finding that the participation clause was “irrelevant because [Plaintiff] did not file a charge with the EEOC until after the retaliatory discharge took place.”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the participation clause was “irrelevant because [Plaintiff] did not file a charge with the EEOC until after the retaliatory discharge took place.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
NANNETTE LEWIS CIVIL DOCKET NO. 3:23-CV-01382
VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH
LINCOLN PARISH POLICE JURY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAYLA D.
ET AL MCCLUSKY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment, specifically: (i) a
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. 15] filed by Plaintiff Nannette Lewis (the
“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and (ii) a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. 20] filed by
Defendants Lincoln Parish Police Jury, Ronnie Dowling,1 and Martene Thissel2 (the
“Defendants’ Motion”). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, and
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of Plaintiff’s termination from her employment with
the Humanitarian Enterprises of Lincoln Parish (“HELP”) on September 15, 2022.
HELP is a local governmental organization that operates under the supervision of
the Lincoln Parish Police Jury. Plaintiff, a black female, was hired by HELP on
January 12, 2022, to assist in processing applications for HELP’s program designed
1 Ronnie Dowling is the Executive Director at the Humanitarian Enterprises of Lincoln
Parish.
2 Martene Thissel is a former executive administrative assistant at the Humanitarian
Enterprises of Lincoln Parish.
to provide financial assistance to low-income residents in paying their utility bills.
[Doc. 20-1, p. 5].
Prior to Plaintiff’s termination, her supervisors had repeatedly raised concerns
with her about her frequent errors at work. [Doc. 20-5, pp. 1-3]. Following a June
22, 2022, meeting with two of her supervisors about her mistakes, Plaintiff lodged
complaints with a payroll supervisor at the Lincoln Parish Police Jury and eventually
filed a grievance alleging mistreatment on September 7, 2022. [Doc. 20-1, pp. 6-7].
Plaintiff was eventually terminated by the Lincoln Parish Police Jury for
“insubordination.” Id.
Following her termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). [Doc. 15, p. 2]. After
receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC3, Plaintiff filed suit in the 3rd Judicial
District Court of Lincoln Parish, Louisiana. [Doc. 1-1, p. 12]. Defendants
subsequently removed the suit on the grounds that Plaintiff was seeking relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). [Doc. 1; Doc. 20-1, p. 4].
Plaintiff alleges she was terminated for filing a grievance with HELP’s Human
Resources Department, which included complaints of a hostile work environment,
improper denial of training and overtime opportunities, and unwarranted extension
of her probation period. [Doc. 15, pp. 1-2]. Plaintiff also claims that she was
3 The EEOC issued a position statement stating that they believed she was terminated
“due to her being insubordinate and causing tension around the office” and “making mistakes
that negatively affected clients and the other co-workers.” [Doc. 20-8, p. 2].
discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”) and retaliated against in violation of Title VII. [Doc. 20-8, p. 1]. Defendants
assert that Plaintiff was terminated because of insubordination and causing conflict
with coworkers. [Doc. 20-1, p. 9].
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail, the moving party bears the initial burden of
demonstrating “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it “is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). Facts are considered “material” only if they “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). If the movant satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must “designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V
Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). There is no
genuine issue for trial, and a grant of summary judgment is warranted, when the
record as a whole “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party[.]” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
LAW AND DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Plaintiff in this matter appears
pro se. The pleadings and filings of pro se litigants are awarded a certain level of
leniency by this Court to ensure that they are afforded due process. Cowart v.
Courtesy of Ruston LLC, 2024 WL 3461068, at *4 (W.D. La. July 18, 2024) (“The
pleadings of pro se litigants are held to a more lenient standard than those of
attorneys and are construed liberally to prevent a loss of rights that might result from
inartful expression.”). Here, it is unclear exactly what claims Plaintiff is asserting
against Defendants. However, because Plaintiff is pro se and has referenced potential
claims under the ADA and Title VII in her EEOC complaint, the Court will liberally
construe her Complaint to include claims under both federal statutes.
I. Plaintiff’s Claims Under the ADA
The ADA prohibits covered employers from “discriminat[ing] against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination
includes failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability … unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (i) she is a “qualified individual with a
disability;” (ii) her disability and its consequential limitations were “known” by the
covered employer; and (iii) the employer failed to make “reasonable accommodations”
for such known limitations. Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Office of the Atty.
Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ADA
defines a disability as: “(1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life acts, (2) a record of such impairment, or (3) being
regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
While the record raises the possibility that Plaintiff was being treated for
various medical conditions, the record does not support a viable ADA claim. For
instance, in her Complaint, Plaintiff states that she told the Lincoln Parish Police
Jury payroll supervisor that “Mr. Dowling told me that if I kept missing days due to
doctor visits, I may loose [sic] my job.” [Doc. 1-1, p.14]. Further, in her grievance
form, Plaintiff stated that “[i]n the past meatings [sic] I am called paranoid and
crazy.” [Doc. 20-6, p.1]. However, neither assertion is alone sufficient to raise a viable
ADA claim nor are these allegations otherwise supported by summary judgment
evidence. Rather, Plaintiff’s employment file indicates that her pre-termination
complaints against HELP were centered on: (i) the alleged extension of her
probationary period; (ii) issues with the training she was receiving; (iii) excessive
corrections by her supervisors; and (iv) personal disputes with her coworkers. [Doc.
