“A condition precedent is either an act of a party that must be performed or a certain event that must happen before a contractual right accrues or a contractual duty arises. The failure of a condition to occur excuses performance by the party whose performance is dependent on its occurrence.”
How later courts described this case
- “A condition precedent is either an act of a party that must be performed or a certain event that must happen before a contractual right accrues or a contractual duty arises. The failure of a condition to occur excuses performance by the party whose performance is dependent on its occurrence.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LATOYA NIXON CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 22-379
VERA CHESTER, ET AL. SECTION: “P” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and to Set Evidentiary
Hearing Thereon1 filed by Defendant, Daniel Edwards in his official capacity as the Tangipahoa
Parish Sheriff. Plaintiff, Latoya Nixon, opposes the motion.2 Following the evidentiary hearing
on the issues raised in the motion, the parties filed supplemental briefing as ordered by the Court.3
Having reviewed and considered the motion, the memoranda and materials submitted in
connection with same, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing, and the applicable law, the Court finds the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement
should be GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Latoya Nixon instituted this action following an incident at the Tangipahoa Parish
jail on February 14, 2021, involving Nixon and two Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office (“TPSO”)
employees—Deputy Vera Chester and Sergeant Latoya Edwards-Williams.4 Nixon alleges she
was brought to the jail on a charge of driving under the influence.5 As she was being escorted by
Chester and Edwards-Williams to be pat down, the parties exchanged curse words, and Nixon told
1 R. Doc. 44.
2 R. Doc. 56.
3 R. Docs. 63, 72.
4 R. Doc. 1.
5 Id. at ¶ 11.
the officers if she was going to be treated like a dog, then she would act like a dog.6 Nixon then
proceeded to bark and imitate a dog.7 Nixon alleges she was facing the wall with her hands behind
her back when Chester grabbed her by the hair, forcefully pulled Nixon’s wig off, and then pushed
Nixon’s head, causing it to strike the wall.8 Chester and Edwards-Williams then forced Nixon into
a bathroom without a camera, where Nixon alleges the officers punched her approximately three
to five times and sprayed her with a chemical agent approximately three times.9 After exiting the
bathroom, Nixon was handcuffed and placed on a bench.10 Nixon further alleges that while she
was sitting on the bench, Chester threw a bag at her on three occasions before eventually walking
away.11
According to the Complaint, a TPSO detective conducted an internal affairs investigation
after the incident and determined that excessive force was used against Nixon.12 Chester was then
criminally charged with simple battery, and her employment with the TPSO was terminated.13 As
of the filing of the Complaint, Nixon did not know whether Edwards-Williams had been criminally
charged or whether she was still employed by the TPSO.14
Nixon alleges the officers’ use of force and chemical agents caused her to experience
burning sensations, a black and swollen eye, and bruising.15 She also alleges that, as of the filing
of the Complaint, she continued to suffer from eye “floaters” that impair her vision because of the
6 Id. at ¶¶ 12–13.
7 Id. at ¶ 13.
8 Id. at ¶¶ 14–16.
9 Id. at ¶¶ 17–19.
10 Id. at ¶ 21.
11 Id.
12 Id. at ¶¶ 22, 28.
13 Id. at ¶¶ 29–30.
14 Id. at ¶ 31.
15 Id. at ¶ 25.
incident.16 In addition, she alleges she has suffered emotional distress, pain and suffering,
degradation, and invasion of her civil rights.17
Nixon asserts Chester and Edwards-Williams, in their individual capacities, are liable to
her pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.18 She
also asserts state law claims for negligence and battery against Chester and Edwards-Williams as
well as Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff Daniel Edwards, in his official capacity.19
Defendant Sheriff Edwards, through his counsel of record (“Bryant”), filed the instant
motion, arguing the parties properly confected a settlement agreement that resolves all the claims
in this matter, and asks the Court to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties.20
Plaintiff Nixon, through her then-counsel of record (“DeReus”), filed an opposition to the
motion.21 The opposition states that DeReus conferred with Nixon prior to submitting the
opposition and that DeReus believes the opposition encapsulates Nixon’s position on the issue.
DeReus subsequently withdrew from representing Nixon in this matter, and Plaintiff Nixon is now
proceeding pro se.22
At the time the instant motion was filed, this case was pending before Chief Judge Brown,
who held an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the motion and opposition.23 The parties
then submitted supplemental briefing following the evidentiary hearing.24 Shortly thereafter, this
case was transferred to the undersigned district judge.25
16 Id.
17 Id. at ¶ 26.
18 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 35–45.
