SHERROD v. ALLISON TRANSMISSION, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SHERRI SHERROD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:19-cv-02233-JRS-DML

)

ALLISON TRANSMISSION, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20)

Pro se Plaintiff Sherri Sherrod brings claims of race, sex, religion, age, and disa-

bility discrimination and retaliation against Defendant Allison Transmission, Inc.,

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 ("ADEA"). (Compl., ECF No. 1.) She seeks "lost wages, pain and suffering,

attorney's fees, punitive damages, and intangibles," (id. at 3), alleging retaliation

"through written warnings, increased discipline, suspensions without pay, settlement

of suspensions without pay, removal of duties, denying vacation time, intimidation,

termination, and denial of unemployment claim," (id. at 2). Attached to her complaint

was a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Sue issued on March 5, 2019. (2018 Right to

Sue, ECF No. 1-1; see also ECF No. 20-2 at 32.) Defendant has moved for summary

judgment. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment ("Opposition") stating that she "received disparate treatment being dis-

criminated against because of my race (African American), sex, religion (Seventh-day

Adventist), age (57), disability, and retaliation for previously filing an EEOC charge

and an earlier lawsuit in 2014 . . . creating a hostile work environment." (ECF No.

23 at 2.) Defendant has filed a Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judg-

ment. (ECF No. 24.) Defendant's motion thus being fully briefed, is ripe for decision.

Having carefully considered the motion, response, reply, evidence, and applicable

law, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No.

20), should be granted for the following reasons.

I. Background

In October 2006, Sherrod began working at Allison Transmission, Inc. ("Allison"),

becoming a permanent employee in 2008. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 44:19–25, ECF No. 20-

1; ECF No. 23 at 3.) Following several disciplinary actions issued against Sherrod,

and Sherrod's various charges of discrimination leveled against Allison, Allison ulti-

mately discharged her in January 2019, (Pence Decl. ¶ 67, ECF No. 20-3 at 12), set-

ting the stage for this lawsuit.

Allison manufactures commercial-duty automatic transmissions and hybrid pro-

pulsion systems for on-highway trucks and buses, off-highway vehicles, and equip-

ment and military vehicles. (Pence Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 20-3 at 1.) Allison employs

approximately 3,100 employees in the United States, including approximately 1,500

hourly employees in Indianapolis who are represented by the union United Automo-

bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America's local chapter 933

("UAW 933"). (Id.)

During her employment at Allison, Sherrod was a member of UAW 933. (Sherrod

Dep. Tr. 45:2–6, ECF No. 20-1 at 5.) Allison's Labor Relations Department ("Labor

Relations"), which is part of Allison's Human Resources Department, is led by Matt

McLaughlin, Executive Director of Human Resources. (Pence Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 20-

3 at 2.) Labor Relations is responsible for the administration of Allison's collective

bargaining agreement with UAW 933, and the enforcement of the Shop Rules and

other policies and procedures applicable to bargaining unit employees, such as Sher-

rod. (Id. ¶ 5.) Two collective bargaining agreements were in place while Sherrod

worked at Allison. Allison's current collective bargaining agreement with UAW 933

is effective from December 18, 2017, through November 14, 2023 ("2017 Agreement").

(Id. ¶ 11; see also 2017 Agreement, Ex. I, ECF No. 20-3 at 15–41.) The prior agree-

ment had been in effect since December 3, 2012 ("2012 Agreement"). (Pence Decl.

¶ 12; see also 2012 Agreement, Ex. II, ECF No. 20-3 at 42–70.)

Allison generally follows a system of progressive discipline, which is set forth on

the Paragraph 76 Notice of Disciplinary Action ("DA") form provided to bargaining

unit employees when disciplinary issues arise. (Pence Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 20-3 at 3;

Paragraph 76 Notice of Disciplinary Action, Ex. III, ECF No. 20-3 at 71.) Bargaining

unit employees are subject to discipline for violations of Allison's Shop Rules, (see

Shop Rules, Ex. IV, ECF No. 20-3 at 72), and other applicable policies, (Pence Decl.

¶ 14, ECF No. 20-3 at 3), and the disciplinary options ranged from a reprimand to

termination of employment,1 (id. ¶ 13). In the case of more serious Shop Rule or

1 Under the "Discipline" column of the Notice of Disciplinary Action form, there are eight

levels of discipline, which increase in severity. The levels, in order of least severe to most,

policy violations, discipline may begin at a higher level, up to and including termina-

tion. (Id. ¶ 15.) For example, for violations of Shop Rule 14, discipline begins with

at least a balance-of-shift suspension. (Id.; see also Shop Rules, Ex. IV, ECF No. 20-

3 at 72) ("Shop Rule 14: Refusal or failure to do job assignment").) Under Paragraph

76(b) of the 2012 Agreement and the 2017 Agreement, an instance of discipline will

be removed from an employee's record eighteen months after it issues. (Pence Decl.

¶ 16, ECF No. 20-3 at 3; see also 2017 Agreement, Ex. I, ECF No. 20-3 at 33; 2012

Agreement, Ex. II, ECF No. 20-3 at 61.)

Allison has forty Shop Rules. (See Shop Rules, Ex. IV, ECF No. 20-3 at 72.) When

a supervisor or Area Manager believes that a bargaining unit employee has violated

Allison's Shop Rules or other applicable policy, the employee is scheduled for a disci-

plinary interview ("DI"). (Pence Decl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 20-3 at 3.) During the DI, the

employee and his or her union representative has an opportunity to tell their side of

the story before discipline issues. (Id.) For lower-level violations, the employee's

supervisor conducts the DI. (Id. ¶ 18.) However, for higher-level violations, such as

when an employee faces a balance-of-shift plus one-week suspension, either the su-

pervisor or a member of Labor Relations conducts the DI. (Id.) And, when an em-

ployee faces termination, a member of Labor Relations conducts the DI. (Id.)

are: reprimand; written warning #1; written warning #2; balance-of-shift suspension ("BOS");

BOS + 1 day; BOS +3 days; BOS + 1 week; and discharge. (DA, Ex. III, ECF No. 20-3 at 71.)

Likewise, under the "Attendance Improvement Steps" column of the form, there are six lev-

els: written warning #1; written warning #2; BOS + 1 week; BOS + 2 weeks; BOS + 30 days;

and discharge. (Id.)

The 2012 Agreement and the 2017 Agreement each address vacation entitlements.

(See generally 2017 Agreement, ECF No. 20-3 at 34–38; 2012 Agreement, ECF No.

20-3 at 63–67.) When eligible, employees may use vacation restricted time ("VR

time") for absences. (2017 Agreement ¶ 194, ECF No. 20-3 at 36; 2012 Agreement

¶ 194, ECF No. 20-3 at 65.) Allison may grant, upon prior approval, the use of VR

time for periods of absence less than four continuous hours. (2017 Agreement ¶ 194;

2012 Agreement ¶ 194.) Bargaining unit employees, through their union represent-

atives, may bring grievances to challenge discipline or to allege other contractual vi-

olations. (2017 Agreement, ECF No. 20-3 at 20–25; 2012 Agreement, ECF No. 20-3

at 48–53.) Grievances that are not resolved between Allison and the Union may be

taken to arbitration. (2017 Agreement ¶ 39, ECF No. 20-3 at 22; 2012 Agreement

¶ 39, ECF No. 20-3 at 50.)

From December 2010 until her termination, Sherrod worked on the day shift as a

Fabricating Machining Specialist ("FMS Operator") in Department 2F40 in Allison's

Plant 12. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 46:9–47:19, ECF No. 20-1 at 6–7.) Jeff Pence, a member

of Labor Relations Staff beginning in 2007, was the Labor Relations Representative

for Plant 12 from March 1, 2017, through April 3, 2019. (Pence Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF

No. 20-3 at 1.) Department 2F40 is divided into several different cells in which trans-

mission parts are processed through a series of machines, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 48:18–

49:11, ECF No. 20-1 at 8–9), and as an FMS Operator, Sherrod worked on processing

those transmission parts, (id. at 48:13–48:17, ECF No. 20-1 at 8–9). Typically, when

Sherrod worked her day shift in Department 2F40, there were four to five FMS Op-

erators, including Sherrod, as well as a job setter. (Id. at 49:14–50:7, ECF No. 9–10.)

