Bartole v. Indiana State of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

MARCUS T. BARTOLE,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-633-GSL-AZ

STATE OF INDIANA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Marcus T. Bartole, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the

merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief.

In the complaint, Bartole challenges the constitutionality of the Indiana bail

scheme. Under Indiana law, bail may be set on a person arrested for an offense “for the

purpose of ensuring the person’s appearance at the appropriate legal proceeding,

another person’s physical safety, or the safety of the community.” Ind. Code. § 35-33-8-

1. “[T]he court shall order the amount in which a person charged by an indictment or

information is to be held to bail.” Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(a). “Bail may not be set higher

than that amount reasonably required to assure the defendant’s appearance in court or

to assure the physical safety of another person or the community if the court finds by

clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the physical safety of

another person or the community.” Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b). In setting the amount of

bail, courts must consider the defendant’s relationship to the community, his financial

ability to post bail, his criminal history to the extent it implicates “instability or disdain

for the court’s authority to bring the defendant to trial,” prior failures to make court

appearances, the nature and gravity of the charges offenses and potential penalties to

the extent they are “relevant to the risk of nonappearance,” and the source of funds

used to post bail to the extent “it affects the risk of nonappearance.” Id.

“Upon a showing of good cause, the state or the defendant may be granted an

alteration or revocation of bail by application to the court before which the proceeding

is pending. In reviewing a motion for alteration or revocation of bail, credible hearsay

evidence is admissible to establish good cause.” Ind. Code. § 35-33-8-5. Under Indiana

law, “the denial of a motion to reduce bail is a final judgment appealable as of right.”

Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing State ex rel. Peak v.

Marion Crim. Ct., Div. One, 203 N.E.2d 301, 302 (Ind. 1965)).

The Tippecanoe Superior Court has issued Local Rule LR79-CR26-161 setting a

bail schedule for the Sheriff’s Department to follow in the absence of a court order for

1 The Tippecanoe County Local Rules of Court are available at

https://www.tippecanoe.in.gov/DocumentCenter/View/44331/Tippecanoe-County-Local-Rules-of-

Court.

those arrested without warrant. For example, the local rule requires $1,500 cash and

$15,000 surety for Level 3 felonies and $250 cash for misdemeanors. It does not allow

the sheriff to release individuals arrested for rape on bail without a court order but

requires a bail hearing before a judge within 48 hours or by the next working day. It

further allows judges to deviate from the bail schedule based on evidence and the

parties’ arguments.

According to the complaint and the electronic dockets for the State courts, the

following occurred.2 On November 13, 2021, Bartole was arrested for the offenses of

rape, failure to register as a sex offender, strangulation, criminal confinement, and

battery. On November 14, 2021, the Tippecanoe Superior Court found probable cause

and set bond in the amount of $15,000 cash and $150,000 surety in Case No. 79D04-

2111-MC-1112.3

On November 17, 2021, the prosecution initiated Case No. 79D04-2111-F3-33,

charging Bartole with rape, knowing or intentional failure to register as a sex or violent

offender, sexual battery, strangulation, confinement, and battery resulting in bodily

injury. The prosecution noted that the standard bond for such charges was $1,500 cash

and $15,000 surety but requested $15,000 cash and $150,000 surety. In support, the

2 Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court takes judicial notice of the electronic dockets for the

Indiana courts, which are available at https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/.

3 “A cash bond must be posted using the total amount of cash.” Indy.gov, Bond Types and

Payments, https://www.indy.gov/activity/bond-types-and-payments (last visited August 15, 2024).

“Once the case is resolved, a cash bond can be refunded if there are no fees, fines, and/or restitution

owed.” Id. “Surety bonds are 10 percent of the total bond ordered in a case and must be posted with a

licensed bail agent.” Id. “The bondsman then posts bail with the court on your behalf.” Id. “This type of

bond is not refundable.” Id.

prosecution cited three prior unrelated felony convictions, that Bartole was on

probation when he committed the charged offenses, that he had few ties to the

community, presented a danger to himself and others, and was a convicted sex

offender. The Tippecanoe Superior Court found probable cause to support the charges

and set bond in the amount of $4,000 cash and $40,000. In the same order, the

Tippecanoe Superior Court invited the parties to raise objections to the order in writing

within fifteen days.

In February 2022, the prosecution charged Bartole as a habitual offender, and the

Tippecanoe Superior Court kept bond at the same amount at another initial hearing. On

January 9, 2023, Bartole filed a motion for a bond hearing. On January 26, 2023, the

Tippecanoe Superior Court heard evidence on the motion and denied it on February 3,

2022.

