Williams v. City of Baton Rouge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ARCHIE WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CITY OF BATON ROUGE, ET AL. NO. 20-00162-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff in this civil rights case was wrongly convicted for rape in 1985 and

spent thirty-five years in prison. On March 17, 2020, he filed suit against numerous

individuals for their alleged role in his conviction. (Doc. 1). These included

Defendants Marjorie Groht, Alfred Charles Mondrick, and Steven Woodring, police

officers involved in Plaintiffs arrest and conviction, and the City of Baton

Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge (City/Parish), (hereinafter, the “Police

Defendants”); and Defendants Sybil Guidry, a fingerprint examiner for the Louisiana

Bureau of Identification, Patrick Lane, a forensic scientist with the Louisiana State

Police Crime Lab, and Nace Jerry Miller, a serologist with the Louisiana State Police

Crime Lab (hereinafter, the “Forensic Defendants”). The Court granted summary

judgment to the Forensic Defendants in June 2024. (Doc. 132). Now before the Court

is the Police Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 115, the

“Motion”), in which these Defendants assert the defense of qualified immunity. The

Motion is opposed. (Doc. 180). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Summary Judgment Evidence

The facts set forth below are drawn from the Court’s prior Ruling and Order

(Doc. 132) on the Forensic Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the parties’

competing statements of material fact, (Docs. 115-8, 130-1), and the competent

summary judgment evidence submitted in support of these pleadings.

On December 9, 1982, a white woman was raped and stabbed multiple times

in her Baton Rouge residence which she shared with her husband and two children.

(Doc. 64-2 § 1). The assailant, a black man who acted alone, forcibly entered the

house, and took the woman to a second-story bedroom. (/d. J 2). The woman

recognized him “immediately” as someone who had come to her back door around a

month earlier saying he was lost. (Doc. 67-1 at 6). She was face-to-face with him

multiple times during the incident. (/d. at 15, 16, 20). During the assault, the woman

noticed a three-inch-long scar on the attacker's right arm. (/d. at 17).

While the sexual assault was in progress, the woman’s minor daughter arrived

at the house, accompanied by Stephanie Alexander, an adult, and Ms. Alexander’s

minor daughter. (Ud. { 3). After Ms. Alexander entered the house, she went to the

bedroom and found the armed assailant and the woman, whose hands were visibly

bloody. Ud. § 6). In the bedroom, Ms. Alexander covered her eyes and “kept saying I

can’t see you.. . | don’t know who you are ...I can’t identify you... . [j]ust get out of

here.” (Doc. 67-1 at 19-20). The assailant ordered Ms. Alexander to lie down, after

which he fled and was not seen again. (/d. □ 7). The whole attack lasted between ten

and fifteen minutes. (Id. § 5).

Following the assault, the victim was treated at Baton Rouge General

Hospital, where a rape kit was prepared. (Doc. 99 at 19). Separately, Ms. Alexander

worked with officers to create a composite sketch of the assailant. (Doc. 67-1 at 25).

Based on this description, an initial photo lineup was created and presented to the

victim on December 15, six days after the assault. (/d. at 25-26). This lineup consisted

of 48 pictures arranged in groups of six, and did not contain any photo of Plaintiff.

(Doc. 130 at 5). The victim did not recognize the person who attacked her in any of

those photos. (/d.).

The next day, Groht and Mondrick presented the victim a single photo lineup

of six images, none of whom was Plaintiff. (Doc. 115-5 at 132). The victim made no

positive identification from this line up but did say that two of the photos depicted

individuals who looked similar to the person who attacked her. (Id.).

On January 3, 1983, the victim was shown five more lineups of six photos, none

of which included Plaintiff and none of which she recognized. (Jd. at 187-188). Later

the same day, an informant named Plaintiff as the attacker. (/d. at 138). The police

returned to show the victim a six-photo lineup that included a photo of Plaintiff in

position four. Ud.). “The victim viewed the .. . lineup for approximately ten (10)

seconds[,] and then she put her finger on photo #4[,] and she began to tremble.” (Id.).

The victim used a paper to cover the hair of the person in photo four and the person

in photo two, and then dismissed photo two as displaying an individual who was “too

big” and whose face “was too fat.” (Id.). Photo four, she said, “looked very, very close

to her attacker,” and she “felt pretty sure that this was the man.” (/d.). She was not,

however, positive of her identification, and asked for a side view lineup. (Id.)

When presented with the side view lineup that same day, the victim said that

the image of Plaintiff, now in position two, “looked the most like” her attacker, “but

she could not positively say.” (d.).

