Hill v. Northwest Indiana Major Crimes Task Force

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

JAMES HILL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:22 CV 262

)

NORTHWEST INDIANA MAJOR )

CRIMES TASK FORCE, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION and ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was convicted of crimes in the State of Indiana, twice. In both cases, his

convictions were vacated because plaintiff was deprived of potentially exculpatory

evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In the present lawsuit,

plaintiff sues the officers who investigated his criminal cases for withholding evidence

from prosecutors in violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See

Am. Compl., DE # 71.) He also alleges that the municipalities who employed these

officers are liable under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for maintaining

unconstitutional customs and policies. (DE # 71.) Finally, plaintiff alleges that the

defendants were involved in a conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

(Id.)

Four municipal defendants (the Town of Griffith, the City of Portage, the Town

of Porter, and the City of Valparaiso), along with the officers they employed (Gregory

Manse, Michael Veal, Jeffrey Balon, and Janis Regnier), have moved to dismiss the

claims against them, primarily under Federal Rule 12(b)(6).1 (DE ## 78, 80, 82, 89.) The

arguments made in these four motions are nearly identical, so they will be addressed

collectively in this opinion. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them, primarily under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A court reviewing a complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) must construe the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-movant. United States ex rel. Berkowitz v. Automation Aids,

Inc., 896 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2018).

Under the liberal notice-pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “While the federal

pleading standard is quite forgiving, . . . the complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ray v. City

of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2011); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

1 Defendants also moved to dismiss for improper service of process, though all

but defendant Veal abandoned this argument in the course of briefing.

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To meet this standard, a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but

it must go beyond providing “labels and conclusions” and “be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint must give

“enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds

together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the truth of

the facts alleged appears doubtful, and recovery remote or unlikely, the court cannot

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if, when the facts pleaded are taken as

true, a plaintiff has “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants first argue that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. The

defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Marshall v. Allen,

984 F.2d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 1993). The United States Supreme Court holds that if no

constitutional right was violated, then qualified immunity applies. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Even if a right is potentially violated, though, an official is still

entitled to qualified immunity if the right was not clearly established at the time of the

deprivation. Id. These two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis may be addressed

in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

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Relevant to this case, officers may be personally liable for withholding evidence

from prosecutors and thus causing violations of the constitutional requirement that

criminal defendants have access to material, exculpatory evidence. United States v.

Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2015). This legal principle is not novel, and was clearly

established at the time of the officers’ alleged wrongdoing, so the second prong of the

qualified immunity analysis does not appear to aid the officers in this case, at least not

under the undisputed facts. See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 260 F.3d 824, 825 (7th Cir.

2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017).

To the extent that the officers seek to establish that a constitutional violation did

not occur, thus satisfying the first prong of Saucier, the argument is premature. This is

because an officer can only be liable for a Brady violation if the officer’s failure was

intentional; thus, the constitutional violation alleged in this case hinges upon the officers’

intent. Moran v. Calumet City, 54 F.4th 483, 493 (7th Cir. 2022). Intent cannot be

determined on the pleadings; it is up to a fact-finder to assess the evidence and/or the

credibility of the officers at a later stage. DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger, 152 F.3d 678, 680 (7th

Cir. 1998) (“Because the facts are in hot dispute, the officers cannot seek pretrial refuge

behind a claim of qualified immunity . . . a fact finder must decide if DuFour can prove

that Morgan and Cogger acted in this fashion.”). Accordingly, the request for qualified

immunity must be denied.

Defendants also seek dismissal on grounds of issue preclusion, a concept that is

raised by defendants using various terms including judicial estoppel and collateral

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estoppel. Defendants’ primary argument that issue preclusion applies in this case is the

fact that plaintiff has previously pointed the finger at the State of Indiana for

committing the Brady errors that twice led to his release. Defendants call attention to

plaintiff’s amended complaint, which alleges that “the state’s failure to disclose

exculpatory evidence prior to trial” led to plaintiff’s conviction being overturned. (DE #

71 ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff and the State of Indiana also filed an agreed statement in one of

plaintiff’s criminal cases in which they jointly acknowledged that defendant did not

receive certain evidence as a result of an unintentional oversight by the State. (DE # 25-

10 at 4.) Further, plaintiff filed a notice in another civil case that the Lake County

Superior Court set aside plaintiff’s 2018 murder conviction due to a Brady violation that

“appears to have been caused by the State of Indiana.” (DE # 25-12.)

