Lee v. City of Shreveport

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

SANDRA LEE CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-604

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

CITY OF SHREVEPORT MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant, the City of

Shreveport (“the City”).1 Pursuant to this Court’s Notice of Motion Setting, a

response was due by August 22, 2023.2 On September 6, 2023, the plaintiff, Sandra

Lee (“Ms. Lee”), filed her response to the motion.3 The response was stricken as

untimely.4 Hence, the City’s Motion is unopposed.5

After careful consideration of the Motion, the record, and the applicable law,

the Motion is GRANTED and Sandra Lee’s claims against the City of Shreveport are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Lee is a former employee of the City.6 She alleges that the City engaged

in unfair labor practices culminating in her forced departure on October 23, 2020;

and that it owes her unpaid wages, liquidated damages, penalties, and attorney fees.7

1 R. Doc. 4.

2 R. Doc. 5.

3 R. Doc. 6.

4 R. Doc. 9.

5 To be clear, the Court does not dispose of this case for want of a timely opposition; rather, it is disposed

of for want of merit.

6 R. Doc. 1 at 1.

7 Id. at 1–6.

Foremost, Ms. Lee contends that she was misclassified in her role with the

City—performing the duties of a superior title—and that she has yet to be

compensated accordingly.8 She intimates causation between her complaining of the

wage discrepancy and her resignation.9 Now, she seeks compensation.10

Notably, this is not Ms. Lee’s first attempt to obtain relief from the City

regarding her October 23, 2020, departure.11 In her first suit (“Lee I”), Ms. Lee sought

relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),12 Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),13 and the Louisiana Employment

Discrimination Law (“LEDL”).14 Unable to prevail in that case,15 Ms. Lee now brings

this second suit (“Lee II”) under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),16 and the

Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”).17

On August 7, 2023, the City filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that

res judicata, and alternatively, prescription, bar this suit.18 The City contends that

Ms. Lee’s claims in this suit arise from the same facts—and could have been raised—

in Lee I.19 Furthermore, the City argues that Ms. Lee’s claims, under both the FLSA

and the LWPA, prescribed before Lee II was filed on May 5, 2023.20

8 Id. at 3.

9 Id. at 2–3.

10 Id. at 4–6.

11 See Lee v. City of Shreveport, No. 21-CV-3232, 2022 WL 2161941 (W.D. La. June 15, 2022).

12 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.

13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

14 La. R.S. 23:301, et seq.

15 Lee v. City of Shreveport, No. 21-CV-3232, 2023 WL 1971331 (W.D. La. Feb. 10, 2023); Lee v. City of

Shreveport, No. 21-CV-3232, 2022 WL 2161941 (W.D. La. June 15, 2022) (dispositive rulings).

16 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

17 La. R.S. 23:631, 633.

18 R. Doc. 4 at 1.

19 R. Doc. 4-1 at 1–3.

20 Id. at 4–5.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

“enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.”21 A complaint

attacked by Rule 12(b)(6) does not need detailed factual allegations but requires more

than labels and conclusions.22 “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.”23 When evaluating a pleading, courts must construe the complaint

liberally and accept all factual allegations as true.24 However, courts need not accept

legal conclusions as facts.25 In addition to facts alleged in the pleadings, the district

court “may also consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.”26 “And, it is

clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public

record.”27

III. ANALYSIS

A. Res Judicata

In the Fifth Circuit, “generally a res judicata contention cannot be brought in

a motion to dismiss; it must be pleaded as an affirmative defense.”28 The Fifth Circuit

has further noted that “[r]es judicata is an affirmative defense that should not be

raised as part of a 12(b)(6) motion, but should instead be addressed at summary

21 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

22 Id. at 555.

23 Id.

24 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).

25 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

26 Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017–18 (5th Cir. 1996).

27 Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d

1338, 1343 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may permissibly

refer to matters of public record.”).

28 Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Norris v.

Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007).

judgment or at trial.”29 Nevertheless, “[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on res judicata

grounds is appropriate when the elements of res judicata are apparent on the face of

the pleadings.”30

In making our res judicata determination here, we consider the pleadings filed

in this suit, Lee II, and compare them with the pleadings filed and judgment rendered

in Lee I, No. 21-CV-3232.31

“Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars the litigation of claims that either have

been litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.”32 Res judicata has four

elements:

(1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior

action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior

action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same

claim or cause of action was involved in both actions.33

The first three elements are not contested.34 Both suits involved Sandra Lee as the

plaintiff and the City of Shreveport as the defendant.35 The United States District

Court for the Western District of Louisiana had proper jurisdiction over Lee I, and a

final judgment was rendered on Lee I’s merits.36

29 Am. Realty Trust, Inc. v. Hamilton Lane Advisors, Inc., 115 Fed. App’x. 662, 664 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004)

(citing Moch v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 548 F.2d 594, 596 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Generally, a party

cannot base a 12(b)(6) motion on res judicata.”)).

