BRAXTON III v. INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

AARON BRAXTON III, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:23-cv-01052-JMS-MJD

)

INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Aaron Braxton III, a former maintenance technician, was hired as a Construction

Trades Teacher for Defendant Indianapolis Public Schools (the "School") from 2019 to 2021. After

two years of difficulties teaching, including issues with classroom management and student safety,

the School decided not to renew his employment contract. Mr. Braxton ultimately sued, alleging

that the School unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his disability (anxiety), and

that the School unlawfully retaliated against him by terminating him for reporting alleged

harassment on the basis of his disability. The School has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

[Filing No. 40], which is ripe for the Court's consideration.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On summary judgment, a party must show the Court

what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson

v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). "'Summary judgment is not a time to be

coy.'" King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sommerfield v. City of

Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2017)). Rather, at the summary judgment stage, "[t]he parties

are required to put their evidentiary cards on the table." Sommerfield, 863 F.3d at 649.

The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return

a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court

views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable

inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008).

It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those

tasks are left to the fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).

Each fact asserted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must

be supported by "a citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible

evidence." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e). And each "citation must refer to a page or paragraph number

or otherwise similarly specify where the relevant information can be found in the supporting

evidence." Id. The Court need only consider the cited materials and need not "scour the record"

for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572-73 (7th

Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(h). Where a

party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's

assertion of fact, the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment

motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts

that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In

other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those

facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005).

Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Before recounting the material facts in this action, the Court addresses the parties' filings.

The School argues that Mr. Braxton's Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment "fails to

conform" with Local Rule 56-1. [Filing No. 43 at 2.] The School argues that Mr. Braxton has not

adequately cited to the record, did not submit his exhibits before filing his brief, and did not

properly lay out a section of facts. [Filing No. 43 at 2-3.]

Local Rule 56-1(e) requires the non-movant's response to "include a section labeled

'Statement of Material Facts in Dispute.'" Mr. Braxton's section is labeled "Facts/Evidence."

[Filing No. 42 at 1.] Even if the Court looked to the substance of that section and not only its label,

that section does not include any disputes about material facts or any dispute of historical facts at

all. [Filing No. 42 at 1-2.] Instead, the section provides only a list of exhibits, which were not

filed before his response as required by the Court's Practices and Procedures. [Filing No. 42 at 1-

2; Filing No. 6 at 4 (Practices and Procedures).] Local Rule 56-1(f)(1) provides that "the court

will assume that . . . the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the movant are

admitted without controversy except to the extent that . . . the non-movant specifically controverts

the facts in that party's 'Statement of Material Facts in Dispute' with admissible evidence" or "the

facts . . . allow the court to draw reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor sufficient to

preclude summary judgment." Having provided counsel with multiple reminders of the Court's

Practices and Procedures, [Filing No. 6; Filing No. 21], there is little good cause to excuse non-

compliance. The Court thus primarily recounts the facts consistent with the School's version of

events. See Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary

judgment against plaintiff who did not comply with S.D. Ind. Local Rule 56-1 and "did not make

any effort to identify with specificity what factual issues were disputed, let alone supply the

requisite citations to the evidentiary record"). In any event, there appears to be little dispute as to

material historical facts, but rather the legal significance of those facts, as the Court's analysis will

demonstrate.

The following Statement of Facts is set forth pursuant to the standard detailed above and

Mr. Braxton's failure to comply with Local Rule 56-1. The facts stated are not necessarily

objectively true, but as the summary judgment standard requires, the undisputed facts and the

disputed evidence are presented in the light most favorable to "the party against whom the motion

under consideration is made." Premcor USA, Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 400 F.3d 523, 526-

27 (7th Cir. 2005).

A. The Parties

The School is a "public school corporation charged with the education of approximately

30,000 of Indianapolis' urban youth in grades K-12." [Filing No. 41 at 3.] It operates four high

schools and "over 70 primary and middle schools." [Filing No. 41 at 3.]

As of 2012, Mr. Braxton was the School's utilities maintenance technician. [Filing No. 40-

1 at 71-72 (Mr. Braxton's resume).] Before then, Mr. Braxton was employed broadly in the trades,

including roofing, painting, electrical repair work, managing inventory and parts, and the like.

[Filing No. 40-1 at 71-72.] Mr. Braxton did not have prior experience teaching. [See Filing No.

40-1 at 71-72.]

In 2019, the School hired Mr. Braxton into Arsenal Technical High School's Career and

Technical Education program to be its Construction Trades Teacher. [Filing No. 40-2 at 12-13.]

Mr. Braxton's direct supervisor was Career Academy Coordinator Chelsa Thompson, who was

functionally the Assistant Principal. [Filing No. 40-1 at 2.] Ms. Thompson reported directly to

Arsenal Tech's Principal, Corye Franklin ("Principal Franklin"). [Filing No. 40-1 at 2.]

B. The School's Expectations for Its Teachers

Ms. Thompson was responsible for evaluating the performance of teachers under her

supervision, including Mr. Braxton. [Filing No. 40-1 at 2-3.] Those evaluations included "periodic

scheduled classroom visits – some longer, some shorter – as well as impromptu or ad hoc

classroom visits and group meetings." [Filing No. 41 at 4 (citing Filing No. 40-1 at 2-3).] Ms.

