Neaves v. Hampton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION

(at Lexington)

CONSTANCE O. NEAVES, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 5: 23-007-DCR

)

V. )

)

TONY HAMPTON, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendants. )

*** *** *** ***

Constance Neaves called 911 on November 13, 2021, after her mother, Opal Webb,

collapsed and was unresponsive. EMS workers found the 92-year-old Webb in “very poor

condition,” with overgrown nails and large decubitus ulcers on her lower extremities.

Following Webb’s arrival at the local emergency department, hospital staff proclaimed it “100

percent neglect” and “the worst case [they’d] ever seen.” Webb died two days later as a result

of septic shock secondary to translocation of bacteria from skin breakdown.

The Scott County Sheriff’s Office comenced an investigation and Neaves ultimately

was charged with manslaughter in the second degree based on these events, although the

charge was later dismissed without prejudice. Neaves now brings a host of claims against the

officers involved, including malicious prosecution, false arrest, and defamation. The

defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment which will be granted. While the

precise reasons for granting the defendants’ motion vary depending upon the particular claim,

there is a common thread underpinning the Court’s analysis: there was probable cause to

believe that Neaves had committed the crime charged.

I. Background

Opal Webb (“Webb”) and her daughter Constance Neaves (“Neaves”) lived next door

to each other in Sadieville, Kentucky. Webb was physically active and drove a car well into

her eighties. [Record No. 84-3, pp. 4-5] Her primary care physician, Benjamin Lyon, M.D.,

reported that Webb was not one to “run to the doctor with every little ache or pain,” but would

come if he instructed her to do so. Webb was diagnosed with cirrhosis of the liver as of

September 2020, which she and Neaves attributed to Webb’s long-term use of a medication

intended to prevent a recurrence of breast cancer. [See Record No. 74-1, p. 375.] Following

an August 2019 wellness visit, Dr. Lyon noted that Webb had no edema in her extremities and

was “doing very well for her age.” [Record No. 74-1, p. 118]

Around that same time, when Webb was 90 years old, her balance declined, and she

began falling at home. Following a couple of incidents which necessitated stays at a local

rehabilitation center, Webb moved in with Neaves in October 2020. Neaves was 70 years old

at the time and was living alone after a recent divorce. [Record Nos. 70-6; 81-4, p. 5; 84-31]

By that time, Webb had stopped driving and Neaves took her to her medical appointments.

Webb saw physician’s assistant Mandy Mynhier in October 2020 for “fluid in legs,”

which she complained was leaking occasionally. [Record No. 74-1, p. 130] Medical records

indicate that there were no pressure ulcers or lesions on Webb’s lower extremities at that time.

Id. at pp. 249, 260. Mynhier increased Webb’s dosage of Lasix which, by December 2020,

seemed to have improved the condition. Id. at p. 124. Webb also received home health

services for seven weeks beginning on October 5, 2020, which included the application of

compression dressings to her legs. Id. at 151, 274. Webb was discharged from home health

on November 23, 2020, having met her treatment goals. Id. at 151.

Adrian Chaffin, D.O. saw Webb at Georgetown Community Hospital’s (“GCH”)

emergency department (“ED”) on February 27, 2021, when she presented with an arm injury

after a fall. Id. at p. 178. Webb was diagnosed with a left proximal humerus fracture and was

instructed to follow up with an orthopedist. Several days later, she saw Matthew Birdwhistell,

D.O. at Georgetown Internal Medicine complaining of pain due to her broken arm. Id. at p.

122. Birdwhistell refilled her prescription for pain medication and noted that her lower

extremities were “grossly edematous.” Id. at p. 122. Birdwhistell further noted that “she may

need reevaluated for her fluid in the near future.” Id. at p. 123. Webb followed up with David

Waespe, M.D. for her arm fracture on April 27, 2021. He recommended that she begin

physical therapy with home health. Id. at 170.

In July 2021, Neaves retained Home Instead, an agency that provides in-home care

services for seniors, in hopes that they could stay with Webb when Neaves needed to be away

for brief periods of time. [Record Nos. 84-11; 70-17] Webb’s plan of care indicated that she

would receive help with ambulation, bathing, continence needs, dressing, eating, and toileting.

Neaves explained, however, that Webb was a private person and really did not want anyone

other than Neaves to help her with personal care. [Record No. 70-17] One exception was

Home Instead employee June Willoughby, whom Webb liked particularly well, and was

allowed to take a more direct role in her care. Other than Willoughby, Home Instead staff

usually performed cleaning chores when they came to the home. Id. A Home Instead staff

member typically visited three times per week beginning August 9, 2021, and ending

November 9, 2021. [Record No. 84-12]

Neaves and Webb stayed up late on the night of November 12, 2021, because Webb

was “very restless” and Neaves could hear her talking to someone even though no one else

was there. [Record No. 84-2, p. 7] The following morning, Neaves was preparing breakfast

when she heard a loud noise in the living room where Webb normally slept on a couch. Neaves

immediately saw that Webb had fallen over and collapsed on the right side of the couch.