According to defendants, these statements constitute admissions by plaintiff that

the relevant constitutional errors were made by the State of Indiana, not the individual

officers or the entities employing them. Defendants ask the court to give these

statements preclusive effect in the present lawsuit. Logically, though, plaintiff’s

statements regarding the State’s errors do not eliminate the possibility that the officers

are also culpable for their own alleged misdeeds. See Davis, 793 F.3d at 720 (officers may

be personally liable for withholding evidence from prosecutors).

Defendants further argue that judicial estoppel requires dismissal of this lawsuit

because the Lake County Superior Court itself blamed the State for failing to comply

with Brady when it vacated defendant’s convictions. (DE # 25-11.) This argument suffers

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from the same logical pitfall– the Lake County Superior Court’s holding regarding the

State’s error does not necessarily absolve the officers of wrongdoing. Further, the

decision of the Lake County Superior Court has no preclusive effect in this case because

that court did not adjudicate the issue of the officers’ liability. “In order for a matter to

have been ‘necessarily adjudicated’ such that issue preclusion applies, the

determination must have been essential to the decision.” Musgrave v. Squaw Creek Coal

Co., 964 N.E.2d 891, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The Lake County Superior Court found

that the State’s Brady errors required plaintiff’s convictions to be vacated, but under

Brady, suppression of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process in criminal

proceedings, “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith” of the officers. Bunch v. State,

964 N.E.2d 274, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In other words, whether officers intentionally

withheld evidence was not even before the Lake County Superior Court, much less

adjudicated by it, and even if they had commented on the officers’ actions, it would

have been dicta. In re Adoption of L.T., 9 N.E.3d 172, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). For these

reasons, judicial estoppel does not require dismissal of the present lawsuit.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Monell and

conspiracy claims as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Monell provides that

a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 if action pursuant to an official policy or

custom of the municipality causes a constitutional tort, 436 U.S. at 690-91, while a

Section 1983 conspiracy claim may succeed if it is proven that government officials

reached an understanding to deprive a plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Logan v.

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Williams, 644 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 2011). Defendants point out that allegations of a

single incident are insufficient to support a claim under Monell (see, e.g., DE # 81 at 11),

and they further argue that there are “no allegations” from which it could be reasonably

inferred that defendants engaged in a conspiracy (see, e.g., DE # 81 at 13). However, it is

beyond dispute that plaintiff was deprived of potentially exculpatory evidence, twice.

This alone “nudges plaintiff’s [Monell and conspiracy] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. What role the officers or their

employing municipalities played in this deprivation has yet to be seen, but the

allegations – taken as true for purposes of the present lawsuit – satisfy Rule 8‘s pleading

requirements.

Defendants argue that even if plaintiff’s Monell and conspiracy claims are

properly pleaded, they should be dismissed because where no constitutional tort

occurred in the first place, no municipal or conspiratorial liability can be had. See Jenkins

v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007); Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d, 335, 344

(7th Cir. 2017). However, as explained previously, the court cannot determine at the

pleadings stage whether a constitutional tort occurred because the inquiry requires a

factual determination regarding the officers’ intent. Moran, 54 F.4th at 493. In short,

defendants’ request to eradicate the Monell and conspiracy claims due to the lack of an

underlying constitutional wrong is premature.

Finally, defendant Veal seeks dismissal of the claims against him under Rules

12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5), because he was not properly served with process. (DE # 80.) The

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plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the district court has jurisdiction over

each defendant through effective service, Homer v. Jones-Bey, 415 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir.

2005), but plaintiff did not address the issue of service in his response brief to Veal’s

motion to dismiss. (DE # 92.) In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m),

the court now orders plaintiff to perfect service on Veal by November 30, 2024. If

plaintiff does not do so, the court will consider whether dismissal of the claims against

Veal without prejudice is appropriate under the factors set forth in Cardenas v. City of

Chicago, 646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED. (DE ##

78, 80, 82, 89.) Plaintiff must perfect service on defendant Michael Veal by November

30, 2024, or the claims against Veal may be dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 30, 2024

s/James T. Moody________________

JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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