Thompson "regularly documented her scheduled observations using structured metrics

corresponding to those used in the teacher's formal annual performance evaluations." [Filing No.

41 at 5 (citing Filing No. 40-1 at 2-3).] The School states that its "teacher evaluations are meant

to encompass not only the multiple formal metrics reflected on the form but also other observations

captured in the 'comments' section." [Filing No. 41 at 5 (citing Filing No. 40-4 at 8-9).] In general,

teachers are evaluated using a standardized Employee Effectiveness Rubric across four domains:

(1) planning and preparation; (2) classroom environment; (3) instruction; and (4) professional

responsibilities. [E.g., Filing No. 40-1 at 21 (Mr. Braxton's final evaluation).] The School states

that it applies a different rubric to "experienced teachers as compared to novice teachers (that is,

those who are new to the profession, whether hired externally or from a non-teaching position

within [the School])." [Filing No. 41 at 5 (citing Filing No. 40-1 at 3).]

C. Mr. Braxton's First Year Teaching

Early on, in January 2020, Ms. Thompson observed that Mr. Braxton "ha[d] immense

potential." [Filing No. 40-1 at 25.] But there were indications that his classroom management and

organization needed improvement: for example, Ms. Thompson noted that "[s]ome students [were]

having their own side conversation." [Filing No. 40-1 at 24.] Nonetheless, Ms. Thompson

recognized Mr. Braxton's efforts, stating that she "appreciate[d] [his] energy and enthusiasm for

[his] position," and that he had "some excellent ideas, and [had] contributed in large ways already

in [his] short time with [the School]." [Filing No. 40-1 at 28.] She asked how she could support

Mr. Braxton and his class further. [Filing No. 40-1 at 28.]

As time went on, in what the School describes as a "persistent and increasingly troublesome

trend," Ms. Thompson discovered that students in class were not "properly using protective

equipment in [Mr. Braxton's] classroom after [Ms. Thompson] observed them using power tools

or performing other hands-on activities without appropriate protective equipment such as safety

goggles, earplugs, gloves, etc." [Filing No. 41 at 6 (citing Filing No. 40-1 at 4; Filing No. 40-4 at

47-48; Filing No. 40-4 at 51-54.)] But given that it was Mr. Braxton's first year, Ms. Thompson

allowed room for improvement, evaluating him on his end-of-year review as "effective." [Filing

No. 40-1 at 11-12.]

D. Mr. Braxton's Second Year Teaching

1. Mr. Braxton's Continued Struggles with Classroom Management and Other

Performance Metrics

Mr. Braxton entered his second year of teaching in the Fall of 2020, during the COVID

pandemic. [Filing No. 40-1 at 4-5.] Consequently, Mr. Braxton had to manage social distancing,

hybrid learning, and wearing masks. [Filing No. 40-1 at 4-5.] He also was expected to serve as a

role model for a new teacher, Mr. Jason Hochstedler. [Filing No. 40-4 at 16-17.]

During the Fall 2020 semester, Ms. Thompson observed "the same types of concerns with

[Mr. Braxton's] performance." [Filing No. 40-1 at 5.] On September 30, 2020, she admonished

Mr. Braxton to avoid using class time on off-topic matters like politics, and reminded him that he

was behind on entering his grades into the School's system. [Filing No. 40-1 at 31.] On October

29, 2020, Ms. Thompson reminded Mr. Braxton that he should be providing hands-on activities

for students on each day of class. [Filing No. 40-1 at 76.] On November 16, 2020, Ms. Thompson

observed that students were asleep in his class and Mr. Braxton was not providing hands-on

projects for students. [Filing No. 40-1 at 78.] On November 30, 2020, Ms. Thompson informed

Mr. Braxton that he had not submitted a required checklist. [Filing No. 40-1 at 79.] On January

29, 2021, Ms. Thompson noted that some students "ha[d] earbuds in, [and] two [were] in the

classroom not participating," and one student was not wearing protective goggles. [Filing No. 40-

1 at 40-41.] On March 1, 2021, Ms. Thompson emailed Mr. Braxton to place him on a Performance

Improvement Plan focusing on his "Planning and Preparation" in the classroom. [Filing No. 40-1

at 16-19.] Mr. Braxton's performance improvement plan concerned "planning and preparation"

because his teaching had demonstrated a "[l]ack of intentional planning [and] lack of precise

leaning objectives determined for daily instruction[,] [r]esult[ing] in loss of productive

instructional time." [Filing No. 40-1 at 16.] But ten days into his Performance Improvement Plan,

Mr. Braxton indicated that he did not know he was on one. [Filing No. 40-1 at 16.] He said he

must have stopped reading Ms. Thompson's email before reaching the end of the page. [Filing No.

40-1 at 16.]

On March 18, 2021, Ms. Thompson documented that there were two students with no

masks. [Filing No. 40-1 at 47.] And on May 5, 2021, Ms. Thompson noted that of six students in

class, three were on their phones, and three were on their laptops. [Filing No. 40-1 at 57.] There

was no instructor supervision. [Filing No. 40-1 at 57.] One of Mr. Braxton's required classroom

documents had not been updated and was still the one created by Ms. Thompson "multiple months

ago," which seemingly had no connection to the current project. [Filing No. 40-1 at 58.] From

these observations, Ms. Thompson noted that "[t]he physical environment is unsafe or some

students don't have access to learning. There is poor alignment between the arrangement of

furniture and resources, including computer technology, and the lesson activities." [Filing No. 40-

1 at 63.] She stated that "[s]afety precautions were not being honored" and asked "[w]hy are

students not wearing safety goggles and allowed to have masks down?" [Filing No. 40-1 at 64.]