According to Neaves, Webb was unconscious and had lost control of her bowels when she

collapsed. Neaves called 911, reporting to dispatch that Webb had deteriorated in the last few

days, had not been eating or drinking, and was “incoherent.” [Record Nos. 70-2; 84-2, pp. 7-

8]

Neaves began cleaning her mother while waiting for Georgetown-Scott County EMS

to arrive. According to Neaves, a paramedic told her that emergency staff would finish

cleaning up Webb on the way to the hospital. EMS found that Webb was in “very poor

condition,” “extremely frail,” and was “responsive to painful stimuli only.” [Record No. 84-

16] She was lying on her back, inclined toward the left side and contracted with her legs drawn

upward. EMS further remarked that her eyes had pus “oozing from the medial corners” and

her mouth “appeared dirty with unidentified material on her teeth and around her mouth.” Id.

EMS also noted various decubitus ulcers on Webb’s lower extremities and severely overgrown

nails. Additionally, it was observed that she had a “large quantity of feces in her [D]epends,”

which “appeared to not be recent.” Id.

Webb was transported to GCH where ED staff documented that she appeared

emaciated, malnourished, and lethargic. She was observed to have various areas of tissue

breakdown, including “many deep tissue injuries,” as follows:

Right leg inner shin 4cmx3cm Right inner ankle deep tissue injury 2cmx2cm,

right heel deep tissue injury, small skin tear on right knee, Right inner deep

tissue injury 3cmx2cm, Right medial foot tissue injury 1cmx0.5cm, Left toe

necrotic, fourth and fifth digit deep tissue injury, left inner foot deep tissue

injury 6cmx2cm. left inner ankle stage 1 1cmx1cm, left inner leg shin area stage

3 ulcer 6cmx2cm, necrotic left back of calf, left knee stage 1 4cmx2cm, Left

inner thigh stage 2cmx1cm, left heel deep tissue injury, left outer knee deep

tissue injury 2cmx1cm stage 1, back 3cmx0.5 stage 1 on back, left flank 4

cmx2cm stage 1, lumbar ulcer 1cmx1cm, sacrum 13cmx3cm deep tissue, left

buttocks and hip 18cmx11cm full open wounds and three open areas inside

unstageable, left elbow deep tissue, left ear stage 1, left ear lobe stage 1, left

shoulder front 2cmx2.5cm stage 2, right forearm bruising, bilateral lower leg.

[Record No. 70-4, pp. 2-3] Further, staff observed that Webb’s brief was full of feces and

stuffed with feminine pads and paper towels. Id. at pp. 5-6. Although one portion of the ED

record states that Webb was “nonverbal,” another reads: “Patient states he/she is victim of

abuse, neglect, and/or violence.” Id. at pp. 1-2. An unidentified GCH staff member called

911, stating: “We need to file for neglect. It’s really bad.” [Record No. 70-2]

Scott County Sheriff’s Deputy Everett Humphries arrived at the ED a short time later,

where hospital staff reiterated, “it’s really bad.” [Record No. 70-6] Staff brought Humphries

into Webb’s room and showed him the wounds on her feet, legs, hips, buttocks, back, and

sacrum and told him about the paper towels that were stuffed in her diaper. Staff advised

Humphries that Webb’s toes and the backs of her legs were necrotic and that “this didn’t

happen in just two days.” Id.

Humphries interviewed Neaves in a private consultation room outside the ED. When

asked what had happened that day, Neaves explained that Webb had liver cirrhosis and had

quit eating and drinking, leading Neaves to think she had “better get her to the hospital.”

[Record No. 70-6] Neaves stated that the “places on [Webb’s] legs just started like the last

day.” She further explained that she had placed an extra pad in Webb’s briefs when she

changed them the previous evening to provide extra protection against incontinence. When

asked about Webb’s medical care, Neaves reported that she had been taking Webb to a doctor

“pretty regular[ly]” until she stopped walking. Neaves stated that she had been telling Webb

that she was going to have to go to the hospital but Webb did not want to go.

Humphries returned to Webb’s room where he advised staff of Neaves’ statements.

One nurse immediately retorted: “This is 100 percent neglect.” Adrian Chaffin, D.O., who

happened to be the attending physician that day, stated that cirrhosis was the “least of [Webb’s]

concerns.” Another provider questioned the reason for the “seventeen paper towels that were

literally embedded in her skin.” Chaffin explained to Humphries that lying in the same

position for prolonged periods of time leads to pressure ulcers. It appeared to Chaffin that

Webb had been lying on her left side predominantly and that many areas on that side had

sustained a lack of blood flow, some to the point of nonviability.

