Williams v. Spiller

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIE WILLIAMS, #B63167, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 22-cv-756-RJD

)

WILLIAM SPILLER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Rob Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45), Defendants

Schonenbeck and Hart’s Motion to Withdraw Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies (Doc. 46), and Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 50 and 51). For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants Schonenbeck and Hart’s Motion to Withdraw Affirmative

Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 46), and Plaintiff’s Motions for

status (Docs. 50 and 51) are GRANTED. Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue

of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45) is GRANTED as it pertains to Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against Jeffreys (Count 2). Jeffreys’ Motion for

Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45) will be set

for an evidentiary hearing with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claim against Jeffreys for the conditions of Plaintiff’s placement in solitary or segregated

confinement at Illinois River Correction Center (“Illinois River”) based on his status as a “circuit

rider” or security risk.

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Background

Plaintiff Willie Williams, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC),

brought this civil rights action on April 19, 2022, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

deprivations of his constitutional rights at Menard and Illinois River Correctional Centers

(Menard/Illinois River). 1 (Doc. 17). Following a preliminary review of the Second Amended

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on the following

claims:

Claim 2: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against Defendants Schoenbeck,

Hart, and Jeffreys for Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings.

Claim 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Rob Jeffreys for

the conditions of Plaintiff’s placement in solitary or segregated confinement

at Illinois River based on his status as a “circuit rider” or security risk.

(Doc. 20).2

The Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleged that on February 27, 2019, Defendant Spiller wrote him a false disciplinary

report related to his involvement in gang activities. (Doc. 17 at 7). On March 5, 2019, Defendant

Schoenbeck and the Adjustment Committee held a hearing on the ticket. Plaintiff pled not guilty,

but the disciplinary committee found him guilty of the offense and assessed three months in

segregation and restrictions on privileges. (Doc. 17 at 7). Plaintiff alleged he grieved the incident

in a timely fashion but did not get the final response at the institutional level until July 13, 2020.

He was ultimately unable to file a timely appeal with the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”)

1 Plaintiff has since been transferred to Danville Correctional Center (Doc. 26)

2 In his Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff had asserted three claims against several defendants.

After a preliminary review of the Second Amended Complaint, Claim 1 was dismissed in its

entirety, and Claim 2 was dismissed as to Defendants Spiller, Wills and Johnson. Because there

were no remaining claims against Defendants John Does 1-3, Spiller, Wills, or Johnson, those

parties were terminated. (Doc. 20).

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because he was placed under investigative status and later transferred to another facility, which

prevented him from timely appealing. (Id. at 8).

On July 23, 2020, Plaintiff was taken to segregation, where he was placed in a cell without

his property. The cell lacked a working light, and he did not have bedding or hygiene materials.

After three days and repeated requests to correctional officers, on July 26, Plaintiff was provided

the requested items, but his light was never fixed. On July 27, 2020, Plaintiff was served a

disciplinary report that alleged he was the highest-ranking member of a gang at Menard. He

informed the officer who presented the report that he intended to present witnesses, and the officer

recorded the same. (Doc.17 at 12). On July 30, John Doe 1 came to get Plaintiff for his disciplinary

hearing, but his door was jammed. Plaintiff alleged that it took a short time for a locksmith to

arrive to open the door. By the time the door was open, John Doe 1 informed him that he should

pack his property instead because he was being moved. A different officer informed him that they

did not know anything about the Adjustment Committee.

Plaintiff alleged that, on that same day, he was transferred to Illinois River w attending the

hearing. He was placed in a cell on an empty wing. He did not have his property, which was

quarantined for 14 days due to his transfer, though he was provided with hygiene supplies. (Doc.

