RASHAD v. USF HOLLAND LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

NEW ALBANY DIVISION

MUHAMMAD RASHAD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:23-cv-00029-TWP-KMB

)

USF HOLLAND LLC US, DOT#75806, )

ANDREW COOK Director of Linehaul, )

BRYCE MITCHEM Louisville, Terminal Manager, )

SCOTT ROGERS Industrial Relations Manager, )

)

Defendants. )

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS COOK'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND

MITCHEM'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by pro se Defendant Andrew

Cook ("Cook") (Dkt. 30), and Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. 36 at 5-6) and for Judgment on the

Pleadings (Dkt. 45), filed by Defendant Bryce Mitchem ("Mitchem"). On March 30, 2023, pro se

Plaintiff Muhammad Rashad ("Rashad") filed an Amended Complaint, bringing claims for

discrimination, failure to hire, failure to accommodate, and wrongful termination under the

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") against Cook, Mitchem, USF Holland LLC ("USF

Holland"), and Scott Rogers ("Rogers")1, (Dkt. 7). For the reasons explained below, the Motions

to Dismiss are granted and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of motions to dismiss and judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts

as true all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint and draws all

1 This case is currently stayed as to Defendant USF Holland pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code with

all deadlines and hearing settings vacated, and all pending motions in this matter terminated without prejudice (see

Dkt. 21). Summonses have been issued twice to Defendant Rogers (Dkt. 14; Dkt. 27; see Dkt. 27-2), but to date no

return of service has been filed.

references in the light most favorable to Rashad as the non-moving party. Rashad, a 58-year-old

male, was "a former applicant" for a Professional Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") Class A

Driver position for USF Holland in 2021 (Dkt. 7 at 2, ¶ 6). At the time of his complaint, Rashad

suffered from a cancer diagnosis but he was "fully capable of driving and possess[ing] a valid

CDL." Id., ¶ 7. His condition impacted his ability to perform major life activities, but he was still

"able to cope with proper medication, regular doctor visits and accommodations from his

employer." Id., ¶ 8. In his response to Cook's Motion to Dismiss, Rashad states that his condition

caused pain, swelling, and discomfort in his lower right leg and foot so he submitted a request for

accommodation "for additional leg room in the forklift or any equipment . . . due to his physical

disability — i.e., cancer/lymphedema" (Dkt. 33 at 1–2). He also contends that Defendants harassed

and told him that he was "unable to perform his duties." Id. at 2.

After he completed orientation and was dispatched on his first assignment, "Defendants[']

subordinate refused to accommodate [him]" (Dkt. 7 at 2, ¶ 10). Central Dispatch informed Rashad

that he "was being removed off the board until [he] [received] a doctor's note excuse [sic] to be fit

for duty". Id., ¶ 11. Instead of accommodating Rashad, Defendants "refused to hire [him] and

wrongfully terminated [his] employment after learning of [his] disability." Id., ¶ 9.

On May 10, 2021, Rashad submitted a charge of discrimination to the Indiana Civil Rights

Commission ("ICRC") (Dkt. 40-1 at 4) and followed up with a second charge to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on or about July 12, 2021, in which he wrote:

I was hired as a Driver with USF Holland-Louisville on or around March 15, 2021.

I was subjected to discrimination due to my disability and denied a reasonable

accommodation. On April, 5, 2021[,] I was dispatched to Indianapolis to pick up a

load. I walked in on crutches and Mgr. Harold Last Name Unavailable instructed

me to call Central Dispatch. Dispatch Mgr. Chris Last Name Unavailable left me a

voice message to inform me that I was being removed until I provide a doctor[']s

excuse showing I was Fit for Duty. On April 8, 2021[,] I requested a reasonable

accommodation. On April 19, 2021[,] the Company denied my request.

On April 20, Central Dispatch Chris Last Name Unavailable discharged my

employment due to my disability.

I believe I was discriminated against because of my disability, in violation of Title

I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.

Id. at 8. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on April 20, 2022. Id. at 13.