Humphries then interviewed Chaffin privately outside the ED. Chaffin stated that it

looked like Webb’s diaper had not been changed in days and that she had dried fecal matter

on her skin. While Chaffin admittedly was not “an expert in adult neglect,” it appeared to him

that the situation had “definitely been going on for more than a day or two.” Chaffin noted

that severe decubitus ulcers like those on Webb’s hip and buttocks take more than two days to

develop. Further, there was pus between her toes and the little toe was so necrotic that “you

could probably grab [it] and twist it and pop it off.” According to Chaffin, such tissue

breakdown would likely take weeks to develop. Ultimately, it appeared to Chaffin that Webb,

who was profoundly dehydrated, had “just laid there and been left to rot.” Humphries filed a

report of adult neglect with the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services the same

day. [Record No. 70-8]

Later that day, Gopi Gundumalla, M.D., admitted Webb to GCH to receive palliative

care. [Record No. 81-23] Webb passed away on November 15, 2021. [Record No. 70-14]

Dr. Gundumalla listed her immediate cause of death as septic shock secondary to translocation

of bacteria from skin breakdown. [Record No. 7-10]

The Scott County Sheriff’s Office investigation into Webb’s death was assigned to

Detective Steve Quire on December 26, 2021. [Record No. 70-12] Quire began by reviewing

Humphries’ body camera footage and case documentation. Thereafter, he interviewed

multiple individuals including Neaves. Quire and another officer spoke with Neaves at her

residence on January 12, 2022. [Record No. 70-17] Neaves told the officers that Webb had

started using a wheelchair about six months earlier. She explained that after home health

services were discontinued in November 2020, Webb began to decline quickly. Neaves

advised officers that she told her mother, “We need to get them back,” but Webb refused,

stating that she did not want to be bothered with more people. Neaves also told the officers

that Webb “got tired of taking medicine and . . . going to the doctor” around that time. Neaves

tearfully stated, “She would get upset with me because I would want to take her and she didn’t

want to go.” Id.

Neaves decided to stop the interview after Quire read her Miranda rights, but she called

him to continue the conversation two days later. He recorded the telephone call on his body

camera. [Record No. 70-20] Neaves reported that Webb’s health began to decline

significantly five or six weeks prior to her death. Neaves wanted to call hospice to see if they

could check on Webb, but Webb was adamant that she did not want anyone coming into the

house. And Neaves did not want to argue with her and make the 92-year-old Webb feel worse.

According to Neaves, Webb had “a little bit of dementia,” but Dr. Lyon had said it was “very,

very early.”

When Quire inquired about any recent medical care that Webb might have had, Neaves

mentioned the treatment she had received for her broken humerus in February and March 2021.

She then reiterated that Webb was stubborn and would not allow Neaves to take her to a doctor

when she needed to go. Neaves said, “I know that I should’ve had her a nurse here . . but she

was so tired of people coming and going and it just made it hard on me to get her fussing and

get her upset and everything.” Further, Neaves did not realize that Webb “was as bad as she

was,” despite the two spending so much time together.

Quire conducted a telephone interview with Dr. Chaffin on January 13, 2022, which he

also recorded on his body camera. [Record No. 70-18] Chaffin could not say “how long

[Webb] was in the condition she was in,” or “over what time period” the pressure ulcers

developed. Following Webb’s presentation to the ED, Chaffin had done some research

regarding decubitus ulcers and learned that they can begin forming within hours. However,

Chaffin was nearly certain that the severe wounds Webb had could not develop within even

one or two days.

Chaffin added that Webb was severely dehydrated and had not drunk “in a considerable

amount of time.” He believed that if she had been brought in earlier for medical treatment,

“she would not have ended up in the shape she was in.” Chaffin stated that Webb’s condition

“definitely required medical condition,” and he agreed with the officer’s suggestion that a

“normal person” having seen someone in that condition would have realized that she needed

to get to a hospital. Chaffin ultimately concluded that the dehydration and pressure ulcers

contributed to Webb’s overall condition, including septic shock.

Quire conducted a recorded telephone interview of Home Instead employee June

Willoughby on January 19, 2022. [Record No. 70-23] Willoughby saw Webb about three

times per week from October 5, 2021, through November 5, 2021. She took notes regarding

each visit, something Willoughby did for each patient she felt was “transitioning” or who was

not “going to be here long.” She reported that Webb “never had any red marks on her,” that

“she was always kept clean,” and that she ate well every day.

