Jones v. Vidrios San Miquel S L

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

DENNIS MILTON JONES, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-370

VERSUS JUDGE DONALD E. WALTER

VIDRIOS SAN MIQUEL, S.L., ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE MCCLUSKY

______________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is an unopposed motion to reconsider, filed by Defendant Vidrios San

Miquel, S.L. (“Vidrios”). See Record Document 33. Vidrios requests the Court to reconsider the

Court’s March 21, 2024 ruling, denying Vidrios’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See id. For the reasons stated

below, Vidrios’s motion to reconsider (Record Document 33) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

I. Allegations.

Sherill Jones (“Jones”) alleges that on September 24, 2021, she visited a Paul Michael

Company store in Monroe, Louisiana, with her minor daughter, hereinafter referred to as “CAJ.”

See Record Document 1-2 at 3. While shopping, Jones claims that she picked up an unpackaged

glass vase, held the vase over her head to examine the price of the item, and the glass vase suddenly

exploded. See id. Jones and CAJ (“Plaintiffs”) assert that the glass shards from the vase resulted

in “profuse bleeding about [Jones’s] head, face, hands, and arms.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs allege that

CAJ was standing adjacent to her mother and observed the explosion. As a result, Plaintiffs

contend that CAJ “suffered severe and lasting emotionally traumatic injuries.” Id. at 5.

On September 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed suit in Louisiana’s 4th Judicial District Court for

the Parish of Ouachita, naming as defendants Vidrios, Elk Lighting, Inc. (“Elk”), Paul Michael

d/b/a Paul Michael Company (“Paul Michael”), Travelers Indemnity Company of America

(“Travelers”), and Westfield Insurance Company (“Westfield”). Plaintiffs allege that Vidrios is a

foreign corporation who manufactured the glass vase that exploded. See Record Document 1-2 at

3, 5. Plaintiffs maintain that Elk is a corporation that manufactures and distributes lighting products

and accessories to wholesalers and retailers. See id. at 5. Elk allegedly purchased the vase from

Vidrios. See Record Document 12-2 at 3. Then, Elk allegedly distributed and sold the vase to Paul

Michael, who owns retail stores specializing in home decor. See Record Document 1-2 at 5.

Plaintiffs contend that Travelers is an insurance company that had in full force and effect a policy

of liability insurance to and in favor of Paul Michael which provided coverage for its acts of

negligence. See id. Additionally, Plaintiffs assert Westfield is an insurance company that had in

full force and effect a policy of liability insurance to and in favor of Elk which provided coverage

for its acts of negligence. See id.

II. Procedural History.

The case was removed to this Court on March 22, 2023. See Record Document 1. On May

4, 2023, Vidrios filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See Record Document 12. Plaintiffs, along with Paul Michael,

Travelers, Westfield, and Elk (hereinafter, collectively “the Non-moving Defendants”), opposed

Vidrios’s motion to dismiss. See Record Documents 18 and 21.1 In its motion to dismiss, Vidrios

1 This Court granted Westfield and Elk’s motion to join in and adopt memoranda in opposition to

Vidrios’s motion to dismiss filed by Paul Michael and Travelers at Record Document 18 and

Plaintiffs at Record Document 21. See Record Document 24.

affirms that it is a company organized under the laws of Spain, and its principal place of business

is in Valencia, Spain. See Record Document 12-1 at 2; Record Document 12-2 at 1.

Vidrios argues that the company is not “authorized” to do business in Louisiana. See

Record Document 12-1 at 2. Vidrios further argues that it has never done business in Louisiana.

See id. Vidrios contends that it has no offices, factories, or stores in Louisiana. See id. Additionally,

Vidrios further contends that it does not sell its products to consumers in Louisiana nor market its

products in Louisiana. See id. Vidrios attached a declaration of Rafael Fornes Juan, the President

of Vidrios. See Record Document 12-2. Juan stated that Vidrios manufactures 13,000,000 units

per year. See id. at 1. Only forty percent of those units are known to be sold directly to business

entities located in the United States, and none of the business entities are in Louisiana. See id.

