finding that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials prevent inmates from using the administrative process”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials prevent inmates from using the administrative process”
- recognizing PLRA’s “strict” requirement to exhaust all available administrative remedies”
- dismissing a federal prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust where he did not appeal his administrative claim through all four stages of the BOP’s grievance process
- holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of counsel
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
RODJAUN NEAL-WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No.: SAG-23-2166
OFFICER DARAMY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Rodjaun Neal-Williams, who is currently incarcerated at Patuxent Institution,
brings this civil rights action against Sergeant Moyosore Ojo and Officers Beige Daramy, Richard
E. Ndoh, Junior Powell, and Richard Austin.1 ECF No. 1. On January 17, 2024, Defendants
moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff opposed the motion. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff
also filed a Motion for Court to Enter Judgment in Plaintiff’s Favor (ECF No. 12), which
Defendants opposed (ECF No. 13), and a Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 11). This matter
is now ripe and ready for review. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion will be
treated as a motion for summary judgment and will be denied without prejudice. Plaintiff’s two
motions will also be denied.
I. Complaint Allegations
Plaintiff alleges that on April 6, 2023, while incarcerated at Montgomery County
Correctional Facility (“MCCF”), his cell door was opened for lunch distribution. ECF No. 1 at 4.
He states that he exited his cell to get his food and upon his return he could not enter because his
cellmate was in an argument with another inmate. Id. Officer Austin called for assistance, stating
1 The Clerk shall be directed to amend the docket to reflect the full and correct names of Defendants.
there was a physical fight, which Plaintiff contends was false. Id. Plaintiff and his cellmate locked
in but officers ordered Plaintiff to pack his belongings and cuff up so they could escort him to
segregation. Id. at 4-5. Upon arrival, Plaintiff immediately informed Officers Daramy, Powell,
and Ndoh that he had not been able to eat lunch because of the incident and they told Plaintiff he
would be brought a lunch tray. Id. at 5. Hours passed and none of the officers brought Plaintiff
lunch. Id. Plaintiff informed Sgt. Ojo that he had not been provided lunch; he stated that he would
look into the issue. Id. at 5, 6. Plaintiff continued to request lunch when Officers Daramy, Powell,
and Ndoh conducted rounds every 15 to 30 minutes; the Officers repeatedly said it was coming or
that they needed to call for it. Id. at 6. Sgt. Ojo and Officer Ndoh and Powell left at the end of
their shift around 3:00 p.m. without addressing the problem. Id. Officer Daramy was working
another shift but still failed to get Plaintiff lunch. See id.
When the new shift arrived, Plaintiff informed Sgt. Parker about the issue as well but she
replied that “it was last shift’s problem not hers.” ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff brought the issue to
Officer Daramy again who asserted that Plaintiff was lying and had eaten lunch in his cell before
being transferred to segregation. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff states that this incident caused him distress
and he was lightheaded from not eating. Id. at 7. Plaintiff requested to see a mental health
professional but Sgt. Parker and Officer Daramy refused because they were conducting a window
and wall check. Id. He also requested medical assistance because he was so hungry and dizzy.
Id. During medication distribution, Plaintiff reported the issue to Nurse Gladys. Id. Feeling that
nothing was being done, Plaintiff decided to attempt suicide in front of the nurse and was sent to
Holy Cross Hospital. Id. at 7-8.
When Plaintiff gained consciousness at the hospital, he states that his body was paralyzed
and he had tubes in his throat and penis. ECF No. 1 at 8. Later, he was discharged and returned
to the jail and housed in the medical unit where he endured severe pain. Id. Plaintiff states that it
took several weeks to heal and he suffers from flashbacks, PTSD, depression, and anxiety. Id.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and an order requiring the dismissal of Officers Daramy, Powell,
and Ndoh from their positions at MCCF. Id. at 5.
II. Defendants’ Response
The MCCF Handbook requires that inmates submit an inmate grievance form within 30
days of the relevant problem. Brandon Ward Decl., ECF No. 8-2 at ¶ 4. A grievance is marked
received when MCCF personnel sign and return a carbon copy of the grievance to the complaining
inmate. Id. In Step One of the inmate grievance procedure, the receiving correctional staff reviews
the grievance and responds with an answer, forwards the grievance to the appropriate section or
person, or notes that the issue is “non-grievable.” ECF No. 8-3 at 7. Inmates must then accept or
reject the action taken. Id.
If the grievance moves to Step Two, the appropriate area or personnel to which the
grievance was referred follow the same review process as in Step One, “with the exception that
they have ten (10) working days from receipt of the grievance to answer…” ECF No. 8-3 at 8.
Inmates again have the option to accept or reject the actions taken at this stage. Id. In Step Three,
the appropriate Section Head follows the same steps to attempt to resolve the grievance within the
same 10-day deadline. Id. If the inmate rejects the action take and moves to Step Four, the Warden
reviews the grievance and responds within 10 days; this is a final response at the departmental
level. Id. However, inmates may still appeal the Warden’s decision to Step Five, which requires
inmates to forward a written statement to the Department Director within 10 days explaining their
reason for appeal. Id.
Sgt. Brandon Ward attests that Plaintiff did not file any inmate grievances between April
and December 2023 concerning the events alleged in the Complaint. ECF No. 8-2 at ¶ 6. Plaintiff
attests in a declaration attached to his Opposition that he did file a grievance on April 26, 2023.
ECF No. 10-2 at ¶ 1. He states that he requested a grievance form and the only one available was
in Spanish but he filled it out anyway and returned it to an officer that same day. ECF No. 10 at 2;
ECF No. 10-2 at ¶ 2; see also ECF No. 10-1. According to Plaintiff, he accepted that his grievance
would be forwarded to custody and security but he did not receive any further response from
correctional staff. ECF No. 10 at 2.
III. Standard of Review
Although Defendants caption their Motion as only a motion to dismiss, in the body of the
filing, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment to be granted in their favor. ECF No. 8. Such
motions implicate the Court’s discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). See Kensington Volunteer
Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436–37 (D. Md. 2011). Rule 12(d)
provides that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d). The Court maintains “‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept
the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider
it.’” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. CIV.A. ELH-12-2319, 2013 WL 1700927, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 16,
2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, at 159 (3d ed. 2004,
2012 Supp.)). Despite the title of the Motion, the substantive arguments in the Motion placed
Plaintiff on notice that Defendants sought summary judgment. ECF No. 8. Both parties attached
additional exhibits to their briefing, making treatment as a summary judgment motion appropriate.
ECF 8-1 through 8-4; ECF 10-1 and 10-2. Accordingly, the Court treats the Motion as one for
summary judgment. See, e.g., Moret v. Harvey, 381 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464 (D. Md. 2005).
Pursuant to Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to…the nonmovant,
and draw all reasonable inferences in [their] favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the
witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.
2002). Importantly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that
there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–
48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
The Court maintains an “affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually unsupported claims
and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346
F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999
F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24
(1986)). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A dispute of
material fact is only “genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the
trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
IV. Analysis
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Enter Judgment
Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Enter Judgment in Plaintiff’s Favor asserts that Defendants
failed to timely respond to the Complaint. ECF No. 12. This Court issued an Order on November
13, 2024, directing Defendants to respond to the Complaint; it was mailed to the County Attorney
for Montgomery County that same day. ECF No. 6. Patricia Kane, Chief of the Litigation Division
of the Office of the County Attorney for Montgomery County attests that the order was received
on November 17, 2023. ECF No. 13-1 at ¶ 3. Accordingly, Defendants’ response was due on
January 16, 2024. As the Court was closed that day due to inclement weather (ECF No. 13-2),
Defendants filed their response, the pending Motion, the following day on January 17, 2024. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(3). Accordingly, Defendants timely filed their response, and Plaintiff’s Motion
will be denied.
B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants raise the affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. ECF No. 8 at 5-6. The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in pertinent
part: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title,
or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
For purposes of the PLRA, “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained
in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or
diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). The phrase “prison conditions” encompasses “all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,
and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002); see also Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x
253 (4th Cir. 2004).
The doctrine governing exhaustion of administrative remedies has been well established
through administrative law jurisprudence. It provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to judicial relief
until the prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
88–89 (2006). Therefore, a claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this Court.
See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007). In other words, exhaustion is mandatory, and a court
ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 (2016) (citing
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he mandatory ‘shall’… normally
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”) (alteration in original)).
However, administrative exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is not a jurisdictional requirement
and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement on the prisoner. Rather, the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proven by defendants.
See Bock, 549 U.S. at 215–216; Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th
Cir. 2005).