Sherrod's shift was regularly scheduled for Monday through Friday, from

6:30 a.m. to either 2:30 p.m. or 3:00 p.m. (Id. at 47:17–48:3, ECF No. 7–8.) At times,

her department worked either an expanded weekday shift or a Saturday shift. (Pence

Decl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 20-3 at 4.) These shifts are referred to as "Plan A" shifts, a ref-

erence to part of a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between Allison and

UAW 933. (See MOU, Ex. V, ECF No. 20-3 at 73–75.) Saturday Plan A shifts ("Plan

A Saturday") may be scheduled by the plant director for a variety of reasons, such as

heightened customer demand, having a crucial machine down during the week and

needing to make up for lost production time, or a delay by a supplier providing raw

material for production. (Pence Decl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 20-3 at 4.) Plan A Saturdays are

scheduled on an ad hoc basis and are generally announced on the Wednesday before

the Saturday on which they are to be worked. (Id. ¶ 23.)

Under the MOU, an employee who has scheduled vacation on the Friday before,

or the Monday after, a Plan A Saturday must be excused from working the Saturday

shift. (See 2017 Agreement, ECF No. 20-3 at 29; 2012 Agreement, ECF No. 20-3 at

57.) Generally, in February, employees are required to make vacation requests for

the entire year. (2017 Agreement, ECF No. 20-3 at 38; 2012 Agreement, ECF No. 20-

3 at 66.) However, supervisors do allow employees to schedule vacation over the

course of the year, as circumstances permit. (Pence Decl. ¶ 26, ECF No. 20-3 at 5.)

Vacation requests are approved or disapproved on a department-by-department basis

based on seniority and operational needs. (Id. ¶ 27.) Similarly, in the event more

employees apply for time off than can be spared from the job at a given time, vacation

is awarded according to seniority. (2017 Agreement ¶ 202e, ECF No. 20-3 at 38; 2012

Agreement ¶ 202e, ECF No. 20-3 at 66.) But, once an employee is given a written

disposition of their vacation time off request, approved vacation time cannot be

changed without the mutual consent of Allison and the employee. (2017 Agreement

¶ 202f, ECF No. 20-3 at 38; 2012 Agreement ¶ 202f, ECF No. 20-3 at 67.)

Sherrod is a life-long, practicing Seventh Day Adventist. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 57:9–

25, ECF No. 20-1 at 17; ECF No. 23 at 3.) In 2013, she first informed Allison man-

agement that working during the period of sundown on Friday evening to sundown

on Saturday evening was contrary to her religious beliefs. (Pence Decl. ¶ 29, ECF

No. 20-3 at 5.) Subsequently, on several occasions, representatives of Allison's Labor

Relations Department met with Sherrod and her UAW 933 representatives to discuss

and review accommodations that would allow her to avoid working mandatory over-

time on Plan A Saturdays. (Pence Decl. ¶ 30, ECF 20-3 at 6.)

Allison offered Sherrod the following accommodations: (1) using available vacation

on a Friday or Monday preceding or following a Plan A Saturday, consistent with

Allison's collectively-bargained vacation policies; (2) having a qualified co-worker fill

in for Sherrod on Plan A Saturdays; or (3) using her seniority to transfer to another

shift or another department where Plan A Saturdays are infrequent. (See Pence Notes

to Sherrod, Ex. VI, ECF No. 20-3 at 76; McLaughlin Email, Ex. VII, ECF No. 20-3 at

77; see also Pence Decl. ¶ 31, ECF No. 6; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 69:1–10, 82:11–21, 173:4–

11, ECF No. 20-3 at 26, 39, 115.) Additionally, during periods for which there were

six employees on day shift in Department 2F40, and there was sufficient coverage

without Sherrod, Allison excused her from Plan A Saturdays without the need to find

another hourly worker to cover the shift. (Kaminski Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, Ex. D, ECF No.

20-4 at 1–2.)

Sherrod also proposed that she be excused from working any Plan A Saturday

and/or she be allowed to work after sundown on Plan A Saturdays, (Sherrod Dep. Tr.

175:6–177:7, ECF No. 20-1 at 116–18; see also Pence Decl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 20-3 at 7),

after Allison Management asked Sherrod if she had any additional suggestions for it

to consider, (see Ex. VI, ECF No. 20-3 at 76). However, Allison informed Sherrod that

it would not accept her proposed accommodations because allowing her to be excused

from every Plan A Saturday would result in inadequate staffing in some instances,

(Pence Decl. ¶ 36, ECF 20-3 at 7), and because no shift existed after sundown on Plan

A Saturdays—and her department could not operate with only one person, (id. ¶ 37,

ECF No. 20-3 at 7).

On July 26, 2013, Sherrod filed a charge of discrimination against Allison with

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ("First Charge"). (ECF No.

20-2 at 21.) Sherrod's First Charge alleged that Allison discriminated against her on

the basis of her race, sex, and religion, and that she was denied a religious accommo-

dation, all in violation of Title VII. (Id.) With a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter

in hand following the EEOC's dismissal of the First Charge, , Sherrod, by her then-

counsel, brought suit in federal court for race, sex, and religion discrimination against

Allison pursuant to Title VII on March 14, 2014. (Complaint, Sherrod v. Allison

Transmission, No. 1:14-cv-00411-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind.); see also ECF No. 20-2 at 22–

26.) On January 13, 2015, Sherrod and Allison entered into a confidential settlement

agreement under which Sherrod released all claims against Allison and agreed to

dismiss the suit with prejudice. (Mediation Report to Court, Sherrod, No. 1:14-cv-

00411-TWP-MJD; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 88:10–92:10, ECF No. 20-1 at 45–49.) On

February 5, 2015, the Court dismissed the suit. (Order, Sherrod, No. 1:14-cv-00411-

TWP-MJD; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 88:10–92:10, ECF No. 20-1 at 45–49.)

For more than three years following the dismissal of the 2014 lawsuit, Sherrod

remained employed with Allison and filed no additional charges or lawsuits against

Allison. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 92:20–25, ECF No. 20-1 at 49.) However, Sherrod received

several disciplinary actions from 2017 through the date of her termination, which led

to her bringing the current suit.

First, on March 25, 2017, Sherrod received a disciplinary action because she did

not find a suitable replacement for her scheduled Plan A Saturday. (March 25, 2017,

DA, ECF No. 20-2 at 54; Pence Decl. ¶ 43, ECF No. 20-3 at 8; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 191:5–

12, ECF No. 20-1 at 132.) Vacation was unavailable that day due to other employees'

previously granted vacation requests. (Pence Decl. ¶ 43, ECF No. 20-3 at 8; Sherrod

Dep. Tr. 191:5–12, ECF No. 20-1 at 132.) As a result, Peter Kaminski, Sherrod's

direct supervisor from January 2017 to August 2017, issued her a reprimand for the

unexcused absence, which was a violation of Shop Rule 6. (March 25, 2017, DA, ECF

No. 20-2 at 54; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 189:3–24, ECF No. 20-1 at 130.) In this

instance, Sherrod and her UAW 933 representative waived the DI, and in return,

Allison agreed to purge the discipline from her disciplinary record as of May 15,

2017—more than sixteen months before the discipline would have otherwise been

eligible to be removed. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 193:24–196:9, ECF No. 20-1 at 134–36;

Pence Decl. ¶ 44, ECF No. 20-3 at 8.)