According to Juan, of Vidrios’s annual sales, fourteen percent are to distributors and eighty-six

percent are to chain stores, and none are known to operate in Louisiana. See id. Juan stated that

Elk purchased the vase at issue as part of a larger order, and the order was tendered to Elk “free

on board” in Valencia, Spain. See id. at 2. Juan maintains that Vidrios was unaware of the

destination of the order or the identity or location of any subsequent purchaser. Therefore,

Vidrios’s position is that this Court does not have general or specific personal jurisdiction over it.

See Record Document 12.

On March 21, 2024, the Court denied Vidrios’s motion to dismiss. See Record Document

30. Relying on the purchase order form to Elk, the Court found that Vidrios sold 550 products to

at least one nationwide distributor. See id. at 8. Additionally, the Court relied on allegations in the

complaint to “reasonably infer that there were other identical glass vases on the shelf that came

from the same distributor, Elk.” Id. The Court held:

Vidrios’s product made its way into Louisiana while still in the stream of

commerce, and Vidrios possessed foreseeability or awareness of this possibility

when it sold 550 products to a nationwide distributor without attempting to limit

the states in which its products would be resold. The facts in this case support the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over Vidrios. See Zoch v. Magna Seating

(Germany) GmbH, 810 F. App’x 285, 293 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that specific

jurisdiction for component parts manufacturers should be determined on a case-by-

case basis under the facts of each individual case.). Having concluded that Vidrios

purposefully entered into an agreement with a nationwide distributor and made no

attempt to limit the scope of that distributor’s marketing agreement, the Court finds

that Vidrios availed itself of the Louisiana market and that Plaintiffs have met their

burden.

Id.

On April 16, 2024, Vidrios filed this motion to reconsider. See Record Document 33.2

Vidrios contends that the Court “applied an incorrect legal standard and relied on erroneous factual

findings, unsupported by record evidence” to reach its decision. Id. Therefore, Vidrios requests

that the Court reconsider its denial of Vidrios’s motion to dismiss. See Record Document 33-1 at

10. The motion is unopposed by all other parties.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Reconsider.

The Federal Rules do not specifically provide for a “motion to reconsider,” so courts in the

Fifth Circuit treat such a motion as a “either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment or a

Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment or order.” Shepherd v. Int’l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326,

328 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). Rule 59(e) governs when the motion to reconsider is filed within 28 days

of the challenged order. See Clearline Techs. Ltd. v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 607,

617 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Amegy Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Monarch Flight II, LLC, No. H-11-3218, 2011

WL 6091807, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 7, 2011). Here, the Court entered its ruling on March 21, 2024,

2 On April 15, 2024, the Clerk of Court entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Failure to

Prosecute for Vidrios’s failure to file a responsive pleading. The filing of the motion to reconsider

reopened the issue of personal jurisdiction, and therefore, good cause was shown by Vidrios for

its failure to file a responsive pleading.

and Vidrios filed its motion to reconsider on April 16, 2024. See Record Documents 30 and 33.

Therefore, Vidrios filed its motion within 28 days of this Court’s ruling denying the motion to

dismiss. The Court will treat the motion as a Rule 59(e) motion.3 See Clearline, 871 F. Supp. 2d

at 617.

“Under Rule 59(e), amending a judgment is appropriate (1) where there has been an

intervening change in the controlling law; (2) where the movant presents newly discovered

evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a manifest error of law or fact.” Demahy

v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012). A motion to alter or amend under

Rule 59(e) “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly

discovered evidence” and “cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been

made before the judgment issued.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863–64 (5th Cir.

2003). A district court has considerable discretion as to whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion.

Clearline, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 617. Rule 59(e) “is an extraordinary remedy that should be used

sparingly.” Templet v. Hydrochem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir.2004).

Here, Vidrios argues that the Court’s prior ruling was manifestly erroneous in finding that

it could exert personal jurisdiction over Vidrios. See Record Document 33-1 at 6. Vidrios

maintains that there was no evidence to support the finding that Elk was a nationwide distributor.