Willoughby knew that Webb was bathed every day mainly because Webb and/or

Neaves told her so. However, Willoughby did give Webb a sponge bath at times. She reported

that on October 26, 2021, Webb undressed completely for a bath and Willoughby did not

observe any skin breakdown. And on November 5, “she had zip, . . . nothing, on her.”

Willoughby did not know how or why the ulcers appeared but was adamant that Webb was

not neglected.

Detective Quire filed a criminal complaint the following day with the Scott County

District Court charging Neaves with manslaughter in the second degree for wantonly causing

Webb’s death. [Record Nos. 70-24; 70-26] District Judge Mary Jane Phelps issued a warrant

for Neaves’ arrest and set cash bail in the amount of $50,000.1 [Record No. 70-27] Two

deputies went to Neaves’ home and arrested her the following day. The Scott County Sheriff’s

Office issued a press release on January 21, 2022, which detailed some of the information

included in the criminal complaint and stated that Neaves had been arrested and charged with

manslaughter in connection with the death of her mother. The Sheriff’s Office subsequently

published on its Facebook page the press release, along with Neaves’ mugshot. [Record No.

1-7]

1 Judge Phelps responded to Quire’s initial complaint by asking a few clarifying

questions. [See Record No. 70-25.] Phelps issued the warrant after Quire submitted a

supplemented complaint. [See Record No. 70-26.]

Neaves was arraigned on January 27, 2022, and was released on a $5,000 bond. Her

preliminary hearing was set for February 17, 2022. However, before that date arrived, Neaves’

attorney filed a notice of intent to subpoena Webb’s medical records as he believed they would

show that Webb was simply nearing the natural end of her life, thus exonerating Neaves.

[Record No. 73-2, p. 55] The preliminary hearing was eventually scheduled for June 30, 2022.

But after reviewing the medical records obtained by Neaves’ attorney, the Scott County

Attorney determined that moving forward with the charge would require expert testimony of

the treating physician. [Record No. 70-38] Also having been advised that Neaves intended to

call numerous witnesses at the preliminary hearing, and wishing to avoid a “mini trial,” the

prosecutor decided the appropriate action was to dismiss the case without prejudice. Id. He

noted that the Commonwealth Attorney’s office could review the case and present it to the

grand jury if he believed it was appropriate and supported by the evidence. Id. On Jun e30,

2022, Judge Phelps dismissed the case without prejudice.2

Neaves filed a Complaint with this Court on January 16, 2023, alleging claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Namely, she

asserted claims of malicious prosecution against Humphries and Quire and false arrest against

Quire. Her Complaint also included analogous claims under Kentucky law against these

defendants, as well as claims of defamation against Quire, negligent investigation against

Humphries and Quire, and negligent training and supervision against Scott County Sheriff

2 The courtroom minutes included in the Dismissal Order state, in part: “The Court further

noted that the medical records completely exonerated the defendant and questioned how the charge

could have ever been brought.” [Record No. 70-39] The plaintiff cites this comment in support

of her position but, unsurprisingly, provides no authority to show that this Court should give any

weight to Judge Phelps’ comments. The Court also notes that the minutes incorrectly state that

Dr. Chaffin was not listed in the GCH ED documentation from November 13, 2021.

Tony Hampton. The matter is now pending for consideration of the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to all of Neaves’ claims.

II. Motion in Limine

The Court considers an evidentiary issue before turning to the plaintiff’s substantive

claims. Neaves’ attorney deposed Judge Mary Jane Phelps on February 28, 2024.3 Judge

Phelps testified regarding her thought processes leading up to Neaves’ prosecution and the

dismissal of her charge, among other matters. The defendants have filed a motion in limine

seeking to exclude or limit Phelps’ testimony, mainly because “the testimony of the mental

processes of a judge [is] not to be considered.” Perkins v. LeCureux, 58 F.3d 214, 220 (6th

Cir. 1995).

Neaves contends, however, that the defendants make an overly broad statement

concerning a judge’s ability to testify and that, instead, a judge may not testify about her mental

process in a later proceeding that challenges that judge’s earlier determination in the same

proceeding. See Perkins, 58 F.3d at 220 (concluding that a judge could not testify in a habeas

proceeding with respect to his thought process regarding the sentence being challenged).

Neaves asserts that, since she is challenging law enforcement’s actions through an unrelated

proceeding, Phelps may testify concerning her thoughts during Neaves’ prosecution.

Neaves has not identified any authority indicating that the rule against judicial

testimony should be construed so narrowly and applicable case law says otherwise. For

example, in Afanasiev v. Alvarez, 319 So.3d 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2021),

Alvarez filed for divorce and a permanent domestic violence injunction against Afanasiev.