Second, on October 3, 2017, Sherrod failed to check one in every five parts on ma-

chine, as required; consequently, she ran several bad parts before the problem was

discovered. (Sherrod Failure to Check, Ex. VIII, ECF No. 20-3 at 79.) In addition,

she failed a 100% check on the burnisher that left the hub out of tolerance. (Id.;

October 3, 2017, DA, ECF No. 20-2 at 55.) John Hooker, Sherrod's direct supervisor

from September 2017 to January 2018, issued her a balance-of-shift suspension for

violating Shop Rule 14 by failing to do a job assignment. (October 3, 2017, DA, ECF

No. 20-2 at 108; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 199:8–19, ECF No. 20-1 at 140.) Because

she violated Shop Rule 14, the discipline progressed immediately to a balance-of-shift

suspension. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 199:16–200:2, ECF No. 20-1 at 140.) Sherrod filed a

grievance over the suspension, which Allison resolved on October 18, 2017, by agree-

ing to purge the discipline from her record on December 31, 2017— more than fifteen

months before the discipline would have otherwise been eligible to be removed. (Id.

at 202:12–23, ECF No. 20-1 at 143; see also October 19, 2017, Grievance, ECF No. 20-

2 at 47; Pence Decl. ¶ 47, ECF No. 20-3 at 9.)

Third, on November 6, 2017, Sherrod was working on a machine that faulted and

required resetting; however, she failed to check and clear the machine before reset-

ting it. (Pence Decl. ¶¶ 48–49, ECF No. 20-3 at 9; see also November 6, 2017, Actions,

Ex. IX, ECF No. 20-3 at 80.) When she restarted the machine, it was damaged due

to a spindle that had continued to turn, which resulted in lost production during her

shift and the following shift. (Pence Decl. ¶¶ 48–49, ECF No. 20-3 at 9.) On Decem-

ber 8, 2017, Hooker issued Sherrod a "balance-of-shift plus one day" suspension for

violating Shop Rule 16 by engaging in careless workmanship on November 6. (No-

vember 6, 2017, DA, ECF No. 20-2 at 56; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 205:22–206:13,

ECF No. 20-1 at 147–48.) Sherrod filed a grievance over the suspension, which Alli-

son resolved by agreeing to remove the discipline from her record—sixteen months

before the discipline would otherwise have been eligible to be removed. (December

11, 2017, Grievance, ECF No. 20-2 at 46; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 209:12–210:8, ECF

No. 20-1 at 150–51; Pence Decl. ¶ 50, ECF No. 20-3 at 9.)

Fourth, on November 11, 2017, Sherrod failed to identify an adequate replacement

for that Plan A Saturday, and she was not able to schedule vacation due to another

employee's previously scheduled vacation. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 223:7–226:16, ECF No.

20-1 at 164–67.) Earlier in 2017, she had requested vacation for Friday, November

10, but her then-supervisor, Kaminski, denied the request due to a conflict with an-

other employee's request for the same day. (Kaminski Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 20-4 at 2.)

On December 11, 2017, Hooker issued Sherrod a "balance-of-shift plus three day"

suspension for her unexcused absences on Saturday, November 11, and the following

Monday, November 13, 2017.2 (November 11, 2017, DA, ECF No. 20-2 at 57; see also

Sherrod Dep. Tr. 222:11–223:6, ECF No. 20-1 at 163–64.) Sherrod filed a grievance

over the suspension, which Allison resolved by agreeing to purge it from her record—

over eleven months before the discipline would otherwise have been eligible to be

removed. (Pence Decl. ¶ 53, ECF No. 20-3 at 10.)

Fifth, on January 22, 2018, for the second time that month, Sherrod arrived late

for her shift. (Pence Decl. ¶ 55, ECF No. 20-3 at 10; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 229:1–24, ECF

No. 20-1 at 170.) The first time she arrived late in January 2018, Hooker did not

initiate a disciplinary action against her, but, rather, allowed her to use VR time to

cover the tardiness and warned her not be late again. (Jan. 2–22, 2018 Attendance

Record, Ex. X, ECF No. 20-3 at 10.) However, Sherrod did not have prior approval to

use VR time to cover her tardiness on January 22, (id.); and on January 25, 2018,

Hooker issued Sherrod a "balance-of-shift plus one week" suspension for violating

Shop Rule 7 by arriving late for her shift on January 22. (January 22, 2018, ECF No.

20-2 at 58; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 229:1–24, ECF No. 20-1 at 170.) Sherrod filed a

grievance over the suspension, which Allision resolved by agreeing to purge it from

her disciplinary record—thirteen months before the discipline would otherwise have

been eligible to be removed. (January 29, 2018, Grievance, ECF No. 20-2 at 45; see

2While there seems to be agreement that a Saturday and the following Monday were involved,

there also seems to be a discrepancy as to the dates. The dates set forth herein are contrary

to the dates set forth in the document but consistent with the agreed upon days of Saturday

and Monday, which are also set forth in the documents, and with the dates those days of the

week actually fell on the calendar.

also Pence Decl. ¶ 56, ECF No. 20-3 at 10; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 234:14–235:16, ECF No.

20-1 at 175–76.)

On March 2, 2018, Sherrod filed her second EEOC charge ("2018 Charge") against

Allison, alleging that Allison discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex,

religion, and age, and that Allison had retaliated against her for filing the First

Charge and the 2014 lawsuit. (2018 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 20-2 at 28–29; see also

Sherrod 93:6–13, 95:5–14, ECF No. 20-1 at 50, 52.) The charge indicated that the

time frame for the alleged discrimination was March 25, 2017, through March 2,

2018. (2018 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 20-2 at 28.) A Dismissal and Notice of Rights

to Sue was issued on March 5, 2019. (2018 Right to Sue, ECF No. 1-1; ECF No. 20-2

at 32.)

Sixth, on April 3, 2018, Sherrod had checked off completing a "TAQC" chart for

two machines but failed to record the underlying measurement for one machine.

(Pence Decl. ¶ 57, ECF No. 20-3 at 10–11.) On April 18, 2018, Pence conducted a DI

pertaining to the incident. (April 3, 2018, DI, Ex. XI, ECF No. 20-3 at 83–84.) Sher-

rod did not deny failing to chart the measurements as required, but, instead, stated

that she had not performed the job for six months and therefore should have received

retraining. (Id.; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 257:4–6, ECF No. 20-1 at 198.) After re-

cessing the DI to conduct further investigation, Pence noted on April 24, 2018, that

Sherrod had not been truthful but in fact had run that job seven (7) times in the

preceding 30 days, including on April 2, 2018, just the day before the incident on April

3, 2018. (April 3, 2018, DI, Ex. XI, ECF No. 20-3 at 84.) Under Allison's system of

progressive discipline, Sherrod was then eligible for termination, (Pence Decl. ¶ 61,

ECF No. 20-3 at 11); however, after the DI, Pence instead issued Sherrod a "balance-

of-shift plus one week" suspension for violating Shop Rule 14 by failing to do a job

assignment on April 3. (April 3, 2018, DA, ECF No. 20-2 at 59; Sherrod Dep. Tr.

256:11–24, ECF No. 20-1 at 197.) Sherrod filed a grievance over the suspension,

which Allison and UAW 933 settled by Allison agreeing to remove the discipline from

her record one year from the date of the violation, rather than after the standard

eighteen months. (April 24, 2018, Grievance, ECF No. 20-2 at 50; see also Sherrod

Dep. Tr. 257:7–261:18, ECF No. 20-1 at 198–202.) The next month, Sherrod went on

medical leave—from May 16, 2018, to January 8, 2019. (Pence Decl. ¶ 64, ECF No.

20-3 at 12.)

The final incident occurred on January 23, 2019. That day, during the afternoon

shift, FMS Operator Benita Young, informed Josh Silver, Sherrod's direct supervisor

at the time, that she had discovered twelve parts out of tolerance. (Silver Decl. ¶ 5,

Ex. E, ECF No. 20-5 at 1; see also Silver Email to Pence, ECF No. 20-5 at 3.) After

investigating the issue, Silver determined that Sherrod had failed to appropriately

take a height measurement on every fifth piece, as required. (Silver Decl. ¶ 6, ECF

No. 20-5 at 2.) After the incident, Sherrod went back on medical leave from January

31 to April 3, 2019. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 272:2–5, ECF No. 20-1 at 213; Pence Decl. ¶ 66,

ECF No. 20-3 at 12.) On the day Sherrod returned from leave, Pence conducted a DI

for a potential violation of Shop Rule 16 on January 23, 2019. (Pence Decl. ¶ 67, ECF

No. 20-3 at 12.) The DI revealed that had Sherrod performed the required check on

every fifth piece, there could not have been twelve consecutive bad parts run, and

that even though some bad parts could have been run on the afternoon shift, she was

at least responsible for missing at least one check. (April 3, 2019, DI Notes, Ex. XII,

ECF No. 20-3 at 85–86.) After the DI, Labor Relations determined that Plaintiff had

indeed violated Shop Rule 16, and Pence terminated her employment. (Pence Decl.