Rashad filed his original complaint on February 2, 2023 (Dkt. 1) and his Amended

Complaint on March 30, 2023.2 He alleges that the "Defendants['] action in refusing to mai[n]tain

employment for [him] constitutes [d]isability discrimination, failure to accommodate and

wrongful[] termination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disability ACT

(ADA) 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq." (Dkt. 7 at 3, ¶ 13.) Read liberally, Rashad's Amended Complaint

alleges that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the

ADA, of which only the ADA claims are now before the Court.3 Specifically, Rashad alleges that,

as a disabled individual who suffers from a cancer diagnosis, the Defendants: (1) failed to hire

him; (2) failed to accommodate him; and (3) wrongfully terminated his employment.

Cook filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss on February 15, 2024, asserting amongst other

things: (1) he is not subject to personal jurisdiction; (2) he was not properly served with the

complaint; (3) Rashad failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (4) Rashad

failed to file his claim before the EEOC and obtain a right to sue letter (Dkt. 30 at 2). Cook also

states he has never lived or conducted business in Southern Indiana, has never met Rashad, and

2 The Court screened and found Rashad's original complaint to be subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Rashad

was granted leave to file his Amended Complaint, which is the operative complaint.

3 In context, the Court understands Rashad's invocation of the "Civil Rights Act of 1964" as an attempt to bring claims

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, which prohibits discrimination by covered

employers on the basis of race. However, in its Screening Order, the Court found that no factual allegations supported

a race discrimination claim and dismissed the claim (Dkt. 8 at 3).

does not recall hiring, working with, or terminating Rashad. Id. The Court sua sponte extended

the time for Rashad to respond to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. 32), and he filed a Response in

Opposition on March 20, 2024 (Dkt. 33).4 Cook replied on April 16, 2024 (Dkt. 35).

Mitchem, by counsel, filed a combined Answer to Complaint, Affirmative Defenses, and

Motion to Dismiss on May 31, 2024, asserting claims similar to Cook's (Dkt. 36),5 to which Rashad

responded (Dkt. 40). On July 18, 2024, Mitchem also filed a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings

(Dkt. 45). The deadline for Rashad to respond has not yet expired, but for reasons addressed in

this Entry, no response is necessary.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint that fails to "state a claim upon which relief

can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6), the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all inferences

in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).

The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the

Supreme Court of the United States explained that the complaint must allege facts that are "enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although "detailed

factual allegations" are not required, mere "labels," "conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of

the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Id. The allegations must "give the defendant

4 Rashad further argues in his responses to the motions to dismiss that he brings retaliation and discrimination claims

under the Indiana Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") and Kentucky Civil Rights Act ("KCRA"). Despite Rashad's insistence,

the Amended Complaint makes no mention of the ICRA or the KCRA.

5 Mitchem's Motion to Dismiss, embedded in his Answer, violates Local Rule 7.1(a), which states that motions must

be filed separately. However, this violation is immaterial to the outcome.

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. Stated differently,

the complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."

Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

In the context of pro se litigation, the Supreme Court reiterates that "[a] document filed pro

se is to be liberally construed . . . and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment after the parties

have filed a complaint and an answer, and the pleadings are closed. Rule 12(c) motions are

analyzed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old

Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007); Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7th Cir.

1996). The complaint must allege facts that are "enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although "detailed

factual allegations" are not required, mere "labels," "conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of

the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Id. Stated differently, the complaint must

include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere &

Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To be

facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that One

Solution is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court will grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if "it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief." N.

Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Craigs, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993)). The factual allegations

in the complaint are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party; however, the court

is "not obliged to ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim or

to assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of law." Id. (quoting R.J.R. Serv., Inc. v. Aetna

Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989)). "As the title of the rule implies, Rule 12(c)

permits a judgment based on the pleadings alone. . . . The pleadings include the complaint, the

answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits." Id. (internal citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

Before turning to the parties' arguments, the Court will clarify the scope of review in light

of the numerous documents Rashad attached, not to his Amended Complaint, but to his responses

to Cook's and Mitchem's motions (see Dkt. 33-1, Dkt. 40-1). In his response to Cook's motion

(Dkt. 33), Rashad attached seven documents for consideration:

• a letter dated April 6, 2021, that Rashad appears to have received from Human

Resources regarding his accommodations request (Dkt. 33-1 at 1);

• a copy of e-mail correspondence dated April 8, 2021, in which Rashad reports that he

was "singled out by staff regarding [his] disability" and requests "immediate action to

be placed back on the duty status", id. at 2–3;

• an accommodation request form dated March 29, 2021, id. at 4–5;

• an authorization for medical release form, id. at 6;

• an accommodations questionnaire, id. at 7–9;

• a typed letter appearing to be written by Rashad's medical provider, id. at 10–12; and,

• a "Probationary Termination" letter dated April 20, 2021, id. at 13–14.

To his response to Mitchem's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 40), Rashad attached several additional

documents:

• his charge of discrimination filed with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (Dkt. 40-

1 at 4–5);

• a request for review Rashad appears to have sent to the EEOC in response to the ICRC's

notice of findings, id. at 6;

• two copies of the charge of discrimination Rashad later filed with the EEOC, id. at 1–

3, 8;

• a letter sent by email indicating the EEOC was closing the second charge of

discrimination filed with it as duplicative, id. at 7;

• Rashad's answers to an EEOC inquiry information form, id. at 9–12; and,

• a copy of an EEOC right-to-sue letter issued on April 20, 2022, id. at 13–15.

At its core, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss probes whether the complaint plausibly

suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief and raises that possibility above a 'speculative level';

if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court. See Wilson v. Price, 624 F.3d 389, 391–92

(7th Cir. 2010). The parties do not need to go to the trouble and expense of proving or disproving

charges that, even if true, would not entitle the plaintiff to any relief. For these reasons, considering

matters outside the pleadings would convert a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 242 F.3d

772, 777 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A motion to dismiss must be treated as a motion for summary judgment

if the judge considers matters outside the complaint, but the judge may elect to treat a motion as

what it purports to be and disregard the additional papers.") (emphasis omitted).

Certain exceptions exist that allow the court to consider documents attached to a plaintiff's

response without converting the motion to summary judgment. While a party cannot submit

documents at the motion to dismiss stage that would "require[] discovery to authenticate or

disambiguate", the court can look beyond a complaint's four corners to consider "concededly

authentic document[s] central to the plaintiff's claim." Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738–39 (7th

Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit has found this rule applies to a limited class of attachments to

Rule 12(b)(6) motions, including documents referenced in the complaint, documents critical to the

complaint, and information subject to judicial notice (such as public records). See Geinosky v. City

of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, "this rule logically extends to

documents attached to a plaintiff's response." Metz v. Joe Rizza Imports, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 983,

988 (N.D. Ill. 2010); cf. Krok v. Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., No. 98 C 5902, 1999 WL 262125, at *6

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1999) (refusing to consider attachments to a plaintiff's response to a motion

because they were not central to his claim).

Although Rashad offers numerous documents for consideration, the Court considers only

his ICRC and EEOC charges of discrimination and the EEOC right-to-sue letter, which he attached

to his response to Mitchem's motion to dismiss (see Dkt. 40-1 at 4–5, 8, 13–15); see also Pierce v.

Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 128 F. App'x. 534, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that the district court

properly considered "numerous" party-submitted "public records" from the "administrative

process" in resolving motion to dismiss); cf. Booden v. Brookfield Properties, No. 21 C 1372, 2021

WL 5232719, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2021) (taking judicial notice of EEOC charge and relevant

contents therein attached to motion to dismiss). The other documents Rashad attaches, though

they may prove helpful to a decision on the merits, are nevertheless improper to consider.

As for Mitchem's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, he attaches Rashad's Notice of

Right to Sue letter from the EEOC dated April 20, 2022, as Exhibit "A" to his Brief in support of

his motion (Dkt. 46-1).

