Jenkins v. Reaves

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KEJUAN JENKINS, Y43195, )

ANTRAY HALL, Y38802, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 24-cv-1488-DWD

)

ANTHONY WILLS, )

C/O REAVES, )

C/O PEDRO, )

C/O ROBERTS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiffs Kejuan Jenkins and Antray Hall, inmates of the Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC), bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged

deprivations of their constitutional rights at Menard Correctional Center (Menard). (Doc.

1). The Complaint was signed only by Defendant Jenkins (Doc. 1 at 7), so on July 16, 2024,

the Court issued an Order wherein it warned Defendant Hall of the difficulties of group

litigation and invited him to express his desire to proceed by August 5, 2024. (Doc. 15).

In the interim, Plaintiff Jenkins filed multiple motions for emergency injunctive relief.

(Docs. 13, 17, 18). Given the nature of the underlying allegations, and the recent

developments, the Court now finds it impractical for the two co-Plaintiff’s to proceed

jointly, because the emergency motions demonstrate that divergent facts are emerging as

to the two plaintiffs. To most quickly address Mr. Jenkins’ allegations, and to still give

Mr. Hall’s allegations full attention and thorough review, the Court will sever Plaintiff

Hall into a separate lawsuit. Jenkins will be allowed to proceed in this lawsuit on his

own, and a response to his recent motions will be directed.

Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter

out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that

is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must

be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se

complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d

816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Jenkins alleges that on April 7, 2024, he and fellow inmates (including Plaintiff

Antray Hall) were escorted to the shower in the West House by Defendant Reaves. (Doc.

1 at 6). While in the shower, Jenkins noticed the presence of “flamboyant homosexuals”

in the shower who were naked and fondled their genitals while watching others. The

other inmates participated in sexual acts in plain sight. Once out of the shower, Jenkins

stopped Defendant Reaves, informed him of the encounter and asked if anything could

be done to improve privacy such as shower curtains. Reaves told him that if he did not

want to be watched in the shower or did not want to observe that sort of behavior, then

he should not attend the shower. Reaves further indicated he liked what he saw and

would not complain. (Doc. 1 at 6). Jenkins alleges a grievance was filed the same day,

but no response has been received to date.

On April 8, 2024, Defendants Roberts and Pedro escorted Jenkins and Hall to the

shower. The shower was again occupied by flamboyant homosexuals who extended an

invitation for others to join “the party.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Jenkins and others declined and

one of the inmates tried to touch Jenkins’ chest. The homosexual inmates threatened that

if Jenkins did not join in, they would beat him. Hall then interjected and insisted the

groups should leave each other alone. The threatening inmates moved to one side and

engaged in loud sexual conduct while calling Jenkins’ name. Defendants Pedro and

Roberts peered into the shower and began rooting for the inmates engaged in sexual

behavior. Upon exiting the shower, Jenkins told Pedro and Roberts that he was not a

homosexual and he believed the shower arrangement was violating his PREA rights. He

again asked for a different shower time or shower curtains, but Roberts simply told him

not to come to the shower if he found the arrangement objectionable. (Doc. 1 at 6).

Jenkins claims that this amounted to physical excessive force because he was being forced

into participating in homosexual acts.

On April 10, 2024, Jenkins and Hall wrote a letter to the Warden and PREA

coordinator to no avail.

Again, in April of 20241, Jenkins and Hall were escorted to the shower by

Defendant Reaves. Once the shower door was closed, homosexuals surrounded Jenkins

and told him to bend over. Reaves heard the commotion, looked into the shower, and

told the homosexuals to get Jenkins. The homosexuals then began to punch Jenkins and

1 Jenkins gave a specific date, but it is illegible. (Doc. 1 at 6).

Hall, and Reaves waited to disperse the fight. No one was disciplined for the altercation.

Jenkins alleges that Reaves violated his PREA rights, failed to protect him, was negligent,

and committed “physical excessive force to sexual assault.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Jenkins claims

there is no supporting evidence because there are no cameras in the West House,

however, he has written to Springfield to request cameras and more privacy in the

showers.

In the demand for relief, Jenkins sought shower curtains, monetary compensation

for “physical excessive force” and PREA violations, cameras in the West House, and an

immediate transfer. (Doc. 1 at 7). He also asked to be “approved for House Bill 3755.”

(Doc. 1 at 7).

In a Motion (Doc. 13) filed July 15, 2024, Jenkins made multiple requests and

indicated that Defendant Reaves had begun to “retaliate” every day. He did not describe

what acts constituted retaliation. In two Motions (Docs. 17, 18) filed July 17, 2024, Jenkins

alleges that Reaves works his gallery five days a week. On July 5, 2024, Reaves

approached his cell before yard and asked if he was going to drop his lawsuit. (Doc. 18

at 1). Jenkins indicated he had tried to be reasonable with Reaves and to resolve his issues

through the prison, to no avail. He indicated left without any option to address the

shower situation, he felt it necessary to pursue a lawsuit. Reaves indicated it did not

matter, and he returned to Jenkins’ cell approximately 30 minutes later with two inmate-

workers. Reaves opened Jenkins’ cell and allowed the two inmates to batter him while

he stood by and laughed. Jenkins’ chin was “busted open,” and he claims it was still

injured at the time he filed his motion.

