“It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”
How later courts described this case
- “It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”
- holding that a pretrial detainee beaten up by security personnel while in detention possessed a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment
- stating that the defendant’s actions must have “so substantially departed from professional standards that their decisions can only be described as arbitrary and unprofessional”
- applying the Youngberg standard to involuntarily committed psychiatric patients
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JULIUS E. MONTGOMERY,
Plaintiff,
V. Civil Action No. TDC-23-1248
TYLNN BRADSHAW,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Self-represented Plaintiff Julius E. Montgomery, an inmate at the Eastern Correctional
Institution (“ECT”) in Westover, Maryland, has filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Defendant Tylnn Bradshaw, in which Montgomery alleges constitutional violations arising
from the use of excessive force against him while he was confined at the Clifton T. Perkins
Hospital Center (“Perkins”) in Jessup, Maryland. Bradshaw has filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in
the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. Having reviewed the submitted materials, the Court finds
that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the
Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
On April 24, 2022, Montgomery was confined at Perkins, a maximum-security psychiatric
hospital operated by the Maryland Department of Health, for a determination of whether he was
competent to stand trial as a criminal defendant in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Maryland.
In his verified Complaint, Montgomery alleges that at approximately 1:00 p.m. that day, after he
had been physically separated from another patient following a verbal altercation with that patient,
Bradshaw, a Perkins security officer, physically assaulted him (“the incident”). Montgomery
alleges that although he was walking away from the other patient, Bradshaw placed him in a choke
hold so that he could not breathe, punched him in the mouth, and moved him into a restraint room,
where Bradshaw then struck Montgomery in the face and grinded his fist into Montgomery’s face,
head, and throat, collapsing his airway. Montgomery alleges that he informed Bradshaw multiple
times that he could not breathe and referenced Freddie Gray, a citizen who died during a 2015
encounter with police in Baltimore, Maryland, but Bradshaw continued to choke him and said,
“Well, I guess you[’re] the white Fredd[ie] Gr[a]y.” Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. Montgomery claims
that he was non-combative during this incident, which lasted approximately two minutes. The
next day, on April 25, 2022, Montgomery saw a doctor, who determined that his injuries included
swelling on his left jaw, right temple contusions, and broken skin in his scalp. He received pain
medication, but his request for x-rays was denied. Montgomery asserts that he continues to have
pain in his neck area as a result of the incident.
Montgomery also states that he filed a grievance with Perkins regarding the incident, and
that the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Perkins “found after investigation [and] viewing of
cameras the Grievance to be valid (physical abuse).” /d. at 2.
In the Complaint, Montgomery asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on this alleged
excessive force. Construing the Complaint liberally, as is required when the plaintiff is self-
represented, the Court views the claim as alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects against punishment of
pre-trial detainees.
On November 17, 2023, Bradshaw filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment. Although Montgomery was notified of his right to file a memorandum in
opposition to the Motion, his only response was to file correspondence in which he requested
clarification of the Motion from the Court. Upon review of the submitted materials, the Court
finds that no clarification is warranted, and no additional response from Montgomery is necessary,
in order to resolve the Motion.
DISCUSSION
In the Motion, Bradshaw argues that he is immune from suit in his official capacity under
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, that Montgomery has failed to allege a plausible
claim that his constitutional rights were violated, that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and that
any state law tort claims against him must be dismissed.
1 Legal Standards
To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. Legal
conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Jd. A court must examine the complaint as
a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. A/bright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994);
Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-
represented party’s complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). However, “liberal construction does not mean overlooking the pleading requirements
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir.
2020).
Bradshaw filed the Motion as a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment. Typically, when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court considers
only the complaint and any attached documents. Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation
Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Here, Bradshaw has attached several exhibits, including
a declaration from Dr. Scott Moran, CEO of Perkins; a letter from the State’s Attorney for Howard
County, Maryland declining to prosecute Bradshaw based on the incident; and Perkins’s policy on
the use of restraints. Rule 12(d) requires courts to treat such a motion as a motion for summary
judgment where matters outside the pleadings are considered and not excluded. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). Before converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, courts must give the
nonmoving party “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion.” /d. “Reasonable opportunity” has two requirements: (1) the nonmoving party must have
some notice that the court is treating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment;
and (2) the nonmoving party “must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for discovery” to obtain
information essential to oppose the motion. Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985). Here,
the notice requirement has been satisfied by the title of Bradshaw’s Motion. To show that a
reasonable opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the nonmoving party must file an
affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d), or another filing, explaining why “for specified reasons,
it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See Harrods Ltd.
v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 245 (4th Cir. 2002). Montgomery has not filed an
affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d) or any other request for discovery. Under these
circumstances, the Court will construe the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Under Rule 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in the record, not
simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522
(4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party.
Id. at 248-49.
Il. Eleventh Amendment
Bradshaw argues that the Complaint must be dismissed to the extent that it asserts a claim
against him in his official capacity because he is a state official. The Eleventh Amendment
provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. In effect, the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages against a state in federal court unless the state has
waived sovereign immunity or Congress has abrogated its immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent
a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is . . . a suit against the official’s office” and thus is the equivalent of “a suit against the
State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see Brandon v. Holt, 469
U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
Although Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases brought
in state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12—201(a) (West 2021), it has not waived its
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to constitutional claims asserted in federal court.
Accordingly, Bradshaw is immune from suit for actions taken in his official capacity. Therefore,
to the extent that the Complaint asserts such a claim, the claim will be dismissed.
