Brown v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PATRICK W. BROWN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-423

JASON R. WILLIAMS, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the opposed1 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss2 of

Jason Williams, in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney.

For the following reasons, the Court denies Williams’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the now vacated conviction of Patrick Brown by

the Orleans Parish District Attorney (“OPDA”) for the aggravated rape of a

minor. Brown sues the OPDA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that the

OPDA is liable for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment based on its

unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs regarding the disclosure of

exculpatory or favorable evidence to criminal defendants under Brady v.

1 R. Doc. 18.

2 R. Doc. 11.

Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).3 Williams now moves to dismiss Brown’s

complaint, arguing that prosecutors acted for the State of Louisiana, not a

municipal entity, when establishing the office’s Brady policies, and therefore

he cannot be found liable under Section 1983.4

The Court considers Williams’s motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially

plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and

must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court is not

bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

3 R. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 196-199.

4 R. Doc. 11.

A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer

possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’”

See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint

(1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to

raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant

evidence of each element of a claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257 (citations

omitted). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual

allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there

is an insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the

contents of the pleadings, including attachments. Brand Coupon Network,

L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court

may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an

opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the

pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. “The district court ‘may

also consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.’” Hall v.

Hodgkins, 305 F. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software

Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996)).

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 authorizes suits for damages against any “person who,

under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Courts consider

municipalities and other local government units to be “persons” for the

purposes of Section 1983, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690

& n. 54 (1978), but not “a State nor its officials,” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

“To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show

that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3)

was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson

v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs therefore

may sue “those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final

policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the

action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory

violation at issue.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989).

Brown argues that the OPDA is liable for its Brady policies, which led

to prosecutors’ alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in his case.5

In response, Williams contends that the Court must attribute the

promulgation of the Brady policies not to the OPDA, but to the State of

Louisiana, which cannot be held liable under Section 1983.6

To determine which government entity is liable for the promulgation

of a policy, courts must “ask whether governmental officials are final

policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular

issue,” based on “the actual function of [the] government official” defined

“under relevant state law.” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784

(1997). The Fifth Circuit has already answered the question at issue and held

that a Louisiana district attorney acts on behalf of his office as a local

governmental entity, not the State of Louisiana, when failing to enact

constitutionally sufficient Brady policies. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,

187 F.3d 452, 468 (5th Cir. 1999).

5 R. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 169-179, 247-260.

6 See R. Doc. 11.

In Burge, the Fifth Circuit outlined the analysis set forth in McMillian

and performed an “analysis of state law” to determine whether the St.

Tammany Parish District Attorney was a “policymaker[] for the local

government” or the state with respect to the disclosure of exculpatory

evidence. 187 F.3d at 468 (citing McMillian at 784). The court considered

provisions of the Louisiana Constitution now cited by Williams7 that state

“that a district attorney has charge of every criminal prosecution by the State

in his district, and is the representative of the State before, and legal advisor

to, the grand jury.” Id. at 469 (citing La. Const. art. 5, § 26). It also looked

to Louisiana statutes describing the powers and duties of a district attorney,

as well as case law on the liability of a local governmental entity for the torts

of its employees. Id. at 469-70. Additionally, the court considered that the

district attorney is an autonomous local governmental official and not

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 469. The Fifth Circuit

concluded that “in a suit against a district attorney in his official capacity

under § 1983 for constitutional torts caused by the district attorney’s policies

regarding the acquisition, security, and disclosure of Brady material, a

victory for the plaintiff imposes liability on the district attorney’s office as an

independent local entity.” Id. at 470. This precedent controls here.

7 R. Doc. 11-1 at 10.

Williams argues that the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Daves v.

Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522, 532 (5th Cir. 2002), overrules Burge, and that

Daves and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Arnone v. Dallas County, 29 F.4th

262, 266 (5th Cir. 2022), indicate that the OPDA was acting for the state with

respect to the adoption of its Brady policies. He argues that these cases

rejected the application of factors such as Eleventh Amendment immunity,

vicarious liability, and the autonomy of the office that were considered in

Burge. 8 See Daves, 22 F.4th at 540-41; Arnone, 29 F.4th at 269-70. But

neither Daves nor Arnone purports to overturn Burge, and “[a]n ‘en banc’

decision cannot overturn a binding published panel decision unless it does

so clearly.” United States v. Lamartiniere, 100 F. 4th 625, 640 (5th Cir.

2024) (quoting United States v. Vega, 960 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2020).

Although Williams asserts that these decisions have “undermined” Burge so

that it is no longer controls,9 this Court cannot refuse to follow binding Fifth

Circuit precedent on the grounds that another case “abrogated” or “implicitly

overruled it.” In re Bonvillian Marine Serv. Inc., 19 F.4th 787, 789 (5th Cir.

2021) (holding that a district court correctly considered itself bound by a

Fifth Circuit precedent, despite an intervening change in the law).

8 R. Doc. 11-1 at 19.

9 Id. at 16-17.

Moreover, Burge, Daves, and Arnone all purport to conduct the same

McMillian analysis of state law. See Arnone, 29 F.4th at 267 (noting that the

Daves opinion “clarifies how to attribute a policymaker’s actions under

McMillian”). Daves and Arnone did not create a new analysis. Further,

Daves and Arnone inquired into substantively different policies and state

laws than those at issue in Burge. In Daves, an en banc Fifth Circuit held

that Dallas County district and county judges acted on behalf of Texas, not

Dallas County, when they set bail schedules. 22 F.4th at 540-41. Likewise,

in Arnone, a Fifth Circuit panel held that Texas district attorneys acted on

behalf of the state when they set policies regarding when to seek revocation

of probation or deferred adjudication. 29 F.4th at 269-70. Neither ruling

examined policies involving the acquisition, security, and disclosure of

Brady materials, as considered in Burge. Moreover, McMillian made clear

that the relevant analysis is state law specific. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at

782 (“[T]he question is . . . whom [officials] represent in a particular area or

on a particular issue . . . [which] is dependent on the definition of the

official’s function under relevant state law.” (emphasis added)). As neither

ruling addressed what Louisiana law provides with respect to district

attorneys making Brady policies, they do not require rejection of Burge.10

As six other sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana have already

held, neither Daves nor Arnone abrogates the Fifth Circuit’s decision in

Burge on the attribution of a Louisiana district attorney’s Brady policies. See

Dent v. Williams, No. 23-3104, 2024 WL 4188521, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Sept. 13,

2024) (Long, J.); Williams v. Williams, No. 23-1922, 2023 WL 6160990, at

*2-4 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2023) (Africk, J.); Jones v. Williams, No. 22-5097,

2023 WL 3211865, at *3-4 (E.D. La. May 2, 2023) (Ashe, J.); Reeder v.

Williams, No. 22-4614, 2023 WL 2771481, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2023)

(Zainey, J.); Floyd v. Dillman, 659 F. Supp. 3d 724, 728-29 (E.D. La. 2023)

(Milazzo, J.); Smith v. Williams, No. 22-1550, 2023 WL 2263841, at *6-10

(E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2023) (Brown, C.J.). The Brady policies underlying

Brown’s Section 1983 claim are attributable to the OPDA “as an independent

local entity,” 187 F.3d at 470, not to the State of Louisiana. The Court

therefore denies Williams’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

10 Indeed, in a recent, unpublished decision of the Fifth Circuit, the panel

cited the decision in Burge with approval for the proposition that

“‘[f]or purposes of “official capacity” suits under § 1983, the district

attorney’s office resembles other local government entities.’” Kimble

v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Off., 2023 WL 1793876, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb.

7 2023) (quoting Burge, 187 F.3d at 470).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Williams’s motion to

dismiss.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this_28th_ day of October, 2024.

Lernk Varese.

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10