3 Judge Phelps retired from the bench in January 2023. [Record No. 73-2, p. 17]

Afanasiev later sued Alvarez and her attorney for malicious prosecution based on their

institution of the domestic violence action. He then asked the trial court judge to recuse from

the divorce action and domestic violence case, arguing that he would be calling the judge as a

material witness in his malicious prosecution action. Id. at *702. The court denied Afanasiev’s

request, stating “it is highly unlikely that the trial court could be compelled to testify in

Afanasiev’s malicious prosecution case.” Id.

In Mitchell, Maxwell & Jackson, Inc. v. State, 117 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Ct. Claims N.Y. Apr.

2, 2019), the plaintiffs alleged malicious prosecution arising from administrative proceedings

brought by the New York Department of State. The plaintiffs sought to depose the

administrative law judge who presided over the administrative hearing at which charges

against the plaintiff were upheld. Id. at 445. The court rejected the plaintiff’s request, citing

the “cardinal principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence[:] a court speaks only through its

minutes.” Id. at 446 (quoting Perkins, 58 F.3d at 214). Notably, the court observed that, while

the language in Perkins specifically addresses subsequent attacks on the decision as to which

the testimony is sought, “the same principle applies to any testimony by a judge about his

thoughts behind a judicial ruling.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Drake v. Village of

Johnstown, 2011 WL 4091846, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept 14, 2011) (citing Washington v.

Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1263 (5th Cir. 1982) (“It is a firmly established rule in our

jurisprudence that a judge may not be asked to testify about his mental processes in reaching

a judicial decision.”).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas confronted this

issue more recently in Banks v. Moore, 2020 WL 7702171 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 28, 2020). Banks

sued a city police officer for malicious prosecution and other claims after the officer arrested

him and took a blood sample after obtaining a warrant from a judge. Banks subpoenaed the

judge for a deposition, which the judge sought to quash. The court granted the motion to

quash, noting that “a judge cannot be required to testify regarding his mental processes in

formulating an official judgment.” Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,

422 (1941)); Cavitt v. Wills, 2006 WL 3792046, at *1 (W.D. Ark. 2006) (“The overwhelming

authority concludes that a judge may not be compelled to testify concerning the mental

processes used in formulating official judgments or the reasons that motivated him in the

performance of his official duties.”).

Phelps’ testimony is admissible to the extent it concerns her personal knowledge of the

facts surrounding Neaves’ prosecution. However, the defendants argue that such testimony

should be excluded because it is cumulative and “tainted” since Phelps reviewed background

documents prior to her deposition. But the general rule is that relevant evidence is admissible.

See Fed. R. Evid. 402. And while the Court has an interest in avoiding the needless

presentation of cumulative evidence at trial, this is less of a concern at the summary judgment

stage. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Finally, the Court is not persuaded by the defendants’ conclusory

assertion that Phelps’ testimony is tainted simply because she reviewed documents in

preparation for the deposition. There is nothing to suggest that she did not independently recall

the facts regarding Neaves’ prosecution, so there is no basis to exclude that portion of her

testimony.

III. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute with respect to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). In other words, the Court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986);

Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, Michigan, 974 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2020). The moving

party has the initial burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, but once the

moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that there is sufficient

evidence from which the jury could render a verdict in its favor. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Electro-Mechanical Corp. v. Ogan, 9 F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 1993).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all facts and draw

all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Max Arnold & Sons,

LLC v. W.L. Hailey & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2006). However, “[t]he mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient;

there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252; Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 760-61 (6th Cir. 2012).

When a defense of qualified immunity is asserted, the analysis is altered somewhat.

Specifically, the existence of a disputed, material fact does not preclude summary judgment if

the defendants cannot be shown to have violated clearly established law. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir.

1996).

IV. Discussion

A. Qualified Immunity

The defendants assert that they are entitled to the protections of qualified immunity

with respect to Neaves’ constitutional claims. This doctrine shields government officials

performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages unless the contours of the

asserted right were sufficiently clear such that any reasonable officer would have understood

that what he was doing violated that right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Murray v. Dep’t of Corrs., 29 F. 4th 779, 786 (6th

Cir. 2022). Qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Chappell v. City of

Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229

(1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to summary

judgment unless the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would

permit a reasonable juror to find that a defendant violated a constitutional right and the right

was clearly established. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

The Court may consider the two factors in any order, but “both must be answered in

the affirmative for the plaintiff’s claim to proceed.” Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712

F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). Once raised, the plaintiff

bears the burden of showing that a defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Courtright

v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). Although on summary judgment

the Court construes the facts in favor of the plaintiff, when a defendant raises the defense of

qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that the facts and inferences would allow a

reasonable to juror to conclude that the defendant violated a clearly established constitutional

right. See Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir. 2020).