The next day, detectives obtained a more recent photo of Plaintiff. (Id. at 140).

They noticed “a striking resemblance” between the composite sketch, “which was

prepared from information furnished by the victim,” and the “picture of [Plaintiff].”

(Id.). The detectives created a lineup using the recent photo of Plaintiff in position

number one. (/d. at 141). This time, the victim “immediately pointed to” the photo of

Plaintiff, and “became very excited.” (/d.). “Detectives noted that the victim’s hands

were trembling[,] and her lips were quivering[,] and that she turned pale.” (/d.). She

screamed “in a loud voice that the subject in position #1 was the subject that raped

her.” (/d.). Later, the victim testified that when she saw the photo of Plaintiff in the

final lineup, she “jumped out of the chair screaming this is the one.” (Doc. 67-1 at 25—

26). She also testified that after seeing the photo, “[i]t was the best feeling in the

world to know that there wasn’t any doubt left in [her] mind.” (Doc. 67-1 at 25-26).

She did not “hesitate in any fashion” when identifying the man. (Id. at 31).

In all, the victim was shown photographic lineups on five separate occasions—

on December 15 and 16, twice on January 3, and a final time on January 4. (Doc. 130-

1 § 3). Plaintiff Archie Williams appeared in three photo arrays.

Two days after the final photo lineup, the woman went to a physical lineup

where she “saw [Plaintiff] instantly.” (Doc. 67-1 at 33). She later identified Plaintiff

in open court at his trial, (d.), where she described a distinctive scar on the right arm

of the man who raped her. (/d. at 35). Following the in-court identification, Plaintiff

stood before the jury to reveal just such a scar on his right arm. (/d.). Plaintiff was

convicted on April 21, 1983, and sentenced to 30 years for aggravated burglary, 50

years for attempted murder, and life in prison for aggravated rape. (Doc. 64-1 at 3).

Tragically, the victim was completely mistaken in her identification. For 36

years, Plaintiff maintained his innocence. No physical evidence had connected him to

the crime. (See Docs. 99 at 14; 96-1 at 3). Finally, in 2019, Plaintiff was released from

prison when latent fingerprint evidence from the crime scene was examined using a

fingerprint database created in 2014, and a different man was identified as the

attacker. (Doc. 70-3 at 4).

b. Procedural History

On March 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the Police and Forensic

Defendants for their alleged misconduct in the investigation and prosecution of the

criminal case for which he was convicted. Against the Police Defendants, Plaintiff

alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for fabrication of

evidence through the use of impermissibly suggestive identification procedures,

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice

of failing to train or supervise, supervisor liability. (Doc. 10). Plaintiff also alleged

state law claims for malicious prosecution, spoliation of evidence, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and vicarious liability, all arising from the

same facts underlying the § 1983 claims. (/d.).

The Police Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims, asserting

the defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 115). Plaintiff opposes the Motion but only

responds to the claim for impermissibly suggestive identification procedures. (Doc.

130).

I. LAWAND ANALYSIS

a. Standard

The summary judgment standard is well-set: to prevail, Defendants must show

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this assessment, the

Court must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff—the non-moving party. Owens v. Circassia Pharms., Inc., 33

F.4th 814, 824 (5th Cir. 2022). Even so, under the Federal and Local Civil Rules,

Plaintiff must counter with evidence to support his claims: “A non-movant will not

avoid summary judgment by presenting speculation, improbable inferences, or

unsubstantiated assertions.” Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quotation marks omitted); see also M.D. La. Local Rule 56. To the point, summary

judgment is required if Plaintiff fails to “produce any summary judgment evidence on

an essential element of [his] claim.” Geiserman v. MacDonald, 898 F.2d 787, 793 (5th

Cir. 1990).

b. Discussion

The Police Defendants invoke qualified immunity. The qualified immunity

doctrine turns the traditional summary judgment burden on its head, requiring

Plaintiff—the non-moving party—to “demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.”

Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 975 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). To

meet his burden, Plaintiff must “(1) raise a fact dispute on whether his constitutional

rights were violated by the defendants’ individual conduct, and (2) show those rights

were clearly established at the time of the violation.” Jd. (quotation marks omitted).