He further alleges that on July 10 and 11, 2024, Defendant Roberts helped his

gallery officer distribute trays. Roberts directed a John Doe officer to withhold his tray

because he was a tattletale and was trying to stop the entertainment provided by the

LGBTQ community. The John Doe officer withheld Plaintiff’s tray and made verbal

threats. Since that time, correctional officers that Jenkins does not recognize regularly

walk past his cell and deploy mace. He claims he has also been beaten by other

individuals.

As emergency injunctive relief, Jenkins seeks: help being approved under House

Bills 3775 and 3779, an immediate transfer from Menard, and help being approved for an

adult transitional center. (Doc. 18 at 2). He claims he has seven months left to serve and

believes he will not make it home without court intervention. (Doc. 18 at 2).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Claim 1: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against

Defendant Reaves related to the April 7, 2024 shower incident;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against

Defendants Pedro and Roberts related to the April 8, 2024 shower

incident;

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against

Defendant Reaves for the final April 2024 shower incident that

resulted in a physical altercation;

Claim 4: Failure to intervene claim against Defendant Reaves for the April

2024 shower altercation;

Claim 5: State law negligence claim against Defendant Reaves for the last

April 2024 shower incident that resulted in the altercation.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissals

Jenkins alleges throughout the complaint that his PREA rights have been violated.

However, there is no private cause of action under PREA, so he cannot proceed on any

such claim. See McRae v. Myers, No. 22-1821, 2023 WL 2423590, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 9,

2023), cert. denied. There is also no freestanding constitutional right to a PREA

investigation under § 1983. See e.g., Walters v. Bello, 2024 WL 3252508 at *3 (S.D. Ind. June

28, 2024). Accordingly, any of Jenkins’ allegations related to PREA are dismissed with

prejudice.

Jenkins named Anthony Wills, the Warden of Menard, as a Defendant, but his only

mention of Wills is that he sent him a letter about the shower issue in mid-April. The

transmission of a single letter to a prison official, without a description of its contents, or

any suggestion that it might have been received, is not enough to sustain a § 1983 claim

premised on that individual’s personal responsibility for some issue mentioned in the

correspondence. See e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2009) (a letter-

writing campaign to high-level officials such as local government officials or the prison

warden is not sufficient to sustain a claim premised on personal involvement under §

1983). Therefore, Jenkins’ complaint is insufficient to maintain a claim against Wills in

his individual capacity.

Analysis

Aside from his mention of PREA, Jenkins characterizes his allegations concerning

the three shower incidents as “physical excessive force” by the Defendants because he

was exposed to the risk of an assault, but the Court finds this theory a poor fit for the

factual allegations. Perhaps the more appropriate framing is just to consider Jenkins’

allegations under the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Under the Eighth

Amendment, prisoners cannot be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts

conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Id. at 834. The objective prong asks

whether the alleged deprivation or condition of confinement is “sufficiently serious” that

a prison employee’s act or omission resulted “in the denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life's necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). On the subjective prong, the prisoner

must allege that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety

because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted). “[N]egligence, gross negligence, or even

recklessness as the term is used in tort cases is not enough” to assert an Eighth

Amendment violation. Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 426 (7th Cir. 2020). Instead, the

inmate must allege “a culpability standard akin to criminal recklessness.” Thomas v.

Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).

Taking Jenkins’ allegations at face value, surely he has identified conduct

sufficient to suggest a violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. He

alleges that on at least three occasions, Defendants Reaves, Pedro and Roberts knowingly

placed him in closed quarters in a shower with homosexual inmates who were openly

engaging in sexual conduct and were attempting to force him to join against his will. On

the third occasion, his protestations led to a physical altercation, which Reaves watched

and encouraged before intervening. On the allegations presented, Jenkins may proceed

on Claims 1-3 against Reaves, Pedro and Roberts.

Jenkins may also proceed against Reaves on Claim 4 for a failure to protect him

during the late-April shower altercation. Finally, Jenkins may also proceed against

Reaves on the lesser included state tort theory of negligence. If Jenkins’ other federal

claims are later dismissed, the Court may relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over this

claim.

Motions for a Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order

Jenkins’ allegation in his July 15, 2024, Motion (Doc. 13) that Reaves has

“retaliated” are too generic to warrant relief, and the other issues discussed in the Motion

have now been resolved. By contrast, his allegations in his July 17, 2024, Motions (Docs.

17 and 18) have not yet been addressed and are much more detailed. The two Motions

are identical. In each, Jenkins alleges that Reaves queried him about his lawsuit and then

brought two inmates to his cell to beat him while Reaves stood by. Jenkins also alleges

that Roberts acknowledge his lawsuit and prompted another correctional official to deny

him food and to harass him. Finally, he indicates that because of his lawsuit, correctional

staff he does not recognize routinely visit his cell to deploy mace, deny him food, or allow

others to beat him.