¶ 69, ECF No. 20-3 at 13; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 271:6–20, ECF No. 20-1 at 212; ECF No.

20-2 at 60.)

On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed her third EEOC Charge ("2019 Charge") against

Allison, alleging that Allison discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex,

religion, and age, and that Allison retaliated against her for filing the two previous

charges of discrimination and 2014 lawsuit. (2019 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 20-2 at

30; see also Sherrod Dep. Tr. 96:9–97:2, ECF No. 20-1 at 53–54.) On September 10,

2019, a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Sue was issued. (2019 Right to Sue, ECF

No. 20-2 at 33.) And, on June 4, 2019, the Sherrod filed her pro se employment dis-

crimination Complaint in this matter. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

The foregoing statement of facts, essentially unopposed by Sherrod and supported

by admissible evidence, has been considered under the standard set forth below.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of production. Mo-

drowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). That initial burden consists

of either "(1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential

element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim." Hummel v. St. Joseph

Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Modrowski, 712

F.3d at 1169). If the movant discharges its initial burden, the burden shifts to the

non-moving party, who must present evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue

of material fact on all essential elements of his case. See Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum

Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's

favor. Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Court

must also view the evidence "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary bur-

den." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).

Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely disputed, the party

must support the asserted fact by citing to particular parts of the record, including

depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party can also

support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible

evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Affidavits or declarations

must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evi-

dence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on matters stated. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's factual

assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed, and potentially

in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider dis-

puted facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Williams v. Brooks, 809 F.3d

936, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2016). "A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists 'if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.'" Daugherty v. Page, 906 F.3d 606, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248).

On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that

would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Gekas v. Vasilades,

814 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment

if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson

v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court cannot weigh evidence or make

credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the

fact-finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court need

only consider the cited materials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required

to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the sum-

mary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572—

73 (7th Cir. 2017). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved

against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth

specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Failure to respond with admissible evi-

dence may result in conceding the moving party's version of the events. See Smith v.

Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[F]ailure to respond by the nonmovant as

mandated by the local rules results in an admission."); see S.D. Ind. L. R. 56-1 ("A

party opposing a summary judgment motion must . . . file and serve a response brief

and any evidence ... that the party relies on to oppose the motion. The response must

. . . identif[y] the potentially determinative facts and factual disputes that the party

contends demonstrate a dispute of fact precluding summary judgment."). This does

not alter the standard for assessing a Rule 56 motion, but it does "reduc[e] the pool"

from which the facts and inferences relative to such a motion may be drawn. Smith

v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir. 1997).

III. Discussion

Allison argues that summary judgment is warranted in this case because no rea-

sonable jury could find, based on the undisputed facts, that Allison subjected Sherrod

to disparate treatment or a hostile work environment on the basis of her race, sex,

age or disability; failed to accommodate her religious beliefs under Title VII; or retal-

iated against her in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA for filing EEOC

charges and a previous discrimination lawsuit. The Court agrees with Allision for

the following reasons.

A. Procedural Issues

As an initial matter, Allison asserts that Sherrod's Title VII and ADA claims based

on incidents that occurred prior to May 6, 2017, and ADEA claims based on incidents

that occurred prior to September 13, 2017, are time-barred due to the applicable lim-

itations periods under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, and that all claims up to

and including January 13, 2015, are barred by the settlement and dismissal of her

2014 lawsuit. Moreover, Allison asserts that Sherrod's ADA claims are barred for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court addresses each argument in

turn.

1. Time-Barred Claims

"Title VII claims [and ADA] claims must be filed within 300 days of the alleged

discriminatory act or unlawful practice." Riley v. Elkhart Cmty. Sch., 829 F.3d 886,

891 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (Title VII statute of limitations));

see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (ADA). ADEA claims must be filed within 180 days of

the alleged discriminatory act or unlawful practice. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(A); see also

Daugherity v. Traylor Bros., 970 F.2d 348, 350 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that be-

cause Indiana is not a "deferral state" with respect to claims of age discrimination,

the 180-day period is applicable). Here, Sherrod filed a second EEOC charge on

March 2, 2018. (2018 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 20-2 at 28–29.) Therefore, any alleged

Title VII and ADA violations that occurred prior to May 6, 2017, or any alleged ADEA

violations that occurred prior to September 3, 2017, are time-barred.

Any claims that Sherrod asserts based on events that occurred prior to January

13, 2015, are further barred, waived, or precluded because those claims were previ-

ously dismissed with prejudice, (Order, Sherrod, No. 1:14-cv-00411-TWP-MJD), after

Sherrod entered into a settlement agreement with Allison in the 2014 lawsuit, (Me-

diation Report to Court, Sherrod, No. 1:14-cv-00411-TWP-MJD; see ECF No. 23-5).

See Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 564 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2009)

(settlement that stipulates to dismissal with prejudice, "is a final judgment for pur-

poses of claim preclusion").

2. Failure to Exhaust in ADA Claims

To recover for violations of the ADA, "a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimina-

tion with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged violation . . . ." Stewart v. Cnty. of

Brown, 86 F.3d 107, 110 (7th Cir.1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). However, "A

plaintiff may pursue a claim not explicitly included in an EEOC complaint only if

[her] allegations fall within the scope of the charges contained in the EEOC com-

plaint." Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 202 (7th Cir.1996) (internal quotations omit-

ted)). "To determine whether the allegations in the complaint fall within the scope of

the earlier EEOC charge, [courts] must look at whether the allegations are 'like or

reasonably related to' those contained in the charge." Id. (internal quotations omit-

ted).

Here, Sherrod's ADA claims are not at all like or reasonably related to those in

her charges. Thus her ADA claims fail because she did not exhaust her administra-

tive remedies. Indeed, she failed to check the box for "disability discrimination" on

either her 2018 EEOC Charge or her 2019 EEOC Charge, and she also failed to allege

disability discrimination in the body of either charge. (See 2018 EEOC Charge, ECF

No. 20-2 at 28; 2019 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 20-2 at 30.) In fact, there is no mention

that she suffered from any disability, much less that she was discriminated against

due to any disability. Moreover, as noted, Sherrod's allegations here are not "like or

reasonably related to" the actions contained in either EEOC charge, which comprise

being made to work on Saturdays in violation of her religious beliefs, and being rep-

rimanded for machine breakdowns because of her age, sex, race, and religion, and in

retaliation for her complaints to the EEOC and in federal court.. In a nutshell, Sher-

rod now alleges, as best the Court can discern, that, after she suffered a hamstring

injury, Joe Hornet, her area manager at the time, (ECF No. 20-1 at 15, 16), removed

chairs and mats from her work area to further injure her, which allegedly led her to

have knee surgery in 2014. (Pl's Resp. Interrog., ECF No. 20-2 at 89–90.) These

allegations, which apparently occurred around 2014, are not only unrelated to any

allegations in either the 2018 EEOC charge or the 2019 EEOC charge, but are waived,

see supra Section III.A.1. Sherrod also points to a post-settlement incident wherein

she alleges without further support that Kaminski asked her why she was sitting,

allegedly to relieve her knee pain, but she was not disciplined for sitting or otherwise

harassed. (ECF No. 20-1 at 234–38.) She cites to no evidence of disability discrimi-

nation in this regard. Also, her narrative Opposition is wholly devoid of evidence or

rebuttal concerning failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, or of any mention

of surgeries, removed chairs/mats, or comments about sitting—and to that extent,

she appears to have abandoned or conceded this claim and has otherwise failed to

rebut Defendant's arguments, (ECF No. 23). See Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis,

736 F.3d 1060, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).

In any event, either for failure to exhaust or for being barred by her prior settlement,

Allison's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Sherrod's ADA claims.