The Court may address either prong of the analysis first, Winzer v. Kaufman Cnty.,

916 F.3d 464, 473 (6th Cir. 2019), and Plaintiffs failure to carry his burden at one

prong is fatal, e.g., Babinski v. Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515, 522 (5th Cir. 2023). The

Court will address the fabrication of evidence claim first, followed by the claim for

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, the claim against the City/Parish for failure

to train and supervise, and the state law claims.

i. Fabrication of Evidence Through Impermissibly

Suggestive Identification Procedures

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Groht, Mondrick, and Woodring “engaged in

unreasonable, unnecessary, and unduly suggestive identification procedures” which

were “intended to communicate and/or suggest to [the victim] that Archie Williams

was the actual assailant,” in violation of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process. (Doc. 10 { 64). In particular, Plaintiff argues that the violation occurred

when the victim was presented with successive photo lineups depicting Plaintiff.

(Doc. 180 at 14). The Police Defendants argue that the identification process did not

violate constitutional protections.

“It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to

due process,” making an identification procedure that leads to a very substantial

likelihood of misidentification the “primary evil to be avoided” when presenting photo

lineups. New! v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (citing Simmons v. United States,

390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). “Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they

increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are

condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is

gratuitous.” Id. Yet, even if an identification procedure was unnecessarily and

impermissibly suggestive, a constitutional violation is not guaranteed. Rather, the

next step is to determine whether, “under the totality of the circumstances[,] the

identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”

Id. at 199; see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (‘[R]eliability is the

linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”); Abdur

Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.8d 122, 13838 (2d. Cir. 2001) (“In sum, the identification

evidence will be admissible if (a) the procedures were not suggestive or (b) the

identification has independent reliability.” (citations omitted)).

Courts around the country have consistently held, including before Plaintiffs

conviction up to the present day, that over-representation of a defendant in photo

arrays does not make an identification procedure impermissibly suggestive, let alone

give rise to “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons,

390 U.S. at 384; see United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 985 (2nd Cir. 1970)

(inclusion of three photographs of defendant, taken years apart and at different

angles, in an array of sixteen pictures was not a denial of due process); United States

v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269, 1271-73 (4th Cir. 1970) (affirming admission of

testimony concerning photographic identifications as not impermissibly suggestive

although seven of fourteen photographs were of appellants, and the only color

photographs were of appellants and a codefendant); Williams v. Lavigne, 209 F.

App’x. 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Clearly established federal law does not mandate a

finding of undue suggestiveness merely because a witness viewed multiple photo

arrays and lineups before ultimately identifying the defendant.”); United States v.

Harris, 281 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2002) (‘[T]here is nothing per se impermissible

about placing the same subject in two different identification procedures.”); United

States v. Martinez, No. CA 11-16, 2012 WL 3059728, at *7 (D. Del. July 25, 2012)

(quoting United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 608 (1st Cir. 1975)) (finding that

law enforcement using two photo arrays was not impermissibly suggestive, as “the

agents did not specify which photo to select, and the resulting identification was an

‘independent decision made without difficulty.”); United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d

1065, 1108 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s finding that identification

procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive where witnesses were shown different

photo arrays on two different occasions weeks apart and presented a separate photo

array six months later with a different picture); English v. Cody, 241 F.3d 1279, 1283

(10th Cir. 2001) (use of a petitioner’s photo in a second lineup after a witness chose

the wrong picture in an initial lineup is not unnecessarily suggestive). see also

Ragunauth v. Ercole, 07 CV 1692, 2008 WL 5401586, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008)

(finding “the witness viewing petitioner two times in a photo array did not taint the

subsequent lineup”); Langston v. Sherman, No. 117CV01108, 2018 WL 34386964, at

*30 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2018) (“[T]he law does not deem impermissible suggestiveness

to arise whenever police or prosecutors expose a witness to a defendant or his or her

picture on multiple occasions.”); cf. Diggs v. Spitzer, No. 06-CV-584S, 2007 WL

3036862, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2007) (using two photos of a defendant in the same

array is not unnecessarily suggestive); Flynn v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections,

No. 91-7888, 1992 WL 50110, at *3—4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1992) (same).

In Simmons, the Supreme Court upheld the use of a six-photo lineup in which

the defendant appeared in multiple photos. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385. That case was

decided in 1968, 15 years before the investigation and trial of Plaintiff, which means

that Simmons was established law when the victim here was shown multiple lineups

featuring Plaintiff. Id. Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity if there is no

constitutional violation, or if the conduct did not violate law clearly established at the

time. Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019).