B. Malicious Prosecution under the Fourth Amendment

The Sixth Circuit recognizes a “constitutionally cognizable claim of malicious

prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, which encompasses wrongful investigation,

prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir.

2010). To prove a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show:

(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff, and the defendant

made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was a

lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a

deprivation or liberty, as understood under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,

apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in

the plaintiff’s favor.

Id. (quoting Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2017)).

1. Defendant Humphries

Neaves asserts that her only “concerns” with Humphries are: “(1) his failure to take

steps to preserve evidence for further investigation; (2) his failure to ensure that [Webb’s] body

be preserved for autopsy purposes in the event she should die in short order; and (3) his failure

to do anything to take steps to investigate this matter further following his November 13, 2021

witness interviews at GCH.” [Record No. 84] Neaves has not identified any authority in

which an officer’s failure to perform additional investigation has been construed as malicious

prosecution, particularly where that officer was not involved in charging the defendant. And

there is no suggestion that Humphries made any misrepresentations or omissions in his

investigatory materials or that he made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute

her. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 314-16 (officer who made “affirmative misrepresentations and

omissions in his arrest-warrant application and investigative report” which “clearly led to the

plaintiffs’ arrests” had participated or influenced the decision to prosecute). Accordingly,

Defendant Humphries is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.

2. Defendant Quire

The Court focuses on the probable cause inquiry in turning to Neaves’ claim against

Defendant Quire. Kentucky law provides that “[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the

second degree when he wantonly causes the death of another person.” Ky. Rev. Stat.

507.040(1). Further, [a] person acts wantonly . . . when he is aware of and consciously

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance

exists” and the risk is “of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the

situation.” Ky. Rev. Stat. 501.020(3).

“Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than

prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 306 (quoting United

States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2005)). Probable cause exists if there is an

objectively reasonable basis to conclude that a crime has been committed. McClain, 444 F.3d

at 562. Accordingly, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances and whether the

facts and circumstances known to Quire could lead a reasonable person to believe that Neaves

had committed the offense of second-degree manslaughter. See id. (citing Hinchman v. Moore,

312 F.3d 198, 204 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Probable cause is not a high bar.” United States v.

Christian, 925 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57

(2018)). However, “[t]he existence of probable cause is a jury question, unless there is only

one reasonable determination possible.” Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th

Cir. 2003).

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Quire reasonably

determined there was probable cause to charge Neaves with second-degree manslaughter. On

November 13, 2021, Webb had numerous decubitus ulcers, mainly on her left side, which Dr.

Chaffin said would have resulted from remaining in the same position for extended periods of

time. Some of the ulcers were stage IV or unstageable. Dr. Chaffin indicated that such severe

necrosis would have taken a significant length of time to develop. Dr. Lyon also opined that

the bed sores would not “just suddenly appear.” [Record No. 84-3, p. 12] Neaves

acknowledged that Webb could not walk and was dependent upon Neaves completely. Neaves

told Quire repeatedly that she knew she should have gotten medical attention for her mother

and conceded that she had not taken Webb for regular doctor visits since she stopped walking

about six months before her death. Chaffin agreed that a “normal person” seeing someone in

Webb’s condition would have recognized that she needed medical intervention. Further, he

stated that had she received medical help earlier, she likely would not have been in the same

condition.

Neaves asserts in her response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment that

Quire’s sworn complaint was “premised on unfounded assumptions, contained false and

misleading factual averments, and intentionally omitted significant and highly material

exculpatory evidence.” [Record No. 84, p. 2] She focuses largely on Quire’s reference to the

“abuse screen” entries in the ED records from November 13. GCH nurse Anna Simmons was

deposed in this matter and explained that Webb was not sufficiently responsive at the time to

make such a statement. Simmons further explained that there is a computer glitch in GCH’s

system such that “Pt complained of abuse/neglect” automatically populates that when medical

staff make the selection for suspected abuse or neglect.

While this “glitch” in GCH’s system may have resulted in an inaccuracy in the ED

notes, it remains that notes did indicate that Webb complained of abuse or neglect. Quire was

not present at the hospital on November 13, 2021, and there is nothing to suggest that he

deliberately included inaccurate information in the complaint. Regardless, even if that fact is

excised from the complaint, there is ample evidence to establish probable cause. See Butler v.

City of Detroit, Michigan, 936 F.3d 410, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2019) (to overcome qualified

immunity, plaintiff must show that the defendant stated a deliberate falsehood or reckless

disregard for the truth and that the false or omitted information was material to the finding of

probable cause).