Nonetheless, the Court will analyze Sherrod's ADA claims throughout this Order in

the alternative, leading to the conclusion that even if Sherrod's ADA claims are not

barred, they still fail for the reasons that follow.

B. Disparate Treatment Claims

To survive summary judgment on a Title VII, ADA or ADEA disparate treatment

claim, the "legal standard . . . is simply whether the evidence would permit a reason-

able factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other

proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action." Ortiz v.

Werner Enterps, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Unlike Title VII, however,

under the ADEA and ADA, "it's not enough to show that age [or disability] was a

motivating factor. The plaintiff must prove that, but for his age [or disability], the

adverse action would not have occurred." Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708,

719 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Martino v. MCI Commc'ns Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 455

(7th Cir. 2009)); see also Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962

(7th Cir. 2010) ("Like the ADEA, the ADA . . . require[s] a showing of but-for causa-

tion.").

The Seventh Circuit has made clear that all relevant evidence must simply be

considered "as a whole." Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 763. A plaintiff can prove a disparate

treatment claim by either establishing a prima facie case for discrimination, see

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), or, alternatively, by pointing

to enough circumstantial evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that a

decision was attributable to discriminatory motivations, see David v. Bd. of Trs. of

Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017).

C. Prima Facie Case

To prove a prima facie case for race, sex, religious, age, or disability discrimination

under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must show "(1)

she is a member of a protected class, (2) her job performance met [the employer's]

legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) an-

other similarly situated individual who was not in the protected class was treated

more favorably than the plaintiff.'" LaRiviere v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 926 F.3d

356, 360 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty., 866

F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2017)). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the

burden will shift to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the adverse action. Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012). If the

defendant successfully rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, then the burden will

shift back to the plaintiff, "who must present evidence that the stated reason is a

pretext, which in turn permits an inference of unlawful discrimination." Id.

Allison argues that Sherrod fails to make out a prima facie case for race, sex, re-

ligious, age, or discrimination because she did not meet its legitimate performance

expectations and because she cannot present sufficient evidence that similarly situ-

ated employees outside of her protected class were treated more favorably. Allison is

correct.

First, the undisputed facts show that Sherrod was a member of a protected class—

e.g., 57-year-old, African American, female—and that Sherrod suffered an adverse

employment action—e.g., termination. To meet her burden, though, Sherrod must

establish that there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether she met Al-

lison's legitimate performance expectations. See Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246

F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2001). Despite her protestations to the contrary, the undis-

puted facts show that Sherrod displayed repeated performance, attendance, and dis-

ciplinary issues, resulting in the violation of several Shop Rules. On October 3, 2017,

Sherrod violated Shop Rule 14 by failing to check one in every five transmission parts,

which resulted in her running several bad parts. On November 6, 2017, she violated

Shop Rule 16 by failing to clear a machine before resetting it, resulting in damage to

the machine and lost production.

Moreover, on November 11, 2017, she violated Shop Rule 6 by failing to find a

replacement or request vacation for her Plan A Saturday, which resulted in an unex-

cused absence that day, as well as the following Monday. On January 22, 2018, she

violated Shop Rule 7 because she was late for work. On April 3, 2018, she again

violated Shop Rule 14 by failing to record a measurement on a machine, despite

checking off on the TAQC chart that she had done so. And, on January 23, 2019, she

again violated Shop Rule 16 by failing to appropriately take a height measurement

on every fifth piece, as required, which resulted in running twelve bad parts. The

aforementioned disciplinary violations show that Sherrod failed to meet Allison's le-

gitimate expectations, and she has not met her burden of showing otherwise.

In any event, Sherrod has also failed to meet her burden in showing that a simi-

larly situated person to her was treated more favorably than her by Allison. "To meet

her burden of demonstrating that another employee is "similarly situated," a plaintiff

must show that there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material

respects. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). "The

proposed comparator need not be identical in every conceivable way, however, and

courts must conduct a common-sense examination." Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731

F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2013). "The similarly-situated inquiry is flexible, common-

sense, and factual. It asks 'essentially, are there enough common features between

the individuals to allow a meaningful comparison?'" Johnson v. Advocate Health &

Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 895 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Coleman, 667 F.3d at 841).

Hence, there is no "magic formula" for the similarly-situated inquiry. Id. "Examples

of evidence that would be required in the usual case . . . [include] whether the em-

ployees being compared (1) were supervised by the same person, (2) were subject to

the same standards, and (3) 'engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating

or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s

treatment of them.'" Id. (citing Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir.

2008)).

Here, Sherrod cannot point to any admissible evidence showing that similarly sit-

uated white, male, younger, non-Seventh Day Adventist and/or non-disabled cowork-

ers were treated more favorably. All of her purported comparators other than a

trainee were also in the protected age class, and no evidence has been adduced con-

cerning whether any of the comparators are either disabled or Seventh Day Advent-

ists. Sherrod points to only a few examples where she alleges that similarly situated

coworkers were being treated more favorably than her—all of these examples are not

only inapt, but also purely speculative, unsupported by any admissible evidence. For

instance, Sherrod alleges that she was "singled out and treated less favorably than

[her] younger white male coworkers," (ECF no. 23 at 2); that "[Robert Ward] also told

[her] that three other people" had a machine crash on them, and when she "asked if

they got written up for it and he said no," (ECF No. 23 at 8); that when she slowly

removed a part from a "constraint machine" and was written up for it, her "white,

younger coworkers" were not for doing the same action, (Pl's Resp. Interrog., ECF No.

20-2 at 81); and that on January 23, 2019, "Kay Young had the same crash and the

machine was down for the whole day . . . and to [her] knowledge no one was written

up," (ECF No. 20-2 at 36).

Whether a comparator is similarly situated is typically a question for the fact

finder, unless, of course, the plaintiff has no evidence from which a reasonable fact

finder could conclude that the plaintiff met his burden on this issue. See Coleman,

667 F.3d at 846–47. Here, however, the Court finds that Sherrod has not met her

burden of showing that white, male, younger, non-Seventh Day Adventist and/or non-

disabled coworkers were treated more favorably than her, because viewing the evi-

dence "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 254, all of Sherrod's examples rely on speculative inferences, baseless opinions, or

inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, she provides no admissible evidence to support any of

her statements, because inferences and opinions must be premised on personal expe-

rience, see Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003)—but must be more than

mere conclusions or unsupported inferences, see Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891

F.3d 911, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2018)—and inadmissible hearsay3 evidence may not be

considered on summary judgment, see Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir.

2016); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

Moreover, even if Sherrod had met her burden of demonstrating that another em-

ployee was similarly situated, the undisputed facts show that the alleged similarly

situated employees were in fact not treated differently. Sherrod alleges that Kevin

3 Indeed, several of Sherrod's assertions rely on her own account of her coworkers' out-of-

court statements to establish the truth of the matter asserted. Those assertions, (see, e.g.,

ECF No. 23 at 8; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 77:18–23, 305:1–19, ECF No. 20-1 at 34, 246), are therefore

hearsay with no exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 801. To the extent that Sherrod argues that

those statements are statements by a party opponent, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d), those state-

ments are inadmissible because they come from coworkers and not representatives of Allison,

see id.

Canary,4 Patrick Liphard (over 40 years old),5 Robert Ward (over 40 years old), Dar-

rell Yates (over 40 years old), Mike Kaiser (over 40 years old), and Michael Mansfield

(over 40 years old)6 "didn't get written up." (ECF No. 20-2 at 36; see also Sherrod

Dep. Tr. 263:1–267:25, 305:1–324:17, ECF No. 20-1 at 204–08, 246–265.) But Sherrod

fails to provide admissible evidence to back her allegations, (see Sherrod Dep. Tr.