Ms. Thompson later testified that she saw "children using saws" who "need[ed] to wear protective

eyewear. It is my job to keep students safe. It is my job to point out when they are not safe. Saws

without eyewear are not safe." [Filing No. 40-4 at 51.]

Principal Franklin also learned of Mr. Braxton's challenges in the classroom, noting that

Mr. Braxton "posted a photo of a student performing class work on social media, and the photo

plainly showed the student not wearing the required face mask." [Filing No. 41 at 10 (citing Filing

No. 40-3 at 51-53; Filing No. 40-3 at 64-66.)]

2. Mr. Braxton's Dispute and Classroom Disruption with a Fellow Teacher

over Automotive Repair Work

Sometime in the Fall of 2020, Mr. Braxton brought a van to campus for another teacher,

Mr. George Mitchell, to work on in connection with automotive classes that Mr. Mitchell taught.

[Filing No. 40-2 at 29-31.] There was apparently an ongoing dispute about payment for van repair

that "trickled on for awhile." [Filing No. 40-4 at 22-23.] On March 9, 2021, Mr. Mitchell and

another teacher entered Mr. Braxton's classroom during an ongoing class to look for tools. [Filing

No. 40-2 at 44-46, 52-55.] Mr. Braxton stated that he asked Mr. Mitchell to leave because he did

not trust him; that Mr. Mitchell refused to leave; that Mr. Braxton asked his co-teacher Mr.

Hochstedler to watch Mr. Mitchell; and that Mr. Mitchell then called Mr. Braxton an expletive.

[Filing No. 40-2 at 39-40.] The entire dispute unfurled in full view of students during class. [Filing

No. 40-2 at 39-40.]

Ms. Thompson and Principal Franklin were upset about the dispute. [Filing No. 40-1 at

9.] They called in Mr. Braxton and Mr. Mitchell for a meeting and recommended that they let the

dispute go. [Filing No. 40-1 at 9.] During the meeting, Mr. Braxton cried, and Mr. Franklin

allegedly commented that Mr. Braxton would benefit from counseling. [Filing No. 40-2 at 90-94.]

Both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Braxton received the same kind of written warning for the dispute.

[Filing No. 40-3 at 83 (Mr. Braxton's written warning); Filing No. 40-3 at 84 (Mr. Mitchell's written

warning).] Mr. Mitchell's warning included the additional instructions that "if there is a need for

Mr. Mitchell or any member on his team to retrieve or get materials from any other place on

campus, an email, indicating the need shall be sent, in advance." [Filing No. 40-3 at 84.]

Mr. Braxton later characterized himself as "an embarrassment" for Principal Franklin,

noting that Mr. Braxton "couldn't let go of the money situation. I know that was making [Principal]

Franklin upset." [Filing No. 40-3 at 44-45.] Mr. Braxton acknowledged that he could not let go

of his dispute with Mr. Mitchell: "I know that was making [Principal Franklin] upset, but I had

been done wrong . . . I had been done wrong, been lied on, and I just wanted the situation to be

handled. . . . I just got mistreated and it's just done and over with . . . . I didn't want that. That —

I mentally — that just mentally — I don't know if it's just me or not, but it just doesn't sit with me

and it — it messed with me." [Filing No. 40-3 at 45.]

3. Mr. Braxton's Final Evaluation

Mr. Braxton's final evaluation was worse than his first. On a 4-point scale, he received the

following scores: In planning and preparation, Mr. Braxton received a 1.67. [Filing No. 40-1 at

21.] In classroom environment, he received a 1.60. [Filing No. 40-1 at 21.] In instruction, he

received 1.60. [Filing No. 40-1 at 21.] And in professional responsibilities, he received his lowest

score, a 1.17. [Filing No. 40-1 at 21.] Although his first evaluation overall scored a 3.1, his final

evaluation scored a 1.56:

Employee Effectiveness Rubric (EER)

Rating Weight Weighted

Rating

[Filing No. 40-1 at 21; Filing No. 40-1 at 11-12 (first evaluation)]

E. The School's Non-Renewal of Mr. Braxton's Teacher Contract

On May 10, 2021, Principal Franklin informed Mr. Braxton that "[d]espite having been

provided support and multiple opportunities to improve instructional planning, compliance with

school and district expectations, and [his] overall teaching performance, [he had] failed to

demonstrate sufficient improvement in [his] teaching responsibilities as directed by administration

and per [his] job description." [Filing No. 40-3 at 93.]

Principal Franklin wrote to the School Superintendent a synopsis of his concerns prompting

his recommendation of non-renewal:

[Mr. Braxton] has not demonstrated effective or strong teaching for the period

observed, which causes concerns for a professional in this setting.

Based on [Mr. Braxton's] observations this year . . . | am not convinced that [Mr.

Braxton] has the skills or ability to manage a classroom or facilitate effective

quality instruction. There have been multiple instances of students sleeping, on

their cell phones, and disengaged during lessons.

Additionally, [Mr. Braxton] has missed professional deadlines, [including]

completing checklists and other professional tasks.

