The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
JANNIE V. SMITH CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-1598
VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
GM FINANCIAL, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE MCCLUSKY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Defendant GM Financial (“GM Financial”) is before the Court on an unopposed
Motion to Dismiss (Record Document 12) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED and
Plaintiff Jannie V. Smith’s (“Smith”) claims are DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
On November 5, 2022, Smith entered into a Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales
Contract (the “Contract”) with and purchased a vehicle from Classic Chrysler Dodge Jeep
Ram. See Record Document 12, Exhibit A. The Contract was assigned from Classic
Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram to GM Financial. See id. The Contract contained a section on
the first page titled “Federal Truth-In-Lending Disclosures,” which detailed the Annual
Percentage Rate, Finance Charge, Amount Financed, Total of Payments, Total Sale
Price, and other terms regarding payments. Record Document 12, at 2; see Record
Document 1 (Contract attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint).
On November 2, 2023, Smith filed a Complaint for Predatory Lending
(“Complaint”), naming GM Financial as Defendant. See Record Document 1. Smith
seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, rescission of the Contract and the return of all
payments made, compensatory damages for her financial loss and emotional distress,
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Smith alleges that “Defendant engaged
in predatory lending practices in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the
Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA)” and that “Defendant’s predatory lending
practices also violated state law prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices.” Id. at 2.
Specifically, Smith claims that “Defendant’s representative knew that Plaintiff was
vulnerable to predatory lending practices and took advantage of her.” Id. at 1. Smith
further claims that “Defendant’s representative misrepresented the terms of the loan
agreement and failed to disclose the true cost of the loan.” Id. Smith also sought a
temporary restraining order against GM Financial, which was denied by this Court on
December 28, 2023. See Record Document 8. GM Financial filed its Motion to Dismiss
on February 23, 2024. See Record Document 12. To date, Smith has not opposed the
motion.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the requirements for
pleadings that state a claim for relief and requires that a pleading contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The standard
for the adequacy of complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) is now a “plausibility” standard found
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and its progeny. Under this
standard, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. If a pleading only contains “labels
and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” the
pleading does not meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows parties to seek dismissal of a
party’s pleading for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In deciding
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court generally “may not go outside the pleadings.”
Colle v. Brazos Cty., Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1993). Additionally, courts must
accept all allegations in a complaint as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, courts
do not have to accept legal conclusions as facts. See id. Courts considering a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are only obligated to allow those complaints that are facially
plausible under the Iqbal and Twombly standard to survive such a motion. See id. at 678–
79. If the complaint does not meet this standard, it can be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See id.
GM Financial seeks dismissal of Smith’s complaint (Record Document 1) under
Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Specifically, GM Financial submits that Smith’s claims should be dismissed for the
following reasons:
1. Smith does not have a private right of action to assert a claim for
“predatory lending” under the Consumer Protection Act or Louisiana
law;
2. Smith’s Truth-In-Lending Act claim fails because she cannot state a
specific violation and the disclosures in the contract comply with the
applicable disclosure requirements;
3. GM Financial is exempt from the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices
Act; and
4. The Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute prevents Smith from
altering the terms of the contract or attempting to use oral assertions
to change the terms.
Record Document 12 at 1.
The Court has reviewed Smith’s complaint and agrees that she has failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, as the allegations found in the complaint are
conclusory and vague. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“While a complaint attacked by
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). The Court also notes that Smith did not
file opposition to the current Motion to Dismiss, nor did she request leave to amend her
complaint. As such, the Court will not grant leave to amend.
A. CFPA Claim.
Smith’s claim for “predatory lending” under the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. § 5481 et seq.,
fails because there is no private right of action for “predatory lending” under the CFPA.
Federal courts have consistently held that the CFPA does not provide for a private right
of action. For instance, the Eastern District of Louisiana in Dixon v. Ally Bank dismissed
a pro se plaintiff’s claim for “predatory lending” against an automobile lender because the
plaintiff failed to allege facts to support that he had a private right of action under the
CFPA and the predatory lending provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. Civil Action No: 19-
11344, 2020 WL 1234435, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Dixon v. Ally
Bank, 853 Fed. App’x 977 (5th Cir. 2021). Thus, a private individual like Smith lacks
standing to bring a claim under the CFPA. Her CFPA claim must be dismissed.
B. TILA Claim.
Smith also alleges in her Complaint that GM Financial’s “predatory lending”
violates TILA. See Record Document 1. Smith admitted that she entered into the Contract
and attached it to her Complaint. See id. The Contract complies with the TILA by including
all the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C.A. § 1632 of the TILA, which are placed clearly
and conspicuously in bolded font on the first page of the Contract. See Record Document
12 at 5.
Moreover, Smith fails to identify any specific TILA violations and does not plead
any facts that would constitute a TILA violation by GM Financial. Although courts are
generally willing to construe pro se filings liberally, pro se litigants are still required to
plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Dixon v. Toyota of New
Orleans, Civil Action No. 17-111, 2017 WL 6211038 (E.D. La. May 24, 2017) (citation
omitted). Here, Smith does little more than merely allege TILA in her Complaint. See
Jones v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., Civil Action 18-1023-SDD-EWD, 2020 WL 4342219,
at *10 (M.D. La. July 28, 2020). Smith does not identify what chapter or section of TILA
under which she is proceeding, nor does she identify any specific TILA violation in her
Complaint. See id.; see also Record Document 12 at 6. Thus, she failed to plead facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under the TILA.
Under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1641(a) of the TILA, an assignee of a contract can be held
liable “only if the violation for which such action or proceeding is brought is apparent on
the face of the disclosure statement, except where the assignment was involuntary.”
Record Document 12 at 6. Here, Smith failed to allege any specific TILA violation on the
face of the disclosure statement, which is displayed on the first page of the Contract
(Record Document 1 at 4). Moreover, the “involuntary” exception does not apply here
because Smith, Class Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram, and GM Financial all signed the
Contract explicitly containing the assignment of the Contract to GM Financial. Record
Document 12 at 6. Therefore, Smith’s TILA claim fails as a matter of law under 15
U.S.C.A. § 1641(a).
Thus, because Smith failed to identify a specific TILA violation in her Complaint,
and because the Contract complies with the disclosure requirements under the TILA,
Smith’s TILA claim is dismissed.
C. Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”) Claim.
Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the LUTPA because GM Financial is expressly
exempt from LUTPA claims under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 51:1406. This statute,
in relevant part, provides that LUPTA shall not apply to “actions or transactions subject to
the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility
regulatory body . . . [or] the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states.”
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1406(1). GM Financial is regulated by the Louisiana Motor
Vehicle Commission, which is a public utility regulatory body, as well as by financial
institutions in various states, such as the State Board of Financial Institutions in South
Carolina and the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services. See Record
Document 12 at 7. Therefore, GM Financial is exempt from LUTPA claims. In any event,
Smith failed to allege any specific facts to support a LUTPA claim. See Record Document
1. Thus, her LUTPA claim is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Smith has failed to set forth
factual allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level as to her federal
claims. Accordingly, GM Financial's Motion to Dismiss (Record Document 12) is
GRANTED and all of Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED.
A judgment consistent with the terms of the instant Memorandum Ruling shall
issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 30th day of July, 2024.
112.