17 at 14). He alleges that he spent 45 days at Illinois River in solitary confinement because he was

labeled as a “circuit rider” and an “extreme security risk.” During this time, he had virtually no

human contact, he was not allowed to recreate outside, and he was escorted to appointments in

elevated restraints. The restraints caused wrist and hand pain, and he was treated with pain

medication on multiple occasions. He alleged that “the ‘circuit rider’ status demanded that the

administration and staff at Illinois River couldn’t make any decisions regarding Plaintiff unless

approved by IDOC’s executive administrators (directors).” (Doc. 17 at 14). After 45 days in

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solitary confinement, Plaintiff was transferred to a different area of the prison, where he was

housed near long-term segregation offenders with serious mental illnesses. (Doc. 17 at 15). His

fellow inmates were “continuously yelling, banging on doors, flooding cells, attempting suicide,

playing with human excrement and causing officers to spray mace.” He further alleged, “Quite

often [he] was deprived of sleep, had to clean toilet water flowing into the cell from floods. [He]

used volume of television to try to drown out noise and [he] remained in cell quiet without ever

speaking to other inmates. As a result, [he] often had headaches from the loud volume of the

television and vomited more than he ever had in life from the smells of feces and mace.” (Doc.

17 at 15).

After inquiring for three weeks, an officer gave him a copy of the Adjustment Committee

findings from Menard, which found him guilty based on evidence that he alleged was fabricated.

The findings stated that he refused to attend the hearing at Menard. (Doc. 17 at 15). Defendants

Schoenbeck and Hart sentenced him to six months in segregation and restricted privileges. (Doc.

17 at 15). Defendant Wills approved the committee findings. Plaintiff grieved the Adjustment

Committee's findings to the ARB. In his complaint, he cited many provisions of the Illinois

Administrative Code that he alleged were violated in his disciplinary proceedings. (Doc. 17 at 16-

18). Specifically, he claimed that the Adjustment Committee hearing was unfair and was based

on uncorroborated false and fabricated information from confidential sources. (Doc. 17 at 16).

Defendant Johnson failed to review records or to inquire into the issues Plaintiff raised and

instead just stated that per the Adjustment Committee, it had no record of an issue with the door

lock on Plaintiff’s cell. Defendant Jeffreys, the Acting Director of IDOC at the time relevant to

this case, concurred with Johnson’s findings. (Doc. 17 at 18). Plaintiff also alleged that Jeffreys

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and Johnson improperly denied a grievance he filed about his stay in a segregation cell from July

23 to 30, 2020, without light, a mattress or hygiene supplies. (Doc. 17 at 18-19).

Plaintiff alleged that Jeffreys violated his Eighth Amendment rights by allowing him to

be housed at Illinois River with long-term segregation inmates who were mentally ill and by

allowing Plaintiff to be subject to elevated restraints for 125 days. In his Due Process claim,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Schoenbeck and Hart violated his rights by holding an inadequate

disciplinary hearing; Defendant Spiller violated his rights by issuing two false disciplinary tickets;

Defendant Wills violated his rights by approving the Adjustment Committee findings; and

Defendants Johnson and Jeffreys violated his rights by concurring with the disciplinary findings.

Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief reversing the outcome of his disciplinary

proceedings and expunging them from his records, and punitive and nominal damages.

Defendant Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of

Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45) and Defendants Schonenbeck and Hart’s Motion to

Withdraw Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 46)

Per the Court’s Initial Scheduling Order, Defendants were required to either file a motion

for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies or withdraw their

respective affirmative defense by September 29, 2023. (Doc. 41). Defendants Schonenbeck and

Hart timely filed their Motion to Withdraw Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies (Doc. 46), which is hereby GRANTED. Defendant Jeffreys timely

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

(Doc. 45). Jeffreys claims Plaintiff’s ARB record contains one relevant grievance—a grievance

Plaintiff submitted while he was in Illinois River, self-dated August 12, 2020 (the “Grievance”).

(See Doc. 45-1 at 1-16). In the Grievance, Plaintiff wrote a detailed four-page narrative

challenging the disciplinary report he received on July 27, 2020, and the Adjustment Committee

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hearing that he failed to attend on July 30, 2020. (Id. at 13–16). The Grievance named a number

of correctional officers but did not mention Defendant Jeffreys by name or description. (Id.). The

ARB received the Grievance on August 28, 2020, and provided a final decision on February 22,

2021. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff’s grievance record does not contain any grievance related to Plaintiff’s

conditions of confinement at Illinois River or his status as an alleged “circuit rider.”