A typical day in [Mr. Braxton's] classroom consists of students engaging in tasks,

but with little to no regard for safety protocols... [Mr. Braxton] has also had

several negative encounters with co-workers that have led to administrative

intervention."

[Filing No. 40-3 at 99 (non-renewal documentation). ]

10

The Board of School Commissioners agreed, while still acknowledging Mr. Braxton's

efforts: "The Board also finds that it was clear that Mr. Braxton cared very much for the success

of his students. Mr. Braxton exhibited passion for high school students and for their mastery of

the construction trades. Mr. Braxton had his students' best interests in mind and demonstrated

positive relationships with his students." [Filing No. 40-3 at 104.] Mr. Braxton was terminated as

of June 18, 2021. [Filing No. 40-3 at 103.]

F. Mr. Braxton Files Suit

On December 15, 2021, Mr. Braxton filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that the School unlawfully

discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and unlawfully retaliated against him for

"reporting workplace harassment." [Filing No. 40-3 at 107.] On February 24, 2023, the EEOC

issued Mr. Braxton a Notice of Right to Sue Letter. [Filing No. 1-2 at 9.] On May 23, 2023, Mr.

Braxton filed suit in the Marion Superior Court, setting forth claims under the Americans With

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA") for discrimination and retaliation. [Filing

No. 1-2 at 5-6 (alleged claims); Filing No. 1-1 at 2 (state-court docket).] The School later removed

the case to this Court. [Filing No. 1.] The School has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

[Filing No. 40].

III.

DISCUSSION

A. ADA Discrimination Claims

1. Wrongful Termination

The School argues in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment that to prove

discrimination under the ADA, Mr. Braxton must show that he is disabled, but in this case, Mr.

Braxton is not actually disabled. [Filing No. 41 at 23.] The School states that to show that Mr.

Braxton is disabled, he must show that he is "substantially limited in a major life activity." [Filing

No. 41 at 23.] The School argues that Mr. Braxton must show that his condition "significantly

restricted [his] ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes

as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." [Filing No.

41 at 24-25.] It asserts that Mr. Braxton has not provided evidence from "documentation,"

"provider testimony," or "any medical professional" to show that he has anxiety and depression.

[Filing No. 41 at 23-24.] The School avers that while Mr. Braxton's perceptions of his experience

may be "real and . . . unpleasant," he "describes in general terms something experienced by nearly

every worker in nearly every profession in stressful workplace situations that inevitably arise from

time to time." [Filing No. 41 at 24.] The School asserts that "unpleasant feelings that come from

dealing with one specific coworker, even when couched in self-diagnosed and quasi-medical terms

like 'stress' and 'anxiety' are not a substantial limitation within the meaning of the ADA," so Mr.

Braxton's negative response to his dispute with fellow teacher Mr. Mitchell does not count. [Filing

No. 41 at 25.]

Mr. Braxton argues that his anxiety and depression "affected his professional performance,"

[Filing No. 43 at 8], rendering him actually disabled, having a record of being disabled, and being

regarded as disabled. [Filing No. 42 at 3-6.] As to actual disability, Mr. Braxton argues that he

has "provided sufficient evidence that he suffers from anxiety which substantially limits one or

more major life activities," including his ratings for "Generalized Anxiety Disorder." [Filing No.

42 at 4.] According to Mr. Braxton, his medical records "confirm that his anxiety and depression

affected him mentally," such as "significantly restrict[ing] his ability to let go of situations that had

been mishandled or where he had been wronged." [Filing No. 42 at 4.] Among those situations,

Mr. Braxton includes the "unfair treatment by" the School, which significantly "impacted his

mental health" by causing "emotional distress." [Filing No. 42 at 4.] Mr. Braxton argues that he

also has a record of being disabled. [Filing No. 42 at 5.] He notes that he confided in Principal

Franklin during multiple "informal conversations about life hardships," including "mentions of his

mental health conditions such as anxiety and depression." [Filing No. 42 at 5.] Mr. Braxton states

that "[a]lthough he did not state his condition formally the context of these discussions made it

apparent to the employer that the plaintiff was experiencing mental health issues." [Filing No. 42

at 5.] For example, Mr. Braxton states that he had an "emotional breakdown," during which time

Principal Franklin made a comment about seeking "counseling." [Filing No. 42 at 6.] Finally, Mr.

Braxton argues that he was regarded as disabled. [Filing No. 42 at 6.] He states that Principal

Franklin and Ms. Thompson "knew of his anxiety and depression due to their close professional

relationship and discussions about personal issues." [Filing No. 42 at 6.] Mr. Braxton states that

"[d]espite not formally declaring his anxiety and depression, Mr. Braxton's mental health struggles

were evident and communicated to his supervisors." [Filing No. 42 at 6.]

The School replies that Mr. Braxton's inability to "let go of situations that had been

mishandled or where he had been wronged" does not establish that he was disabled. [Filing No.

43 at 10.] The School argues that Mr. Braxton has shown "at most" that "his limitations were

specific to a certain individual with whom he had a specific source of conflict, which does not

qualify as a disability under the ADA." [Filing No. 43 at 11.] The School argues further that "[t]o

have a record of disability, a plaintiff must show he 'has a history of, or has been misclassified as

having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.'"