310:20–311:2, 314:7–315:3, 316:5–317:12, 319:6–320:9, 324:8–17, ECF No. 20-1 at

251–52, 255–56, 257–58, 261–62, 265–66), that these purported comparators were

either proper comparators or treated differently by, for example, escaping discipline

when warranted. Rather, the evidence shows that from 2017 to the start of this liti-

gation, Allison did in fact discipline Sherrod's alleged comparators for similar mis-

conduct. For example, Robert Ward received disciplinary actions for violations of

Shop Rules 6, 14, and 16, (see Ward SR 6 DA, ECF No. 20-3 at 94; Ward SR 14 DA,

ECF No. 20-3 at 93; Ward SR 16 DA, ECF No. 20-3 at 96); Darrell Yates received

disciplinary actions for violations of Shop Rules 6 and 7, (see Yates SR 6 DA, ECF No.

20-3 at 89, Yates SR 6 DA's, ECF No. 20-3 at 90–92); and Kaiser received disciplinary

actions for violations of Shop Rules 6 and 7, (see Kaiser SR 6 DA, ECF No. 20-3 at 88,

4 Kevin Canary is not similarly situated to Sherrod because he was a new employee and in

training in 2018, and because Sherrod admits to not having evidence that he was treated

differently on account of his race, gender, religion, lack of disability, or lack of religious ac-

commodation. (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 263:1–267:25, ECF No. 20-1 at 204–08.)

5 Patrick Liphard is not similarly situated to Sherrod because he is over forty years old,

(Pence Decl. ¶ 74, ECF No. 20-3 at 13), and because Sherrod has not provided admissible

evidence to show that he was supervised by the same person as her, subject to the same

standards as her, and that he engaged in similar conduct as her.

6 Michael Mansfield is not similarly situated to Sherrod because he is older than her, (Sherrod

Dep. Tr. 121:4–7, ECF No. 20-1 at 63), and worked as a union official, which means that he

was not supervised by the same person as her, subject to the same standards as her, and did

not engage in similar conduct as her.

Kaiser SR 7 DA, ECF No. 20-3 at 89). Simply, Sherrod presents no admissible evi-

dence that any alleged similarly situated employees were treated differently than her

during the timeframe she worked in Department 2F40.

Therefore, Sherrod has failed to establish a prima facie case for race, sex, religious,

age, or disability discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework. This is enough to find against her claims of discrimination. But even if

she had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case, Allison argues that it had legit-

imate, nondiscriminatory reasons for issuing each of the disciplinary actions—

namely, well-documented absenteeism and unsatisfactory performance. Because Al-

lison's reasons are indeed legitimate and nondiscriminatory,7 see Harper v. C.R. Eng-

land, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 311 (7th Cir. 2012) (absenteeism); Abioye v. Sundstrand

Corp., 164 F.3d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1998) (poor performance), if Sherrod had estab-

lished a prima facie case for discrimination, she must demonstrate that Allison's rea-

sons were pretextual, which she fails to do.

"In determining whether an employer's stated reason is pretextual, '[t]he question

is not whether the employer's stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether

7 The Court notes that, because Allison had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons—absen-

teeism and poor performance—for issuing disciplinary actions against Sherrod, it seems to

be the case that Sherrod was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job under

the ADA. Under the ADA, Sherrod must meet the threshold question of establishing whether

she is a "qualified individual with a disability" through evidence that she is disabled within

the meaning of the ADA and is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or

without reasonable accommodation. Timmons v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1127

(7th Cir.2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2),12111(8), 12112)). Regardless of whether Sherrod

can show she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, she has not shown she is qualified

to perform the essential functions of her job. See Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407

F.3d 852, 863 (7th Cir. 2005).

the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the discharge.'"

Robertson v. Wisc. Dept. of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 380 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Harper, 687 F.3d at 311 (alteration in original)). "To meet this burden, [Sherrod]

therefore 'must identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contra-

dictions' in [Allison's] stated reason that would permit a reasonable person to con-

clude that the stated reason was 'unworthy of credence.'" Id. (quoting Boumehdi v.

Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007)).

Here, Sherrod does not point to any admissible evidence to show that Allison did

not honestly believe it discharged her for absenteeism and unsatisfactory perfor-

mance, as evidenced by her admissions of not having any evidence of pretext, (see,

e.g., Sherrod Dep. Tr. 203:11–205:14, 216:24–218:25, 222:4–8, 228:9–25, 270:12–

271:5, ECF No. 20-1 at 144–46, 157–59, 163, 169–71), and her bald assertions that

she did not misbehave or otherwise warrant any discipline or discharge (see, e.g., ECF

No. 20-1 at 153-56; ECF No. 23 at 7-10). But even if the evidence she provides, for

the most part by way of mere speculative narrative, (e.g., ECF No. 23 at 7–10), were

admissible, that evidence is insufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude

that Allison's stated reasons were unworthy of credence. For example, she admits

that she did not know what Hooker honestly believed about the incident on November

6, 2017, which led to her receiving a DA, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 212:8–215:20, ECF No.

20-1 at 153–56); and she admits that she did not know what Pence or Silver honestly

believed regarding who was at fault for the bad parts on January 23, 2019, which

ultimately led to her termination, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 276:4–277:13, 281:16–25, ECF

No. 20-1 at 217–18, 222). Simply, even if Sherrod had been able to establish a prima

facie case for discrimination, then her claim would still fail for the inability to demon-

strate that Allison's reasons were pretextual.

Even more detrimental to her disparate treatment claims, however, is the fact

that Sherrod seems to rely on personal belief and "speculation and conjecture" about

Allison's possible motives, "which is not enough to survive summary judgment." Lisle

v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 720 (7th Cir. 2019). Her evidence "must point directly to a

discriminatory reason for the employment action . . . and be directly related to the

employment decision." Dass v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1071 (7th Cir. 2012).

But it does not. Rather, she has merely offered "an amorphous litany of complaints

about a myriad of workplace decisions." Gorence v. EagleFood Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d

759, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).

In sum, the undisputed material facts preclude a reasonable jury from finding that

Sherrod's race, sex, or religious discrimination was a motivating factor in any adverse

employment action by Allison during the relevant period. Likewise, the undisputed

material facts would not preclude a reasonable jury from finding that but for Plain-

tiff’s age or disability, any adverse action by Allison during the relevant period would

not have occurred. Thus, Allison's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to

Sherrod's Title VII, ADA, and ADEA disparate treatment claims.8

8 Based on the Court's analysis in this Section, it is also clear that Sherrod has failed to point

to enough circumstantial evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that a decision

was attributable to discriminatory motivations, see David, 846 F.3d at 224, and has therefore

failed to create any genuine issue of material fact as to her alleged discrimination, see Ortiz,

834 F.3d at 765.

D. Hostile Work Environment Claim

Title VII prohibits an employer from creating a "hostile or abusive work environ-

ment." Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 982 (7th Cir. 2014). To prevail

on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements:

"(1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was

based on a reason forbidden by Title VII [ ]; (3) the harassment was so severe or

pervasive that it altered the conditions of employment and created a hostile or abu-

sive working environment; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability." Smith v.

Ill. Dep't of Transp., 936 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Huri v. Off. of the Chief

Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir. 2015)).

Allison argues that Sherrod's hostile work environment claims fail because she

cannot prove that any alleged harassment was based on her membership in a pro-

tected class. Sherrod responds by offering several examples of encounters that she

believes show she was subject to a hostile work environment. Even when framed in

the way Sherrod wants, these examples do not show a hostile work environment. For

instance, Sherrod alleges that her former supervisor, Jake Jones, "defame[d] her

work ability" and said she "didn't produce as much as [her] coworkers," (ECF No. 23

at 6), but she admitted that she did not believe Jones discriminated against her on

the basis of race, sex, religion, or disability—only that he attacked her work ethic,

(Sherrod Dep. Tr. 126:7–128:3, 136:9–19, ECF No. 20-1 at 68–70, 77).

Sherrod also alleges that her former supervisors, Peter Kaminski and Virgil Eitel-

jorg, were "riding her back," (ECF No. 23 at 6); that Kaminski attempted to write her

up for missing a Plan A Saturday, (id. at 6–7); that Kaminski did not allow her to

take a break until the bell rang, (id.); and that, on May 23, 2017, Kaminski asked her

to sweep the floor, which made her feel light headed and short of breath, resulting in

her going to the hospital, (id.). However, regarding these interactions with Kaminski

and Eiteljorg, Sherrod fails to identify any admissible evidence to show that their

treatment of her was based on her sex, religion, age, or disability. (Cf. Kaminski Decl.