B. Failure to Initiate Lawsuit within 90-day Time Limit

In their motions to dismiss, Defendants Cook and Mitchem initially assert that Rashad's

claims fail because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies (see Dkt. 30 at 1; Dkt. 36 at 6).

In response, Rashad presents evidence of filing charges of discrimination with both the ICRC and

EEOC, along with the EEOC's letter of notice of right to sue issued on April 20, 2022 (Dkt. 40-1).

Mitchem argues in his reply brief that Rashad's suit, initiated when he filed his original complaint

on February 27, 2023 (Dkt. 1), is untimely and contends that the 90-day period for bringing an

action in this Court expired on or about July 19, 2022 (Dkt. 41 at 3, ¶ 13). Mitchem contends that

Rashad filed his complaint two hundred and twenty-three days late. See id. at 3, ¶ 14. In his Brief

in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 46) Mitchem again asserts that Rashad's

90-day limitation period for bringing an action in this Court expired on or about July 19, 2022,

because the EEOC Determination and Notice of Rights is dated April 20, 2022. Id. at 4, 5.

Discrimination claims under the ADA must be pursued first through the administrative

process, and, after that process is complete, a claimant must file their claim in federal court within

90 days of receiving the EEOC's notice of right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). The Seventh Circuit has reiterated that the 90-day period

begins to run when the claimant receives actual notice of his right to sue. Houston v. Sidley &

Austin, 185 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1999); see also DeTata v. Rollprint Packaging Prods. Inc., 632

F.3d 962, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2011). Because the 90-day period is a statute of limitations and not a

jurisdictional requirement, Rashad need not address or anticipate in his Amended Complaint any

potential affirmative defense asserted by the Defendants regarding the 90-day limitation. See

Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 993–94 (7th Cir. 2000); United States Gypsum Co. v. Indiana Gas

Co., 350 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, Defendants maintain the burden of proof and they

must demonstrate that Rashad's lawsuit is untimely by establishing the date of receipt for the notice

of right to sue. See Prince v. Stewart, 580 F.3d 571, 574 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Houston, 185

F.3d at 839.

The Court takes judicial notice of the pair of charges of discrimination and the EEOC right-

to-sue letter, which demonstrate an exhaustion of Rashad's administrative remedies. Mitchem's

argument that Rashad brought suit in this Court outside of the permissible window is likewise

unsuccessful. The date Mitchem asserts as the expiration of the limitation period is seemingly

based upon a mere addition of ninety days to April 20, 2022, the date when the right-to-sue letter

was issued (compare Dkt. 40-1 at 13, with Dkt. 41 at 3, ¶ 13 ("Plaintiff's 90-day limitation period

. . . expired on or about July 19, 2022")). Mitchem is correct that Rashad filed suit well beyond

90 days after the EEOC issued the notice of his right to sue. This fact is of no consequence,

however, as no evidence in the record demonstrates the date that Rashad actually received notice.

The "Exhaustion of Federal Administrative Remedies" section of Rashad's initially-filed form

complaint, which asked whether and on which date he received a notice of right to sue, is blank

(see Dkt. 1 at 5–6), and the operative Amended Complaint is also silent.

Since no allegations in the operative Amended Complaint or evidence in the record

indicates the date Rashad received notice, the Court does not find that he impermissibly filed suit

outside of the statutory 90-day period. The Defendants remaining in the lawsuit following this

Entry may instead provide evidence that aims to prove the untimeliness of Rashad's complaint at

the summary judgment stage, if applicable. See Moses v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:11-CV-385-PRC,

2012 WL 1066769, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2012) (quoting Johnson v. Five Star Transp., LLC,

No. 3:11-CV-138, 2011 WL 5446452, at * 2 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2011)) (noting that "the issue of

the timeliness of the complaint cannot usually be addressed through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion").

Accordingly, the motions to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings are denied in this

respect.