[Filing No. 43 at 8.] But in this case, the School argues, Mr. Braxton has at most a record of

"telling people he has a history of anxiety and depression." [Filing No. 43 at 8.] The School states

that each mention of "anxiety" and "stress" in Mr. Braxton's telehealth records really comes from

only what Mr. Braxton reported himself, not from an official diagnosis. [Filing No. 43 at 7.] In

contrast, the School states it "cannot locate a single instance anywhere in those records where any

third party purports to 'rate' or otherwise convey any belief that [Mr. Braxton] has any cognizable

medical condition." [Filing No. 43 at 7.] The School notes further that Mr. Braxton's "records

from telehealth services" were rendered only "after his separation" from the School. [Filing No.

43 at 7.] The School argues that the records are "unauthenticated and rife with inadmissible

hearsay" and that general "conversations with a supervisor" do not "constitute historical evidence

of a substantial limitation." [Filing No. 43 at 7-8.] Finally, as to whether Mr. Braxton's supervisors

"regarded" him as disabled, the School points to Mr. Braxton's own contrary testimony, in which

he stated, "I don't know if I ever came out and said . . . I have anxiety, I have depression. . . . I'm a

man, so I probably didn't. I tried to keep my business to myself as much as possible." [Filing No.

43 at 9.] Even if Mr. Braxton had more specific conversations with his supervisors, the School

argues that Mr. Braxton is not able to "testify as to what others knew or believed," [Filing No. 43

at 9], so "reporting stressful circumstances does not . . . mean an employer must have thereafter

considered the employee to be 'impaired.'" [Filing No. 43 at 11.]

The ADA, as amended, provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a

qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to discharge of . . . employees." 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(a). "To prove a violation of § 12112(a), a plaintiff must show that: . . . he is disabled."

Monroe v. Indiana Dep't of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503 (7th Cir. 2017). "Under the ADA, the term

'disability' means that an individual has: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more 'major life activities'; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as

having such an impairment." Carothers v. Cnty. of Cook, 808 F.3d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). The term "substantially limits" compares "the ability of an

individual to perform a major life activity [versus] most people in the general population. An

impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing

a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every

impairment will constitute a disability." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)-(ii).

Mr. Braxton does not make clear which of his major life activities are substantially

impaired by his anxiety and depression. He argues only generally how his anxiety substantially

limits "one or more major life activities." [Filing No. 42 at 4.] His most specific argument is with

reference to how his anxiety had "affected his professional performance." [Filing No. 43 at 8].

For purposes of analysis, then, the Court assumes that Mr. Braxton argues his mental health

impairments substantially limit his major life activity of "working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

For mental health conditions, the Seventh Circuit has generally "distinguished between . .

. personal conflicts with others, or mere temperament and irritability, . . . and medically diagnosed

mental conditions," Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054,

1059 & n.9, n.10 (7th Cir. 1998), such as substantially limiting anxiety and depression. See, e.g.,

Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 1996) (ruling in favor of disabled employee

diagnosed with a "depressive reaction in anxiety state"). This distinction is key to resolving Mr.

Braxton's claim. For example, Mr. Braxton focuses on his negative experiences with fellow

teacher Mr. Mitchell and the way the School handled their dispute. But "a personality conflict

with a supervisor or coworker does not establish a disability within the meaning of disability law."

Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997). And being "substantially

limited in the major life activity of working" does not include "a substantial limitation in

performing the unique aspects of a single specific job," such as experiencing anxiety from

interacting with specific individuals on the job, like Mr. Braxton's dispute with Mr. Mitchell.

Carothers, 808 F.3d at 1147-48 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630 Appendix) (affirming summary

judgment against employee whose anxiety flared up while engaging with juveniles at work).

Likewise, Mr. Braxton may well have become more stressed because he was reprimanded

for the dispute with Mr. Mitchell and given general work criticism, but "[t]he major life activity of

working is not 'substantially limited'" due to "anxiety and stress related to his [supervisor's] review

of [his] job performance." Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996)

(affirming summary judgment against employee with anxiety). To Mr. Braxton's credit, it is true

that under the ADA, a person may be "regarded as" disabled "because of an actual or perceived . .

. mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life

activity." Powers v. USF Holland, Inc., 667 F.3d 815, 823 n.7 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(3)). So it is relevant that Principal Franklin might have commented that Mr. Braxton

would benefit from counseling, discussed Mr. Braxton's hardships with him, and permitted him to

take a sick day for his mental health. Nonetheless, those conversations and alleged

acknowledgements fall short of worse remarks that are insufficient to "show[] even a perception

of a mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." Stewart v. Cnty.

of Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 111 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment against employee as

being regarded as disabled even though the employer "ordered . . . psychological evaluations for

him" and stated he was "emotionally or psychologically imbalanced"); see also Wells v. Winnebago

Cnty., Ill., 820 F.3d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming summary judgment against employee who

"relied exclusively on the many times she told supervisors about her anxiety").

Beyond Mr. Braxton's work experiences, he supports his claim of disability with his

therapy records. Even assuming that those records are not hearsay, they would not offer support.

That is because an employee's disability is "determined as of the time of the employment decision."

Weiler, 101 F.3d at 524. The matter of timing presents a problem here: Mr. Braxton's records

describe his mental health struggles before and after his employment, but not during his

employment. The therapy notes do show high scores for depression and anxiety, but the earliest

documentation is from 2022, a year after his termination. [Filing No. 42-1 at 13.] The therapy

notes indicate that he had a history of therapy in childhood and adolescence, but that was years

before his termination. [Filing No. 42-1 at 10.] The most contemporaneous assessment states that

Mr. Braxton struggled "since 2017 specifically after the death of his mother, [which] increase[d] .