To the extent Neaves suggests that Quire failed to consider or omitted other exculpatory

information from the complaint, she does not explain what was omitted or not considered. For

instance, she suggests that he should have obtained records from Dr. Lyon’s office, but Webb

had not seen Dr. Lyon since October 28, 2020. Although she saw his assistant Mandy Mynhier

in March 2021, it is unclear how this record would have impacted Quire’s decision. Neaves

also suggests that Quire should have included additional information from his January 14

interview of her but does not state what portions of the interview she believes are exculpatory.

[Record No. 84, p. 9]

Neaves also contends that Quire should have interviewed EMS personnel, performed

follow-up interviews with ED staff, and consulted with a wound care specialist. But Neaves

does not indicate what additional information she believes could have been gleaned from

further discussions with EMS and ED personnel. And Neaves has not established that

consultation with a wound expert was necessary, as “[t]he probable cause requirement was not

intended to be a tool to divine what actually happened. That role is fulfilled by the high burden

of proof required at criminal trials.” Cheolas v. City of Harper Woods, 467 F. App’x 374, 380

(6th Cir. 2023).

Finally, Neaves focuses heavily on Webb’s purported refusal to go to a nursing home

and desire to pass away at home. While Neaves might have wanted to “honor [her mother’s]

wishes,” the caretaker of a vulnerable adult has an obligation to avoid neglecting that

individual. West v. Commonwealth, 935 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996); Ky. Rev. Stat.

§ 209.020(4). Webb had numerous severe pressure ulcers, including skin breakdown to the

point of necrosis, and died as a result of septic shock secondary to translocation of bacteria

from these skin disruptions. And even though Neaves knew that her mother needed medical

attention, she concedes that Webb did not receive any medical care for the last six months of

her life.4

Based on the foregoing, Quire reasonably believed he possessed probable cause to

charge Neaves with manslaughter in the second degree. Therefore, he is entitled to the

protections of qualified immunity with respect to Neaves’ claim of malicious prosecution.

C. False Arrest Under the Fourth Amendment

Neaves contends that Quire violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from “false

arrest,” but Quire was not one of the officers who actually effected Neaves’ arrest. While a

plaintiff may assert a false arrest claim against a non-arresting officer, “no clearly established

law compels the conclusion that officers who neither arrested the plaintiff nor swore false

statements in a warrant affidavit can be liable for false arrest.” Schulz v. Gendregske, 544 F.

4 The record indicates that Webb had not been to a doctor since she saw Dr. Waespe,

concerning her arm fracture on April 27, 2021. However, during the January 14, 2022

telephone interview, Neaves told Quire that Dr. Lyon had prescribed a sedative for Webb over

the phone the previous week.

App’x 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). Further, a claim of false arrest requires the

absence of probable cause for arrest. Buttino v. City of Hamtramck, 87 F. App’x 499, 502 (6th

Cir. 2004). As previously explained, probable cause for Neaves’ arrest existed in this case.

Accordingly, Defendant Quire is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.

D. State Law Claims

1. Malicious Prosecution

Kentucky’s malicious prosecution standard is similar to that applied under federal law.

However, Kentucky’s standard is more stringent in that a showing is required that the

defendant acted with malice. Compare Martin v. O’Daniel, 507 S.W.3d 1, 11-12 (Ky. 2016)

(requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with malice) with King v. Harwood,

852 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that malice is not an element under Sixth

Circuit jurisprudence). But under both standards, the plaintiff is required to show that the

defendant “initiated, continued, or procured . . . a proceeding” against her and acted without

probable cause. See Martin, 507 S.W.3d at 11-12. For the reasons already explained, Neaves

cannot make this showing with respect to Defendants Humphries or Neaves. Accordingly,

they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to her claim of malicious prosecution under

Kentucky law.

2. False Arrest and Wrongful Detention

Claims of false arrest and false imprisonment are consolidated when the alleged

torfeasor is a law enforcement officer. Estep v. Combs, 366 F. Supp. 3d 863, 883 (E.D. Ky.

2018); Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Ky. 2007) (declaring that, “[f]rom this point forward,

. . . we shall refer to the torts of false imprisonment and false arrest together as false

imprisonment”). To be liable for false imprisonment, the defendant must have intentionally

confined the victim of the alleged tort and the confinement must have been unlawful. Dunn,

226 S.W.3d at 71.

Quire argues that he is entitled to qualified official immunity under Yanero v. Davis,

65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001), which affords protection from damages liability for good faith

judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment. Qualified official immunity applies

to the negligent performance by public officers of discretionary acts done in good faith that

are within the scope of the employee’s authority. Id. The Court notes that an officer’s decision

to seek an arrest warrant is a discretionary function. See, e.g., Baughman v. Brooks, 2016 WL

8731438, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 29, 2016) (plaintiff asserting a false imprisonment claim did

not dispute that the arresting officer was performing a discretionary function). There also is

no dispute that Quire acted within his authority in filing a criminal complaint.