C. Rashad's Claims against Cook and Mitchem as Individuals

Defendants Cook and Mitchem each argue in their motions to dismiss that Rashad's ADA

claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim against them. Cook asserts that the Amended

Complaint "does not state a valid claim or cause of action against [him] personally or in [his]

capacity as a former employee of USF Holland." (Dkt. 30 at 1.) Similarly, Mitchem argues that

Rashad fails to state a claim against him "either individually or in his capacity as a former

employee of USF Holland, upon which relief can be granted." (Dkt. 36 at 5, ¶ 1.)

The Amended Complaint alleges that USF Holland, Mitchem, Cook, and Rogers "refused

to hire [Rashad] and wrongfully terminated employment [sic] after learning of [his] disability."

(Dkt. 7 at 2, ¶ 9.) Rashad also asserts that "Defendants [sic] subordinate refuse[d] to accommodate

[him] after [he] completed orientation and was dispatch[ed] on his first assignment." Id. at ¶ 10.

In the section of the complaint identifying the parties, Rashad identifies Andrew Cook, Bryce

Mitchem, and Scott Rogers as "employees for USF Holland LLC." Id. at ¶ 2.

The ADA prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis of a

disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Seventh Circuit case law is clear that ADA claims cannot be

brought against individuals in their individual capacity. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd.,

55 F.3d 1276, 1279–82 (7th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995)

(discussing AIC, 55 F.3d 1276) ("[T]he ADA's definition of 'employer,' which (like Title VII)

includes an employer's agents, is simply a statutory expression of traditional respondeat superior

liability and imposes no individual liability on agents."). Even if the Amended Complaint were to

clearly delineate which claims are related to the alleged actions of Cook and Mitchem (which it

does not do), they cannot be held liable in their individual capacity under the ADA. See Banning,

72 F.3d at 553–54; Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). Because the

ADA does not provide for recovery for Rashad's allegations against Cook or Mitchem, in their

individual capacities, the claims against these Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

D. Claims Against the Remaining Defendants

As for Defendant Rogers, the Process Receipt and Return docketed on February 27, 2024

indicates that on February 22, 2024, U.S. Marshals were unable to locate Rogers and according to

the receipt's remarks, the current homeowner of Rogers' listed residence informed the Deputy U.S.

Marshal that Rogers had moved to South Carolina (Dkt. 31). The original Complaint was filed on

February 27, 2023 (Dkt. 1) and the Amended Complaint was filed on March 3, 2023 (Dkt. 7).

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—

on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(m); see also Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011).

Rashad will have until Monday, August 19, 2024, to perfect service upon Rogers or to show cause

why the claims against Rogers should not be dismissed for failure to serve process on him.

As for Defendant USF Holland, the matter remains stayed and, as previously ordered, "any

party may file a motion to lift the automatic stay following the conclusion of the bankruptcy

proceedings." (Dkt. 21.)

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Defendants Cook and Mitchem's Motions to Dismiss

(Dkt. 30; Dkt. 36) are GRANTED, and Rashad's claims against Defendants Cook and Mitchem,

are DISMISSED with prejudice. Since Mitchem has been dismissed with prejudice, his recently

filed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Dkt. 45) is DENIED as moot.

Furthermore, when the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceedings against USF Holland are

concluded, Rashad may file a motion to lift the automatic stay. Until such time as the bankruptcy

proceeding is concluded, USF Holland is ORDERED to update the Court on their progress by

filing a status report every sixty (60) days.

Rashad has until Monday, August 19, 2024, to file a return of service as to Defendant

Rogers or show cause why the claims against Rogers should not be dismissed.

Finally, to avoid the potential of piecemeal appeals, no final judgment will issue at this

time.

SO ORDERED.

Date: _ 7/24/2024 ( \ Qn, x \ atta \Larcatt

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

DISTRIBUTION:

Muhammad Rashad

107 Shawnee Court

Bloomfield, Kentucky 40008

Michael Carl Mohler

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C.

michael.mohler@ogletree.com

Andrew Cook

P.O. Box 433

8350 Byron Center Avenue SW

Byron Center, Michigan 49315-0169

April M. Geltmaker

CHURCH LANGDON LOPP & BANET, LLC

ageltmaker@cllblegal.com

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