. . depression/anxiety after [the] loss of [his] father in 2019." [Filing No. 42-1 at 10.] As

unfortunate as Mr. Braxton's familial losses are, a general assessment of grief alone does not

specifically describe how he is substantially limited in his ability to work. Indeed, "[m]any people

suffer anxiety without being disabled by it." Wells, 820 F.3d at 867 (affirming summary judgment

against employee whose "medical evidence [did not] back up her contention that her disability

adversely affected her ability to" work). Ultimately, Mr. Braxton's therapy notes are effectively a

retroactive diagnosis, which does not shine light on any substantial limitations "as of the time of

the employment decision." Weiler, 101 F.3d at 524.

No reasonable juror could find that Mr. Braxton was disabled under the ADA. Without a

finding of disability, Mr. Braxton's discrimination claim for wrongful termination cannot succeed.

The Court GRANTS the School's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 40], as to Mr.

Braxton's disability discrimination claim for wrongful termination.

2. Failure to Accommodate

The School did not address a failure-to-accommodate claim in its Motion for Summary

Judgment, but Mr. Braxton argues in his Response that he has asserted such a claim and that the

School's "failure to accommodate [his] anxiety . . . constituted discrimination under the ADA."

[Filing No. 42 at 8.] He argues that "[u]nder the ADA, employers are required to provide

reasonable accommodations to employees with known disabilities unless it causes undue

hardship." [Filing No. 42 at 8.] He asserts that he "requested that his interactions with a particular

co-worker," presumably Mr. Mitchell, "be managed to avoid unnecessary stress, but this was not

effectively resolved, leading to increased anxiety." [Filing No. 42 at 9.] He states that "prior to

his termination," the School should have "offered the opportunity" to apply for another "custodial

job available," for which he was "overwhelmingly qualified." [Filing No. 42 at 9.]

The School argues in its Reply that Mr. Braxton has not "preserved any failure-to-

accommodate claim." [Filing No. 43 at 4.] The School states that Mr. Braxton did not "clearly

assert a claim in a Statement of Claims," resulting in "abandonment of that claim." [Filing No. 43

at 4.] Even if the claim were preserved, the School argues, Mr. Braxton "cannot establish that he

was a qualified individual with a disability, nor that [the School] was aware of his disability," or

that the School "failed to reasonably accommodate him." [Filing No. 43 at 4-5.] The School

argues that employees "must make their employers aware of any nonobvious, medically necessary

accommodations with corroborating evidence such as a doctor's note or at least orally relaying a

statement from a doctor, before an employer may be required under the ADA's reasonableness

standard to provide a specific accommodation." [Filing No. 43 at 5.] The School states that

"[w]hile [Mr. Braxton] may have made various references to stress and anxiety in communications

with his supervisors, he never presented substantiating documentation, and he never linked those

references to work in a way that reasonably suggested he was seeking 'accommodation' for any

substantial impairment." [Filing No. 43 at 6.] The School states that it "did manage the situation"

between Mr. Braxton and Mr. Mitchell "decisively as soon as it learned that [Mr. Braxton] and his

colleague were incapable of keeping their personal dispute from disrupting their work: both were

disciplined and told unequivocally to 'let it go.'" [Filing No. 43 at 6-7.] The School notes that

thereafter, Mr. Braxton "reported no further problems with" Mr. Mitchell, and that Mr. Braxton

"thanked his supervisors for addressing the situation." [Filing No. 43 at 7.]

The Court first begins with whether Mr. Braxton waived his claim for failure to

accommodate. In ADA cases, the Seventh Circuit has imposed waiver when "nowhere in [the

plaintiff's] complaint [were] there facts to put [the defendant] on notice that [the plaintiff] was

alleging failure to accommodate." Hooper v. Proctor Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir.

2015) (imposing waiver on failure-to-accommodate claim). In this case, however, Mr. Braxton

"allege[d] a claim for discrimination under the ADA, and ADA discrimination includes a failure

to accommodate." Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir.

2014) (holding failure-to-accommodate claim was preserved where complaint "pled a number of

facts relevant to his failure-accommodate-claim"). Mr. Braxton argued to the EEOC that "a

reasonable employer would have offered him a position similar to his previous position." [Filing

No. 40-3 at 113.] Additionally, Mr. Braxton asserted in his "Burden of Proof Statement" – which

the Court understands to be Mr. Braxton's "Statement of Claims" required by the Court's Case

Management Plan – that the School "lacked a legitimate business reason to terminate Mr. Braxton

because at the time of [his] termination as a teacher, there were positions that he qualified for based

upon his previous position as a maintenance worker and he was not offered the position." [Filing

No. 36 at 2.] This is the same argument he makes in his response to the School's Motion for

Summary Judgment. [Filing No. 42 at 9.] Consequently, the Court holds that Mr. Braxton's

failure-to-accommodate claim is not waived.