The good faith component asks whether the official’s conduct was objectively

unreasonable or if the official willfully or maliciously intended to harm the plaintiff or acted

with a corrupt motive. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. “Once the officer or employee has shown

prima-facie that the act was performed within the scope of his/her discretionary authority, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by direct or circumstantial evidence that the

discretionary act was not performed in good faith.” Cole v. Shadoan, 782 F. Supp. 2d 428,

433 (E.D. Ky. 20110 (quoting Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522). Neaves did not respond to the

defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment with respect to this claim, so she necessarily

has failed to meet her burden regarding Quire’s entitlement to qualified official immunity. The

Court additionally notes that the record is devoid of evidence indicating that Quire’s conduct

was objectively unreasonable or that he acted with a corrupt motive.

3. Defamation

Neaves asserts a claim of defamation against Quire based on the criminal complaints,

the press release, and the Facebook post. But as Quire argues in his motion for summary

judgment, Kentucky law provides that “statements in pleadings filed in judicial proceedings

are absolutely privileged when material, pertinent, and relevant to the subject under inquiry.”

Adams v. Lexington-Fayette Cnty. Urban Gov’t, 2023 WL 6205415, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 22,

2023) (concluding that allegations made in a detective’s criminal complaint could not form the

basis of a defamation claim) (citing Heavrin v. Nelson, 384 F.3d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 2004)).

“Further, statements protected by absolute privilege keep their privilege even when

republished.” Id. (citing Ohnemus v. Thompson, 594 F. App’x 864, 869 (6th Cir. 2014)).

Neaves has failed to respond to Quire’s motion for summary judgment with respect to

this claim, which the Court interprets as her acknowledgment that the statements are, in fact,

privileged. Accordingly, Quire is entitled to summary judgment.

4. Negligent Investigation

The basis for Neaves’ “negligent investigation” claim is not entirely clear. Her

Complaint is vague with respect to this claim and alludes to the “deficient criminal

investigation” and the defendants’ “acts and omissions.” [Record No. 1, ¶¶ 117-18] The Court

can only assume that Neaves is referring to Humphries’ alleged failure to preserve evidence

and/or require an autopsy and Quire’s failure to interview additional witnesses including a

wound care expert. But any negligence claim requires proof of a duty owed to the plaintiff, a

breach by the defendant, and a consequent injury. McNally v. Tabor, 2019 WL 6044882, at

*5 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2019) (citing Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Ky.

2003)).

Although police officers owe a general duty to the public to investigate crimes, this

does not create the type of duty sufficient to sustain a negligence action. See Grant v. City of

Raceland, 2014 WL 3020383, at *1-2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 3, 2014). Such a duty only arises

when a “victim is in state custody or was otherwise restrained by the state actor at the time in

question, and that the violence or other offensive conduct was perpetrated by a state actor.”

Id. (citing Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky. 1995)).

Like several of her other claims under Kentucky law, Neaves did not respond to the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the motion will be granted with

respect to this claim.

5. Negligent Training and Supervision

Neaves’ Complaint alleges merely that Scott County Sheriff Tony Hampton “was

grossly negligent and/or negligent in the training, supervision, and discipline of Defendants

Quire and Humphries, resulting in [Neaves] being deprived of her right to be free from false

arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and defamation.” [Record No. 1, ¶ 122] To

prove a claim for negligent training or supervision, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant

knew or had reason to know of the employee’s harmful propensities; that the employee injured

the plaintiff; and that the defendant’s training or supervision of the employee proximately

caused the plaintiff’s harm. Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d

840, 849 (Ky. 2005).

As the defendants note, decisions regarding officer training and supervision are often

discretionary functions. See Upper Pond Creek Vol. Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Kinser, 617 S.W.3d

328, 338 (Ky. 2020) (J. Wright, dissenting). And there is no suggestion that Defendant

Hampton acted outside the scope of his authority or in bad faith with respect to these issues,

so he is likely protected by qualified immunity under Yanero. Regardless, Neaves has not

identified evidence indicating that Humphries or Quire acted wrongfully or had “harmful

propensities,” so her claim of negligent training or supervision necessarily fails. And again,

she has failed to respond to this portion of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted with respect to Neaves’ claim of negligent training

and supervision.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendants Tony Hampton, Steve Quire, and E. Humphries’ motion for

summary judgment [Record No. 70] is GRANTED.

2. Defendants Tony Hampton, Steve Quire, and E. Humphries’ motion in limine

[Record No. 73] is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

Dated: July 1, 2024.

aL =

CP

we yee Danny C. Reeves, Chief Judge

WNammeae (United States District Court

Ss” * Eastern District of Kentucky

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