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to

Defendant Jeffreys because he does not mention Jeffreys or the Director in his grievance regarding

the July 2020 disciplinary hearing. He claims that the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

against Jeffreys for his alleged participation in Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing must be dismissed

because Plaintiff has not filed or properly exhausted a grievance identifying Defendant Jeffreys

specifically, by name or description, regarding his conduct or any involvement in the disciplinary

proceeding. Jeffreys further argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

as to his Eighth Amendment claim for the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement or his alleged

“circuit rider” status at Illinois River because Plaintiff has failed to file any grievance that directly

grieves the conditions of his confinement at Illinois River or his security risk status.

On October 24, 2023, Plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment. He did

not dispute that the Grievance is the only grievance contained in the ARB’s record. (Doc. 47).

Plaintiff further does not dispute that Jeffreys was not named in the Grievance. (Id.). He states

that the reason he did not name Jeffreys in the Grievance is that Jeffreys was not liable for the

Fourteenth Amendment violation until he became aware of the Grievance, and he then failed to

take any remedial measures. Plaintiff cites case law standing for the proposition that a supervisor

may be liable for a violation of a prisoner’s due process rights if he was informed about the

violation through the grievance process but failed to take remedial measures. (Id. at 6 (citing

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Gabai v. Jacoby, 800 F. Supp. 1149, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Boone v. Elrod, 706 F. Supp. 636,

638 (N.D. Ill. 1989), and Amaker v. Hakes, 919 F. Supp. 127, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)).

As to his Eight Amendment claim for conditions of confinement at Illinois River, he

argues, in essence, that the grievance process was unavailable to him. Specifically, he states that

at all relevant times at Illinois River, the facility was under COVID-19 protocols, and the assigned

staff at the Law Library did not respond to Plaintiff’s written requests to visit him at the Restricted

Housing Unit. (Doc. 47 at 7-8). He states that he wrote a grievance pertraining to his “Circuit

Rider” and “Extreme Security Risk” status and attempted to submit it to the I.D.P. without making

a copy. (Id.). He sealed the grievance in a white envelope addressed to “Grievance Dept.,” then

placed the grievance in the door of the cell to be collected by the security staff, but he never

received a response to his grievance. (Id.). He claims that he filed the complaint more than a year

after submitting the unanswered grievance. (Id.). He, thus, claims that he should be deemed to

have satisfied the exhaustion requirement with respect to that claim. (Id.).

Legal Standards

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-

Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving

party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the

adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the

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evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of

Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In

considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most

favorable to and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Apex Digital,

Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). While courts

generally may not resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment, when the motion

pertains to a prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies, “the Seventh Circuit has instructed

courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding a prisoner's

efforts to exhaust.” Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Roberts v. Neal, 745 F.

3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 2014).

Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative

remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each

step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Pozo v. McCaughtry,

286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies

have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on

the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v.

Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a)

should be without prejudice.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).

An inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections must first submit a

written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem to his

or her institutional counselor unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.810(a). If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered by

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a Grievance Officer who must render a written recommendation to the Chief Administrative

Officer — usually the Warden — within two months of receipt, “when reasonably feasible under

the circumstances.” Id. §504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a decision on the

grievance. Id.

An inmate may appeal the decision of the Chief Administrative Officer in writing within

30 days to the Administrative Review Board for a final decision. Id. §_504.850(a); see also Dole

v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2006). The ARB will submit a written report of its

findings and recommendations to the Director, who shall review the same and make a final

determination within six months of receipt of the appeal. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d) and

(e).

An inmate may request that a grievance be handled as an emergency by forwarding it

directly to the Chief Administrative Officer. Id. § 504.840. If it is determined that there exists a

substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm, the grievance is

handled on an emergency basis, which allows for expedited processing of the grievance by

responding directly to the offender. Id. Inmates may further submit certain types of grievances

directly to the Administrative Review Board, including grievances related to protective custody,

psychotropic medication, and certain issues relating to facilities other than the inmate’s currently

assigned facility. Id. at § 504.870.