On May 23, 2023, Barole filed a motion for bond reduction, and the Tippecanoe

Superior Court conducted a hearing on June 2, 2023. On July 5, 2023, the Tippecanoe

Superior Court ruled as follows:

Initially, the Court notes, among other relevant factors, the results of the

Tippecanoe County Community Corrections Pre-Trial Services Risk

Assessment. Said Assessment, dated January 25, 2023, indicates

Defendant's risk level to be moderate. Further, the Defendant is not

eligible for Tippecanoe County Community Corrections Pre-Trial Services.

In addition, the Court has considered all facts relevant to the risk of the

Defendant’s nonappearance. More particularly the Court has considered

the length and character of the Defendant's residence in the community;

the Defendant’s employment status and history; the Defendant’s criminal

history and juvenile record; the Defendant's family ties’ and relationships;

the Defendant’s character, reputation, habits, and mental condition; the

nature and gravity of the offenses and the potential penalties; and all other

factors.

The Defendant is charged with Rape as a level 3 felony; two (2) counts of

Failing to Register as a Sex or Violent Offender, both level 6 felonies;

Sexual Battery as a level 6 felony; Strangulation as a level 6 felony;

Criminal Confinement as a level 6 felony; and Battery Resulting in Bodily

Injury.

Having considered all that it must, the Court Denies Defendant’s Motion

for Bond Reduction.

On July 20, 2023, Bartole appealed the order denying bond reduction, initiating Case

No. 23A-CR-1709. On March 28, 2024, the Indiana Court of Appeals found that the

order was not an abuse of discretion, noting the seven felony charges and the habitual

offender enhancement and that a potential lengthy sentence tends to increase the risk

that a defendant will fail to appear at trial. Bartole v. State, 233 N.E.3d 1008 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2024). The appellate court further noted his criminal history, his probationary

status when he committed the charged offenses, and his failure to attend a bench trial in

2020. Id.

Against this backdrop, Bartole argues that the Indiana bail scheme violates his

right to substantive due process because it infringes of his right to liberty and that the

strict scrutiny applies. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court

of the United States considered a similar challenge to the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §

3141 et seq.4 The Supreme Court reasoned that “the mere fact that a person is detained

does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed

4 While similar in many respects, Salerno involved a challenge to the Bail Reform Act’s

authorization of ordering pretrial detention without bail, while, here, Bartole asserts that the Tippecanoe

Superior Court has set bail in an amount he cannot afford.

punishment.” Id. at 746. “To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes

impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent.”

Id. at 747. “Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the

punitive/regulatory distinction turns on whether an alternative purpose to which the

restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears

excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it.” Id.

The Supreme Court first concluded that the Bail Reform Act was regulatory,

finding that the legislative history did not indicate that Congress implemented the act

as punishment but as a means to address the legitimate goal of preventing danger to the

community. Id. at 747. The Supreme Court then concluded that the act was not

excessive in relation to that goal, noting that it allowed pretrial detention without bail

for only the most serious offenses, that it entitled arrestees to a prompt detention

hearing, and that the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., limited the length of

pretrial detention. Id. at 747-48.

Indiana codified its bail scheme in 1981 and allows trial courts to set bail bonds

for the purposes of “ensuring the person’s appearance at the appropriate legal

proceeding, another person’s physical safety, or the safety of the community.” Ind.

Code. § 35-33-8-1. As detailed above, the scheme requires trial courts to consider factors

that are materially relevant to these purpose, including numerous references to whether

they are relevant to the risk of flight or nonappearance. Though Bartole objects to the

proposition that those faced with the possibility of a relatively lengthy sentence present

a greater flight risk, the proposition is widely accepted. See e.g., United States v. Taylor,

31 F.3d 459, 468 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting with approval a trial court’s finding that “a

defendant who is facing a possible lengthy prison sentence has nearly half a million

dollars in cash on hand was clearly material to the risk of flight.”); United States v. Jones,

938 F.2d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that “[f]light was almost certain to happen”

when she faced a 30-year sentence with access to large sums of money); United States v.

Diaz, 777 F.2d 1236, 1238 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The presumption [for pretrial detention

without bail set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)] reflects a congressional judgment, to which

we are obligated to give weight, that persons facing heavy sentences for particular types

of offenses are likely to jump bail.”). The Tippecanoe Superior Court’s local rules

similarly required him to receive a prompt hearing, which Bartole received. And the

Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure limit the length of pretrial detention, subject to

certain exceptions, to 180 days. Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(A). Consistent with Salerno, the court

finds that the Indiana bail scheme did not violate his substantive right to liberty.