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement serves several purposes. These include “allowing a
prison to address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit,
reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation
that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Bock, 549 U.S. at 219; see also
Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that exhaustion provides prison
officials with the opportunity to respond to a complaint through proper use of administrative
remedies). It is designed so that prisoners “pursue administrative grievances until they receive a
final denial of their claim[s], appealing through all available stages in the administrative process”
so that the agency reaches a decision on the merits. Chase, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 530; see also Gibbs
v. Bureau of Prison Off., 986 F. Supp. 941, 943–44 (D. Md. 1997) (dismissing a federal prisoner’s
lawsuit for failure to exhaust where he did not appeal his administrative claim through all four
stages of the BOP’s grievance process); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001) (affirming
dismissal of prisoner’s claim for failure to exhaust where he “never sought intermediate or final
administrative review after prison authority denied relief”); see also Griffin v. Bryant, 56 F.4th
328 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing PLRA’s “strict” requirement to exhaust all available
administrative remedies”).
Ordinarily, an inmate must follow the required procedural steps in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Moore, 517 F.3d at 725, 729; see Langford v. Couch, 50 F. Supp. 2d
544, 548 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“The … PLRA amendment made clear that exhaustion is now
mandatory.”). Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines ….” Woodford, 548 U.S. at
88. This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues
on the merits).’” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)).
But the Court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in [administrative] exhaustion were not
procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d
1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding
that “the inmate cannot be required to exhaust [administrative remedies] … when prison officials
prevent inmates from using the administrative process”).
Upon review of the record, the Court finds that there exists a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this Complaint.
While Defendants submit Sgt. Ward’s declaration which attests that Plaintiff did not file any
grievance in 2023 concerning the events in the Complaint, Plaintiff’s declaration states that he
filed a grievance which was received by MCCF correctional staff on April 26, 2023. Plaintiff also
submits what appears to be a carbon copy of a grievance which the Court acknowledges is mostly
illegible except for Plaintiff’s name and ID number, the date, and a check mark in a box labeled
security and custody. ECF No. 10-1. While the Court is unable to identify the substantive contents
of the grievance, Plaintiff’s declaration and Sgt. Ward’s declaration stand in direct conflict with
one another. Furthermore, because the grievance procedure laid out in the MCCF Inmate
Handbook does not dictate what action an inmate should take if they do not receive a timely
response from correctional staff, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court turns to Defendants’ argument that they are
immune from suit.
a. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue in the alternative that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 8
at 7-8. “Qualified immunity bars § 1983 actions against government officials in their individual
capacities ‘unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’” Barrett v. Pae Gov't Servs.,
Inc., 975 F.3d 416, 428 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018))
(cleaned up); see also Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020); Halcomb v. Ravenell, 992 F.3d 316,
319 (4th Cir. 2021); Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 584 U.S. 1013 (2018); Osborne v. Georgiades, 679 F. App’x 234, 237
(4th Cir. 2017); Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir. 2016); Hunter v. Town of
Mocksville, N. Carolina, 789 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2015).
In Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 395 (4th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied sub nom. Baltimore City Police Dep't v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015), the Fourth Circuit
reiterated: “Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for ‘civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)).
Defendants’ qualified immunity argument is unavailing. Plaintiff has alleged facts
suggesting that he suffered physical and mental injury as a result of Defendants’ deliberate refusal
to provide him with his lunch, which at minimum alleges a claim for relief under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Defendants simply conclude that their actions were not violative of a clearly
established constitutional right without any legal support. ECF No. 8 at 8. Without more,
Defendants’ conclusory assertion that there was no clear violation of Plaintiff’s rights is
insufficient, at this stage, to show they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Enter Judgment is denied.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, construed as a motion for summary judgment, is denied without
prejudice to Defendants filing additional dispositive motions at later stages of the proceedings. At
present, Defendants shall file an answer or other dispositive motion within 30 days.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel will also be denied without
prejudice. ECF No. 11. A federal district court judge’s power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1) is a discretionary one and may be considered where an indigent claimant presents
exceptional circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); see also
Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982). There is no absolute right to appointment of
counsel; an indigent claimant must present “exceptional circumstances.” See Miller v. Simmons,
814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987). Exceptional circumstances exist where a “pro se litigant has a
colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it.” See Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163
(4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989)
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of counsel).
Exceptional circumstances include a litigant who “is barely able to read or write,” Whisenant, at
162, or clearly “has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it,” Berry v. Gutierrez, 587
F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (E.D. Va. 2008). Upon careful consideration of the motions and previous
filings by Plaintiff, the Court finds that he has demonstrated the wherewithal to either articulate
the legal and factual basis of his claims himself or secure meaningful assistance in doing so. No
exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the appointment of an attorney to represent plaintiff
under § 1915(e)(1).
A separate Order follows.
July 15, 2024 ________/s/_____________________
Date Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States District Judge