Discussion

After a careful review of the arguments and evidence set forth in the parties’ briefs

regarding the issue of exhaustion, the Court determines that an evidentiary hearing pursuant to

Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008) is not necessary with respect to Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment Claim against Jeffreys. However, because the availability of the grievance

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process is in question with respect to Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference, the Court FINDS that an evidentiary hearing is necessary as to that claim. The Court

will set this part of the motion for an evidentiary hearing in a separate order.

Turning to the exhaustion motions as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for due

process violations concerning the disciplinary ticket proceeding, based on the briefing of the

parties and the evidence in the record, the Court finds that the only relevant grievance, which is

dated August 12, 2020 (the “Grievance”), was fully exhausted. The only question is whether the

grievance exhausted the claims in this lawsuit against Defendant Jeffreys.

While grievances must contain factual details regarding each aspect of the inmate’s

complaint, including the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved

in the complaint, this condition is tempered in that an offender who does not know the name of

each person who is involved in the complaint may simply describe the individual with as much

detail as possible. ILCS § 504.810(c). The Seventh Circuit has interpreted this as requiring the

inmate plaintiff to identify names only to the extent practicable to serve a grievance’s function of

giving “prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate’s] complaints.” Maddox v. Love,

655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir.2011); Glick v. Walker, 385 F. App’x 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus,

not naming the defendants in a grievance is “‘a mere technical defect’ where the inmate sufficiently

describes the alleged wrongdoing to allow prison officials a fair opportunity to respond.” Saffold

v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., No. 18 C 3301, 2021 WL 4477930, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2021)

(quoting Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722). So long as the “prison officials have been afforded an

opportunity to address an inmate’s claims internally prior to federal litigation, the purpose of

exhaustion has been met, and the prisoner has properly exhausted his available remedies.”

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Bandala-Martinez v. Bebout, 188 F. Supp. 3d 836, 842–43 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Kaba v. Stepp,

458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir.2006).

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Grievance did not name or in any way identify Defendant

Jeffreys. The Court first notes that the “mere mishandling of an inmate grievance alone cannot be

a basis for liability under § 1983” where “the defendants were not involved in the underlying

harm.” See Montanez v. Feinerman, 439 F. App'x 545, 547 (7th Cir. 2011); see also George v.

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who cause or participate in the

violations are responsible. . . Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not

cause or contribute to the violation.”); Courtney v. Devore, 595 Fed. Appx. 618, 620-21 (7th Cir.

2014) (noting that “state grievance procedures do not create substantive liberty interests protected

by the due process clause,” and the “mishandling” of grievances states no claim); Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Prison grievance procedures are not mandated by

the First Amendment and do not by their very existence create interests protected by the Due

Process Clause.”).

In any case, Plaintiff’s argument that Jeffreys can still be liable for the due process

constitutional violation because he became aware of the procedural deficiencies of the disciplinary

ticket when he reviewed the Grievance misses the point. The issue is not whether Jeffreys became

aware of the due process violation attributable to the remaining Defendants. Rather, the issue is

whether Plaintiff specifically grieved any constitutional violation attributable to Jeffreys. Plaintiff

did not file any grievance regarding Jeffreys’ conduct. Jeffreys’ knowledge of the alleged

constitutional violations attributable to the remaining Defendants is irrelevant to the issue of

exhaustion of administrative remedies as to Plaintiff’s claims against Jeffreys. Accordingly, the

Court FINDS that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his Fourteenth

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Amendment claim for a due process violation against Jeffreys. Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45) is GRANTED with

respect to that claim.

Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 50 and 51)

Plaintiff filed two motions asking for an update on Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45). Plaintiff’s Motion

for Status (Docs. 50 and 51) are GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is instructed to send Plaintiff a

copy of this Order addressing Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion

of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendants Schonenbeck and Hart’s Motion to Withdraw

Affirmative Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 46) and Plaintiff’s

Motions for Status (Docs. 50 and 51) are GRANTED. Jeffreys’ Motion for Summary Judgment

on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45) is GRANTED as it pertains to

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against Jeffreys (Count 2). Jeffreys’ Motion

for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 45) will be

set for an evidentiary hearing with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claim against Jeffreys for the conditions of Plaintiff’s placement in solitary or segregated

confinement at Illinois River based on his status as a “circuit rider” or security risk.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 6, 2024

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

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