Because the law was clearly established at the time of the investigation into Plaintiff

that the appearance of a suspect in multiple photo arrays on its own does not violate

due process, the Court finds that the lineup procedures used here did not violate

Plaintiffs due process rights. Importantly, there is no evidence to indicate that the

victim here was told anything about the progress of the investigation, or that the

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police officers in any other way suggested which person in the pictures was under

suspicion. In other words, there is no indication that the identification procedure used

here was unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. Defendants Groht, Mondrick,

and Woodring are accordingly entitled to qualified immunity and Plaintiffs claims

against them will be dismissed.

ii. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

Next, the Police Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Count

Five, which alleges a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against Groht

and Mondrick for an alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. (Doc. 115-2 at

8-9). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Groht and Mondrick failed to

disclose to prosecuting attorneys a statement from the victim “that her attacker did

not ejaculate” when he raped her. (Doc. 10 4 10). Plaintiff further alleges that this

statement was purposefully withheld to inculpate Plaintiff. As mentioned above,

however, Plaintiff fails to contest Defendant’s Motion as to this claim.

When summary judgment is unopposed, “[t]he movant has the burden of

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and, unless he has done

so, the court may not grant the motion, regardless of whether any response was

filed.” Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.8d 360, 3862 (5th Cir. 1995)

(citing Hibernia Natl Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d

1277, 1279 (Sth Cir. 1985)). In this District, however, the failure to file an opposition

requires the Court to deem the moving party’s statements of uncontested material

facts admitted. See M.D. La. LR 56(/).

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In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held that

“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective

of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. The prosecutor’s duty to

provide favorable evidence includes impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). To prevail on a Brady claim, a

defendant or plaintiff must show that (1) the prosecutor suppressed evidence; (2) the

evidence is favorable to the defense; and (8) the evidence is material to guilt or

punishment. Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Brady, 378

U.S. at 87).

Notably, here, Plaintiff argues that police officers involved in the criminal

investigation of Plaintiff committed a Brady violation, not the prosecutors who tried

Plaintiffs criminal case. (Doc. 10 at 24-25). Brady, however, generally does not

extend to police officers. Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir.

2001). Instead, the Fifth Circuit has held that although neither police officers or lab

technicians have a Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal

defendants, allegations that such parties “elicited false evidence and deliberately

concealed exculpatory evidence from all parties, including the prosecution,” will

support § 19838 liability. Mowbray v. Cameron County, Tex., 274 F.3d 269, 278 n.5

(5th Cir. 2001). But Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that Groht or Mondrick

“deliberately concealed” the evidence in question. See id. Nor has Plaintiff offered any

argument in support of this claim.

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For these reasons, the Court finds that no constitutional violation occurred and

Groht and Mondrick are entitled to qualified immunity.

iii. Failure to Train and Supervisory Liability

The Police Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims

against the City/Parish Defendant for failure to train or supervise. “Municipalities

cannot be held lable under [§] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, and a [city or

parish] is not liable where an injury is caused solely by one ofits employees.” Harmon,

478 F. Supp. 3d at 578 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 486 U.S. 658, 690

(1978)). Monell established the standards for a municipal lability claim under § 1983

by articulating the three elements of such a claim: “(1) an official policy (or custom),

of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge,

and (8) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).”

Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing Monell). “As

is well established, every Monell claim requires ‘an underlying constitutional

violation.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017). As

explained above, the Court has found that no underlying constitutional violation

occurred here. For this reason, Plaintiffs failure to train or supervise claim fails.

A “supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 for the wrongful

acts of a subordinate when [the supervisory official] breaches a duty imposed by state

or local law, and this breach causes plaintiffs constitutional injury.” Tuttle v. Sepolio,

68 F.4th 969, 975 (5th Cir. 2028) (quotations omitted). Again, however, the Court has

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found that no underlying constitutional violation occurred. For this reason, Plaintiffs

supervisory liability claim fails as well.

iv. State Law Claims

Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs state law

claims for malicious prosecution, spoliation of evidence, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, negligence, and vicarious liability, arguing that “Plaintiff cannot

establish a basis of support for each essential element” of such claim. (Doc. 115-2 at

13). Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence whatsoever in support of his state

law claims. Moreover, the Court has found that no constitutional violation occurred

with respect to any of Plaintiffs § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs state law claims, which are

based on the same conduct that underlies Plaintiffs § 1983 claims, will therefore be

dismissed with prejudice.

iI. CONCLUSION

Regrettably, although a flawed prosecution and a mistaken eyewitness sent

Plaintiff to prison for decades, and the State of Louisiana has definitively stated in

its joint filing seeking to vacate Plaintiff's sentence that Plaintiff is factually innocent

of his crimes, (see Doc. 70-3), the law does not provide a remedy for Plaintiffs claims

here.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton

Rouge, Alfred Charles Mondrick, Marjorie Groht, and Steve Woodring’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 15) be and is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims

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against these Defendants be and are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Judgment will issue separately.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this IT day of October, 2024

bo Q.

BRIAN A. JACKS JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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