Opinion

BAUGH v. ZATECKY

Court
District Court, S.D. Indiana
Filed
Sep 26, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 31.4%

reversing summary judgment grant because plaintiff did not identify a sufficiently analogous case or explain why defendant's actions were plainly excessive

How later courts described this case

  • reversing summary judgment grant because plaintiff did not identify a sufficiently analogous case or explain why defendant's actions were plainly excessive

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

WILLIAM EUGENE BAUGH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:22-cv-00482-JPH-MG

)

FAGOROYE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff William Eugene Baugh alleges that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious harm he faced when being

transported back to Putnamville Correctional Facility ("PCF") after knee

surgery. Defendants Sergeant McCullough and Sergeant Fagoroye have moved

for summary judgment on Mr. Baugh's claims. For the reasons below,

Defendants' motion, dkt. [76], is GRANTED.

I.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has

to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it

need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of

Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and identify the record evidence it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed,

the party must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the

record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's

factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed,

and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

II.

Factual Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule

56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence in the light most favorable to

Mr. Baugh and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Khungar, 985

F.3d at 572–73.

On July 1, 2022, Mr. Baugh was discharged from Terre Haute Regional

Hospital following recovery from his right knee replacement surgery. Dkt. 77-1

at 24–25, 29 (Baugh Deposition). Mr. Baugh had an immobilizer on his right

knee that prevented the joint from bending. Id. at 39. His left knee was in

good condition, and Mr. Baugh was able to stand on his left leg to move from

his hospital bed to his wheelchair. Id. at 25, 49.

Sgt. Fagoroye and another officer provided Mr. Baugh's transport from

Terre Haute Regional Hospital to PCF. Id. at 41. Sgt. McCullough stated in his

affidavit that he was not present or involved in any way in Mr. Baugh's

transport. Dkt. 77-4 at 1.

Mr. Baugh exited the hospital by wheelchair, dkt. 77-1 at 33, but the van

used to transport him was not wheelchair accessible, id. at 31. The van had

side doors with two steps to get up into the van. Id. at 40. Sgt. Fagoroye and

the other officer instructed Mr. Baugh to get in the van. Id. at 41. Mr. Baugh

did not ask for help getting into the van. Id. at 49. After Mr. Baugh got out of

his wheelchair and was standing on his left leg, Sgt. Fagoroye asked Mr. Baugh

what he was doing, and Mr. Baugh said, "I'm falling, man." Id. at 51. Sgt.

Fagoroye did not attempt to reach for Baugh or grab him. Id. Mr. Baugh fell

on the steps of the van, hitting his right outside thigh. Id.

After Mr. Baugh fell, Sgt. Fagoroye further instructed Mr. Baugh to get

into the van, and he lifted himself onto the van seat. Id. at 51–52. Sgt.

Fagoroye fastened Mr. Baugh's seatbelt. Id. at 52. That day, the temperature

was 90 degrees or higher. Id. at 18. The van was not air-conditioned, and the

windows were not open. Id. at 54. Mr. Baugh complained to the officers that

there was no ventilation in the back of the van. Id. One of the officers

responded that Mr. Baugh would be okay. Id. at 56. Sgt. Fagoroye indicated to

the other officer that he thought Mr. Baugh may have hurt himself when he

fell. Id.

During the ride to PCF, Mr. Baugh passed out twice, although he does

not know how long he passed out. Id. at 58–59. Both times, Mr. Baugh

informed the officers of his passing out, and the officers told him that they

thought he would be okay. Id. at 58–60. After arriving at PCF, Mr. Baugh

exited the van by sliding down the steps. Id. at 62. Mr. Baugh was provided a

wheelchair and was seen and evaluated by PCF medical staff. Id. at 63; dkt.

77-3 at 1–4.

III.

Discussion

"Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when

they display deliberate indifference towards an objectively serious medical

need." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021). "Thus, to

prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show '(1) an

objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was

deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th

818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839

F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)).

A. Sgt. McCullough

Sgt. McCullough first argues that he is entitled to summary judgment

because he lacked personal involvement in Mr. Baugh's transport from the

hospital. See dkt. 78 at 8–9.

"To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a

defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional

right." Whitfield v. Spiller, 76 F.4th 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gentry v.

Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). Here, the undisputed facts

establish that Sgt. McCullough was not personally involved in the events

underlying Mr. Baugh's claims. In his affidavit, Sgt. McCullough attests that

he worked a different shift, specifically the 6:00 P.M. – 6:00 A.M. shift, during

all times relevant to Mr. Baugh's complaint and that he was neither present

nor involved in any other way in Mr. Baugh's transport. See dkt. 77-4 at 1, ¶¶

4–5. In response, Mr. Baugh concedes that he believes another officer—not

Sgt. McCullough—was involved in transporting him from the hospital back to

the prison. See dkt. 81 at 1–2. Because Mr. Baugh did not designate evidence

showing that Sgt. McCullough was personally involved in the alleged

deprivation, Sgt. McCullough is entitled to summary judgment. Whitfield, 76

F.4th at 706.