III. Excessive Force
Bradshaw argues that the allegations in the Complaint fail to establish that he used
excessive force against Montgomery in violation of his constitutional rights. Liberally construed,
the Complaint alleges that Montgomery was subjected to excessive force as a pretrial detainee in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. On such a claim, a plaintiff must show that force was
used “purposely or knowingly,” and that it was “objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). Such a claim need not establish a subjective intent to
punish or cause harm. See id. Objective reasonableness turns on the “facts and circumstances” of
the particular case. Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016). The Court considers
“the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time,
not with 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397.
In the case of involuntarily committed patients at state psychiatric facilities, the United
States Supreme Court has provided additional guidance. Under Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307 (1982), “[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish.” /d. at 321-22; see Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 837-38 (4th Cir. 2001)
(applying the Youngberg standard to involuntarily committed psychiatric patients). Under the
Youngberg standard, a state must provide such an involuntarily committed patient with reasonable
conditions of safety, including “adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care,” as well as
“freedom from unreasonable restraints.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315, 321.
In assessing whether conditions are constitutionally adequate, courts apply the
“professional judgment” standard, under which “the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised.” /d. at 321. Decisions made by
medical or other professionals are presumptively valid, and “liability may be imposed only when
the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base
the decision on such a judgment. Jd. at 323; see Patten, 274 F.3d at 845-46 (stating that the
defendant’s actions must have “so substantially departed from professional standards that their
decisions can only be described as arbitrary and unprofessional”).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Montgomery, the Court cannot conclude
that summary judgment is warranted at this time. In his verified Complaint, Montgomery asserts
that his constitutional rights were violated when Bradshaw unnecessarily assaulted him and held
him in a choke hold. The Complaint asserts that the incident occurred after and not during a
confrontation with another patient, that Montgomery had already turned to walk in the opposite
direction of the patient with whom he had the altercation when Bradshaw assaulted him, and that
Montgomery was non-combative during the incident. Even if there was a basis to restrain
Montgomery at that point, the conduct he has alleged, which includes punches to the face, grinding
knuckles into his face and throat, placing him in a choke hold to the point that he could not breathe,
and verbally taunting him, could fairly be construed as going beyond normal restraint and could
support a claim of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment, whether applied to a pretrial
detainee or an individual committed to a psychiatric hospital.
Bradshaw’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Although in the Motion,
Bradshaw asserts that Maryland law and Perkins policy permitted him to restrain a patient in
situations where a patient poses a serious and imminent danger, and that the circumstances justified
his treatment of Montgomery, the allegations that the altercation with the other patient had already
subsided, that Montgomery was non-combative, and that the use of force went beyond mere
restraint, at a minimum, create a genuine issue of material fact on whether Bradshaw’s actions
were justified or constituted excessive force. Notably, Bradshaw has not submitted any evidence
that directly refutes Montgomery’s allegations. Rather, he has submitted a declaration by Dr.
Moran, the CEO and clinical director at Perkins, which states that Perkins investigated
Montgomery’s allegation and found it to be “unfounded/inconclusive,” Moran Decl. 7, Mot. Ex.
1, ECF No. 11-2, and a letter noting that the State’s Attorney declined to prosecute Bradshaw,
neither of which directly refute Montgomery’s allegations, much less demonstrate that
Montgomery has not established a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary
judgment. Even Dr. Moran’s statement is the subject of a dispute of fact, as Montgomery has
asserted that the CEO of Perkins “found after investigation” and “viewing of cameras” that his
grievance was “valid (physical abuse).” Compl. at 2. Where Bradshaw has presented no evidence
to refute the allegations in the Complaint, and there are genuine issues of material fact, the Motion
for Summary Judgment will be denied.
IV. Qualified Immunity
Bradshaw also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Montgomery’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim based on excessive force. He asserts that the Complaint, taken as
true, does not describe actions by Bradshaw that violated a clearly established constitutional right
of which a reasonable public official would have known.
Government officials sued in their individual capacity may invoke qualified immunity.
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391 (4th Cir. 2013). “Qualified immunity protects government
officials from civil damages in a § 1983 action insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a
claim of qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the government
official violated a federally protected right of the plaintiff; and (2) that right was clearly established
at the time of the alleged misconduct, in that a “reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right.” /d. Because one of the purposes of qualified immunity is to “protect
public officials from the *broad-ranging discovery’ that can be ‘peculiarly disruptive of effective
government,” the United States Supreme Court has “emphasized that qualified immunity
questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.” Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citations omitted). If the Court determines that the government
official took actions that a reasonable officer could have believed were lawful, then the official is
entitled to dismissal before discovery. /d.
As discussed above, Montgomery has adequately alleged a Fourteenth Amendment claim
against Bradshaw based on his assertions that Bradshaw used excessive force against him
following an altercation with another patient, and his asserted facts establish at a minimum a
genuine issue of material fact on whether such a violation occurred. See supra part III. The right
of a pretrial detainee to be free from excessive force was clearly established at the time of the
incident. See United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 785-86, 788 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
pretrial detainee beaten up by security personnel while in detention possessed a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from the use of excessive
force that amounts to punishment). The Court will therefore deny the Motion on the issue of
qualified immunity.
V. State Law Claims
Finally, Bradshaw moves to dismiss any state law tort claims against him in his official
capacity. The Court does not construe Montgomery’s Complaint as asserting any state law claim,
as Montgomery specifically states that he is filing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without
expressing any intent to pursue a state law claim. Accordingly, the Court need not address those
arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Bradshaw’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment, will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion,
construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, will be granted as to any claims against Bradshaw
in his official capacity and will be otherwise denied. A separate Order shall issue.
Date: July 24, 2024 =
THEODORE D. CHUANG
United States District Judge
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