¶ 11, ECF No. 20-4 at 3). Moreover, she admits that she has no knowledge of Kamin-

ski's interactions with her coworkers, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 158:3–161:2, ECF No. 20-1

at 99–102); that she has no evidence to show that Kaminski's actions on May 23,

2017, were in any way retaliatory or discriminatory on the basis of her race, sex, age,

religion, or disability, (id. at 161:7–163:17, ECF No. 20-1 at 102–04); and that she

has no evidence that Kaminski had any knowledge about her EEOC charges or pre-

vious lawsuit, (id. at 155:19–156:13, ECF No. 20-1 at 96–97). Again, Sherrod fails to

demonstrate that any alleged harassment was based on her membership in a pro-

tected class. This failure is fatal to her hostile work environment claim.

But even if Sherrod had been able to demonstrate such a connection, her hostile

work environment claims fail because Sherrod cannot show that the harassment was

so "severe or pervasive" that it altered her conditions of employment. In determining

whether the conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable, the Court

looks at the totality of the circumstances, "including [1] the frequency of the discrim-

inatory conduct, [2] how offensive a reasonable person would deem it to be, [3]

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal

abuse, [4] whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance,

and [5] whether it was directed at the victim." Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys., Inc.,

723 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co.,

307 F.3d 535, 552 (7th Cir. 2002)).

Here, there are only two events that could possibly show Allison's alleged harass-

ment was severe or pervasive. First, as previously mentioned, on May 23, 2017, while

Sherrod was in the middle of conducting a tool change, Kaminski told her to stop and

instead sweep the floor. (ECF No. 23 at 7.) As instructed, Sherrod swept the floor.

(Id.) She began to feel "light headed [sic] and short of breath," so she informed Ka-

minski, who then called an ambulance. (Id.) She was subsequently taken to the

hospital. (Id.) Second, on March 29, 2017, Sherrod and a few coworkers filed a Group

Employee Grievance, (ECF No. 20-2 at 41), against Allison management for "creating

an unsatisfactory working condition in as much as the supervisor, Peter Kaminski, is

constantly harassing the employees in [Department] 2F40," (id.)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, these two events fall short of showing

that Allison's alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it altered Sherrod's

conditions of employment. Even though Sherrod went to the hospital on May 23,

2017, as a result of having to sweep the floor at the direction of Kaminski, she admits

that she "wasn't angry or upset" about having to sweep the floor, but, rather, thought

"it was [a] dumb" request. (ECF No. 23 at 7.) This one-time task was not humiliating

or offensive to Sherrod—far from severe or pervasive. Likewise, the filing of the

Group Employee Grievance against Kaminski cannot be said to show Allison's alleged

harassment was severe or pervasive because the grievance did not allege harassment

based on any protected characteristic, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 357:12–359:11, ECF No. 20-

1 at 274–76), and because it was ultimately withdrawn, (ECF No. 20-2 at 42). In

short, the alleged conduct was infrequent at best, was likely not offensive to a rea-

sonable person (and merely "dumb" to Sherrod), was not comprised of any physically

threatening or humiliating conduct, and was not alleged to have interfered with Sher-

rod's work performance. Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances of all con-

duct Sherrod alleges is harassment on the part of Allison, the Court finds that Sher-

rod fails to show that Allison's alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it

altered Sherrod's conditions of employment.

Because Sherrod has failed to demonstrate the elements required to prevail on a

hostile work environment claim, Allison's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted

as it relates to Sherrod's Title VII, ADA,9 and ADEA10 hostile work environment

claims.

9 The Seventh Circuit has recently stated that it "need not resolve whether a hostile work

environment claim is cognizable under the ADA" when a plaintiff "does not establish a hostile

work environment or any other adverse employment action," Tarpley v. City Colls. of Chi.,

752 F. App'x 336, 346 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Mannie v. Potter, 394 F.3d 977, 982 (7th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted)), as is the case here.

10 Hostile work environment claims under the ADEA are analyzed the same way as harass-

ment/hostile work environment claims brought under Title VII. See Bennington v. Caterpil-

lar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals "has

assumed, without deciding, that plaintiffs may bring hostile environment claims under the

ADEA," and applying the same standard used to analyze hostile work environment claims

brought under Title VII).

E. Failure to Accommodate Claim

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and job ap-

plicants based on their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). "To prove a Title VII claim

for failure to accommodate religion, an employee must prove three things: (1) 'the

observance or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is religious in

nature;' (2) the employee 'called the religious observance or practice to [the] employ-

er's attention;' and (3) 'the religious observance or practice was the basis for [the em-

ployee's] discharge or other discriminatory treatment.'" Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweet-

eners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Porter v. City of Chicago, 700

F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2012)). "Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case

of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to make a reasonable accommo-

dation of the religious practice or to show that any reasonable accommodation would

result in undue hardship." Porter, 700 F.3d at 951 (citing EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,

Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1997)).

It is undisputed that Sherrod established a prima facie case for failure to accom-

modate religion. Allison, however, argues that it has met its burden of showing that

it made a reasonable accommodation for Sherrod's religious practice. Sherrod re-

sponds by alleging that Allison failed to accommodate her religious practices because

Allison breached their written agreement.

On January 13, 2015, Allision and Sherrod entered into an agreement which

states in part:

Allison . . . hereby reaffirms its commitment to maintaining a workplace

free of unlawful discrimination, harassment, and retaliation on the ba-

sis of . . . religion. Specifically, neither Allision nor its managers or

supervisors will discriminate, harass, or retaliate against its employee

Sherri Sherrod . . . on the basis of her . . . sincerely-held Seventh-day

Adventist beliefs . . . . Allison will also continue to meet its obligation to

accommodate Ms. Sherrod's sincerely held religious beliefs and practices

consistent with the requirements of Title VII . . . . Should Ms. Sherrod

experience any such harassment, discrimination or retaliation, she

should report it immediately to Eula Seawood, HR . . . or any member of

Allison's Labor Relations Department.

(ECF No. 23-5.) In compliance with both Title VII and this written agreement, Alli-

son provided Sherrod the following accommodations to avoid her having to work a

Plan A Saturday: (1) using available vacation on a Friday or Monday preceding or

following a Plan A Saturday, consistent with Allison's collectively-bargained vacation

policies; (2) having a qualified coworker fill in for her on Plan A Saturdays; or (3)

using her seniority to transfer to another shift or another department where Plan A

Saturdays are infrequent. (See Pence Notes to Sherrod, Ex. VI, ECF No. 20-3 at 76;

McLaughlin Email, Ex. VII, ECF No. 20-3 at 77; see also Pence Decl. ¶ 31, ECF No.

20-3 at 6; Sherrod Dep. Tr. 69:1–10, 82:11–21, 173:4–11, ECF No. 20-1 at 26, 29, 115.)

Additionally, during periods for which there were six employees on day shift in De-

partment 2F40, and there was sufficient coverage without Sherrod, Allison excused

her from Plan A Saturdays without the need to find another hourly worker to cover

the shift. (Kaminski Decl. ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 20-4 at 1; Pence Decl. ¶ 34, ECF No. 20-

3 at 6.) Also, it seems that on the few occasions where Sherrod's own conduct put her

at odds with the reasonable accommodations, the collective bargaining requirements

and undue hardship to Allison, Allison further accommodated Sherrod through early

removal from her record of any ensuing discipline. (See, e.g., Pence Decl. ¶¶ 53, 56,

ECF No. 20-3 at 10.)

"The reasonable accommodation requirement of Title VII is meant 'to assure the

individual additional opportunity to observe religious practices, but it [does] not im-

pose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs.'" Porter, 700 F.3d at 951

(quoting Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986)). "This means that

a 'reasonable accommodation' of an employee's religious practices is 'one that elimi-

nates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.'" Id.

(quoting Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omit-

ted)).