19 Id. at ¶¶ 3, 46–65.
20 R. Doc. 44.
21 R. Doc. 56.
22 R. Doc. 70.
23 R. Doc. 58.
24 R. Docs. 63, 72.
25 R. Doc. 73.
Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, it is undisputed that on
Tuesday, March 21, 2023, DeReus sent an email to Bryant that said, “I have authorization from
Ms. Nixon to resolve this matter for $70,000.00.”26 And on Wednesday, March 22, 2023, at 10:40
a.m., Bryant responded, “We conditionally accept and agree to a full and complete settlement at
$70,000.00 with each party to bear their own costs. The condition, of course, being the approval
of the board as you and I discussed. I anticipate that we’ll have a quorum by Friday or Monday.”27
Shortly thereafter, at 11:58 a.m., DeReus emailed the chambers of the magistrate judge assigned
to this case stating, “The parties in this action have reached compromise, subject to approval vote
by the Sheriff’s Insurance Board. The parties would like to put the settlement on the record before
a court reporter. From my call with Bianca, it sounds like it might be possible to have a telephone
conference tomorrow at 11:00 a.m. to put the terms on the record.”28 The Sheriff’s Insurance
Board approved the settlement on Thursday, March 23, 2023,29 but, for the reasons explained
below, the terms of the settlement were never put on the record.
On March 22, after receiving the acceptance email from Bryant, DeReus sent a text
message to Nixon at 10:44 a.m., stating “Great news. Give me a call when you are available.”30
At some point between 10:44 a.m. and 12:34 p.m., Nixon called DeReus, and he relayed to her
that the defendants agreed to settle the case for $70,000.00 and that there would be a call with the
magistrate judge to put the terms of the agreement on the record. According to DeReus, based on
his impression of this conversation, Nixon was satisfied with the settlement amount, and
everything seemed fine. Then, at 12:34 p.m., DeReus sent a follow-up text message to Nixon,
26 R. Doc. 59-1.
27 R. Doc. 59-2. Although Bryant was counsel of record for Sheriff Edwards only, Bryant testified he had been
authorized to negotiate settlement on behalf of all defendants in this matter.
28 R. Doc. 59-3.
29 R. Doc. 59-5.
30 R. Doc. 59-4.
letting her know that the call with the magistrate judge would likely be the next day (Thursday) at
11:00 a.m.31 Nixon then responded to DeReus in a series of text messages, first stating she would
call DeReus prior to the call with the magistrate judge, then stating “I really wanna [sic] say I’m
not settling out unless they throw my ticket out too[.]” She then explained she had multiple tickets
in Ponchatoula, Tickfaw, and Hammond32 and said she was “only signing if they throw [her]
ticket[s] out too” because it would be “of no cost” to the defendants.33 Nixon then followed up
saying she also wanted Edwards-Williams “pick[ed] up and arrested” before she would “sign any
paper work [sic].”34
The timeline of the following events is less clear, but, after receiving the text messages
from Nixon, DeReus reached out to Bryant to discuss Nixon’s requests. Bryant explained that the
defendants could not do what Nixon was asking, and DeReus asked if Bryant would explain those
reasons to Nixon directly. Bryant agreed, and DeReus, Bryant, and Nixon all held a phone call
during which Bryant provided those reasons to Nixon. Upon learning that defendants could not
assist her with her tickets in the way she wished, Nixon modified her request and said she would
not settle unless the defendants increased the settlement amount to cover the costs she would
otherwise have to pay to resolve the tickets. Bryant explained to Nixon that it was the defendants’
position that the parties had already reached an agreement to resolve this matter and, therefore, he
would be filing a motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
Given Nixon’s belief that this matter is not settled until she personally executes a settlement
agreement and, thus, that she still has the right to negotiate for additional relief, the parties have
31 Id.
32 Nixon was referring to tickets for traffic violations she received in cities within Tangipahoa Parish but that were
unrelated to this lawsuit.
33 R. Doc. 59-4.
34 Id.
not taken any additional steps towards consummation of the settlement agreement the defendants
contend the parties entered into on March 22, 2023.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Court has the inherent power to recognize, encourage, and enforce settlement
agreements reached by the parties.35 Defendants contend, and Plaintiff does not contest, that
federal law governs this dispute. Under federal law, a settlement agreement is a contract.36 The
federal common law of contracts “uses the core principles of common law of contracts that are in
force in most states.”37 For a valid contract to exist under federal law, there must be an offer,
acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds on all essential terms.38 Federal law does
not require settlement agreements to be reduced to writing.39 Thus, Nixon’s position that the
settlement agreement is not enforceable unless she personally signs a written agreement is
incorrect.
Nixon does not challenge the validity of the settlement agreement on the basis that any of
elements of contract formation have not been satisfied.40 Rather, the issue appears to be whether
DeReus, her counsel of record at the time, had the requisite authority to settle her claims. It is
well-settled that “an attorney of record is presumed to have authority to compromise and settle
35 Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Cia Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris,
374 F.2d 33, 35–36 (5th Cir. 1967)).
36 Guidry v. Halliburton Geophysical Servs., Inc., 976 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1992).
37 Smith v. United States, 328 F.3d 760, 767 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003).
38 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 786 F.3d 344, 355–59 (5th Cir. 2015).
39 E.E.O.C. v. Phillip Servs. Corp., 635 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1981)).
40 The Court recognizes that at the evidentiary hearing Chief Judge Brown requested supplemental briefing regarding
the condition of the approval vote of the Sheriff’s Insurance Board and whether that condition had any effect on the
timing of the contract formation. The Court agrees with the defendants’ position that the record reveals the parties
intended the approval vote to be a condition precedent to performance, as opposed to a condition precedent to
formation, and therefore the contract was formed on March 22, 2023, when Bryant accepted the offer to settle the
claims in this lawsuit for $70,000.00. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 786 F.3d at 361 (“A condition precedent is either
an act of a party that must be performed or a certain event that must happen before a contractual right accrues or a
contractual duty arises. The failure of a condition to occur excuses performance by the party whose performance is
dependent on its occurrence.”) (cleaned up).
litigation of his client.”41 To rebut this presumption, the party challenging the attorney’s authority
bears the burden of proving by affirmative evidence that the attorney had not been given express
authority to settle.42 Based on the record before the Court, Nixon has failed to carry her burden.
At the evidentiary hearing, Nixon’s timeline of events was unclear and at times contrary to
the documentary evidence in the record. Despite repeated questions to clarify when she had certain
conversations with DeReus and what she recalled saying during those conversations—which were
asked in an effort to determine whether she spoke to DeReus on March 21 before he sent the email
to Bryant stating he had authorization to resolve the matter for $70,000.00—Nixon kept referring
to the phone calls and conversations held on March 22 and the days following. DeReus, however,
testified that he did call Nixon on March 21 prior to sending the email to Bryant.43 The Court
finds this testimony persuasive. Indeed, Nixon does not deny that the parties held this conversation
or that DeReus spoke to her about settling with the defendants for $70,000.00. Instead, she merely
contends that she did not realize that there would not be further opportunity to negotiate after the
offer was made.
The record is unclear regarding exactly what words were exchanged between DeReus and
Nixon during the March 21 conversation, but three things are clear. First, DeReus initiated the
call with Nixon on March 21 for the purpose of determining whether he had authority to settle the
case for $70,000.00. Second, he had no doubt in his mind at the conclusion of the conversation
that Nixon had given him such authority. Third, after his conversation with Nixon, DeReus sent
the email to Bryant stating, “I have authorization from Ms. Nixon to resolve this matter for
41 See, e.g., Quesada v. Napolitano, 701 F.3d 1080, 1083 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win,
Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1984)).
42 See Mid-South Towing Co., 733 F.2d at 390–91.
43 This testimony is also supported by Nixon’s version of events as stated in both memoranda she provided to the
Court with respect to the instant motion. See R. Docs. 56, 72.
$70,000.00.” Although DeReus’s testimony that he believed he had been given authority to settle
the case is not conclusive of whether he was actually given such authority, it is highly probative.“
And the Court finds that DeReus’s belief that he had been given express authority 1s substantiated
by the fact that DeReus spoke to Nixon almost immediately after Bryant sent the acceptance email,
and Nixon did not express any issue or dissatisfaction with the terms of the settlement agreement
at that time. Indeed, it was not until DeReus sent the second text message about putting the terms
of the agreement on the record that Nixon began expressing an unwillingness to go forward with
the settlement agreement without additional relief.
Ultimately, Nixon has not put forth any affirmative evidence that she did not provide
DeReus with express authority to settle this matter for $70,000.00. To the contrary, the record
before the Court appears to support the presumption that DeReus did have authority to settle.
Nixon’s challenge to the validity and enforceability of the settlement agreement therefore fails.
I. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Enforce Settlement
Agreement (R. Doc. 44) is GRANTED.
Because the settlement agreement resolves Plaintiff's claims against all defendants in this
matter, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (R. Doc. 39)
and the Motion for Leave to File Answer Out of Time (R. Doc. 49), filed by Defendant Latoya
Edwards-Williams, are DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 30th day of September 2024.
ove paneer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
“4 See Mid-South Towing Co., 733 F.2d at 391.