.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Benjamin, 77

F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). Conditions of confinement that “involve wanton and unnecessary

infliction of pain,” or which “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities,” may amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes vy. Chapman, 452. U.S. 337,

347 (1981). However, conditions that are merely restrictive or even harsh “are part of the penalty

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Jd. In order to establish the

13.

imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in conditions of confinement, a prisoner must prove

two elements: ds “the deprivation of [a] basic human need was objectively sufficiently serious,’

that subj stilely ‘the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Shakka v.

Smith, 71 Pd bo 166 (4th Cir: 1995) (citation omitted). “These requirements spring from the

text of the smerémen itself; absent intentionality, a ‘condition imposed on an inmate cannot

properly be cael ‘punishment,’ and absent severity, such punishment cannot be called ‘cruel and

unusual.”” Jko, ths F.3d at 238 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 US. 294, 298-300 (1991)).

The obj op prong ofa conditions of confinement claim requires the prisoner to “‘produce

. evidence of a setious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged

conditions,” or sthnonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s

unwilling poste to the challenged conditions.” Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (quoting Strickler v.

Waters, 989 F.2d) 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993)). Thus, “a condition of confinement that is sure or .

very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year” violates

the Eighth amerdiment even if “the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms.”

Helling v. Mekinkey 509 U.S, 25, 33-34 (1993); Webb v. Deboo, 423 F. App’x 299, 300 (4th Cir.

201 1) To a sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be evidence of deliberate

indifference in that a known excessive risk of harm to the inmate’s health or safety was

disregarded. sa Wilson vy. Seiter, 501 ‘US. 294, 302-03 (1991) (applying the deliberate

indifference senda to conditions of confinement claims). “[ T]he test is whether the guards know

the plaintiff inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet

they fail to do Brown v, N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Case

y, Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir, 2002)). ,

A review of. Mills’ allegations establishes that he has not provided a sufficient basis to

support his Eighth Amendment claim as to any of the named Defendants. There is no allegation

that any of the named Defendants were subjectively and deliberately indifferent to Mills’ needs in

relation to his request for longer showers. Mills fails to demonstrate that any of the named

Defendants were aware that he was mentally ill, that his prescribed medication had the side effects

indicated, nor does he demonstrate that any of the named Defendants were aware or should have

been aware that his inability to take a longer shower would create a substantial risk of serious

harm. Without such knowledge Defendants could not have drawn the inference that Mills was

subjected to a risk of harm. Further, other than denying Mills’ ARP, he fails to allege any facts

demonstrating personal knowledge or participation of any of the named Defendants in denying

him access to longer showers. Lastly, as noted, there is no evidence that Mills’ desire for longer

showers was medically necessary. As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

F. Equal Protection

Mills’ equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed for failure to

state aclaim. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action does not satisfy Rule 8’s basic pleading requirements. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 536

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 71 wombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Equal Protection Clause generally requires the government to treat similarly situated

people alike. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “[T]o state a claim

for violation of the [Equal Protection] Clause, a plaintiff must plausibly allege first ‘that he has

been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal .

treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.’” Fauconier v. Clarke, 966

F, 3d 265, 277 (4th Cir, 2020) (quoting Martin v. Duffy, 858 F. 3d 239, 252 (4th Cir.2017))

15 .

Mills states his rights were violated under the Fourteenth Amendment when he was

subjected to the general policy regarding showers. However, he does not provide facts to support

his claim. He ades not allege that there were similarly situated inmates who were treated more

favorably. Nor |e he provide any facts alleging that Defendants’ conduct was the result of

intentional or post discrimination. Because the limited details Mills provides “do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but

has not ‘show[n] re [Mills} is entitled to relief.’” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a}(2)). As sich, Mills’ Fourteenth Amendment claim must be dismissed. □

IV. | CONCLUSION

“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Seal, ECF 13, is granted: Motion to

Dismiss, or for Summary Judgment, ECF 14, is granted; Motion for Other Relief, ECF 17, is

denied; and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute, ECF 18, is denied as moot.

Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants Richard Roderick, O. Wayne Hill, Frank Bishop, □□

Sandra Holmes, F. Todd Taylor, Robert Green, Lawrence J. Hogan, NBCI, Division of Correction,

Inmate Grievance Office, and DPSCS.. The Complaint is dismissed as to Office of the Governor.

A sepaaté Order follows.

Dated: 8/5/2024 /s/

. Brendan A. Hurson

United States District Judge □

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