Nonetheless, his claim cannot succeed. A prerequisite for a failure-to-accommodate claim

is that Mr. Braxton have a disability. Li v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC, No. 23-3286, 2024 WL

3648287, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024) (observing that the ADA "proscribes discrimination against

a 'qualified individual on the basis of disability.'") (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). As the Court

has analyzed above, no reasonable jury could find that Mr. Braxton was disabled. Even if he were

disabled, Mr. Braxton "has not offered medical evidence demonstrating that a reasonable employer

would understand every mention of [his] anxiety as a disability." Wells, 820 F.3d at 867 (affirming

summary judgment against employee's failure-to-accommodate claim). And to receive an

accommodation in the form of a job transfer, "the individual must . . . satisfy the legitimate

prerequisites for that alternative position." Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678

(7th Cir. 1998). Yet when Ms. Thompson was asked whether Mr. Braxton would have been

"qualified for a position as a custodian," she answered that "[w]ith the campus that he had disrupted

heavily, that would not have made sense." [Filing No. 40-4 at 57-59.] The Court GRANTS the

School's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 40], as to Mr. Braxton's failure-to-

accommodate claim.

B. Disability Retaliation

The School argues that Mr. Braxton "never engaged in protected activity," so his retaliation

claim fails. [Filing No. 41 at 26.] It states that general complaints are not the same as "complaining

that [a] coworker had discriminated against [him] 'because of [his] disability.'" [Filing No. 41 at

26-27.] Applying that rule, the School argues that Mr. Braxton "complained to his supervisors

about perceived 'harassment' by" Mr. Mitchell, "but he never said or implied anything reasonably

suggesting that [Mr.] Mitchell allegedly directed harassing conduct at [him] because of a

disability." [Filing No. 41 at 28.] The School also argues that Mr. Braxton "cannot demonstrate

any causal connection between his separation and any protected category or conduct." [Filing No.

41 at 28.] The School states that Mr. Braxton must show that the School's "decision not to renew

his contract was motivated by . . . his disability or his allegedly protected complaint about

disability-based harassment." [Filing No. 41 at 28.] The School states that on the contrary, "there

is no evidence that anyone at [the School] was upset at [Mr. Braxton] or harbored any negative

feelings towards him for having any kind of mental health condition." [Filing No. 41 at 29.] To

the extent that Principal Franklin remarked that Mr. Braxton would benefit from professional

counseling, the School asserts that "such a remark reflects no anti-disability animus but rather an

accurate observation coupled with a reasonable suggestion." [Filing No. 41 at 29-30.] If Ms.

Thompson and Principal Franklin were upset with Mr. Braxton, it was solely because his dispute

with Mr. Mitchell erupted into a "dramatic and disruptive display in front of students." [Filing No.

41 at 31.] The School states that Mr. Braxton's performance reviews had lower scores, not because

of his complaints about Mr. Mitchell, but because of the documented "problems with . . . lesson

planning and concerns over students not paying attention and not utilizing safety gear properly on

repeated occasions throughout his second academic year teaching." [Filing No. 41 at 32.] The

School argues that any other miscellaneous "retaliatory discharge" claim about reporting

"[w]orkplace harassment" "must be grounded in an activity protected by a particular statute," and

in this case, there is none. [Filing No. 41 at 33-34.]

Mr. Braxton responds that the School unlawfully retaliated against him on the basis of his

disability. [Filing No. 42 at 10.] He states that he engaged in the "protected activity" of "requesting

reasonable accommodations for his disability" and "reporting . . . workplace harassment and

threats." [Filing No. 42 at 10.] He asserts that he "requested a meeting with school administrators

. . . to address issues arising from Mr. Mitchell's behavior, which included harassment and

disruption of his classroom," but Ms. Thompson disregarded him by telling him to "let it go."

[Filing No. 42 at 11.] He asserts further that he was harassed by Mr. Mitchell when Mr. Mitchell

"entered [his] classroom without permission, disrupted his teaching, and made threatening

comments." [Filing No. 42 at 12.] Mr. Braxton states that when he "reported these incidents to

Ms. Thompson and Principal Franklin," they "discouraged him from filing formal complaints."

[Filing No. 42 at 12.] After engaging in his allegedly protected activity, Mr. Braxton states that he

"suffered adverse employment actions," including a "negative evaluation," and despite a

performance improvement plan, "[t]ermination." [Filing No. 42 at 13-14.]

The School replies that protected activity "must be 'more than simply a complaint about

some situation at work, no matter how valid the complaint might be.' The complaint instead must

indicate discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class." [Filing No. 43 at 11.] In

applying this rule, the School states that Mr. Braxton "never told (nor even claims to have told)

[the School] that he believed [Mr.] Mitchell was mistreating him on the basis of a disability."

[Filing No. 43 at 11-12.] The School reiterates that it terminated Mr. Braxton's employment, not

because of any purported disability, but because of Mr. Braxton's "consistent and consistently

documented failings in lesson planning, classroom administration, safety practices, and other key

metrics used in [the School's] teacher evaluation rubrics across two academic years." [Filing No.

43 at 12.]

"An employee bringing a retaliation claim against an employer must present evidence of

'(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3)

a causal connection between the two.'" Li, 2024 WL 3648287, at *6 (7th Cir. Aug. 5, 2024)

(quoting Adebe v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 35 F.4th 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2022)). To

satisfy causation, an employee must show that "the record contain[s] sufficient evidence to

conclude that retaliatory motive caused the materially adverse action." Li, 2024 WL 3648287, at

*6 (quoting Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 (7th Cir. 2022)). As it pertains to the

behavior of employees, "employers must control the behavior of others in the workplace, so as to

ensure nondiscriminatory working conditions." Wells, 820 F.3d at 865.