The Court finds that Allison met its burden of showing that it made a reasonable

accommodation for Sherrod's sincerely held Seventh Day Adventist beliefs. Indeed,

Allison offered Sherrod four options to avoid working Plan A shifts, which provided

Sherrod with a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago,

156 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[I]t is a reasonable accommodation to permit an

employee to exercise the right to seek job transfers or shift changes . . . ."); Rose v.

Potter, 90 F. App'x 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Title VII does not require an employer

to interfere with a valid seniority system in the interest of religious accommodation.")

(citing United States v. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535, U.S. 391, 403 (2002)); EEOC v.

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 913, 928 (C.D. Ill. 2000) ("[A] system of

voluntary swaps always depends on willing volunteers, yet courts have consistently

found these systems to be reasonable accommodations, even when a swap was not

always possible."). And although Sherrod preferred that she be excused from working

any Plan A Saturday altogether and/or she be allowed to work after sundown on Plan

A Saturdays, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 175:6–177:7, ECF No. 20-1 at 116–18; see also Pence

Decl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 20-3 at 7), Allison's offered accommodations were not required to

"be the [Sherrod's] preferred accommodation[s] or the accommodation[s] most bene-

ficial to [her]." Porter, 700 F.3d at 951 (quoting Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69).

Therefore, Sherrod's argument that Allison "breached" the agreement by not al-

lowing her to be excused from working all Saturdays, (Sherrod Dep. Tr. 177:4–10,

ECF No. 20-1 at 118), is unavailing. Similarly unavailing is any argument that her

privacy or confidentiality was breached by Allison because some of her coworkers

knew about her religious accommodation. This is so because she admits that many

of her coworkers and supervisors knew she was a Seventh Day Adventist; that she

had asked a number of them to cover a Plan A Saturday on her behalf; and that her

Union representatives were aware of the accommodations Allison had offered to her.

(See Sherrod Dep. Tr. 64:10–68:11, 177:11–178:5, 178:10-14, 180:9–182:11, ECF No.

20-1 at 21–25, 118–19. 121–23.)

Because Allison "offered an alternative that reasonably accommodated [Sherrod's]

religious needs . . . 'the statutory inquiry is at an end[.]'" Id. (quoting Ilona, 108 F.3d

at 1576 (citations omitted)). Thus, Allison's Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted as it relates to Sherrod's failure-to-accommodate claim.

F. Retaliation Claim

To succeed on a Title VII, ADA, or ADEA retaliation claim, a plaintiff "must pro-

duce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) she engaged in a stat-

utorily protected activity; (2) the [employer] took a materially adverse action against

her; and (3) there existed a but-for causal connection between the two." Burton v. Bd.

of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2017) (referring to Title

VII retaliation claims); see also Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir.

2011) (stating the same standard applies to ADEA claims); Freelain v. Vill. of Oak

Park, 888 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating the same standard applies to ADA

claims). "When the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, an employer

may produce evidence which, if taken as true, would permit the conclusion that it had

a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment action."

Robertson v. Dep't of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020). "If the employer

meets this burden, the plaintiff, to avoid summary judgment, then must produce ev-

idence that would permit a trier of fact to establish, by a preponderance of the evi-

dence, that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons

but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. (citing Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539

F.3d 724, 736 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Allison takes issue with the causation prong, arguing that Sherrod fails to provide

evidence that establishes a causal connection between the alleged adverse actions

and her filing of the EEOC charges or the previous lawsuit she filed against Allison

in 2014. Similarly, Allision argues that Sherrod also fails to provide evidence that

her protected activity played any role in any action taken by it. The undisputed facts

support Allison and doom Sherrod's retaliation claims.

Sherrod alleges that Allison conspired to fire her by intimidating her, suspending

her, and writing her up. But her bald allegations rely solely on speculation or conjec-

ture, clearly missing the mark she needs to defeat summary judgment on this issue.

See McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2003). For example, Sherrod

states that the "write-ups, suspensions, and correspondences among management

will prove that not only did [Allison] try not to comply but that it was the complete

opposite being a conspiracy for the demise of my employment," (ECF No. 23 at 3);

that "Joe Hooker was subtle. He wasn't very condescending[,] but he made it his

business to fire [her]," (id. at 7); and that she "knew it was a conspiracy when [Cory

Giocio] was introduced in the morning meeting . . . ," (id. at 5). Yet she offers no

admissible evidence to prove her assertions. Instead, Sherrod admits that she has no

evidence that any of Allison’s employment actions were based on a retaliatory reason.

(See, e.g., Sherrod Dep. Tr. 126:7–128:3, 136:9–19 (Jones’ actions), 161:7–163:17 (Ka-

minski's actions), 203:11–205:14 (October 3, 2017, DA), 216:24–218:25 (November 6,

2017, DA), 228:9–25 (November 11, 2017, DA), 235:20–239:19, 246:2–11 (January 22,

2018, DA), 270:12–271:5 (April 3, 2018, DA), 282:17–21 (termination), 310:20–311:2,

314:7–315:3, 316:5–317:12, 319:6–320:9, 324:8–17 (treatment of comparators), , ECF

No. 20-1 at 68–70, 77, 102–04, 144–46, 157–69, 169, 175–80, 186, 211–12, 222, 250–

52, 254–55, 257–58, 260–61, 264.)

Moreover, to the extent Sherrod relies on suspicious timing, her reliance on the

timing is insufficient to prove the causation prong. An examination of the timing of

both Allison's and Sherrod's actions shows this. On February 5, 2015, the Court dis-

missed her 2014 lawsuit. (Order, Sherrod, No. 1:14-cv-00411-TWP-MJD.) For more

than three years following the dismissal of the 2014 lawsuit, Sherrod remained em-

ployed with Allison and filed no additional charges or lawsuits. (Sherrod Dep. Tr.

92:20–25, ECF No. 20-1 at 49.) However, on March 2, 2018, Sherrod filed the 2018

Charge against Allison. (2018 EEOC Charge, ECF No. 20-2 at 28–29.) Then, on April

3, 2018, Sherrod had checked off completing a "TAQC" chart for two machines but

failed to record the underlying measurement for one machine. (Pence Decl. ¶ 57, ECF

No. 20-3 at 10–11.) Notably, she could have been terminated for this incident, but

was instead given a suspension, and the undisputed facts show that Pence's decision

to issue her the suspension was not based in any way on Plaintiff’s race, sex, religion,

age, any disability, or the fact that she filed EEOC Charges or lawsuit against Allison.

Over nine months later, Sherrod's final incident occurred, on January 23, 2019.

After the incident, Sherrod went back on medical leave from January 31 to April 3,

2019; and on the day she returned from leave, Pence conducted a DI and ultimately

terminated her employment. This timeline dooms Sherrod's retaliation claims. In-

deed, the Seventh Circuit has held that "extended time gaps alone militate against

allowing an inference of causation based on suspicious timing," Kidwell v. Eisen-

hauer, 679 F.3d 957, 967 (7th Cir. 2012), because timing will "rarely be sufficient in

and of itself to create a triable issue, Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (7th

Cir. 2005).

Construing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Sher-

rod, she simply does not establish that Allision retaliated against her on the basis of

race, sex, religion, age, disability or for filing complaints and lawsuits against Alli-

sion. And even if she had, Allison has met its burden of showing that it had legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for taking the alleged adverse employment actions, and,

based on the undisputed facts, Sherrod cannot establish that Allison's legitimate rea-

sons were not its true reasons but rather were a pretext for discrimination, (see supra

Section IJI.B). Therefore, Allison's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as it

relates to Sherrod's Title VII, ADA, and ADEA retaliation claims.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20)

is granted. Final judgment will issue under separate order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/29/2021

JAMES R. SWEENEY I, JUDGE

United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

SHERRI SHERROD

7443 Hiner Ln

Indianapolis, IN 46219

Emmanuel V.R. Boulukos

ICE MILLER LLP (Indianapolis)

emmanuel.boulukos@icemiller.com

43

Charles Ellis Bush, II

ICE MILLER

charles.bush@icemiller.com

Kayla Ernst

ICE MILLER LLP (Indianapolis)

kayla.ernst@icemiller.com