See id. at 8. Additionally, Vidrios contends that the Court relied on an allegation—not evidence—

in “[finding] that a Paul Michael Company employee ‘personally inspected other identical glass

3 The Court notes that Vidrios brought this motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Record Document

33-1 at 3. Because Vidrios’s motion was filed within 28 days of the final judgment, the Court

construes it as a motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma,

Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 2012) (where the court considered the plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)

motion as a motion to amend judgment under Rule 59(e) because it was filed within the applicable

28-day time frame).

vases on display next to the one which exploded and observed them to have hairline fractures.’”

Id. (internal citations omitted). Vidrios asserts that Plaintiffs produced no evidence in opposition

to Vidrios’s motion to dismiss. See id. Therefore, Vidrios’s position is that the Court made a

manifest error of law and “prematurely shifted the burden of proof away from Plaintiffs and onto

Vidrios on the basis of factual findings not only unsupported by record evidence, but affirmatively

contradicted by record evidence.” Id. at 13. This Court finds it arguable that the Court’s prior ruling

was manifestly erroneous, and that it is, therefore, appropriate for this Court to reconsider whether

this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Vidrios.

II. Personal Jurisdiction.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction. When a defendant challenges a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff

bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist. See Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,

188 F.3d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1999). On a pretrial motion such as this one where no evidentiary

hearing is held, the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must be taken as true

and any conflicts between facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the

plaintiff’s favor. See Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1990). Those facts must

create for the plaintiff only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. See Travelers Indem. Co. v.

Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 1986). A plaintiff who satisfies the minimal

standard must still prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the jurisdictional facts before

obtaining relief on the merits against the non-resident. See id.; see also Felch v. Transportes Lar-

Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1996).

To exercise personal jurisdiction, a federal court sitting in diversity must satisfy both

statutory and constitutional requirements. See Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291,

294 (5th Cir. 1999). The state’s long-arm statute must confer jurisdiction over the defendant, and

the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must be consistent with the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The Louisiana long-arm statute, Louisiana Revised Statute

13:3201, provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by stating

that:

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly

or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following

activities performed by the nonresident:

. . . .

(8) Manufacturing of a product or component thereof which caused damage or

injury in this state, if at the time of placing the product into the stream of commerce,

the manufacturer could have foreseen, realized, expected, or anticipated that the

product may eventually be found in this state by reason of its nature and the

manufacturer’s marketing practices.

B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may exercise

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the

constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States.

The Louisiana long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of constitutional due process,

merging the statutory and constitutional analyses into one. See La. R.S. 13:3201(B); A&L Energy,

Inc. v. Pegasus Grp., 791 So. 2d 1266, 1270 (La. 6/29/01).

Due process requires that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state

and that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. See Walk Haydel & Assoc., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir.

2008). The defendant must have committed an act which purposefully avails itself of the privilege

of conducting activities with the forum state, and therefore, invoked the benefits and protections

of the forum state’s laws. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240 (1958).

“Minimum contacts” may give rise to either general or specific personal jurisdiction.

Choice Healthcare, Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 615 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2010).

General personal jurisdiction empowers a court to hear “any and all claims” against a defendant

whose contacts with the forum state are “continuous and systematic” such that the defendant is “at

home” in the state. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014). Specific

personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s contacts with the state arise from or are directly

related to the cause of action. See Marathon Oil, 182 F.3d at 295. To determine whether a court

may exercise specific jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit prescribes a three-step analysis: “(1) whether

the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause of

action arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the

exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.” Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L.,

615 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266,

271 (5th Cir. 2006)). The contacts, while not as substantial as those required for an exercise of

general jurisdiction, may not be merely “random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Clemens v. McNamee,

615 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally, the contacts cannot result from the “unilateral

activity of another party or third person.” ITL Int’l, Inc. v. Constenla, S.A., 669 F.3d 493, 498 (5th

Cir. 2012). If the plaintiff successfully establishes the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the

defendant to show that litigation in the forum state would be “‘so gravely difficult and

inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to [its] opponent.”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (1985)

III. Analysis.

Vidrios reurges that its contacts with the state of Louisiana do not meet the requirements

for either general or specific jurisdiction. See Record Document 12-1 at 2. In their prior

oppositions, Plaintiffs and the Non-moving Defendants agreed that there is no general jurisdiction

in this case. Therefore, the Court’s analysis will focus on specific jurisdiction.