The court also finds that the bail determination did not violate his Eighth

Amendment right against the imposition of excessive bail. “The right to release before

trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand

trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). “Bail set

at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is

excessive under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. He is charged with violent crimes and

faces a potentially lengthy sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (sixteen-year maximum

sentence for Level 3 felony); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 (twenty-year maximum sentence for

habitual offender enhancement). He has a substantial criminal history and espouses no

significant ties to the community. The State courts found that he committed the charged

offenses while on probation, and that, four years ago, he failed to appear at a bench

trial. And, while Bartole appears to be indigent, bail bond set in a manner that requires

the immediate payment of only $8,000 seems reasonably calculated to assure Bartole’s

presence at trial. On this basis, the court finds that Bartole has not stated a plausible

claim that the Indiana bail scheme violated his right to substantive due process.

Bartole next asserts that the Indiana bail scheme violated his procedural right to

due process. He alleges a plethora of shortcomings, including no individualized

determination, no consideration of indigency, no right to review by another judge,

irrebuttable presumption of a flight risk, mandated bail amounts, no opportunity to be

heard, and no written decisions. However, review of Indiana law and the State court

proceedings indicate that these alleged shortcomings are unfounded.

To start, the Tippecanoe County local rule sets only presumptive bail amounts

based on the severity of the offense and expressly allows the court to deviate from those

amounts based on evidence and the parties’ arguments. Indiana statute sets forth

numerous factors for the court to consider in making individualized bail

determinations, including the defendant’s employment status, financial condition, and

several flight-related factors. The fact that the Tippecanoe Superior Court set an amount

in between the presumptive amount and the amount requested by the prosecution, by

itself, reflects an individualized determination. Indiana statute expressly allows

criminal defendants to move for bond reductions, and denials are immediately

appealable. The Indiana courts acknowledgment of the commonsense proposition that a

lengthy sentence “tends to increase” a criminal defendant’s flight risk does not amount

to an irrebuttable presumption.

Further, the electronic docket for the State courts reflects that Bartole attended no

less than four separate hearings in which the Tippecanoe Superior Court considered

whether to grant Bartole bail and on what terms. The Tippecanoe Superior Court also

directly invited Bartole to lodge objections to the initial hearing order. Additionally, the

Tippecanoe Superior Court considered his financial or employment status at numerous

points, including when it initially appointed him counsel, in reaffirming that

appointment at the second initial hearing, when he sought to appeal, and in the order

denying bail reduction. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6 (“Prior to the completion of the initial

hearing, the judicial officer shall determine whether a person who requests assigned

counsel is indigent under section 6.5 of this chapter. If the person is found to be

indigent, the judicial officer shall assign counsel to the person.”). And Bartole received a

written decision in the order denying bail reduction and on appeal. Consequently, the

court finds that Bartole has not stated a plausible claim that the bail proceedings

violated his right to procedural due process.

Bartole argues that the Indiana bail scheme violates his right to equal protection

by favoring wealthy defendants and defendants charged with lesser offenses and that a

strict scrutiny analysis applies. He also asserts that he is a member of a suspect class

based on his status as a sexually violent predator. Bartole does not plausibly allege

membership in a suspect class. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.

432, 440 (1985) (listing suspect classes as including race, alienage, nationality, gender,

and illegitimacy); L.D.R. by Wagner v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 1146, 1153 (7th Cir. 2019)

(“Rational basis scrutiny applies to equal protection discrimination claims on the basis

of age and wealth.”); Shaw v. Smith, 206 F. App'x 546, 548 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying

rational basis review to convicted sex offenders). As a result, rational basis review

applies. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to

be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally

related to a legitimate state interest.”).

“Rational basis review requires the plaintiff to prove that (1) the state actor

intentionally treated plaintiffs differently from others similarly situated; (2) this

difference in treatment was caused by the plaintiffs’ membership in the class to which

they belong; and (3) this different treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate

state interest.” Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). “To be

considered similarly situated, a plaintiff and his comparators (those alleged to have

been treated more favorably) must be identical or directly comparable in all material

respects.” LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2010).

“Rational-basis review tolerates overinclusive classifications, underinclusive

ones, and other imperfect means-ends fits.” St. Joan Antida High Sch. Inc. v. Milwaukee

Pub. Sch. Dist., 919 F.3d 1003, 1010 (7th Cir. 2019). “[T]he absence of legislative facts’

explaining the distinction on the record has no significance in rational-basis analysis.”