20-6]. Moreover, while Plaintiff did state in her employee medical history
questionnaire for HELP that she suffered from scoliosis, back and neck problems, and
chronic headaches, there is no evidence in her personnel file that she ever requested
accommodation from her employer for these alleged conditions, nor that her employer
ever denied her any requested accommodation. [Doc. 20-8, pp. 4-5]. Thus, there is
no genuine dispute of material fact precluding entry of summary judgment
dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA claims.
II. Plaintiff’s Claims Under Title VII
Title VII declares it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S. Code §
2000e–2(a)(1). When a plaintiff is unable to set forth direct evidence of
discrimination, “the three-step McDonnell Douglas Framework applies.” Myles v.
TPUSA – FHCS, Inc., 2020 WL 6276957, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2020) (citing Wallace
v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001)). For both discrimination
and hostile work environment claims under Title VII, Plaintiff must establish that
she is a member of a protected group and that she was treated differently as a result.4
Here, the Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with any direct evidence of
discrimination on the basis of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Nor
does the record contain sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas Framework. Specifically, among other
deficiencies, the record is devoid of any evidence that Plaintiff was replaced by
someone outside her protected group, or that she was treated less favorably than any
other employee. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims of discrimination and a hostile
work environment fail as a matter of law.
III. ADA and Title VII Retaliation
Lastly, the Court will consider summary judgment on Plaintiff’s possible
retaliation claims under the ADA and Title VII. Without direct evidence of an
4 To establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination, Plaintiff must prove that
she: “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was
discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was
replaced by someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than other
similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” Brown v. Montclair Assisted
Living, 2013 WL 1818500, at *3 (W.D. La. Apr. 26, 2013) (citing McCoy, 492 F.3d at 557).
Similarly, to establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Plaintiff must show:
“(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on her membership in a protected class; (4) the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) her employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.” Gibson v.
Verizon Servs. Org., Inc., 498 F. App’x 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ramsey v. Henderson,
286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)).
unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff’s retaliation claim is governed by the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Smith v. Touro Infirmary, 2015 WL 5093487,
at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2015). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff makes a prima
facie case of retaliation by establishing that: (i) the plaintiff engaged in an activity
protected by statute; (ii) her employer took an adverse employment action against
her; and (iii) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse
action. McKinney v. Sheriffs Off. Rapides Par., 2021 WL 1083979, at *10 (W.D. La.
Mar. 19, 2021) (citing Feist, 730 F.3d at 454). To establish that Plaintiff engaged in
a protected activity, she must show that she opposed a practice made unlawful by the
ADA or Title VII and that she had a “reasonable belief” that Defendants were
“engag[ing] in unlawful employment practices.”5 Smith v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
102 F. Supp. 3d 867, 878 (E.D. La. 2015).
As stated above, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence of unlawful or
discriminatory behavior or practices by Defendants. Nor is there any evidence in the
record from which the Court could infer that Plaintiff had a reasonable belief
5 There are two categories of protected activities: “(1) opposition to any practice
rendered unlawful by Title VII, the opposition clause, and (2) making a charge, testifying,
assisting, or participating in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII, the
participation clause.” Newell v. Acadiana Plan. Comm’n Inc., 637 F. Supp. 3d 419 (W.D. La.
2022). The Court is only considering the opposition clause, not the participation clause,
because while Plaintiff did eventually file an EEOC complaint, the filing took place after she
was terminated. Plaintiff was terminated September 21, 2022. [Doc. 20-1, p. 5]. Plaintiff
filed her complaint with the EEOC in January 2023. Id. at 8. See Byers v. Dallas Morning
News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the participation clause was
“irrelevant because [Plaintiff] did not file a charge with the EEOC until after the retaliatory
discharge took place.”).
unlawful employment practices were taking place. Hence, Plaintiffs retaliation
claims under the ADA and Title VII also fail as a matter of law.®
CONCLUSION
There is insufficient evidence in the record to create a genuine dispute of
material fact that Defendants violated either the ADA or Title VII. As such,
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Considering the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Doc. 15] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT [Doc. 20] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants are
DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 23" day of September 2024.
Coord C poops
DAVID C. JOSEPH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 “If Plaintiff cannot support all three elements of a prima facie case of retaliation, then
summary judgment for Defendant is appropriate.” Cowart, 2024 WL 3461068, at *7 (citing
Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n., 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009)).
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