In their initial briefs, Plaintiffs’ and the Non-moving Defendants’ focused their theory of

personal jurisdiction on the “stream of commerce.” Record Document 18 at 4; Record Document

21 at 5. “That doctrine recognizes that a defendant may purposely avail itself of the protection of

a state’s laws—and thereby will subject itself to personal jurisdiction—‘by sending its goods rather

than its agents’ into the forum.” In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab.

Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 778 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.

873, 882, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011)). Under the “stream of commerce” approach to personal

jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit has consistently found that “the minimum contacts requirement is

met so long as the court ‘finds that the defendant delivered the product into the stream of commerce

with the expectation that it would be purchased by or used by consumers in the forum state.’”

Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bearry v. Beech

Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987)). In the Fifth Circuit, a court can exercise specific

personal jurisdiction over a defendant “if the defendant’s product made its way into the forum state

while still in the stream of commerce” and the defendant possessed “foreseeability or awareness”

of this possibility. Ainsworth, 716 F.3d at 177.

Vidrios asserted that the only connection between it and Louisiana is that one of its

products allegedly injured Plaintiffs in Louisiana. See Record Document 12-1 at 6. Vidrios

contended that connection alone is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. See id. Vidrios

correctly noted that its contacts must be with the forum itself, not a plaintiff who happens to be in

the forum. See id. Therefore, Vidrios must have minimum contacts with Louisiana, rather than

simply a connection to a plaintiff who happens to be injured in Louisiana. Vidrios argued that it

sold the vase in question to Elk free-on-board, and therefore had no knowledge of its product’s

destination. See Record Document 25 at 4. Vidrios further argued that it has never done business

in Louisiana, and it does not sell its products to consumers in Louisiana nor market its products in

Louisiana. See Record Document 12-1 at 2. Additionally, Vidrios asserted that it “had no

knowledge that its products were being distributed to Louisiana retailers or sold in Louisiana.” Id.

Thus, Vidrios contended that the role it played in this case occurred out-of-state, and there is an

insufficient connection to Louisiana to support specific jurisdiction. See id. at 6.

Plaintiffs’ and Non-moving Defendants’ do not oppose the motion to reconsider. However,

their arguments in opposition to the motion to dismiss referenced Vidrios’s admission that Vidrios

places 5,200,000 products into the United States’ stream of commerce each year. See Record

Document 18 at 4. They argued that the vase at issue was sold to a nationwide distributor, Elk

Lighting. See id. Therefore, Plaintiffs and Non-moving Defendants concluded that Vidrios should

have reasonably foreseen that one of its 5,200,000 products, sent to a nationwide distributor, would

end up in Louisiana. See id. This argument is misplaced.

Plaintiffs and Non-moving Defendants have extrapolated Vidrios’s admission with no

factual basis for doing so. Juan stated that only fourteen percent of Vidrios’s annual sales are to

distributors. Plaintiffs and Non-moving Defendants failed to account for that reduction in their

argument. Additionally, Plaintiffs and Non-moving Defendants imply that all 5,200,000 products

were sent to nationwide distributors. There is no evidence to suggest that all distributors are

nationwide distributors. When a defendant challenges a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction,

the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. See Guidry, 188 F.3d at 626.

Plaintiffs must show that Vidrios committed an act which purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting activities with Louisiana and therefore invoked the benefits and protections

of Louisiana’s laws. Based on the materials presently before the Court, the Court finds that

Plaintiffs did not meet their burden, and the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over

Vidrios.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Vidrios’s motion to reconsider (Record

Document 33) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s March 21, 2024 Memorandum Ruling

(Record Document 30) is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Vidrios’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

Jurisdiction (Record Document 12) is GRANTED.

An order consistent with the instant Memorandum Ruling shall be issued herewith.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 29th day of July, 2024.

Ul bu.

prac /

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

11