30 Murry v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 553 Fed. Appx. 362, 364 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Kansa Reinsurance Co.

v. Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994)).

31 See Hall v. Hodgkins, 305 F. App'x 224, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2008) (“If, based on the facts pleaded and

judicially noticed, a successful affirmative defense appears, then dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

proper.”)

32 Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Southmark

Corp., 163 F.3d 925, 934 (5th Cir. 1999)) (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (“Res judicata

prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the

parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.”)).

33 Houston Pro. Towing Ass'n v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

34 R. Doc. 8 at 2–3.

35 See Lee I, 2023 WL 1971331 at *1.

36 Id. at *1, *3.

It is only the fourth and final element that is contested here: whether this suit

involves “the same claim or cause of action” as the prior suit.37 “[T]o determine

whether two suits involve the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata” “[t]he

Fifth Circuit employs the transactional test.”38 Under the transactional test, “[i]t is

the nucleus of operative facts, rather than the type of relief requested, substantive

theories advanced, or types of rights asserted that defines the claim.”39 And, res

judicata “bars all claims that were or could have been advanced in support of the

cause of action on the occasion of its former adjudication . . . not merely those that

were adjudicated.”40

In both Lee I and Lee II, Ms. Lee: (1) held the title of “Recreation Supervisor

II” with the City; (2) alleges to have been performing the duties of “Recreation

Superintendent” while remaining compensated as a Recreation Supervisor II; (3)

asked for an audit of her position; (4) prevailed in that audit; (5) was determined to

be entitled to back wages; and (6) was allegedly forced to resign on October 23, 2020,

in response to the results of that audit.41 The Court thus finds that these “two actions

are based on the same nucleus of operative facts.”42

37 Houston Pro. Towing, 812 F.3d at 447. Although Ms. Lee’s response has been stricken, the Court

acknowledges that she only contested this element. See R. Doc. 6.

38 BVS Constr., Inc. v. Prosperity Bank, 18 F.4th 169,174 (5th Cir. 2021).

39 Houston Pro. Towing, 812 F.3d at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Davis v. Dallas

Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The critical issue under the transactional test

is whether the two actions are based on the ‘same nucleus of operative facts.’”).

40 Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (internal citation omitted)

(alteration in original).

41 Lee I, 2022 WL 2161941 at *1; Lee II, R. Doc. 1 at 2–3.

42 Davis, 383 F.3d at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In that same vein, the Court finds that Ms. Lee’s current claims could have

been raised in Lee I.43 Again, the Complaint in Lee I alleges the same facts underlying

the City’s owing and withholding of back wages that are now pleaded in Lee II.44

Furthermore, Ms. Lee sought these same back wages—albeit not under the statutes

cited here—in Lee I.45

Accordingly, because Ms. Lee’s unfair labor practice claims concerning her

alleged underpayment and subsequent departure arise from the same series of

transactions from which Lee I arose; and because Ms. Lee could have raised these

claims in Lee I but failed to do so, Lee II must be dismissed 46

B. Statutes of Limitations / Prescription

Alternatively, “[a] statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff's pleadings that the action is barred and

the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like.”47 Any claim for back

wages accrued when Ms. Lee resigned in October 2020—at the latest.48 Because the

prescriptive periods lapsed in October 2021 for her LWPA claims and October 2022

for her FLSA claims, her claims are also time-barred.49

43 E.g., Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2009).

44 COMPLAINT, Lee I, No. 21-CV-3232 (W.D. La. Sept. 3, 2021), R. Doc. 1 at 8.

45 Id. at 10.

46 See Oreck, 560 F.3d at 403–04.

47 Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

48 See Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261, 271 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on reh'g, 826 F.2d 2

(5th Cir. 1987) (“A cause of action [under the FLSA] accrues at each regular payday immediately

following the work period during which the services were rendered for which the wage or overtime

compensation is claimed.”)

49 See La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (prescribing a one-year period to bring tort claims); 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)

(prescribing a two-year period to bring claims under FLSA absent bad faith by the employer). Ms. Lee

has failed to adequately allege bad faith for the purposes of applying a three-year statute of limitations

to her FLSA claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the City’s Motion to Dismiss®° is GRANTED, and

Sandra Lee’s claims against the City of Shreveport are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. A judgment consistent with this ruling shall be issued accordingly.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 28th day of June, 2024.

JERRY EDWARDS, JR.

UWVIED STATES DISTRICT JUDG

50 Doc. 4.