B. Sgt. Fagoroye

Sgt. Fagoroye argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because (1)

there was no constitutional violation and (2) at the time Mr. Baugh was

transported from the hospital back to the prison, there was no clearly

established right for a prisoner be transported in an air-conditioned,

wheelchair-accessible van after knee replacement surgery. Dkt. 78 at 7.

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). This

"clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably . . .

anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 639 (1987)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two important interests—

the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

In considering a qualified immunity defense, courts evaluate "(1) whether

the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ], show that the

defendants violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Gonzalez v.

City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The "difficult part" of the

qualified-immunity test is "identifying the level of generality at which the

constitutional right must be clearly established." Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d

1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). A "high level of generality" is not appropriate;

instead, the question is "whether the law was clear in relation to the specific

facts confronting the public official when he acted." Id.

Qualified immunity applies unless the specific contours of the right "were

sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would

have understood that he was violating it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,

778–79 (2014). "A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer's

conduct 'does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was

firmly established.'" District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018)

(quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). While "a case directly on point" is not

required, "existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question

beyond debate." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (cleaned

up). Put slightly differently, a right is clearly established only if "every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right." Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015) (per curiam).

When the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised, "the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to defeat it." Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir.

2019). To meet his burden, Mr. Baugh must "show either a reasonably

analogous case that has both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a

factual circumstance similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so

obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as a

violation of the law." Id. (quoting Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir.

2017)). The failure to do so means a plaintiff "cannot defeat" a "qualified

immunity defense." Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2013)

(reversing summary judgment grant because plaintiff did not identify a

sufficiently analogous case or explain why defendant's actions were plainly

excessive); Soriano v. Town of Cicero, 521 F. App'x 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2013).

The Court may evaluate the "clearly established" prong without reaching the

first prong as to whether a constitutional violation occurred. Kemp v. Liebel,

877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017).

Here, Mr. Baugh has not identified an analogous case dealing with facts

similar to this lawsuit, nor has he explained why Defendants' actions were so

obviously violative of the Eighth Amendment that any reasonable person would

have recognized them as such. See Findlay, 722 F.3d at 900. As the Seventh

Circuit has explained, that's fatal to overcoming a qualified immunity defense.

Id.; Soriano, 521 F. App'x at 567.

Moreover, the Court's review of Eighth Amendment case law does not

indicate that Mr. Baugh had a clearly established right to be transported from

the hospital back to the prison in an air-conditioned, wheelchair-accessible van

after knee replacement surgery. See Smith v. Price, No. 1:21-cv-00373-JMS-

CSW, 2024 WL 278143, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 25, 2024) (granting summary

judgment for defendants when plaintiff "was exposed to uncomfortable

temperatures in the summer heat for around two-hours" during van ride

between prison and hospital); Wheeler v. Godinez, No. 13-CV-964-NJR-RJD,

2016 WL 5394385, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2016) ("The Supreme Court and the

Seventh Circuit have not yet held, however, that prisoners are entitled to air

conditioned cells."); Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 475–76 (7th

Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for defendants on pretrial detainee's

due process claim because he could not "satisfy the deliberate indifference

standard" when he was placed in a wheelchair-accessible cell but "had limited

access to the toilet and sink and no access to the shower" for two days);

Strominger v. Brock, 2:10-—cv-O0158-LJM-DKL, 2014 WL 268444, at *8 (S.D.

Ind. Jan. 23, 2014) (granting summary judgment for defendants when

wheelchair-bound plaintiff was placed in non-handicap accessible cell for eight

days).

Set. Fagoroye is entitled to qualified immunity as to Mr. Baugh's claims.

C. Mr. Baugh's Motion for Settlement

Finally, Mr. Baugh has filed a "Motion for Settlement," in which he seeks

a monetary award in his favor. See dkt. 83. As stated above, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Baugh's claims. Accordingly, Mr.

Baugh's motion, dkt. [83], is DENIED.

IV.

Conclusion

Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dkt. [76], is GRANTED.

Consistent with this ruling, Mr. Baugh's motion for a monetary award in his

favor, dkt. [83], is DENIED. Final judgment will issue in a separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/26/2024

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

WILLIAM EUGENE BAUGH

9 Schuyler Ave

Muncy, PA 17756

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.