To seek a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: a likelihood of success

on the merits of his claim; no adequate remedy at law; and irreparable harm without the

injunctive relief. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). An injunction that

seeks an affirmative act by the respondent is a mandatory preliminary injunction and

should be sparingly issued. Mays, 974 F.3d at 818. If injunctive relief is warranted, the

Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that the injunction must be “narrowly drawn,

extend no further than necessary to correct the harm . . . ,” and “be the least intrusive

means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Any injunctive relief

granted must also be related to claims proceeding in the underlying lawsuit, and it must

generally concern parties associated with those claims.

The Court takes Jenkins’ new allegations seriously because he suggests that he has

recently been the victim of an assault at the direction of Reaves by other inmates in

retaliation for filing this lawsuit. This case presents an extreme circumstance. Generally,

the Court will not entertain any request for injunctive relief where it is not related to an

underlying operative claim, nor is the Court likely to grant a prison transfer. See e.g.,

Girtler v. Fedie, 835 Fed. App’x 124 (7th Cir. 2020) (prison transfers are the business of

prison officials and federal courts must afford broad deference to prisons on this issue).

However, here, Plaintiff alleges that the same defendants implicated in his underlying

claims have now learned of his lawsuit and have allowed other inmates to commit

violence against him as retaliation for this lawsuit. Given the nature of the underlying

factual allegations, and this new development, the Court finds it appropriate to mandate

the Defendants to respond to Jenkins’ emergency motions. (Docs. 17, 18). In responding,

the Defendants should be sure to provide some sort of evidence about Plaintiff’s current

physical condition given that he asserts he was recently assaulted. The Defendants do

not need to respond to Jenkins’ requests for relief related to Illinois House Bills 3755 or

37792, or his placement at an adult transition center, because the Court does not have

jurisdiction to offer relief related to any of these options.

Severance of Plaintiff Antray Hall

As the Court mentioned in the introductory paragraph, this Complaint was filed

on behalf of Kejuan Jenkins and Antray Hall, but Jenkins was the only one to sign the

pleading. On July 16, 2024, the Court warned Hall of the risks of joint litigation and

invited him to inform the Court if he wished to proceed. (Doc. 15). Jenkins tried to assert

for Hall in his Motion (Doc. 15) that Hall did not wish to proceed, but an inmate pro se

litigant cannot make legal representations on behalf of another inmate, so this effort is

not sufficient to terminate Hall’s participation. On July 31, 2024, Hall indicated in a

response that he wished to proceed (Doc. 19), and he filed a signed complaint (Doc. 20).

However, given Jenkins’ recent emergency motions, the Court finds it impractical to

allow the two plaintiffs to proceed jointly because the emergency motions and recent

2 Both are Bills about the placement of IDOC inmates in local county jails if there are available re-entry

programs. See, Illinois General Assembly, Bills & Resolutions, Bill Status of HB 3755,

https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3755&GAID=17&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=1

49013&SessionID=112&GA=103, last accessed July 30, 2024; and Illinois General Assembly, Bills &

Resolutions, Bill Status of HB 3779,

https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=3779&GAID=17&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=1

49037&SessionID=112&GA=103, last accessed July 30, 2024

developments alleged by Jenkins are not intertwined with Hall, and will require intensive

immediate attention. A district court has discretion to sever a party at any time. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 21. Here, the Court exercises that discretion to sever Plaintiff Antray Hall into a

separate case. In the new case, Hall’s pleading will be reviewed by the terms of 28 U.S.C.

§1915A.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Clerk of Court shall sever Plaintiff Antray

Hall into a new lawsuit against Defendants Wills, Reaves, Roberts, and Pedro. In the new

lawsuit, the Clerk shall docket:

e This Memorandum and Order;

e Hall’s Response (Doc. 19);

e The Complaint (Doc. 20);

The Clerk shall then TERMINATE Plaintiff Antray Hall from this action and no effort

shall be made to collect a filing fee from him for this action. In the new action, the Clerk

of Court is DIRECTED to seek Hall’s consent?, and to seek an application to proceed in

forma pauperis or the $405 filing fee.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 3-5 survive against Defendant

Reaves, and Claim 2 survives against Defendants Pedro and Roberts. By contrast, all

claims against Anthony Wills in his personal capacity are insufficient, so the Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Wills in his individual capacity. However,

3 The Court acknowledges that Hall signed a consent form for this case (Doc. 8), but because he is now

proceeding separately, the Court will confirm that he still wishes to consent.

Anthony Wills is the current warden of Menard, so he will remain in this lawsuit in his

official capacity only, solely for the purpose of addressing any potential injunctive relief.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Reaves, Pedro,

Roberts, and Anthony Wills (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and

Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), Motions

for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 17, 18) and this Memorandum and Order to

Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and

return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the

date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service

on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,

to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

US.C. § 1915(£)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act.

As explained above a ruling on Jenkins’ Motions for a Preliminary Injunction or

Emergency Relief (Docs. 17, 18) is DEFERRED and the Defendants are DIRECTED to

respond to his Motions within 14 days of counsel entering an appearance on their behalf.

Jenkins’ Motion (Doc. 15) is DENIED for the reasons explained above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2024 Ul. b i Ly □□

DAVIDW.DUGAN

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.