F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). “In other words, a legislative

choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation

unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Id. “[T]he burden is upon the challenging

party to eliminate any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational

basis for the classification.” Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).

It is not irrational to presume that those like Bartole charged with higher level

felonies carrying the possibility of substantial penal consequences present more of a

flight risk or that those like Bartole charged with serious violent offenses pose a greater

danger to the safety of others. The effect of a criminal defendant’s wealth on bail

determinations is more nuanced and could cut either way. As a general proposition, it

seems a wealthy defendant would have a greater ability to post bond and be more

willing to part with a certain sum of money than an indigent defendant. Depending on

the source of wealth, a wealthy defendant might also have greater ties to the

community based on his or her employment status, professional reputation, or property

ownership. In any event, the extent and nature of a defendant’s wealth is rationally

connected to the State’s interest in securing trial appearances. Additionally, Bartole has

none of these ties to the community, so a fair reading of Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b) would

result in the trial court setting bond for a similarly situated wealthy defendant at a

higher amount. Significantly, Bartole identifies no specific similarly situated wealthy

defendant that received a more favorable bail determination. Moreover, even if Bartole

won the lottery as he suggests, the prosecution would be entitled to seek and the trial

court would have discretion to impose a higher bond amount given the material change

in circumstances. As a result, Bartole may not proceed on a claim that the Indiana bail

scheme violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause.

Bartole further asserts that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by

failing to inform him of his right to bail and bail-related procedures upon his arrival at

the Tippecanoe County Jail in November. He cites no legal authority suggesting that the

State has an affirmative duty to inform arrestees regarding the bail process, and the

court can find none. See Salem v. City of New York, 811 F. App’x 678, 683 (2d Cir. 2020)

(“At most, Salem alleges that correction officers failed to inform him of his bail status

when they allegedly ignored his questions about what was happening with his case.

Correction officers are tasked with ensuring the safety of correctional facilities and do

not have a duty to inform inmates of legal updates in their cases.”). It also appears that

any claim relating to his arrival at the Tippecanoe County Jail is untimely. See Behavioral

Inst. of Ind., LLC v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2005) (two-

year statute of limitations). As a result, Bartole may not proceed on such a claim.

Bartole asserts that the State and local public defender systems have violated his

right to effective assistance of trial counsel. The Sixth Amendment entitles indigent

criminal defendants to appointed trial counsel and all defendants to effective assistance

of trial counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984). However, “[t]he

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct

so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be

relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686. Given that Bartole’s criminal

proceedings are ongoing, the court cannot assess whether they have produced a just

result, and his claims that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel are

premature. Moreover, the State court docket indicates that Bartole has not been

represented by public defenders since they withdrew and were replaced with private

counsel in September 22, 2022. It further indicates that Bartole has represented himself

in his criminal case since May 10, 2023, and has thus waived his right to counsel. See

United States v. Traeger, 289 F.3d 461, 475 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Because representation by

counsel and self-representation are mutually exclusive entitlements, the assertion of one

right constitutes a de facto waiver of the other.”). Therefore, Bartole may not proceed on

claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Here, the court also pauses to observe that, despite Bartole’s contention that he is

not challenging or seeking to enjoin the ongoing State criminal proceedings, the

complaint as a whole indicates that he seeks pretrial release on his own terms and

further seeks the appointment of trial counsel whose performance meet his personal

standards. As a practical matter, the court could not order the sweeping injunctive relief

Bartole seeks without substantially interfering with the State criminal proceedings. For

example, the allegations concern the trial court’s failure to consider and afford weight to

specific and purportedly indisputable arguments and articles of evidence; they also

concern the manner in which the trial court conducts hearings and the failure to

expound even further on the reasoning for its decisions in writing. The injunctive relief

he seeks would also task this court with monitoring and correcting the performance of

trial counsel throughout each stage of his pending State criminal proceedings. It is

difficult to see how these claims could be any more intrusive. In sum, while the court

has chosen to address these claims on the merits, they suffer from the same procedural

pitfalls as his prior challenges to his custody and ongoing State criminal proceedings in

this court. See e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488 (1973) (habeas corpus is the

exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement); Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[I]f a prisoner claims

to be entitled to probation or bond or parole, his proper route is habeas corpus, even

though he is seeking something less than complete freedom.”); Stroman Realty, Inc. v.

Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[F]ederal courts must abstain from enjoining

or otherwise interfering in ongoing state court proceedings that are (1) judicial in

nature, (2) involve important state interests, and (3) provide an adequate opportunity to

raise the federal claims, as long as (4) no exceptional circumstances exist that would

make abstention inappropriate.”).

Finally, Bartole asserts that Judge Philip P. Simon has violated his constitutional

rights by conspiring with Governor Holcomb, Federal Agent Stapleton and other

unknown federal agents and agencies, Tippecanoe County Judges Randy Williams and

Matthew Sandy for the past three years. He alleges that Judge Simon communicated

with these entities in person, by Zoom, emails, telephone calls, texts, and letters. He

alleges that Judge Simon has engaged in:

Directing, encouraging, advising, facilitation communication to other

actors on how to and that it would be okay to violate Bartole’s

constitutional rights. Specifically, to tamper with Bartole’s mail, to

intentionally withhold it to keep him from appealing his bond motion, to

keep him from subpoenaing witnesses and documents for his criminal

and civil cases, to withhold amended lawsuits to prevent him from suing

federal actors, to Superior Court judges, to deny all of Bartole’s critical

dispositive motions because as long as the Simon defendant was at the

helm (which he is in the Hammond Division) none of those actors would

be held accountable in a suit or habeas corpus petition as the Simon

defendant would make sure it never happens. Directly because of these

conspiratorial acts, all of Bartole’s critical dispositive motions in the

Superior Court have been denied, his appeal of his bond motion was

denied because his briefs and motions were intentionally withheld by

[Tippecanoe County Jail] employees, his federal lawsuit in the

Indianapolis division was also denied because [jail] authorities

intentionally withheld his amended complaint, various subpoenas for

depositions, documents, and Bartole’s criminal discovery thumbdrive

were and is intentionally withheld from the courts, Bartole’s public

defender [took] this discovery thumb drives from him directly, plus

countless other affirmative misconduct Bartole is suffering from at [the

jail.]

In the last 3 years of experience with all the conspiratorial actors involved,

Bartole knows beyond a doubt that the Simon (partly based on his

experience with him in the legal arena) has undertaken this civil

conspiracy against Bartole. Obviously, the Simon defendant has not gone

ahead and provided Bartole with any information of this civil conspiracy.

Thus Bartole’s claims should not suffer – especially being Bartole is

confined in a maximum deprivation of liberty setting at [the jail] with zero

access to research or resources to uncover more of this conspiracy –

simply for lack of evidence at this point. However, it is indisputable that

with the recruitment of counsel, documents will be provided, depositions

with be conducted by counsel and that the Simon defendant’s civil

conspiracy will come to more light than what’s been illustrated here.

* * *

These agreements and directions were made/are made for every decision

they made/affirmative misconduct inflicted on Bartole. For every mail

intentionally withheld; for every decision to deny every motion Bartole

put before the Superior Court, for every unconstitutional/tortious act the

State and the [jail] authorities have inflicted on Bartole, the Simon

defendant was made aware of it beforehand and/or directed

communicated to them that he would protect them if Bartole tried to gain

relief in his court, certainly explained/directed how to go about all these

unconstitutional/tortious acts.

ECF 1 at 33-35.

“[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are

clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and

delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). “As those words suggest, a

finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of

the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them.” Id. To recap, Bartole asserts that a federal judge --

whose only interaction with him involved presiding over his civil suits filed in this

court and who has routinely presided over similar cases filed by uncounseled

incarcerated individuals for more than two decades—communicated through every

possible means with numerous federal and State actors, including law enforcement,

State judges, and jail officials, with the purpose of thwarting Bartole’s criminal and civil

proceedings in other courts by pervasively monitoring and interfering with his

conditions of confinement at the Tippecanoe County Jail and by relentlessly ensuring

that his efforts in other courts were unsuccessful. He further maintains that these

allegations are true beyond any doubt and are indisputable while also conceding that

he has not one shred of evidence to support it. These allegations are “wholly

incredible,” to say the least. As a result, the court finds that this claim is factually

frivolous and will not allow Bartole to proceed on it.

In sum, Bartole cannot proceed on this complaint because it does not state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. “The usual standard in civil cases is to allow

defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where amendment

would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018).

“District courts, however, have broad discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint

where the amendment would be futile.” Russell v. Zimmer, Inc., 82 F.4th 564, 572 (7th

Cir. 2023). For the reasons previously explained, such is the case here.

For these reasons, this case is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

SO ORDERED on August 15, 2024

/s/Gretchen S. Lund

JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT