The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
QUENTIN WILLIAMS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-847
SHERIFF CRAIG WEBRE, ET AL. SECTION: “J”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 28) filed by Defendant, Dr.
Stan Cowley and a response (Rec. Doc. 35) filed by Plaintiff Quentin Williams. Having
considered the motions and memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
finds the motion to dismiss should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court recently detailed the factual background underlying this case; (Rec.
Doc. 36); but provides the following allegations relating specifically to movant, Dr.
Cowley. This case arises from the medical treatment Lafourche Parish Jail and 17th
Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafourche employees and doctors provided to
Plaintiff Quentin Williams between January 1, 2022 and February 22, 2023. (Rec.
Doc. 1-1). Williams claims that, on February 14, 2023, after several interactions with
healthcare providers at the jail, the dentist, Dr. Cowley did not extract his tooth and
failed to follow up and prescribe additional medication. Id. at 5. Williams claims that
he presented to Dr. Cowley with fever, chills, and a swollen, red, throat. Id. The
complaint also states that Dr. Cowley told Williams that Williams would need a
surgery, but that it could not be covered while incarcerated. Id. After more treatment
by providers at the jail, Williams fell asleep and had to be rushed to the hospital and
subsequently placed in an induced coma. Id. at 8-9.
Williams currently has a pending claim against Dr. Cowley before a Louisiana
state medical review panel. (Rec. Doc. 28-1, at 2). Thus, in the instant motion, Dr.
Cowley argues that Plaintiff’s medical negligence and respondeat superior claims
against him should be dismissed as premature pursuant to the Louisiana Medical
Malpractice Act (“LMMA”). Id. at 2-3.
In his opposition, Williams argues that he also stated a § 1983 claim against
Dr. Cowley, which does not fall under the LMMA. (Rec. Doc. 35, at 1-3). Williams also
contends that Dr. Cowley failed to show that he falls under the LMMA. Id. at 3-8.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient
facts to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. The factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[D]etailed factual
allegations” are not required, but the pleading must present “more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232
(5th Cir. 2009). However, “‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading
as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’” Beavers v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether Williams alleged a § 1983 Claim
Even if Williams claims that he alleged a § 1983 claim against Dr. Cowley, that
claim would not survive the motion to dismiss. In his § 1983 claim, Williams contends
that unspecified Defendants “exceeded constitutional limitations” by failing to
provide adequate medical treatment. (Rec. Doc. 1-1, at 9). On a previous motion to
dismiss filed by other Defendant healthcare providers, the Court found that the
medical care that Williams received over at issue in this case did not amount to
deliberate indifference necessary for a § 1983 claim. (Rec. Doc. 36). Similarly here, a
§ 1983 claim against Dr. Cowley should be dismissed because his treatment of
Williams and Williams’s disagreement with the treatment do not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation.
“Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs constitutes an
Eighth Amendment violation and states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1244 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 105–07 (1976)). Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to
meet. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). The “official conduct must be ‘wanton,’ which is defined to
mean ‘reckless.’” Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th
Cir. 2017). “Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical
malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does an inmate’s
disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances.” Id.
Additionally, an incorrect diagnosis by medical personnel or the “failure to alleviate
a significant risk that [the official] should have perceived, but did not” are both
insufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d
1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).
“[A]n inmate who has been examined by medical personnel fails to set forth a
valid showing of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Mickens v. Stalder,
2008 WL 544240, at *2 (W.D. La. 2008) (citing Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.2d 286,
292 (5th Cir. 1997)). Instead, a plaintiff alleging a denial or delay of medical care
must show that the officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,
intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would
clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Domino v. Texas
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson, 759
F.2d at 1238).
Williams’s complaint simply establishes that he disagrees with the treatment
that Dr. Cowley provided—disagreement that does not amount to a § 1983 deliberate
indifference claim. The complaint states that Dr. Cowley saw Williams on February
14, 2023 and informed Williams that he was not able to pull his tooth. (Rec. Doc. 101,
at 5). Dr. Cowley stated that Williams would need a surgery, but that the surgery
could not be covered while incarcerated, and Dr. Cowley ordered no follow up and
prescribed no medication. Id. At the time, Williams alleges, his tooth was broken and
very tender, with decay below the gum line, his throat was swollen and red, and he
was experiencing fever and chills. Id. These claims demonstrate that Dr. Cowley
evaluated Williams because Williams reported his tooth infection and informed him
that he would need surgery in the future. Although Williams may have desired
different treatment than the treatment that he received from Dr. Cowley, Williams’s
own accounting of this treatment does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference
because he does not allege that Dr. Cowley refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in similar conduct
evincing a wanton disregard to his serious medical needs. Accordingly, Williams
failed to establish that Dr. Cowley violated his constitutional rights with deliberate
indifference in his provision of medical care to Williams. Thus, Williams’s § 1983
claim against the Dr. Cowley must be dismissed.
II. State Law Claims
Dr. Cowley argues that Williams’s state law claims against him for medical
negligence should be dismissed as premature pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute
40:1231.8. (Rec. Doc. 28-1, at 5-6). R.S. 40:1231.8. provides that a medical malpractice
claim against a private qualified health care provider is subject to dismissal on an
exception of prematurity if such claim has not first been presented to a medical review
panel. Blevins v. Hamilton Med. Ctr., Inc., 959 So. 2d 440, 444 (La. 2007).
The parties agree that Williams currently has a claim pending before a medical
review panel. (Rec. Doc. 28-1, at 5; Rec. Doc. 35, at 5). Accordingly, Williams’s state
law claims against Dr. Cowley are premature because Williams must present these
claims to a medical review panel prior to filing suit.
Though the briefing is unclear, Williams seems to argue that Dr. Cowley does
not meet the statutory requirements to fall under the LMMA, because Dr. Cowley did
not offer proof that his malpractice insurance policy applied at the time of the
incident. (Rec. Doc. 35, at 7). However, Dr. Cowley attached to his motion a certificate
of enrollment in the Patient’s Compensation Fund indicating insurance coverage for
the periods May 19, 2021 to May 19, 2022 and May 19, 2022 to May 19, 2023. (Rec.
Doc. 28-2). Thus, Dr. Cowley’s insurance policy applied at the time he treated
Williams, on February 14, 2023. Mr. Williams’s other arguments as to Dr. Cowley’s
coverage under the LMMA may be evaluated by the medical review panel.
III. Request to Cure the Complaint’s Defects
In his opposition memorandum, Williams also requests leave to amend with
the goal of curing the defects in his complaint. (Rec. Doc. 35, at 9). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a) provides the Court should grant leave to amend freely when
justice so requires. Leave to amend is not automatic, but a district court must possess
a “substantial reason” to deny a request for leave to amend. Halbert v. City of
Sherman, 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). To determine whether to grant leave to
amend, a court “may consider a variety of factors in exercising its discretion,
including undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility
of the amendment.” Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir.
2005).
Here, amendment of the federal claims in the complaint would be futile. As the
Court explained above, the facts underlying Williams’s allegations indicate that the
medical care Williams received from Dr. Cowley was not the result of deliberate
indifference. In the event that Williams seeks leave to amend his state law claims,
the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims in
light of the dismissal of the federal claims. Accordingly, Williams’s request for leave
to amend his complaint is denied.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 28) filed
by Defendant, Dr. Stan Cowley is GRANTED. Williams’s § 1983 claim against the
Dr. Cowley are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Williams’s state law claims against Dr.
Cowley are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 9th day of August, 2024.
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SAX
CARL J. BAR R
UNITED ST ob S DISTRICT JUDGE