Regarding the confrontation between Mr. Braxton and Mr. Mitchell, the evidence shows

only a dispute between coworkers, not harassment of a disabled employee. When asked whether

"Mr. Mitchell harassed [Mr. Braxton] because of [his] disabilities," Mr. Braxton answered, "I don't

know why he did that." [Filing No. 40-3 at 43.] When asked whether Mr. Mitchell "knew [he]

was disabled," Mr. Braxton answered, "I couldn't answer that." [Filing No. 40-3 at 43.] When

asked whether he ever even spoke with Mr. Mitchell about his mental health concerns, Mr. Braxton

was unsure, stating that "we definitely talked about hardships in life," but "I mean, I don't know if

I ever came out and said, you know, I have anxiety, I have depression. I don't know if I've ever

said that. I'm a man so I probably didn't." [Filing No. 40-3 at 43-44.]

As to allegedly retaliating by not handling the dispute to Mr. Braxton's liking, the School

did, in fact, handle the dispute. The School called both teachers in. The School disciplined both

teachers. Both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Braxton received the same kind of written warning for the

dispute. [Filing No. 40-3 at 83 (Mr. Braxton's written warning); Filing No. 40-3 at 84 (Mr.

Mitchell's written warning).] Additionally, Mr. Mitchell's warning included instructions that "if

there is a need for Mr. Mitchell or any member on his team to retrieve or get materials from any

other place on campus, an email, indicating the need shall be sent, in advance." [Filing No. 40-3

at 84.] This would have the practical effect of preventing Mr. Mitchell from entering Mr. Braxton's

classroom for tools without prior permission.

As to allegedly retaliating by not providing an accommodation generally, the Court

reiterates its earlier analysis that no reasonable jury could find that Mr. Braxton was disabled and

if he was, he was required to "make [his] employer aware of any nonobvious, medically necessary

accommodations with corroborating evidence such as a doctor's note or at least orally relaying a

statement from a doctor, before an employer may be required under the ADA's reasonableness

standard to provide a specific accommodation." Wells, 820 F.3d at 867. The record shows that no

reasonable jury could find that Mr. Braxton met this requirement.

Mr. Braxton argues that his reporting the alleged harassment preceded his decline in

performance reviews, which reflects suspicious timing. In general, "'temporal proximity between

an employee's protected activity and an adverse employment action is rarely sufficient to show

that the former caused the latter' without additional facts." Li, 2024 WL 3648287, at *6 (quoting

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012)). "Loose temporal proximity . . . . is not

enough." Id. (affirming summary judgment against employee's retaliation claim). A "case based

on suspicious timing is particularly weak where a plaintiff’s protected activity follows 'a

performance warning for the very same conduct that ultimately led to his termination.'" Taylor-

Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 496 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming summary

judgment against ADA discrimination claim where employee was warned for tardiness and

ultimately terminated for tardiness). In this case, Mr. Braxton's reasons for termination included

the documented history of problems from the beginning of his tenure. Ms. Thompson testified

that "keeping an organized, productive, efficient classroom . . . was never his strong suit from the

beginning." [Filing No. 40-4 at 16.] In addition to extensive documentation, Ms. Thompson

testified that Mr. Braxton "had two school years to figure out what he was doing and had a lot of

support and training to do it." [Filing No. 40-4 at 12.] But ultimately, when asked whether

"students learn[ed] in Mr. Braxton's class," Ms. Thompson answered, "[n]ot often enough." [Filing

No. 40-4 at 47.] Ms. Thompson explained that "the deficiencies [she] observed in his performance

would have been equally concerning regardless of whether they were caused by a medical

condition or any other reason." [Filing No. 40-1 at 10.] She stated that she would have evaluated

Mr. Braxton's performance negatively "in the exact same manner even if [she] was aware that he

had a mental health condition." [Filing No. 40-1 at 10.]

No reasonable juror could find that the School unlawfully retaliated against Mr. Braxton

based on a disability. The Court GRANTS the School's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing

No. 40], as to Mr. Braxton's retaliation claim.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, "[n]ot every personal discomfort nor workplace embarrassment rises to the

level of a recognized disability." Weiler, 101 F.3d at 526. There is a distinction between the routine

emotional ups and downs of the working world, and the debilitating effects of substantially limiting

depression and anxiety. The evidence shows that Mr. Braxton is a skilled tradesman, but as a

classroom teacher, he fell short of the School's legitimate expectations. The Court recognizes that

Mr. Braxton cares about students. The School, too, cares about its students, and the School

determined that it was in the best interest of the students that the School and Mr. Braxton part

ways. This is not the outcome either party originally intended, but it is an outcome permitted by

law. The Court GRANTS the School's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Mr. Braxton's

claims. [40.] Final judgment shall enter accordingly.

Date: 8/14/2024 ~ ant Mas Steam

(Hon. Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

25

Distribution:

Joseph C. Pettygrove

KROGER GARDIS & REGAS LLP

jpettygrove@kgrlaw.com

Hamidullah Saahir

Hamid Saahir & Associates PLLC

hamid@hurt317.com

Aaron J. Williamson

Kroger Gardis & Regas, LLP

AWilliamson@kgrlaw.com